The Eastern Front Week by Week

Eastern Front #7 the Fall of Smolensk

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Smolensk. The Wehrmacht, having swiftly advanced through the Soviet Union, prepared to engage the Red Army in fierce combat. The Luftwaffe had dominated the skies, severely diminishing Soviet air power. However, unbeknownst to the Germans, the Soviets, under General Timoshenko, were regrouping and mobilizing hidden reserves, readying themselves for a counteroffensive. Amidst logistical chaos and heavy losses, the Soviets utilized their cadre system, rapidly generating new field armies. While the Germans celebrated captures, they failed to recognize the Soviets' latent strength. As the Germans advanced toward Smolensk, the Red Army struggled but exhibited resilience, relocating factories eastward to maintain wartime production. This industrial mobilization became vital, allowing the Soviets to outproduce the Germans in tanks and aircraft by late 1941. The intense fighting around Smolensk evidenced the brutal realities of warfare, with both sides suffering greatly. 

This episode is the Fall of Smolensk

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

A heavy smoke of battle clings to the air above the city of Smolensk, a crucial location in western Russia. It’s July 15, 1941, and the gates to Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union are creaking ominously under the relentless pressure of the German advance. Army Group Center, under the command of General Fedor von Bock, is launching a fierce attack against the newly fortified defenses of the Western Front, commanded by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. He is desperately fighting to hold Smolensk, a strategically vital city that stands as a key to unlocking the road to Moscow. We witnessed the Wehrmacht commencing their assault on Smolensk. Meanwhile, in the north, their drive toward Leningrad continued relentlessly, and in the south, Army Group South had pivoted to encircle Uman after being thwarted in their advance on Kyiv.

In the early days of July, while army commanders were focused on the day-to-day challenges of the campaign, Adolf Hitler began to look further ahead. His well-known hesitance about continuing the operation beyond the great rivers towards Moscow was a source of concern for both General Franz Halder and General Walther von Brauchitsch. However, they believed that the ongoing successes of the campaign offered the best assurance for maintaining a forward advance across all fronts. As early as July 3 and 4, Hitler voiced his interest in halting the panzer groups under General Heinz Guderian and using them to support flanking advances instead. On July 5, General Alfred Jodl contacted Brauchitsch by telephone, urging him to meet with Hitler and present his views on the strategic choices for the northern and southern fronts. Jodl posed several crucial questions regarding both the necessity and feasibility of these operations, highlighting the growing tension between the OKW and OKH over the future direction of the campaign. He stressed the urgency of the army's involvement in the discussion, stating, “Given that the Führer’s thoughts, and those of others, are shifting towards an early turning of the panzer groups toward the northeast or south, General Jodl considers it essential that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army promptly meets with the Führer for a discussion.”

The meeting took place at Hitler’s headquarters on July 8, with Halder accompanying Brauchitsch. Both men presented before Hitler and his staff. Brauchitsch began by summarizing the latest tactical reports, after which Halder outlined the army’s assessment of the enemy situation and progress within the three army groups. The tone of Halder’s presentation was characteristically optimistic, aimed at instilling confidence in the army's management of the war and reaffirming its strategic direction. Halder firmly believed that the German forces were now in a commanding position to secure victory. He cited the most recent intelligence report from Colonel Kinzel, which indicated that of the 164 identified Soviet rifle divisions, 89 had been either completely or largely eliminated. From the remaining 75 divisions, 46 were actively opposing the German front, while 18 were engaged on other fronts, 14 in Finland and four in the Caucasus. The last 11 divisions were likely held in reserve deep within Soviet territory. Kinzel’s report also stated, “The enemy is no longer able to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features.” He emphasized that Army Group Centre, already stronger than its opponents, now enjoyed a crushing superiority that could be maintained even if the Soviets brought up fresh units.

The environment created by Halder’s buoyant report fostered a sense of confidence about the war's progress and minimized the urgency to make a decisive operational decision regarding Bock’s panzer groups. This optimistic atmosphere briefly inspired a sense of reconciliation between Hitler and Halder, opening up avenues for compromise that had previously seemed impossible, particularly concerning the direction towards Moscow. Hitler articulated his ‘ideal solution’ for continuing the campaign: Army Group North was to accomplish its assigned tasks in the Baltic states and Leningrad using its own resources. Meanwhile, Army Group Centre was tasked with eliminating the last remnants of organized Soviet resistance along the overstretched front north of the Pripet Marshes, which, he suggested, would thereby open the road to Moscow. Upon reaching their designated positions east of Smolensk, Hoth’s forces could halt and either assist Leeb, if necessary, or press on eastward with the goal of encircling Moscow. Guderian’s forces could then strike in a southern or southeastern direction in coordination with Army Group South.

Meanwhile the Soviet Air Force, commonly known by its acronym, the VVS, was still grappling with the repercussions of the disastrous events of June. The early campaigns of Operation Barbarossa had decimated their fleet, resulting in the loss of more than half of their available aircraft. By mid-July, however, the VVS began to regain some footing, managing to contest the Luftwaffe’s previously assumed air superiority. Despite the Luftwaffe's dominance during the initial stages of the operation, they faced their own limitations: there were simply not enough planes, infrastructure, or trained pilots to sustain their aggressive tactics. This shortage meant that some of the Red Army's counter-attacks went unnoticed in the early stages of their planning, but it also allowed the VVS to harass and distract Wehrmacht columns as they advanced. By mid-July 1941, the Luftwaffe’s capabilities were being pushed to the breaking point. The VVS was actively strafing and bombing German troops on the southern approaches to Smolensk, a city critical for both sides. Though these attacks often amounted to little more than a nuisance, they had a significant psychological impact on the German soldiers. Many in the Wehrmacht had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was all but defeated, that its military might lay in ruins, and that their only task now was to mop up the remnants of resistance. Yet, they found themselves facing a determined adversary, launching air attacks that the Luftwaffe seemed unable to stop or prevent. This unexpected persistence from the VVS not only challenged the German advance but also forced the Wehrmacht to reconsider their assumptions about a swift victory.

The relentless drive towards Leningrad was taking a significant toll on Army Group North. After the explosive initial success of Operation Barbarossa, the campaign was now encountering a series of stumbling blocks in the north. On the northern flank of Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb’s Army Group North was making more favorable progress. However, as the esteemed General Erich von Manstein, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, would later note, “the enemy, though pushed back to the east, was still not destroyed, something that would soon become evident.” After successfully capturing Riga, the capital of Latvia, Leeb was compelled to continue his eastward push to support the left flank of General Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre. Simultaneously, he needed to mount a significant offensive northward into Estonia to protect his own left flank. This strategic situation was stretching Army Group North's front width rapidly. As the smallest of the three German army groups, this expansion would soon prove to heavily tax its offensive momentum. On July 16, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, the commander of Army Group North’s Panzer Group 4, expressed his dissatisfaction with the stalled advance towards Leningrad in a letter to his wife. He wrote, "The deciding cause remains our weakness. The number of divisions is as inadequate as their equipment. The men are tired, the losses are increasing, and the rate of vehicle breakdowns is on the rise." His candid assessment highlighted the growing strains on the German forces as they faced not only the challenges of combat but also the detrimental effects of fatigue and equipment shortages.

While the Red Army had not succeeded in completely halting the Wehrmacht's advance in the Baltic region, many counterattacks launched by the Northwestern Front were failing, yielding few, if any, tangible results. However, the sheer weight of the Soviet Union's manpower and equipment advantages was gradually beginning to tip the scales against the Nazi invaders. In a critical miscalculation, General Erich von Manstein had allowed several units of his Corps to stumble directly into an ambush that had been meticulously set up at the end of the previous week. Now, the 8th Panzer Division found itself struggling for survival as it became completely cut off and encircled. This ambush, orchestrated by Lieutenant General Vasily Vatutin, who had taken over as the chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, was a carefully planned operation aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities of the German forces.  Nikolai Vatutin was a bright up and coming officer at this point. He had the personal attention of Stalin. He would go on to achieve front level command in 1942. Vatutin made his reputation on aggressive and intelligently designed attacks. In 1941, he was still perfecting his craft, but would go on to display his trademark aggressiveness. Perhaps most famously in the Stalingrad campaign and Operation Little Saturn, where his men destroyed the Italian 8th Army in the wake of the encirclement of the German 6th Army inside Stalingrad. 

The assault began with what appeared to be weak resistance in front of the stretched-out 8th Panzer, luring them further into the trap. On July 15, the trap was sprung. The main force of the Soviet 11th Army launched a coordinated attack, bolstered by two specially assembled shock groups. On the northern flank of the offensive were the 21st Tank Division, the 237th Rifle Division, and the 70th Rifle Division, all primed for the assault. To the south, this offensive was supported by the 180th, 182nd, and 183rd Rifle Divisions. The 8th Panzer was further accompanied on its left flank by the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, but aside from this, Manstein had precious little to reinforce his position. The assault commenced on July 15, and within hours, the 57th Panzer Corps was fragmented, torn into three isolated groups. The first group included the majority of the 8th Panzer Division, the second contained the 3rd Motorized Infantry, and the third, positioned outside of the encirclement, comprised the remnants of the beleaguered 56th Panzer Corps.

Lieutenant General Vasily Vatutin had meticulously planned his trap, ensuring that he possessed both local air superiority and a significant artillery advantage. Meanwhile, the German 16th Army, located to the southwest, was unable to provide assistance to General Erich von Manstein because the German Panzers had advanced far ahead of their accompanying infantry, making it impossible to close the gap in time to save them. Even if they had been in a better position, Vatutin had anticipated this scenario; he ordered the Soviet 27th Army to launch an attack on Colonel General Busch’s infantry units to ensure there was no possibility of relief.

As the situation deteriorated, Manstein could not rectify the crisis alone. He reached out to Colonel-General Erich Hoepner for help after the first day of fighting. Responding to this urgent plea, Hoepner redirected the SS Totenkopf Division and other elements to assist Manstein’s encircled forces. The fighting was fierce and continued until it began to taper off by the third day. By dawn on June 19, it became clear that Vatutin’s trap had failed; his forces were unable to maintain the encirclement. The Wehrmacht managed to pull its troops back from their positions in Soltsy, but this retreat came at a heavy cost. The 8th Panzer Division had reported approximately 150 operational tanks on the morning of June 15. By the 19th, that number had dwindled to around 80. Losses in large campaigns are always difficult to pinpoint, but the Eastern Front presents larger issues of counting casualties. Different definitions of losses interfere with counts, as do political, military and other motivations. The 8th Panzer lost no more than 70 tanks in the Battle for Soltsy. Permanent losses were higher than usual, as the Wehrmacht abandoned the field. It is unclear the exact amount of tanks or other vehicles denied to the 8th Panzer as a result of the battle. While the Soviet losses from this engagement remain unclear, it was evident that their units had faced tough resistance and were hard-pressed to maintain their fighting capability.

Although Vatutin did not succeed in completely destroying the 8th Panzer Division, the attempt to encircle them at Soltsy marked a notable achievement in the early battles. Unfortunately for Vatutin, his commanders struggled to coordinate their attacks effectively, and the execution of small-unit tactics left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the operation did inflict significant damage, critically blunting the strength of the 56th Panzer Corps. Recovery would take considerable time for the 4th Panzer Group, as they found themselves critically short of tanks in the days and weeks ahead while inching closer to Leningrad. Army Group North lost four precious days of summer weather as operations essentially ground to a halt, with Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb and Hoepner focused on extricating Manstein’s Corps from dire straits. In a further testament to the impact of Vatutin’s assault, Army Group North suspended all major operations towards Leningrad for about three weeks. Securing their left flank in Estonia became paramount, while the right flank of Hoepner’s Panzer Group remained in disarray following the battle at Soltsy.

The Finnish forces, organized into the Army of Karelia under the command of General Heinrichs, had concentrated their strength for a decisive offensive. General Heinrichs was the principal Finnish field commander during what the Finns called the “continuation war.” He was the Chief of the General Staff and had served with a volunteer Prussian unit in the First World War. On July 10, they launched their assault, aiming to push aside the Red Army and reclaim the territory lost during the Winter War. While the Finns were motivated to regain their lost lands, this objective did not fully align with Adolf Hitler’s broader ambitions. Nevertheless, the Finnish military managed to maintain a degree of independence from German control, despite the fact that the Germans needed and desired more support from the Finnish Army than the Finnish government was willing to provide. The Finnish offensive continued throughout July and August, and we will revisit their campaigns in the coming weeks as key developments unfold. In this initial phase, they pressed forward against the Soviet 7th Army along the Northern Front, attempting to split the territory between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega in two. Achieving this could allow the Finnish forces to take control of the entire area at will, thereby compelling the Russians to retreat into the vast expanses of Northwestern Russia.

The German strategic plan centered on utilizing Finnish forces to encircle Leningrad and systematically reduce the city’s defenses. In this collaboration, the Finns were envisioned as the anvil, while the Wehrmacht would act as the hammer. However, as the weeks progressed, this seemingly straightforward plan began to encounter significant complications. One of the foremost challenges was the marshy terrain, which severely hampered mobile operations at the scale the Germans had envisioned. Panzer Group 4 was already feeling the effects of this difficult terrain, particularly around Soltsy. Moreover, the Finns and Germans often found themselves at odds regarding the level of effort required from the Finnish Army. These disagreements, compounded by the challenging terrain, the staunch resistance of the Red Army, and the seasonal limitations, ultimately proved to be critical factors that undermined the success of their joint objectives.

Around Smolensk, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko was desperately trying to hold back the advancing tide of Hoth’s and Guderian’s panzers as they pushed further east. The wave of German armor brought with it an encirclement that rivaled any in history; the Western Front was being engulfed just as it had been at Minsk and Bialystok. On July 15, Lieutenant General Bolterstern’s 29th Motorized Infantry Division stormed into the southern reaches of Smolensk. This division was bolstered by a strong mix of Sturmgeschütz (StuGs), Flammpanzer vehicles, and Nebelwerfers, enabling them to spend the entire day clearing out the city south of the Dnipro River. For those interested the Flammpanzer was a Panzer II with the main gun replaced by a flamethrower and the Nebelwerfer was a towed rocket launcher with six 15cm tubes. In the early hours of July 16, two regiments crossed the river and began assaulting the rest of the city. Newly promoted Lieutenant General Konstantin Rokossovsky had taken command of the fresh 19th Army just a day before. However, the 19th Army was barely a scratch force, consisting of just one scattered rifle regiment tasked with garrisoning the city. Bolterstern’s troops worked their way through Smolensk, systematically attacking, surrounding, and defeating Rokossovsky’s men in detail. By 2300 hours, Soviet resistance had completely collapsed. As had been the case at Minsk, the Wehrmacht captured a major city with its agile motorized units before the Soviets could mount an effective response. The city had fallen, but the Soviet Union’s debacle in Smolensk was far from over.

On July 15, the collapse of Timoshenko’s front at Smolensk was predicted by Panzer Group 3 to be only days away, a sentiment echoed by many soldiers in the ranks. Karl Fuchs, a tank gunner in the 7th Panzer Division, wrote home on July 15: “We are now positioned outside the city of Smolensk and have penetrated the highly acclaimed Stalin lines. I would imagine that within eight to ten days, this campaign will be over.” Similarly, Ernst Guicking, a soldier from the 52nd Infantry Division, wrote to his wife on July 14: “If you could see the frantic advance here, you would surely be completely speechless. Something like this has never been recorded in the history of the world. The main thing is that the campaign will soon be over; we are all convinced of that.” Walter Tilemann, an orphan from a German family living in the Soviet Union, noted after being adopted by a German unit early in the campaign, “The word ‘Blitzkrieg’ did not seem to be an empty phrase. Many believed in it and that the war would soon be won.” However, he also added, “It was more hope than belief, accompanied by a dull feeling that it must not turn out differently.” Waffen-SS General Max Simon later attested to the valor of Soviet infantry and their capacity for resistance in the war’s early phases. He emphasized that Germany’s failure to recognize this tenacity was a significant shortcoming. “Very soon we had to admit that we were up against a very different adversary than we had expected, and I believe that this underestimation was one of the reasons for the unfortunate course the campaign in Russia took.” Further events, such as the capture of Stalin’s son on July 18, who served as a battery commander in the 14th Tank Division, seemed to suggest that the disintegration of the Red Army was closer than ever. Throughout July 1941, accolades for success began to flow. The Knight’s Cross was awarded to Lemelsen, Schweppenburg, and Model, commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, while Schmidt, Hoth, Guderian, and Richthofen, commander of the 8th Air Corps received the prestigious Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.

On July 17, Field Marshal Bock could survey the battlefield with a sense of well-deserved pride. In less than four weeks, Army Group Centre had orchestrated its second historically significant encirclement. He had directed two of the largest battles the world had ever witnessed, and remarkably, with minimal losses to his forces. Most of Timoshenko’s Western Front lay either destroyed or encircled, with the 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies trapped in the pocket. The only remaining question was whether the Wehrmacht would possess enough strength at the tip of the spear to prevent significant leakage from this encirclement, something they had failed to achieve at Minsk. That oversight had led to severe recriminations and disputes between the OKH, Hitler, and the field commanders. Bock was resolute in his determination not to let this happen again.

However, several obstacles hindered Bock's objectives. One of the most significant challenges was the bypassed city of Mogilev, located to the southwest of Smolensk. Bock recorded in his diary: ‘Geyer thinks all the reports on the enemy are exaggerated and doesn’t believe that there are serious enemy forces near Mogilev or in the pocket around Smolensk.’ In fact, Mogilev was garrisoned by a significant portion of the 13th Army, under the command of Major-General F. A. Bakunin, who led the 61st Rifle Corps. Within the fortress and the surrounding countryside were approximately one hundred thousand Soviet soldiers, still organized and prepared to fight. Seven Rifle and two Tank divisions posed a credible threat of a breakout if not addressed properly. Bakunin was tasked with ensuring the city's defense on all sides, mobilizing workers’ militias and transforming Mogilev into what one historian described as the “Belorussian Madrid.”. In response, Guderian dispatched General of Panzers Schweppenburg with his 24th Corps to secure Mogilev and prevent any potential breakout or relief from the nearby Soviet 21st Army. This decision represented a critical weakening of Guderian’s spearhead, which was intended to thrust behind Smolensk and cut off the remnants of Timoshenko’s Western Front. Guderian had already lost the 47th Corps to pocket security duties at Smolensk, leaving his Panzergroup with only one Corps to fulfill its strategic objectives. To address the situation, Guderian planned for the 46th Corps, under General of Panzers Vietinghoff, to advance rapidly toward Yelna.

In addition to the dilution of Guderian’s forces, Bock faced the challenge of his increasingly exposed southern right flank. Army Group South was making slow progress and could not close the gap, leaving the area from Mogilev to Gomel still open territory. This flank required protection, which in turn consumed Bock’s available infantry for the reduction of both Mogilev and the Smolensk pocket. Compounding these issues, Hitler was convinced of an impending Red Army counterattack at Velikiye Luki in the northern reaches of Bock’s area of responsibility. Ironically, just days earlier, he had denied Halder’s request to redirect some of Army Group North’s panzers to that area. On July 13, Halder believed that Velikiye Luki would be the point where the Red Army could concentrate its greatest force. It is possible that his intelligence reports had confused Vatutin’s offensive at Soltsy with an attack on Velikiye Luki. Regardless, Hitler denied the request. However, by July 17, he had become convinced that Velikiye Luki was indeed a point of concern. He overrode both Halder’s and Bock’s objections, directing significant portions of Hoth’s forces to counter this perceived threat.

All of these factors combined to create a perfect storm. The Panzers were crucial to Operation Barbarossa; the Wehrmacht had designed its entire campaign around leveraging the strength and mobility of the Panzer Corps' combined arms teams to overwhelm the Red Army. Achieving this required the Panzer Corps to maintain a focus on singular objectives. At no point during the Eastern Front campaign did the Wehrmacht enjoy significant numerical superiority; even local advantages were often challenging to secure. It was only through speed and concentration that they had achieved this level of success. The incompetence of the Red Army played an equally important role in the Wehrmacht’s stunning victories at Minsk and Smolensk as the Panzers themselves.

Even the more perceptive Bock did not fully appreciate just how much fight remained in Timoshenko’s Western Front. His stated intention to destroy this force through renewed offensive action reflected a misunderstanding of the weakened state of his own forces. Army Group Centre’s ailing condition, compounded by worsening shortages and severe overextension, was indeed serious. As their advance reached its limits, the initiative temporarily shifted to the Stavka, which seized the opportunity to thrust the German armies into their first military crisis of the war. While the beleaguered Soviet 20th, 19th, and 16th Armies fought for their survival within the large pocket around Smolensk, the Stavka, under Stalin’s direction, concluded that it was time for a major counteroffensive to relieve the nearly encircled formations and retake Smolensk. Timoshenko’s command was bolstered by the entire first echelon of the new Front of Reserve Armies, comprising the 29th, 30th, 24th, and 28th Armies, that had been raised throughout June and July. On July 20, Stalin informed Timoshenko of the upcoming offensive, stating: “Until now, you have counted on help in the form of two or three divisions at a time, but nothing really has come of this. Therefore, it is time to abandon this practice and begin to create a fist of 7–8 divisions with cavalry on the flanks.” With the capacity to deliver powerful attacks finally in place, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Chief of the General Staff, devised a plan to launch simultaneous concentric strikes against Army Group Centre from each of the four new armies. Unbeknownst to the German generals, they had reached the high point of the summer blitzkrieg in the east.

Thus the Stavka was desperately attempting to raise a third tier of armies on the road to Moscow. Rokossovsky was appointed to lead an effort to reclaim some lost ground. He was given command of the 101st Tank Division and the 69th Motorized Rifle Division. The 7th Panzer Division had captured Yartsevo, located east of Smolensk, and Rokossovsky was ordered to force them out. He commenced his assault on the city on July 21, with the attack continuing into the following week. At the same time, Guderian was proving to be a troublesome figure. Bock directly ordered him to take his 46th Corps and finally close the Smolensk pocket. However, Guderian refused, becoming increasingly fixated on the idea of pushing eastward. To this end, he sent the 46th Corps to Yelna. By this time, the last Soviet corridor out of the Smolensk pocket was defended by fewer than fifteen light tanks. Yelna was captured on the 20th, but only then was Guderian persuaded to close the corridor. By the time he redirected the 17th Panzer Division to this task, several rifle divisions had already taken positions in the area. Guderian’s refusal to follow orders in a timely manner did not result in discernible discipline but cost his men a straightforward victory, allowing the Red Army to evacuate many of the otherwise doomed soldiers from the pocket. It was only late in the third week of July that the pocket would be completely closed.

In Ukraine, Army Group South was fully engaged in a major encirclement battle centered around Uman, which became known as the Uman Pocket. On July 15, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny arrived in the theater to take direct command of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts. His first decision was to abandon the Dniester defensive line in order to establish a defense around the city of Uman, aiming to cover a perceived gap in his lines between Kyiv and the Dniester River. Unfortunately, this strategy had the opposite effect. He rearranged armies in the area, placing them into positions without regard for the command responsibilities of his nominal subordinates. Meanwhile, Kleist had already begun deploying his forces in a southern hook after they had been turned back in front of Kyiv the previous week. On the center-right, the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions rapidly pushed the disheveled 6th Army back toward Uman. As the Soviets retreated, a gap opened in their lines. Kleist quickly recognized this opportunity and rushed the 9th Panzer Division into the breach, forming the encirclement. On July 21, the 6th Army launched a last-ditch armored counterattack at Monastryche. While merely a delaying action, it managed to buy enough time for the remnants of the 6th Army’s infantry to retreat to Uman, deepening the pocket. Fighting continued in the area for the rest of the week and extended well into August. Though the fate of the 6th and 12th Armies was not yet sealed, the outlook was grim as the third week of July came to a close.

As the third week of July came to a close, the situation across the front was bleak for the Soviet Union. Smolensk, the key to Moscow and the heart of the USSR, was in German hands, taken with little resistance. Like Minsk, it had fallen to relatively small Panzer units during a rapid advance. In front of Smolensk, three field armies were trapped with little hope of avoiding destruction, effectively rendering the Western Front destroyed for the second time in less than a month. There was a brief glimmer of success with Vatutin’s near destruction of a Panzer division at Soltsy, but even this was only partial, as the Panzers managed to escape. In the south, Kyiv had been defended, but large portions of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts now faced the prospect of encirclement at Uman.

Meanhile the armies of Army Group Centre were tightening the noose around the colossal pocket around Smolensk, Adolf Hitler, at his East Prussian headquarters, was already contemplating the next phase of operations. On July 17, he returned to his preferred strategy of swinging Hoth’s panzer group north to support Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb’s advance on Leningrad, while simultaneously diverting Guderian’s panzer group south. This move would be bolstered by strong infantry support from General Weichs, aiming to create a new pocket in conjunction with Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Hitler exhibited little interest in launching an attack on Moscow and, perhaps sensing that such a move might spark a dispute with the OKH, proceeded to formalize his strategic vision without consulting them. Dated July 19, War Directive 33 formalized the divergent northern and southern thrusts of Bock's panzer forces, relegating the advance on Moscow to the remaining infantry on Bock’s front, a feeble concession to satisfy the OKH. In Hitler’s mind, the conclusion of the battle at Smolensk would expose the road to the east, leaving little opposition for Army Group Centre. He envisioned using its armored units to envelop the Soviet forces still resisting in the north and south. The tone of the directive implied that the war on the central front was already won. “It proclaims that the second series of battles in the East has ended,” and asserts that “mopping up” operations are needed to eliminate the remaining resistance in Army Group Centre. Following this, the next phase of the campaign would focus on “preventing any sizable enemy forces from withdrawing into the depths of Russia and wiping them out.” Even for someone as prone to delusions of grandeur as Hitler, depicting the military situation on the Eastern Front in such terms revealed a striking detachment from reality. This attitude reflected both his overweening self-confidence and the excessive bias in the information flowing through the high command. Timoshenko’s Western Front was far from defeated, and the Soviet high command was certainly not contemplating a hasty retreat to the east.

An entry from the diary of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, on July 18, captures this stark contrast in perception regarding the war's progression: Hitler went to war believing that the struggle against Bolshevism might lead the Anglo-Saxon countries to end the conflict. Von Ribbentrop did not agree; in fact, he was convinced that Churchill is ready to make an alliance even with the devil himself if he can only destroy Nazism. And this time he was right. Now the struggle is hard and bloody, and the German people, who are tired, wonder why. Frau Mollier used harsh terms. She said Hitler is a blockhead. In fact, the war is harder than the Germans had foreseen. The advance continues, but it is slow, and harassed by the very vigorous Soviet counterattacks. Colonel Ame´ and General Squero, who made a report on the military situation today, believe that the Russians will succeed in maintaining a front even during the winter. If this is true, Germany has started a haemorrhage that will have incalculable consequences.

Just as Hitler was unswervingly fixated by victory, Halder too remained defiantly optimistic in spite of a notable downturn in the confident mood at OKH. On 20 July Halder noted in his diary: The gruelling battles involving some groups of our motorised forces, in which the infantry arriving from the west can only slowly become involved, together with the time taken on bad roads which restrict movement and the exhaustion of the troops who have been marching and fighting without rest, have dampened the spirits at high command. Nowhere is this better seen than in the thorough despair into which Brauchitsch had been plunged. However there is really no call for this. While Halder appeared unfazed by the military situation, the implications of Hitler’s new war directive, War Directive 33, were undoubtedly a significant concern for him. It remains unclear how Halder responded to this directive, as there is no mention of it in his diary on the issuance date, July 19. However, a discussion with Hitler seems plausible, especially since just two days later, on July 21, during Hitler’s visit to Leeb’s Army Group North, the prospect of Hoth’s panzer group advancing northward had become considerably less certain. Leeb recorded in his diary, “The Führer spoke of the possibility that Panzer Group 3 would turn to the north.” Additionally, the OKW war diary for the same day (July 21) framed the northern operations as a decision requiring resolution “at the latest in 5 days” and concluded: In this regard it could then happen, that Panzer Group 2 turns to the south, so that for the thrust on Moscow only infantry armies of Army Group Centre remain. This eventuality does not worry the Fuhrer because Moscow is for him only a ¨ geographical term.

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Amidst chaos, the Soviets mobilized hidden reserves and relocated factories, boosting their wartime production. On July 15, fierce combat erupted, with German forces surrounding Smolensk. Despite initial successes, they underestimated Soviet resilience. General Vatutin launched a counteroffensive, aiming to encircle German units, showcasing the stubbornness and adaptability of the Red Army. The battle underscored the harsh realities of war, leading to significant losses on both sides, marking a crucial turning point in the Eastern Front of WWII.

Eastern Front #6 Battle for Smolensk Begins

Last time we spoke about the Red Army on the Run. In the second week of Operation Barbarossa, the progress of the German forces was marked by swift victories and severe challenges. The Luftwaffe's dominance in the skies led to significant destruction of Soviet aircraft, with Germany claiming thousands downed. However, the Soviet Air Force, with hidden reserves, began to regroup under General Timoshenko, setting the stage for resilience. Amid these chaotic battlefields, disorganization plagued the Red Army, which struggled to adapt its tactics against the more cohesive German forces. Despite losing heavily, Soviet commanders sought to turn the tide, but logistical issues and fierce German assaults exacerbated their plight. As the Germans captured crucial territories like Riga, their strategic goal conflicted with rising concerns from within their command. While Hitler believed victory was within reach, generals like Halder worried about underestimating Soviet strength. The relentless advances led to fierce fighting at the edges of Smolensk, where both armies braced for an inevitable and consequential clash. 

This episode is the beginning of the Battle for Smolensk 

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

Well hello there, we are back and its week three of Operation Barbarossa. On July 8, Army Group Centre officially proclaimed that it had captured 287,704 prisoners, destroyed or seized 2,585 tanks, and taken 1,449 guns. While these numbers do reflect considerable gains, they do not necessarily indicate that the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, in fact, the opposite was true. As the German offensive strength began to wane, the Soviet Union was implementing one of the most remarkable mobilization programs in military history. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army had developed a cadre system, maintaining a small number of active-duty soldiers in peacetime that could be rapidly expanded by reservists during wartime. This system received a boost with the 1938 Universal Military Service Law, which extended the age of enlistment for army reserves to 50 and established numerous military schools to accommodate the influx of recruits. By the time of the German invasion, the Red Army boasted a mobilization base of 14 million men. By the end of June 1941, 5.3 million reservists had been called up, with subsequent mobilizations continuing to swell the ranks. This cadre system allowed for an unprecedented rate of force generation, catching German intelligence completely off guard and concealing the true strength of the Soviet military. In July 1941, an astounding 13 new field armies emerged, followed by another 14 in August. While these reserve armies were not as well-equipped or trained as their professional counterparts, as the German mobile forces weakened, many of the frontlines began to settle into positional warfare. This shift granted the new armies the time they needed to improve.

 

While it would be unreasonable to downplay the magnitude of the Western Front’s military disaster in Belorussia, it is important to recognize that the Soviet Union’s system for generating forces allowed it to quickly replace losses and expand the size of the Red Army. On June 22, 1941, the Red Army counted 5,373,000 men. By August 31, despite heavy losses, this number had surged to 6,889,000, and by December 31, 1941, it reached an estimated 8 million. After the war, German military officer Blumentritt acknowledged the fundamental issue of latent Soviet military strength. He recalled the German offensive plans aimed at encircling and destroying the Red Army before reaching the Dnieper and Dvina Rivers, ultimately asking, “But what if armies, millions strong, had not yet even been mobilized, and only parts of the Red Army were in western Russia?”

 

The loss of tanks weighed heavily on the Soviets, as these assets were much harder to replace. However, historians have often overstated the extent of German victories, particularly regarding the Soviet tank fleet. At the war's outset, the Soviets had an astonishing total of 23,767 tanks, but this figure included many that were already obsolete. Around 15,000 of those were older T-26 and BT models, most of which were in need of repair. Compounding the issue, untrained crews faced a severe shortage of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and critical support such as air cover. It’s little wonder that Soviet tanks often sat abandoned on the battlefield if they even made it that far. Thus, the seemingly impressive numbers of Soviet tanks destroyed can be better understood as a disaster waiting to happen. Ineffective Soviet planning and direction significantly contributed to what became the Germans' first major triumph, inflating the narrative of an overwhelming victory through the sheer volume of outdated equipment. However, what proved vital for the future of the war was the production of new tanks. In this regard, Soviet leadership demonstrated impressive resolve. 

 

As the powerful German war machine charged eastward, another kind of battle raged behind Soviet lines, a battle not fought with tanks or rifles, but with wrenches, train cars, and sheer determination. Entire factories were uprooted and transported east, beyond the towering Ural Mountains, in a frantic race against the relentless advance of the enemy. As the Wehrmacht relentlessly pushes toward Smolensk and Leningrad, the Soviets are embarking on an extraordinary industrial mobilization, one of the most staggering efforts in military history.  What was unfolding was nothing short of remarkable: the relocation of hundreds of Soviet factories from the devastated western front to the safer haven east of the Urals. It all began on June 24, when a dedicated committee sprang into action, tasked with the monumental challenge of evacuation. By the first week of July, the effort was in full swing and rapidly gained momentum as the month progressed. This evacuation would stretch on until December 1941, and its importance cannot be overstated, the survival of the Red Army depended on it. As the field forces suffered staggering losses of equipment, the situation grew even graver. Much of the stockpile was outdated, a relic of a bygone era. Modern war machines were rolling off assembly lines, but they were being deployed to the front lines faster than they could be replenished. Just last week, we witnessed KV-1 tanks being dispatched directly from factories to participate in fierce assaults. The emergency deployment of arms and ammunition to frontline units would continue throughout the war, but to sustain this momentum, the factories had to be relocated. And while the Lend-Lease equipment would only begin arriving in significant numbers in 1942, the Soviets were determined not to lose ground. Their resolve, ingenuity, and relentless spirit would be tested like never before in this pivotal moment of history.

 

It was decided that entire factories would be dismantled, sometimes down to the wiring carefully packed, and transported eastward. This monumental task was anything but easy. Surprisingly, the Germans appeared largely unaware of what was unfolding, showing little effort to disrupt the evacuation. Yet, even without German interference, the process of dismantling, moving, and reassembling the industrial base presented staggering challenges. The invasion itself turned this effort into a Herculean task, fraught with difficulties. Many factories arrived at their new locations incomplete, delayed, misplaced, and in some cases, all three. Throughout most of 1941, the fighting was carried out with weapons that had already been produced. However, one must wonder: how much would the Red Army’s rebuilding efforts for the 1942 campaigns hinge on the output from these relocated factories in 1941? Not everything necessary for the war effort could be evacuated. Crucial infrastructure, like mines, roads, and dams had to be abandoned. In many cases, Soviet forces resorted to sabotage, deliberately undermining these assets to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Perhaps most famous of these acts of sabotage by the retreating Soviets was the destruction of the dam at Zaporozhye in August 1941. The resultant flood may have killed upwards of 100,000 people. This was no trivial matter; sabotage often came at a steep cost, claiming lives and destroying years of hard work by countless men and women who had toiled during the five-year plans. Yet, despite the risks, Stalin and his inner circle understood that this grim decision was essential for the survival of their war effort.

 

Between July and November, 1,523 industrial enterprises moved to the Volga region, Siberia, or Central Asia, totaling about 1.5 million railway wagon loads. Even more astonishingly, production of essential war materials actually increased during the latter half of 1941, with some official production quotas, particularly for tanks being exceeded. In fact, the Soviet Union produced more tanks in 1941 than Germany did, with 66 percent of these being the newer T-34 and KV-1 models. The Soviets also manufactured more aircraft and artillery pieces than Germany, effectively meeting the immediate needs of their armed forces. When evaluating the outcome of Germany’s first significant offensive on the eastern front, it becomes clear that the German military leadership overestimated how their victories would impact the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain a cohesive front. They failed to recognize the necessity of balancing the tight perimeter around their encircled forces with the need for a rapid continuation of their advance to capitalize on their success. The root of this problem became evident early in the war: the Germans lacked sufficient mobile forces to achieve their objectives. Consequently, as losses mounted and the campaign ventured into ambitious new territories, the specter of overextension loomed large.

 

Meanwhile as Guderian and Hoth were mapping out the next phase of their operations, Brauchitsch hosted an important meeting at his home, attended by Hitler, Halder, and Heusinger. Halder opened the session with a summary of current operations, after which Hitler expressed his strong belief in the necessity of securing the Gulf of Finland, emphasizing the need to eliminate the Soviet fleet's threat to ore shipments. In a notable shift from his previous assertiveness, Halder recorded that Hitler seemed “unsure” about whether additional panzer forces would need to be allocated by Bock for the rapid capture of Leningrad. It’s possible that under the pressure from Halder and Brauchitsch, who may have praised the successes of Leeb’s advances, Hitler felt compelled to hesitate about diverting strength from Army Group Centre. The positive reports from the front left Hitler in high spirits, giving Heusinger the impression that he could speak freely with him, even sharing ideas that might typically be unwelcome.

 

Aside from discussing northern operations, Hitler highlighted the strategic significance of Ukraine for its food supply and industrial potential, underscoring the economic motivations behind his military strategy. However, Halder's diary, the only surviving record of the meeting, reveals that Hitler did not seem to consider diverting Bock’s panzers to the south at that time. He viewed the advance on Moscow as a secondary priority, suggesting that it could only be undertaken by infantry units, at the earliest in August, once Smolensk had been secured. In Hitler’s mind, he would not commit armored forces to support the infantry’s drive toward Moscow until the northern front had been adequately addressed. Ultimately, the future role of Army Group Centre remained uncertain even after the meeting on June 30, and it would not be conclusively determined until Smolensk fell into German hands.

 

As the Battle for Smolensk commenced, the Luftwaffe struggled with dwindling numbers of aircraft, tasked with covering an ever-expanding frontline. The reduction of the encircled pockets at Minsk and Bialystok had only been achieved through the intense commitment of Luftwaffe resources. This heavy reliance resulted in wear and tear on the planes, hampering more comprehensive efforts to support the encirclement at Smolensk. Moreover, establishing and maintaining supply routes became increasingly challenging for many units in the Second Air Corps, which was responsible for supporting the southern flank of Army Group Center. These logistical issues allowed the Soviet air force, the “VVS” or “Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily”, to exploit gaps in the Luftwaffe’s protective coverage. Soviet Il-2 bombers launched raids that created significant headaches for the German Heer. With an ever-growing number of Soviet fighters joining the fray, the Soviets were far from ready to surrender control of the skies, even after suffering staggering losses in June.

 

Army Group North was fully engaged in its push towards Leningrad. The Red Army launched an armored counterattack at Ostrov against General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps but ultimately failed to drive them back. In the wake of this setback, desperation began to set in as the Northwestern Front sought to establish a new defensive position at Luga, just 140 kilometers southwest of Leningrad. Meanwhile, General Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps found itself bogged down in swampy woods, struggling to cover the largely unprotected stretch between Ostrov and Luga. He arrived in Ostrov five days after Reinhardt, a delay that, while not catastrophic, was beginning to create complications. By July 10, Manstein finally reached Porkhov, around 90 kilometers past Ostrov. On the same day, Reinhardt arrived at Luga, another 100 kilometers further down the road. The growing gap between their forces was becoming increasingly perilous, but Manstein was determined to close it. To outflank the Soviets at Luga, he pushed his forces towards Soltsy. However, the first assault by the 1st Panzer Division at Luga met fierce resistance and was halted. In response, Reinhardt orchestrated a wide flanking maneuver with the 6th Panzer Division to the west. This approach was consistent with the standard tactics favored by Panzer commanders, who often achieved remarkable victories, from Sedan to Minsk, by opting for encirclement instead of direct assaults.

 

There was just one major issue: in the forests and marshes of the Baltic region, where the landscape was dotted with lakes and small rivers, the Panzers lacked the speed necessary for effective envelopment. Reinhardt managed to establish a small bridgehead at Luga, but this required an entire week of intense fighting. During this time, the Soviets capitalized on the slow progress of the Germans. The Northwestern Front repositioned significant forces, led by the 70th Rifle Division, on either side of Manstein’s stretched lines as he struggled to march to Soltsy. A trap was being set for the following week, aimed at crushing the leading edge of the 56th Panzer Corps. On July 13, the 8th Panzer Division finally arrived at Soltsy, and it was here that the trap would be sprung. Vatutin, now serving as the chief of staff for the Northwestern Front, was prepared to direct the battle. The tables had turned; it was now the Panzers that found themselves desperately trying to break free from a pocket. Hoepner would need to intervene to save Manstein from potential disaster, redirecting some of his forces away from the advance on Luga to assist him in this critical moment.

 

As Army Group North unwittingly led its Panzers deeper into the Baltic forests and into a carefully laid trap, Army Group Center was gearing up for the fight for Smolensk. July 10 is often marked as the official start of this battle. Battles rarely conform to neat definitions of time and space, especially in the context of industrial-scale conflicts. The timestamps we attach to the “beginning” and “ending” of battles are necessarily arbitrary. Throughout this podcast, we will emphasize this point while still acknowledging the most commonly accepted dates and locations for various battles. It’s important to remember that the fighting within a battle cannot be confined to the times or places we're mentioning. When battles involve hundreds of thousands of troops and span thousands of square miles over days or weeks, they cannot be adequately captured by a simple label like “the Battle of X.” This terminology implies a level of neatness that fails to reflect the complexity and chaos of real warfare. The counterattacks launched by Timoshenko’s Western Front the previous week were crucial; they aimed to buy him the time needed to assemble his main forces to resist the Germans at Smolensk. While these counterattacks failed to push the Panzers back, they were still successes in that they allowed him to move vital fresh troops into position. However, none of these efforts proved sufficient. Not the fresh divisions, nor the time, nor the space would be enough to turn the tide.

 

On the morning of July 9, the 20th Panzer Division launched a decisive strike across the Dvina River. Their attack was a textbook example of armored warfare, quickly demolishing the Soviet infantry of the 62nd Rifle Corps from the 22nd Army. By nightfall, the Panzers had reached Vitebsk, covering an impressive sixty kilometers while breaking through well-prepared Soviet defenses. This remarkable advance echoed the early days of the war and seemed to dispel any doubts about the offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht’s panzer forces. However, this perception was misleading, as the declining numbers of available tanks and trucks told a different story. Yet many leaders within the Wehrmacht allowed themselves to be blinded by their string of victories, beliefs that would soon be put to the test. For the time being, the Wehrmacht remained in a position of dominance, leaving Timoshenko reeling from this unexpected assault that easily disrupted his preparations. In response, he clumsily committed the remainder of the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps to the fight. Unfortunately for him, these forces were brushed aside with ease. In less than a week, Timoshenko had lost a significant portion of his armored reserves, more than eight hundred tanks, a catastrophic blow and the assault against his lines was just beginning. Meanwhile, in front of Guderian’s Panzergroup, the Soviet 13th Army struggled. Still battered from the encirclement at Minsk, the 13th had not received any significant reinforcements. The tanks of the 37th Panzer Corps faced little resistance from the remnants of the 13th Army. Once they crossed the river in force, they drove straight toward the heart of Smolensk. Timoshenko faced encirclement from both sides, just as his unfortunate predecessor had experienced at Minsk and Bialystok only two weeks earlier. Although the 20th Army still held the line between Smolensk and Orsha, this position was rapidly becoming irrelevant as the Panzers advanced further east, outflanking these defenses to the north and south.

 

In many respects, the first ten days of July 1941 represented a race toward the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, as both Bock and Timoshenko endeavored to amass sufficient forces to confront each other. The swift collapse of the Soviet Western Front in June, coupled with the chaos among Timoshenko's scattered and makeshift troops, placed him at a disadvantage in this race. However, the German blitzkrieg was also losing its momentum. A major impediment for the Germans was the condition of Soviet roads, which inflicted more damage on their panzer and motorized divisions than on the Red Army. To bolster the German advance into the Soviet Union, a significant number of civilian vehicles, trucks and cars, were commandeered to supplement the army's lack of motorization. Unfortunately, these vehicles often lacked the ground clearance needed for such treacherous conditions, leading them to bottom out on the rutted and uneven roads. This caused considerable damage to their transmissions and oil sumps. Additionally, the weaker suspension systems of civilian vehicles frequently broke, leaving a trail of wreckage in the wake of the German advance.

 

Military vehicles were not spared either. Alexander Cohrs, serving with a panzer division, vividly described the perilous roads his unit encountered on July 5. Noting the "very bad roads, full of holes," he wrote in his diary: "Some [vehicles] tipped over luckily none in our company. After 18 kilometers of marching, I sat on an armored vehicle that tipped so much it balanced on two wheels while the other two lifted off the ground. Miraculously, it did not topple over. Along the way, there was a moor that forced the vehicles to take a long detour. One by one, they got stuck or even overturned, leading to breakdowns and a slow pace." On July 6, General Heinrici, who commanded three infantry divisions, expressed his frustrations in a letter to his wife: "The compression of troops onto narrow avenues of advance makes progress slower than we would like. To this, we must add the dreadful roads that exacerbate the difficulties. Lord God, this is a primitive land north of the Pripet marshes, forests everywhere, interspersed with kilometer-wide swamps where one can sink up to the knee."

 

In addition to the inhospitable terrain, vast distances, and terrible roads, worsening weather emerged as a significant obstacle for the advancing German forces. Following heavy rainfall, a report from Kluge’s 4th Panzer Army on July 6 indicated that the roads across the expansive Beresina swamplands—from the west of Minsk to the Dnepr were "exceptionally bad" and "often bottomless." The report noted that motorized units were being "greatly slowed" and urgently required more engineers and construction resources. As Hans von Luck from the 7th Panzer Division described, “after brief downpours, the roads transformed into muddy tracks that were only passable at certain points, often requiring engineers or off-loaded grenadiers to fell trees to create makeshift wooden pathways. Ultimately, it was not just the enemy that hindered the advance; the catastrophic state of the roads played a significant role”.

 

Field Marshal Kesselring, commander of Army Group Centre’s Air Fleet 2, noted that the intermittent rain worsened the already primitive roads, revealing "the true face of the Russian theatre." He summed up the logistical challenges in the east, concluding that even fully tracked vehicles, including tanks, and the supply services largely depended on the arterial roads, which aided troops by providing warnings about impending difficulties. On July 7, Bock added, "It has been raining for two days on the 4th Panzer Army. This has made the road conditions dreadful and placed an extraordinary strain on both men and materials." At one point, the sunken roads forced the 7th Panzer Division to struggle for two days to advance just 90 kilometers. While the summer downpours turned many roads into swamps, elsewhere, the thick mud quickly reverted to the army's other significant hindrance: dust. On July 6, Wilhelm Pruller noted in his diary: "The advance is proceeding very slowly. Numerous obstacles are hindering our progress. You can hardly call what we’re on a road it’s better than this in the smallest hamlet in Germany. And we’re marching on a main road! The shoulders of the road are muddy from the previous rain sinking up to our knees but in the center, there's already dust... each vehicle is engulfed in an impenetrable cloud of dust."

 

This remarkable scene was echoed by 4th Panzer Army’s Chief of Staff, Major-General Gunther Blumentritt, who later wrote, "A vivid picture that remains from those initial weeks is the massive clouds of yellow dust... The heat was intense, interspersed with sudden showers that quickly turned the roads to mud before the sun reappeared, baking them back into crumbling clay." On just the second day of the war, the commander of the 43rd Army Corps remarked, "Every step and every vehicle creates an impenetrable cloud of dust. The march routes are marked by a yellowish-brown cloud that lingers in the air like mist." For men, machines, and animals, the dust became a torment for the German advance. Ironically, the very roads crucial to the rapid German blitzkrieg were also a primary factor in slowing their progress eastward. One soldier described the exhausting summer advance: "Our feet sank into the sand and dirt, sending dust into the air that clung to us. The horses coughed in the dust, creating a pungent smell. The loose sand was almost as tiring for the horses as the deep mud would have been. The men marched in silence, covered in dust, with parched throats and lips. In the early days of the campaign, the fine dust of the Soviet Union proved deadlier to the German panzer and motorized divisions than the Red Army’s counterattacks."

 

The dust quickly overwhelmed the inadequate air filters, infiltrating the engines and initially increasing oil consumption, ultimately rendering many engines unusable. Despite its dangers, the dust remained pervasive and unavoidable. Claus Hansmann wrote that his motorized column drove "as if in a sandstorm," noting how "the wheels churned up fountains of sand that obscured the sun... The dust burned our noses and throats." As a result, the rate of vehicle failure began to rise alarmingly. In Guderian’s panzer group, estimates of combat-ready tanks varied widely but indicated a significant attrition rate that severely reduced force strength. The most optimistic assessment recorded on July 7 noted that the tanks in the 18th and 3rd Panzer Divisions were at just 35 percent combat readiness, while the 4th and 17th Panzer Divisions were at 60 percent, and the 10th Panzer Division was the strongest at 80 percent. However, contrasting figures from the quartermaster’s diary indicated that the 18th Panzer Division was only at 25 percent strength, and the 17th at 50 percent. Just two days earlier, the war diary of the 47th Panzer Corps, which included both divisions, reported the 18th Panzer Division at 30 percent strength and the 17th at 33 percent of its initial total. Clearly, there was confusion regarding the precise figures, likely due to differing definitions of what constituted as 'combat ready.' Nevertheless, it is evident that the first two weeks of operations took a toll on the German panzers. Undoubtedly, the poor roads and pervasive dust accounted for most of the high failure rates, although reports indicated that using captured Soviet low-octane fuel also significantly damaged German engines, contributing to the losses.

 

Timoshenko struggled to gather reinforcements to counter the German spearheads, but two major factors hindered their effective deployment. First, Timoshenko failed to wait for a strong force to be assembled. Instead, incomplete tank divisions and rifle corps arrived from trains or road marches and launched attacks before they could properly organize. These assaults lacked coordination and were no match for the well-structured German units. The second issue was Timoshenko’s poor intelligence regarding the positions and intentions of the Panzers. The German Army on the Eastern Front was starting to undergo a process that author David Stahel refers to as de-modernization. During the battle of Smolensk, the Panzer divisions were still capable of functioning as a well oiled combined arms team but this was reliant on the stockpile of spare parts and fuel that Army Group Center had been able to assemble for the push. This was one of the last times that any of the Army Groups was able to facilitate a large scale offensive before the end of the year. However, this de-modernization meant only that the units were regressing to an earlier stage of tactical mobility in the absence of trucks and tanks. It did not mean that they could not still beat their unorganized Soviet counterparts. This problem was not unique to the battle of Smolensk; it plagued the Red Army throughout Operation Barbarossa. Due to inadequate tactical intelligence, Timoshenko missed opportunities to isolate and destroy the Panzers. As a result, he often marched his troops deeper into developing pockets rather than cutting off the spearheads of the Panzer groups.

 

On July 12, Zhukov sent an order from Stavka to Timoshenko, directing him to initiate a counteroffensive with all available land and air forces. Timoshenko complied, launching the largest counteroffensive of the war up to that point, sending six armies into battle. One of the primary objectives was to relieve the encircled 13th Army at Mogilev. While this goal was not achieved, the distraction did allow some elements of the beleaguered 13th Army to make it back to Soviet lines. There were a few minor successes during this offensive. The 63rd Rifle Corps, under the 4th Army, managed to push back elements of the 43rd Infantry Corps in the area around Rogachev, a critical crossing point on the Dnipro River. However, this victory was short-lived, as the infantry of the 63rd Rifle found themselves exposed due to the failure of the surrounding attacks on their flanks. Other instances of squandered success appeared throughout the front. Colonel General Gorodnikov had a three-division horse cavalry group that broke out behind German lines around the same time, wreaking havoc on supply lines. However, their impact was less significant than it could have been, likely due to hesitancy about becoming cut off in the rapidly evolving situation. Meanwhile, Guderian paid little heed to these attacks, focusing instead on his drive to encircle Smolensk. Though maybe surprising to some, the Red Army employed cavalry throughout the war in large formations. This was partially because of the strong influence of old cavalry officers at the top of the Red Army’s hierarchy. Budyonny and Timoshenko had both been long-time cavalrymen in the Russian Civil War and preached its continuing place on the modern battlefield. They faced criticism for this stance, but eventually were proven right to some degree. No doubt helpful to their cause was the fact that Stalin had served in the Cavalry himself, where he first made the acquaintance of the two marshals.  The fighting was far from over; the scale of the conflict meant that a resolution could not be achieved within a week. By July 14, the situation had become dire, but the fate of the Western Front was not yet sealed. Timoshenko still had the opportunity to save his men, if not Smolensk itself.

 

On the Southwestern and Southern fronts, the situation was equally challenging for the Red Army. Kleist’s Panzers had been split, pursuing two divergent objectives. The 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions faced counterattacks from the 4th, 9th, 19th, and 22nd Mechanized Corps in front of Kyiv. Although the Southwestern Front remained strong, its forces were stretched thin across Western Ukraine. These mechanized forces represented Kirponos's last best chance to blunt the Panzers' advance toward Kyiv. While the Southwestern Front was launching its final armored reserves at the Panzers outside Kyiv, Lieutenant General Potapov was pulling the 5th Army back from positions at Korosten. Under Kirponos's orders, Potapov aimed to strike from the north, while Lieutenant General Muzychenko’s 6th Army was tasked with attacking from the south. Together, with the mechanized corps in the center, these armies hoped to rescue the trapped 7th Rifle Corps and, ideally, cut off Kleist’s spearhead heading toward Kyiv. Unfortunately, this goal was beyond their reach, and all they managed was to delay the Panzers at great cost. 

 

By July 13, the four mechanized corps had dwindled to just ninety-five tanks. On the opening day of Operation Barbarossa, these corps had possessed over two thousand three hundred tanks. Despite the losses suffered by the Germans, it was hard to see anything but a near-total victory for the Wehrmacht in the first three weeks of fighting in Ukraine. However, the fighting in front of Kyiv did manage to delay the Panzers long enough to convince Hitler that they could not take Kyiv on their own. He reversed his earlier order that Kleist should take Kyiv while simultaneously completing the southern encirclement at Uman. His new directive was to finish the encirclement first, then turn the entire Army Group to capture Kyiv. This was essentially a reversal, a tacit admission that he had erred just days after issuing orders to Kleist. Operation Barbarossa was always conducted with political pressures from Hitler and his inner circle at the forefront in the minds of his Generals. Halder, Rundstedt, Bock and Leeb as the highest ranking officers in the Army battled with each other and Hitler constantly over the direction of the campaign. The lower tiers of commanders were not immune to this either, as we shall see in a few weeks with Guderian. It was becoming clear that Army Group South was unable to seize Kyiv and destroy the Red Army around Uman simultaneously. Even the task of cutting off Soviet forces in the area was proving difficult. Choosing to focus on closing the pocket at Uman rather than a location further east was a compromise, reflecting the actual combat power Army Group South could muster. These deliberations continued throughout the week, with the attack date set for July 15. In the meantime, Hitler increasingly assumed the role of Army Group Commander, shuffling individual divisions around the front.

 

At this stage of the war, logistics underpinned every German plan. The General Staff recognized early on that the existing Russian rail lines would need to be converted to standard European gauge. Initially, there were unfounded hopes that a quick strike across the border would allow for the seizure of significant amounts of Russian rolling stock, which would mitigate the need for immediate rail conversion. "rolling stock" refers to all the vehicles that move on the tracks, including both powered and unpowered ones. This encompasses locomotives, passenger and freight cars, and various other railway equipment like snowplows. However, this did not materialize. In the absence of the necessary rolling stock, the gauge conversion process began, but this was not quick, even under the best conditions. The railroad troops assigned to the conversion were undermanned, poorly protected, and lacking in resources. Changing the gauge on rail lines is an involved process that is not done well by amateurs. As skilled workers were killed or died from the conditions on the Eastern Front, there were few replacements from the home front. The process revolves around pulling the track spikes, lifting the rails and re-laying them to the desired gauge, then driving the spikes back in. It is hard labor even if only one rail is moved when narrowing gauge.

 

Moreover, they faced conflicting demands from commanders at the front and the long-term construction priorities set by the Quartermaster General, General Wagner. Wagner required these troops to focus on building high-capacity rail lines behind each Army Group, which involved more than just re-gauging the tracks. Essential infrastructure such as switching yards, turnabouts, signals, and more had to be constructed to establish proper high-capacity lines. Additionally, many of the existing track routes were subpar. Even those tracks that could be easily re-gauged were often poorly engineered and installed, significantly lowering their carrying capacity. This entire process was labor-intensive and required careful allocation of men and materials to succeed. General Wagner was tasked with this challenge because it was his responsibility to ensure that field forces received the supplies they needed, facilitating the construction of large supply dumps that could serve as buffers against the demands of the armies.

 

The other side of the rail debate was the urgent need for the field forces to have the tracks re-gauged as quickly as possible. This would reduce the demand on their limited truck transport capabilities and enable them to redeploy via rail, which was far easier for both the men and equipment than marching. Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht in the east, there simply weren’t enough rail troops available to meet this demand. As a result, neither mission was accomplished to the satisfaction of any party involved, and the logistics of the Wehrmacht continued to suffer. From the war's opening days, the strategic reserves of fuel were already low, and a lack of other critical resources was impacting production. As the conflict dragged on, fuel became an immediate concern for field commanders. Some of this shortage was due to production shortfalls. There is much to be said about the war economy in Germany. Alternatives to petroleum based fuels were explored, but these required other resources that were scarce as it was. Steel, Coal, and Labor were not plentiful as production was falling in many areas of Europe.  However, even more critical for the Panzers was the sharp decline in fuel deliveries as they advanced further from Germany. The logistics apparatus simply could not keep pace with the demands of the front lines.

 

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The Luftwaffe dominated the skies, but the Red Army, under General Timoshenko, rallied despite heavy losses. A remarkable mobilization program saw millions of reservists called up, even as factories relocated eastward to evade German forces. As armored clashes erupted, Stalin’s leadership shone through, but logistical challenges loomed large. Timoshenko’s forces faced a desperate struggle, launching counteroffensives amid fierce battles. The fate of Smolensk hung precariously as both sides braced for an inevitable and crucial confrontation in this brutal conflict.

Eastern Front #5 Red Army on the Run

 

Last time we spoke about Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine. As Operation Barbarossa unfolded, Army Group South advanced into Ukraine, driven by the need to secure critical oil reserves for Germany’s war machine. Initial gains were swift, as the German forces used air superiority to capture key positions. However, logistical issues quickly surfaced, revealing the vulnerabilities of their supply lines. Soviet General Kirponos, although initially caught off guard, managed to organize defenses and counterattacks thanks to a well-structured communication system. Despite their numerical advantages, the Red Army was plagued by disorganization and outdated tactics. The clash at Dubno highlighted this struggle, with Soviet forces launching piecemeal assaults that were easily countered by the more coordinated German defenses. As battles raged, both sides faced the brutal realities of war, heavy losses and the harsh conditions of the Eastern Front. 

This episode is the Red Army on the Run

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello there, welcome back, we have just got through week one of Operation Barbarossa and now its time to head into week two.  

In the opening days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe achieved remarkable success, obliterating a staggering number of Soviet aircraft. The air battle on the Eastern Front was indeed a chaotic spectacle, yet it's important to note that it wasn't as one-sided as some histories have portrayed. In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe unleashed devastation upon the Soviet Air Force, racking up staggering losses that reached into the thousands. One source reported that by the end of June, the Luftwaffe had destroyed 4,614 Soviet aircraft, with 3,176 of those taken out on the ground and 1,438 in aerial combat. In stark contrast, German losses amounted to just 330 planes. These figures highlight a clear German superiority in the skies, but for various reasons, this supremacy was fleeting. Following the doctrines of blitzkrieg, the Luftwaffe's primary objective in the East was to gain immediate control of the airspace above Soviet territory. In an impressive display of force, they achieved total domination of the skies within just two days, inflicting chaos on Soviet airfields in the western districts. This victory enabled the Luftwaffe to shift focus toward supporting ground operations. 

However, lurking behind the front lines were thousands of Soviet aircraft, strategically stationed further back from the border and in the Soviet interior. These planes had managed to survive the initial onslaught and would eventually be relocated to new airfields. During this brief window of Luftwaffe dominance, concerns began to surface. Major General Hoffman von Waldau, head of the Luftwaffe's operations department, conveyed his worries to Halder on July 1st. "The air force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy," he warned. "It's quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes." Just two days later, he further reflected in his diary that the Soviet military capabilities were significantly stronger than pre-war assessments indicated. “The material quality is better than expected. Though we achieved great successes with relatively low losses, a large number of Soviet aircraft remain to be destroyed.” Despite the Luftwaffe's initial triumphs, they now faced the daunting challenge of balancing support for the army while contending with a resurgent Soviet aerial presence. As the operational theater expanded at a rapid pace, the Luftwaffe's already limited resources became stretched thin. Air bases had to be relocated eastward to newly established, poorly equipped airfields, where inadequate supply lines hindered their effectiveness just as much as they did for the ground troops. These new airfields were also particularly vulnerable to attacks from roaming enemy groups infiltrating the rear areas. While the Luftwaffe experienced significant successes, the Soviet Air Force was not without its victories. In July 1941, Soviet pilots managed to raid German airfields, inflicting damage on the Luftwaffe as well. One Soviet pilot vividly recalled an attack near Bobruisk: “Approaching our target, the Shturmoviks flew low to the ground. As our leader turned to launch the assault, missiles struck the rows of bombers, causing explosions. Tracer bullets shredded the wings adorned with black crosses. Just above the earth, our Shturmoviks released their hundred-kilo bombs, igniting Junkers and Messerschmitts prepped for takeoff. We arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from launching their operations! Our regiment repeatedly struck Bobruisk airfield, causing significant damage and destroying dozens of bombers and Messerschmitts.”

As the frontlines surged forward, reconnaissance units struggled to keep pace with the fast-moving Panzer divisions. Even though the initial weeks of the campaign had seemed relatively light in terms of losses, skepticism lingered among key figures. On July 1st, Major General Waldau, commander of the 10th Air Corps, communicated a stark warning to the head of the Army High Command, General Halder. He expressed concerns that the Luftwaffe had drastically underestimated the strength of the Soviet Air Force, now estimating their numbers to exceed 8000 aircraft. Halder was taken aback, unable to accept such a figure. Just days before, the Luftwaffe's own strength had barely surpassed 3500 planes. The idea that the Soviets could have lost over four thousand planes and still possess a similar number ready for battle seemed implausible. Halder wasn’t alone in his disbelief. The senior leadership of the Luftwaffe shared his sentiment, dismissing Waldau’s grim assessment. They were riding high on the belief that they had secured a monumental victory, and any contrary evidence only dampened their spirits. To their credit, they had indeed decimated a significant portion of the Soviet Air Force, and their influence remained pivotal in the ongoing battlefield struggles around Minsk, Kyiv, and Leningrad. However, their major flaw lay in their unwillingness to acknowledge that the war was far from over. The early weeks of the conflict revealed a harsh truth: victory could not be seized in a single stroke. A decisive triumph was proving elusive, regardless of how fiercely the Luftwaffe's commanders clung to their beliefs. This goes to a larger point about whether or not Germany could ever have managed a truly decisive victory over the USSR. A decisive battle is one that decides a war. This is an elusive concept at any rate and one that is debated at the highest levels of intellectual circles in military theory. The now dominant understanding of the Second World War as an industrial conflict decided on the production lines and the mines of the combatants precludes any discussion of “decisive battles.”

As the second week of the war unfolded, Army Group North continued to make significant strides. On July 1st, they captured Riga, and Pskov was now within reach. The Soviet Northwestern Front was in disarray, with roughly twenty out of the thirty-one divisions that began the campaign operating at less than half strength. In response to this dire situation, Colonel General F. Kuznetsov was replaced by Lieutenant General Sobennikov. Sobennikov had been the 8th Army commander during the first week of the war. He was replaced in this role by Lieutenant General Ivanov. To further bolster the command structure, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Stavka, Lieutenant General Vatutin, was sent to the front headquarters. This marked one of the early instances of a practice that would become a hallmark of the war. The Stavka regularly dispatched representatives to front commands, serving as both advisors and overseers to ensure that orders were executed precisely. For now, Vatutin faced the daunting task of restoring the front lines and preventing further German breakthroughs. However, he wasn’t given any additional resources to accomplish this monumental challenge.

From the German perspective, the initial weeks in the North were marked by rapid advances interspersed with periods of regrouping. The only significant combat during the first week of the invasion occurred at Raseiniai, as discussed in our previous podcast. The Red Army fought fiercely wherever it could, but much of the early phase of Operation Barbarossa was characterized by a chaotic retreat. The Northwestern Front was sacrificing territory in a desperate attempt to stall Colonel General Hoepner’s Panzer spearheads. The 4th Panzer Group maneuvered between the infantry divisions of Army Group North as they swung northeast and then north through the Baltic region. Positioned as the southern spearhead was Colonel General Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps, which made rapid progress in the initial days of the war but faced a fierce Soviet counterattack that they had to fend off without support. Meanwhile, Colonel General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps engaged at Raseiniai, participating in one of the largest tank battles witnessed thus far in the conflict. By July 3rd, the Panzers were once again on the move. Manstein managed to secure Rezenke but soon found his forces mired in the treacherous swamps, slowing their advance. 

Reinhardt took over as the lead, capturing Ostrov on July 4th and reaching the outskirts of Pskov by the 7th. Riga fell to the 26th Infantry Corps on July 1st. Field Marshal Leeb relayed orders from Hitler for Hoepner to push past Lake Ladoga and capture Leningrad, with the advance limited to Velikiye Luki. Velikiye Luki is not very far east of the current line of advance of the Army Group at this point. Its role as a marker was intended to limit the Panzer’s eastward drive and to keep them in line with the strategic objective of Leningrad. At this time, the Wehrmacht was still operating under the understanding that destruction of the Red Army had essentially been achieved. This meant that the pursuit of strategic objectives like the major cities of the USSR could be attacked. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev were on the chopping block. This proved to be a point of contention between Hitler and the Heer as the campaign progressed. By July 6th, the Northwestern Front was essentially in ruins. The Northern Front, under Lieutenant General M. Popov, was now the last line of defense standing between Army Group North and Leningrad. Popov faced the Finnish forces to the north and was ill-equipped to confront the full might of the Wehrmacht advancing from the south. The Stavka knew they needed to act and quickly.

Things were going almost as poorly for the Western Front. The Minsk-Bialystok pocket was rapidly closing, trapping a significant portion of the Western Front within its confines. Minsk had fallen during the first week, and by July 5th, Colonel Generals Hoth and Guderian succeeded in linking up east of the city. Initial reports from the Wehrmacht estimated that upwards of 3,000 Red Army tanks had been destroyed by the end of the second week of the operation. However, these numbers were misleading. The German estimates were flawed in two key respects. First, there simply weren't 3,000 Soviet tanks in the area; more reliable Soviet figures indicated that the actual number was closer to 2,500. Second, the quantity of abandoned tanks was not as significant a metric as Wehrmacht leaders believed. They were still operating under the assumption that this would be a short war. To them, destroying Soviet tanks meant fewer guns on the road to Moscow. However, the USSR was already bracing for a protracted conflict. In a long war, the crucial element isn’t just the number of tanks, but the resilience and experience of their crews. The Minsk operation, though incredibly swift, did not seal an airtight pocket. Thousands of Red Army soldiers managed to abandon their equipment and slip through the thin German lines. They carried with them experience, determination, and a steadfast will to continue the fight.

A lot of this was due to struggles for control over divisions. General Kluge was focused on sealing the pocket tightly to capture as many prisoners as possible, but Guderian sought to continue the advance eastward as quickly as possible. To Kluge, maintaining control over the gains at Minsk held more weight than risking further advancement. In contrast, Guderian felt that delaying to round up every last prisoner was a waste of valuable time and resources. He believed that keeping the momentum of the advance was crucial to keeping the enemy off balance, and he wanted to push ahead toward the next objective. This clash of perspectives revealed the fundamental strategic rift within the German command. Seeking resolution, both men turned to higher authorities for support, but Bock and Halder were eager for both options and ultimately backed neither fully. This compromise clouded Kluge’s victory and left Guderian’s offensive noticeably under-resourced. The reality was that German forces were attempting too much. Guderian was right to advocate for a rapid solution through deep penetration, but he underestimated the threat to his rear between Slonim and Minsk, as well as the strength of the opposition further east, for which he would urgently need Kluge’s infantry. Hoth faced a similar dilemma, but for the Panzer generals, bold action in the face of danger was a hallmark of their previous victories. Neither Kluge nor Guderian was willing to back away from the risks of advancing, nor would they yield to the cautious reservations of the army commanders. Even after the war, Guderian asserted that the biggest obstacle to his advance was the persistent doubts of Field Marshal von Kluge, who, as Guderian noted, was “inclined to stop the advance of the Panzers at every difficulty arising in the rear.” Despite his strong conviction that Army Group Centre's primary goal should be to close the ring at Minsk, Halder favored sending elements from both Panzer groups towards the Dvina and Dnepr rivers to secure bridgeheads for the next phase of the advance. On June 29th, Halder made a significant entry in his diary, revealing for the first time that the ultimate objective of Army Group Centre was an attack on Moscow. He expressed hopes of seizing Rogachev and Mogilev on the Dnepr, declaring that this would “open the road to Smolensk and from there the course to Moscow.”

As July began, the Red Army faced pressing concerns that extended far beyond securing a supply of experienced tank crews. First and foremost, the disaster that struck Pavlov’s forces was largely due to their appalling strategic deployment deep into the Bialystok salient, which left them half encircled by the Germans even before the invasion began. Additionally, the element of strategic surprise, which played a crucial role in determining Pavlov’s fate, had been severely compromised due to significantly disrupted communications. However, the encirclement of Pavlov’s armies west of Minsk did not spell the end of the Soviet Western Front, as the German generals might have hoped. Soviet pre-war planning had established a first strategic echelon positioned between 20 and 100 kilometers from the border, intended to counter-attack and halt the enemy advance. This would pave the way for a general Soviet offensive carried out by a second strategic echelon located much farther back, between 100 and 400 kilometers away. With the first strategic echelon doomed to defeat, Pavlov was ordered back to Moscow. General Pavlov was relieved of his command of the Western Front and replaced by Marshal of the Soviet Union, Timoshenko. Pavlov was arrested and later tried for “Criminal Behavior in the Face of the Enemy.” He was executed late in July, alongside his chief of staff. Unfortunately, he could not save the majority of the armies under his command. The 3rd, 4th, 10th, and 13th Armies were now trapped west of Minsk. The 2nd Panzer Group successfully advanced to the Berezina River, capturing crossings at Borisov, nearly one hundred kilometers east of Minsk. Meanwhile, Guderian’s 3rd Panzer Group had pushed south to Bobruisk, almost two hundred kilometers southeast of the city. Timoshenko received a brief reprieve as the Panzers were forced to pause at the Berezina, turning inward to fully encircle the pocket they had created during their advance. This temporary halt provided Timoshenko with the space and time needed to formulate a new defensive line.

The strong-willed Timoshenko, upon his arrival at the Western Front headquarters, promptly took on the vital task of defending the Dnepr River line. He utilized all available resources from the second strategic echelon and mobilized the civilian population to construct defensive works. In stark contrast to Germany, the Soviet Union was fully gearing up for a long and grueling war. On June 22, 1941, the Supreme Soviet drafted most reservists born between 1905 and 1918 into the ranks of the Red Army. Additionally, an emergency labor decree conscripted all able-bodied men aged 18 to 45 and women between 18 and 40, who were not already employed, to assist in building defenses. By June 24, martial law was declared across the western part of the Soviet Union. Two days later, mandatory overtime of up to three hours a day was instituted at the discretion of factory managers, and all leaves and holidays were suspended. For the western regions already overrun by the Germans, Stalin’s first public address on July 3 issued a rallying call to the occupied Soviet people: “Foment partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to forests, stores, and transport. Conditions in the occupied regions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all of his accomplices.”

Although the Red Army had reserves, they needed time to position them effectively. These reserves were crucial if Timoshenko aimed to rebuild the Western Front. He had remnants of ten rifle divisions and the 20th Mechanized Corps, but they were without tanks. His primary objective was to prevent the Panzer Groups from crossing the Dvina and Dnepr rivers. To bolster his efforts, he gained access to the five reserve armies of Marshal Budenny's Reserve Front. Originally, the Soviet defensive plan had envisioned these forces forming the backbone of a strategic counteroffensive to crush the German Army in Belarus. However, that plan was now scrapped, and the reserve field armies were redirected to establish a new defensive line in front of Smolensk. To fill the void left in the Soviet reserves, the Stavka mobilized two new armies and positioned them along the road to Moscow from Smolensk. The 24th and 28th Armies were the first of the wartime mobilized field armies of the Red Army. They were soon followed by dozens more. Following this deployment, four additional armies were assembled, organized around a core of NKVD border guards. Led by NKVD generals, these units were stationed around Moscow. However, these reserve armies were not fully staffed or equipped; in many cases, they were mere shadows of effective forces, supplemented by daily arrivals of new conscripts. The Red Army had a larger reservoir of regular units, but these were located in the Far East, and it would take time for them to be redeployed. Even though the reserve front armies were effectively emergency measures designed to give Timoshenko a fighting chance against Army Group Center, their existence remained unknown to the Germans. The Heer would soon discover them as they inadvertently bumped into these forces in the coming days and weeks.

On July 4th, the Soviet 22nd Army launched an attack against the 57th Panzer Corps at Polotsk, while the 20th Army struck at the 39th Panzer Corps near Lepel. The 20th Army received support from the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps, each equipped with at least 1,000 tanks for the assault. However, the 39th Panzer Corps was widely dispersed as they were road marching toward Orsha, and they did not anticipate encountering large enemy formations. In a crucial misstep, the Soviets attacked without sufficient reconnaissance of the area and struggled to coordinate their efforts between the two corps. The 20th Army staff was unprepared to take command, and there was no formal agreement on the division of responsibilities between the two Soviet generals. This lack of coordination became the downfall of Timoshenko’s counterattack. The challenges of effectively managing the cumbersome mechanized corps were becoming evident along the frontlines in these initial weeks of the war. The Red Army simply did not possess the command-and-control capacity necessary for organizing large-scale counteroffensives involving hundreds or even thousands of tanks. The outcomes mirrored earlier battles but on a larger scale: soldiers fought valiantly, while field officers struggled to execute orders, leading to repeated attacks.

Despite their bravery, the Germans fended off the assaults with impressive resilience. It is estimated that, of the 2,000 tanks the Soviets had mobilized on paper, more than 800 were destroyed, with dozens, possibly hundreds, out of commission due to mechanical failures. One notable incident involved 44 brand-new KV-1 tanks ordered from the Kirov factory to support the assault. Unfortunately, seven of these tanks sustained burned-out clutches during the short road march, rendering them inoperable and requiring recovery for repairs. Such diversions of resources were intolerable in the early days of July 1941, yet they persisted. By the end of the week, approximately half of the remaining tanks were put out of action due to poor driving, resulting in damaged clutch packs.  In the popular mythology of the Second World War, it is a common theme that German tanks were over engineered and unreliable. The Panther is often the stereotypical example of this tendency. The Soviet tanks are represented as the ideal opposite; sturdy and simply built. This can be dismissed as a childish simplification of the reality on the ground. Tanks are complex pieces of machinery with dozens of interacting systems made of thousands of parts. All early models will have teething problems as the kinks in the design are worked out. As well, no tank is reliable without proper maintenance and a well-trained crew. While the fighting succeeded in slowing the German advance, it did not stop it. Smolensk remained firmly in the sights of Army Group Center, and the Minsk-Bialystok pockets were on the verge of complete collapse by the end of the second week. The casualties were staggering; the Soviets lost around 400,000 soldiers under Pavlov’s command. As both sides braced for what would be an even larger conflict at Smolensk, the stage was set for a decisive clash as the second week of the war came to a close at the center of the Eastern Front.

For the under-resourced Army Group South, the war unfolded differently than for their counterparts in Army Groups Center and North. There were no massive pockets of Soviet soldiers ready for encirclement through daring Panzer attacks, nor was there the wide-open countryside left behind by the Red Army as they retreated to fight another day. Instead, they faced a grueling attritional conflict, with every kilometer fought and bled for. The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General Kirponos, struggled to concentrate his forces for the Stavka’s planned counter-offensive. He was committing everything he could get his hands on in a desperate effort to buy time for his front to organize the counter-offensive, but this attempt was failing. On July 2nd, the southern portion of Army Group South launched a significant attack into Moldavia. 

This was part of Operation München, a joint German-Romanian offensive to recapture Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Hertsa region, all of which had been ceded by Romania to the Soviet Union a year earlier during the Soviet occupation of these territories. The operation commenced during the night of July 2–3, 1941, and would go on for 24 days. The Axis forces involved included the Romanian 3rd Army, commanded by General Petre Dumitrescu, positioned in the north; the German Eleventh Army, along with subordinated Romanian units under General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, in the center; and the Romanian Fourth Army, led by General Nicolae Ciupercă, in the south. Sadly, the invasion was accompanied by a genocide against the Jewish population of Bessarabia. The combat operations in Southern Bessarabia were among the most complex of the entire campaign, involving artillery, warships, aviation, and troops from both sides. The Soviet Danube Flotilla was composed of five river monitors, 22 armed and armored motorboats, and seven minesweeping boats. In contrast, the Romanian Danube Flotilla had seven river monitors but only around four smaller armed boats. Fighting in this sector began days before the main operation, with the first skirmish between Soviet and Romanian warships occurring on June 23. During this engagement, Soviet vessels attempted to break the Romanian naval blockade.

On June 26, in support of a sea-borne raid on Constanța, Soviet armored motor gunboats landed troops at Chilia Veche, capturing most of the Romanian 15th Marine Infantry Battalion, resulting in Romanian losses of 468 troops. The remaining soldiers of the battalion, supported by one armed boat and two motorboats, managed to defend Stipoc Island against further Soviet assaults. Meanwhile, the Romanian 17th Marine Infantry Battalion successfully held the Periprava sector throughout the operation, repelling numerous Soviet attacks and even sinking four Soviet armored boats with their artillery. The offensive officially began on July 2, with Romanian forces advancing north. By July 5, Cernăuți, the capital of Northern Bukovina, was captured by the 3rd and 23rd Vânători de Munte Battalions. On July 16, Chișinău, the capital of Bessarabia, fell after intense fighting, primarily led by Romanian forces spearheaded by the 1st Romanian Armored Division (Divizia 1 Blindată), which was equipped mainly with 126 R-2 light tanks. Ultimately, the Soviet Danube Flotilla suffered significant losses, with two river monitors damaged, five armored motorboats sunk, and one more damaged during the confrontations. On July 18–19, the flotilla withdrew from the Danube Delta. Consequently, on July 22, the Romanians occupied Reni, Izmail, Kiliia, and Vylkove. By July 26, the entire region was under Romanian-German control. Finally, on August 17, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were formally re-integrated into the Romanian state.

Around Lviv, the 1st Panzer Group continued to make progress despite facing stiff resistance. By July 2nd, they were spread out between Lviv and Rovno, having successfully defeated the Soviets in the opening battle of Dubno. However, cracks were beginning to show in the command structure of the Wehrmacht. Field Marshal Rundstedt and Colonel General Kleist expressed their strong belief that the 1st Panzer Group should concentrate on encircling and destroying the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies. They viewed this as the primary objective in line with Hitler's strategic goals: the annihilation of the Red Army as a fighting force. Commanders on the ground realized that the Southwestern Front possessed large reserves. Without significant encirclements in the south, Kirponos would eventually be able to reorganize his forces and potentially overwhelm the smaller German units. In contrast, Hitler preferred that Kleist push toward Kyiv. After further discussions, the 1st Panzer Group was divided to pursue these conflicting objectives. The eastern thrust was spearheaded by the 3rd Panzer Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry Mackensen, the son of Field Marshal August von Mackensen of First World War Fame. They surged through the disorganized remnants of the Soviet Mechanized Corps in the area, breaching the so-called Stalin Line by July 7th. Despite the efforts of the 9th, 15th, 19th, and 22nd Mechanized Corps to plug the gap, they were unable to hold back the German advance. Lieutenant Colonel Raczek, commanding on the front, was given a battlegroup and ordered to push as far east as possible. The coming week of fighting would ultimately determine the outcome of Hitler's risky decision to split the Panzers of Army Group South.

Speed and surprise were the cornerstones of the German victories from Pskov to Lviv. The triumphs were never about having larger armies or launching stronger attacks. However, the view from the Wolf’s Lair differed significantly from that of Hitler’s generals. The wolf’s Lair was Hitler’s complex of bunkers, shelters and barracks near Masuria, Poland. He used this location as his command center throughout the war from its completion in 1941 until 1944 when the complex was demolished after the official retreat to Berlin. It was also the scene of the 1944 assassination plot. The 20 July plot AKA Operation Valkyrie was carried out in one of the briefing rooms of the complex. By this point, Hitler had developed a strong bias against much of the Army’s senior leadership and was constantly at odds with them. He had previously lectured Field Marshal Bock about overreaching at Minsk, and now he was convinced that Rundstedt was not aggressive enough. Caught in the crossfire was Colonel-General Halder, the chief of the OKH. Having been outmaneuvered during the planning stages of the invasion, he saw this as his opportunity to regain Hitler’s favor. Halder had assured Hitler that the destruction of the Red Army was essentially a foregone conclusion. He evidently believed it himself, as on July 3rd, he wrote in his diary that the war was all but won. Halder’s Diary Entry, July 3rd, 1941. “On the whole one can already now say that the objective to destroy the mass of the Russian army in front of the Dvina and Dnepr [Rivers] has been accomplished. I do not doubt . . . that eastwards of the Dvina and Dnepr we would only have to contend with partial enemy forces, not strong enough to hinder realisation of the German operational plan. Thus it is probably not too much to say, when I claim that the campaign against Russia was won within fourteen days. Naturally it is not yet over. The wide open spaces and the stubborn resistance, conducted with all means, will still claim our efforts for many more weeks to come. Once we are across the Dvina and Dnepr, it will have less to do with the destruction of enemy forces than with taking from the enemy his centres of production and thereby preventing him from raising a new army from his enormous industrial potential and inexhaustible reserves of manpower”. 

Halder’s buoyant outlook was also reflected at the Wolf’s Lair, where Below later reported that “the month of July found most in an optimistic frame of mind at FHQ [Führer Headquarters]. Hitler saw himself confirmed in his judgment. Neither Brauchitsch and Halder, nor Keitel and Jodl, had a word to say to the contrary.” While Joseph Goebbels exhibited an unshakeable confidence in the final outcome of the campaign, he maintained a more realistic tone when discussing the demands and difficulties of the fighting. On July 2, he noted, “In total, the fighting is very hard and bitter... The Red regime has mobilized the people. Plus, there is the proverbial stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers have their hands full.” Although Goebbels was closer to the mark than many in the High Command, he still fell short of grasping the realities faced by the men at the front and the looming danger of fighting in the endless east. Siegfried Knappe, a lieutenant in the 9th Army’s 87th Infantry Division, recounted a revealing exchange with Major-General von Studnitz during the march to Minsk.

“‘How do you think the campaign has gone so far?’ he asked. ‘Great,’ I replied enthusiastically. ‘Everything seems to be going according to plan.’ He paused for a moment, lost in thought. Finally, he responded, ‘I was in Russia during the last war. I have experienced the Russian winter. It is savage, unlike anything we’ve ever faced. It will come—and it will come soon. We’re only in this small part of Russia. Ahead of us lies a vast, empty country, and if we do not take Moscow before the weather turns bitter cold, I worry about what will happen.’ He was clearly not optimistic. I was amazed by his words, but I recognized that he was intelligent, experienced, and capable. I began to tone down my own optimism after that.” As the second week of fighting came to a close, Smolensk loomed on the horizon. However, neither the Wehrmacht nor the Red Army fully grasped just how critical and costly this next battle would be.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As the second week of Operation Barbarossa unfolded, the German Luftwaffe dominated the skies, inflicting heavy losses on the Soviet Air Force. The Soviets, facing initial chaos and disorganization, began reorganizing under General Timoshenko’s command. Despite early German successes, the Red Army showed resilience, managing to regroup and prepare for a prolonged conflict. Both sides suffered tremendous losses, setting the stage for a brutal and costly struggle as they headed toward the decisive battle of Smolensk.

Eastern Front #4 Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine

Last time we spoke about Day 3 of Operation Barbarossa, the encirclement of Bialystok-Minsk. The relentless German advance caught the Soviet forces off guard. As Army Group Center surged forward, equipped with nearly 1,500 Luftwaffe aircraft, they aimed to encircle Soviet armies. They swiftly captured vital positions, overcoming initial defenses with shocking ease. However, despite early successes, logistical challenges began to stifle their momentum, revealing cracks in their operational capabilities. The Soviet response, though disorganized, showcased unexpected resilience as they regrouped and launched counterattacks. The chaos within Soviet command hindered coordinated efforts, resulting in heavy losses during futile counteroffensives. Ultimately, the Germans achieved a substantial operational victory, encircling massive Soviet forces at Bialystok-Minsk, one of the largest encirclements in military history. The clash at Bialystok-Minsk marked a turning point in the campaign, revealing the grim realities of warfare and setting the stage for future confrontations as the Eastern Front unfolded.

This episode is: Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello again, we are now in day four of Operation Barbarossa. In this podcast we are going to now focus on Army Group South, who find themselves in a large campaign in Ukraine.

Conquering Ukraine was critical to not just Operation Barbarossa, but Germany’s entire war plans. A critical challenge for the motorized supply system of operation barbarossa was the availability of fuel. Just nine days before the campaign began, Halder was informed of Germany’s oil reserves. He was warned that "fuel supplies will be exhausted by autumn," with aviation fuel projected to drop to half and regular fuel down to only a quarter of what was needed. Diesel and heating oil would be at just half of the required levels. Since the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht’s operations department had been monitoring the declining oil stocks. They tried to advocate for economic goals, particularly focusing on the Soviet oil-producing region in the Caucasus. This meant that part of Army Group South needed to advance towards the Donets region and then on to Krasnodar and Maykop-Grozny. In line with these objectives, the War Economic Staff sent a request to the 17th Army back on June 12, urging the swift occupation of the oil-rich region of Drogobycz in Galicia. However, Halder rejected this request, writing in his diary the next day: "Political Questions I refuse to allow economic considerations to influence the operational direction." This not only underscored the urgency of Germany’s fuel shortage, according to the War Economic Staff, but also highlighted Halder’s commitment to his operational strategy, dismissing objectives he deemed unrelated to defeating the Soviet Union. Such thinking would prove detrimental to the German war effort. 

Army Group South was backed by the 4th Air Fleet under Colonel General Löhr, which included the 4th and 5th Air Corps. This Air Fleet was equipped with approximately 392 light bombers and 248 fighters. Among these aircraft were the Ju-87 Stukas, the Luftwaffe's workhorses for close air support. However, there was always a shortage of these vital planes. Another challenge was the vast distances within the operational area, which limited the effective use of the Stukas due to their short range. In contrast, the Heinkel He-111 had almost double that range, but it was less maneuverable and more challenging to use for the close precision strikes needed in air support missions. On the first day of operations, the bombers of the 4th Air Fleet carried out similar missions to those of the other Air Fleets, targeting airfields, command centers, and supply depots. As the week progressed, they successfully established air superiority, edging towards complete air supremacy. Air Supremacy and Air Superiority are two different concepts. Modern USAF doctrine defines the terms as follows: Air Supremacy is complete control over the skies, such that opposing air forces are incapable of interfering within the operational area. Air Superiority is the level of control that allows for operations without prohibitive interference from enemy air forces. This is often constrained in time and space. 

Army Group South was divided into two nearly equal halves. The southern half, stationed in Romania, wouldn't begin serious operations until the first week of July. However, during the initial week, they managed to seize several bridges across the Prut River using patrol-sized units. It is unclear how large these “patrol sized elements” were. It can be inferred that they were probably company sized operations. Significant enough to seize the bridges from any border forces but not large enough to invite serious attention from the Soviet Southern or Southwestern commands. These strategic positions were held to secure a passage for the German 11th Army, along with the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, to advance into Bessarabia and southern Ukraine when the time was right. No significant resistance was encountered, likely because Soviet forces were focused on the immediate areas where the invasion was actively taking place. It wasn't until June 25 that the Soviet Southern Front was activated to defend Odessa and the southern approaches to the Ukrainian Steppe. Although this activation was late in coming, it significantly improved the Red Army's readiness in the region when the Germans and Romanians launched their larger offensive across the border in early July.

While the advance of Army Group Centre was crucial for German operations in the east, its success relied on the simultaneous progress of the northern and southern army groups. These groups not only had their own objectives but also needed to provide flank support for Army Group Centre. Rundstedt's Army Group South faced the toughest challenge, engaged with the Soviet South-Western Front commanded by Colonel-General Michail Kirponos. The Soviets mistakenly believed that Ukraine was the primary target of the German invasion. The Red Army in their pre-war planning had decided that Ukraine would be the scene of the main effort in a German invasion. This was incorrect as the Wehrmacht ultimately decided that Army Group Center aimed at Moscow would be the initial main effort. However, it did have basis in reality. There had been much discussion in the OKH and OKW about where the main effort should be directed. Hitler himself still felt that the economic objective of the war could only be achieved by taking the natural resources of Ukraine.  This tension would lead to significant friction in the command structure of the Wehrmacht. 

Kirponos had successfully overseen the construction of formidable fortifications along the Ukrainian border. Additionally, he had established a well-organized communication system that allowed him to receive warnings about the invasion earlier than his counterparts to the north. This advance notice did not precede the invasion itself; rather, it confirmed that the invasion was indeed underway before other front commanders were aware. Thanks to this timely information, Kirponos could begin organizing his forces and planning counterattacks within minutes, rather than hours. The Southwestern Front boasted an impressive 4,780 tanks spread across eight mechanized corps. In contrast, the 1st Panzer Group, led by Colonel General Kleist, had only 715 tanks. Although the Soviet forces appeared to have a significant numerical advantage, this superiority was diluted by the dispersion of the Soviet mechanized corps, as well as deficiencies in communication equipment, training, and effective tactics. Despite these challenges, Kleist recognized the threat posed by the Soviet troops and could not afford to underestimate them. As he advanced into open country in the war’s early days, he faced counterattacks from multiple directions, sometimes simultaneously. He worked diligently to use his panzers effectively and skillfully navigated the complexities of each situation. It was clear that the battles ahead would not be straightforward.

While the Soviets were disadvantaged in specialized weaponry, they did have superiority in  the sheer number of guns they could assemble and supply with ammunition. While there were certainly significant imperfections in the Soviet employment and handling of artillery early in the war, the Germans were frequently outgunned and struggled to bring up sufficient stockpiles of shells. Later on as the conditions of static warfare began to take hold along the vast eastern front, the importance of the infantryman grew much more. No longer just tasked with securing the territory won by the Panzers, they were responsible for holding the long front together. In this role, the German infantry demonstrated good training, but their equipment was lacking, especially when compared to their Soviet counterparts. One officer from the 4th Panzer Division remarked after the war, “The equipment, which had proved efficient in previous campaigns, was not robust enough for battle under the conditions prevailing in Russia. Russian equipment seemed to be more durable and less sensitive. Therefore, whoever got hold of a Russian tommy gun kept it.” Likewise an Italian officer inspecting a Russian machine gun for the first time commented, “I loved the simplicity, easy handling, and firepower of this gun.” Colonel-General Kleist, who later rose to the rank of Field Marshal and served on the eastern front until March 1944, stated after the war, “The Soviet equipment was very good even in 1941, especially the tanks. Their artillery was excellent, and most of their infantry weapons, such as their rifles were more modern than ours and had a faster rate of fire.” Colonel-General Erhard Raus, another former German commander with extensive experience on the eastern front, wrote for a post-war US military study, “The best weapon of the Russian infantryman was the machine pistol. It was easily handled, suited to Russian winter conditions, and was one that the Germans highly regarded. The mortar also proved highly valuable as the ideal weapon in terrains where artillery support was impossible. At the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, Russian infantry far surpassed the Germans in mortar equipment and its effective use. The same was true for the Russian anti-tank gun, which was considerably more efficient than the anti-tank guns of the German infantry divisions at the start of the campaign and was readily employed whenever captured.”

Another aspect of the Red Army often incorrectly viewed as antiquated was their extensive early use of horse cavalry. This practice was fundamental to their success, as it allowed for constant movement in difficult terrain such as marshes and forests where cover was abundant and German motorized forces struggled to operate. These advantages enabled surprise raids on weak German positions and long forays into the German rear to cut supply lines and destroy vital infrastructure. Although cavalry was not a replacement for mechanized operations, it proved useful when employed on a limited scale against the exposed flanks of the overstretched German armies. In the initial hours of the invasion, the German 6th Army attempted to establish a bridgehead across the Bug River. While some bridges across the Bug River, which formed the German-Soviet border, were captured in the initial assault, Field Marshal Bock noted that at Brest, a key location on the road to Moscow, the first bridge over the river was only secured by noon.They faced opposition from two Soviet rifle divisions, the 124th and the 140th. However, the Soviets were too dispersed to mount an effective defense, and within hours, most of the German infantry was crossing the river. 

Complicating the situation, General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen, the commander of the 47th Panzer Corps which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized Division, and the 167th Infantry Division reported difficulties crossing the captured bridges. The approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic. Even after crossing the Bug, German forces had to deal with the Brest fortified district, which would become a persistent thorn in the army’s side long after the armored spearhead had moved on. The challenges were further compounded when a central route of the panzer group’s right wing, composed of the 47th Panzer Corps featuring the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, the 10th Motorized Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 255th Infantry Division, led by General of Panzer Troops Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenberg, was discovered to have "catastrophic road conditions" that were deemed "impossible" to traverse. Consequently, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions had to share the same road, which was described as "hardly traversable" for wheeled vehicles. These delays, along with the subsequent loss of the bridge over the Muchaviec River, meant that by the end of the day, the German advance covered only 18 kilometers when it should have ideally been 80 kilometers.

As they advanced, they encountered a series of well-prepared defensive positions. The 4th and 2nd Fortified Regions were strategically positioned to cover the major crossings in front of the river. It took the infantry of the 6th Army the entire day to battle through these positions, enduring grueling combat from bunker to bunker. This relentless fighting provided the Southwestern Front with valuable time to react, even though the Panzers had broken through by midday. Over the next week, the German forces would continue their advance. They faced fierce opposition for days, often marching seemingly impossible distances to keep up with the Panzers and fend off Red Army counterattacks, only to repeat the cycle. The infantry quickly learned the harsh realities of the war they were in. The first week proved to be incredibly challenging, and it was clear that it would never get any easier.

Late on the night of June 22, Kirponos received orders from Moscow. This was Directive Number Three, issued by Marshal Timoshenko, which called for a general counteroffensive. While completely detached from reality, the directive was rooted in the pre-war plans of the Red Army. It instructed Kirponos to leverage his supposed superiority in armor to strike at the southern lines of the German advance, severing their access to bases in Poland. However, this ambitious plan was based on two key assumptions. First, the Red Army needed time to mobilize its forces to execute the intended counterstroke. Unfortunately, by June 22, they were almost completely caught off guard, with troops scattered across the operational area. There was no time for proper mobilization and organization; divisions and corps were forced to march to their jumping-off points with little to no preparation. The second major shortcoming for the Red Army was a lack of a clear strategic understanding of where the main effort lay. The immense scale of the German assault surpassed anything they had anticipated. The entirety of the Western Soviet border was under attack, leaving little room for maneuver. Communication lines between units and commanders were severed, creating chaos. Generals had no idea where their units were, much less how they were faring under the relentless onslaught of the German invasion. These were the dire conditions facing the Front Commanders when Timoshenko and the General Staff ordered the counteroffensive. Kirponos was designated as the main effort, but he harbored no illusions about his capability to push the Germans back. Faced with no alternatives, he had no choice but to follow orders and organize the counterattack, or risk being recalled to Moscow. Given the purges that had decimated the ranks of the military leadership, the threat inherent in this order was unmistakable.

To facilitate the order for the counteroffensive, Timoshenko dispatched General Staff officers to each of the fronts, including Army General Zhukov to assist Kirponos. The nature of this assistance is unclear, but sources seem to indicate that it involved a degree of supervision. If the Front Commander did not execute his orders with a certain degree of competency then it was likely that he would not be the Front Commander for much longer. The case of Army General Pavlov comes to mind. Unfortunately for the counteroffensive, Kirponos was still in the process of concentrating his forces when the order was issued. This disarray meant that the mechanized corps, intended to serve as the main effort, had to be deployed piecemeal. Few of the corps were able to engage in battle as complete units, which was the opposite of Timoshenko’s vision. However, delaying the offensive was not an option, so Kirponos ordered his armor forward. The 22nd and 15th Mechanized Corps were directed to attack the northern and southern flanks of the German penetration. By coincidence, on the morning of the invasion, the strongest unit of the 22nd Mechanized Corps was training just north of Vladimir Volynskii. The 41st Tank Division, commanded by Colonel P. Pavlov boasted thirty-one KV series tanks and nearly three hundred fifty T-34s, placing him in an excellent position to strike at the expanding German breach. However, Pavlov’s pre-war orders dictated that he pull back to his assembly area in the event of an invasion. Compromising with local commanders who were desperate for support, he decided to send a single battalion of his lightest tanks to the front while pulling the rest of his division back to Kovel. This sort of move might seem absurd to the modern viewer. Especially one that remembers Napoleon’s maxim of fighting with your whole force. However, it is important to remember that Pavlov had no ability to communicate with his superiors. Additionally, the pre-war Red Army had a culture of strong obedience to orders, regardless of circumstances. Pavlov almost assuredly felt that he had no choice but to follow his existing orders, lest he risk his life for disobeying superior officers. In addition to this, he must’ve felt a responsibility to help his comrades. He chose the worst of all paths, dividing his forces. Lest we allow ourselves to much satisfaction, we need to remember this was made in the heat of battle. The T-26 battalion quickly faced disaster, falling victim to German anti-tank units at Vladimir Volynskii. Led by Major Suin, the battalion arrived with fifty tanks but soon lost thirty of them in the assault. The Soviets were ultimately forced to abandon the town.

Kirponos had forty-eight hours to initiate his counteroffensive with the scattered mechanized corps at his disposal. Meanwhile, Kleist had divided his panzers into two spearheads: one advancing north toward Lutsk and the other moving south to secure Berestechko. As Kirponos struggled to concentrate his forces, Kleist’s spearheads continued their relentless drive. In the south, the advance was spearheaded by General of Panzers Crüwell and his 11th Panzer Division. By midday on the twenty-third, they reached Radekhov, nearly seventy kilometers into Soviet territory, where they encountered the 10th Tank Division. Initially, they were able to push back the surprised Soviet tankers. After this initial success, Crüwell reinforced his position and established a defensive ring in anticipation of a counterattack. Anticipating the need for stronger anti-tank support, he ensured that the Luftwaffe's eighty-eight millimeter guns were brought up and emplaced. However, by the time Major General Ogurtsov managed to position his tanks to retake the town, the 11th Panzer Division was firmly entrenched in well-prepared positions. Ogurtsov obliged his adversaries by launching his attacks in waves. Early war Soviet tank tactics were a confounding mishmash of mismanagement and poor tactical sense. Local commanders attacked in waves, without infantry or artillery support. Armored cars would attack first, then light tanks and finally medium and heavy tanks in a final wave. This was a predictable pattern that allowed German defenders to save limited heavy AT ammunition. It also meant that the most vulnerable vehicles could be picked off at leisure as there was nothing else to shoot at. These tactics would soon fall by the wayside, but they were here for now. They would devastate the pre-war tank arm and cost many talented small unit commanders their lives. This misguided tactic allowed the defenders to avoid facing the full strength of his division simultaneously. After sustaining heavy losses, Ogurtsov ultimately pulled back, having lost forty-six tanks while inflicting only minimal casualties on the Germans, five panzers and a few anti-tank guns.

Kirponos was aware of the escalating attack and attempted to redirect more of his forces to the rapidly expanding battle, especially as the 11th Panzer Division dispatched a battalion to secure Berestechko. In the north, General of Panzers Kühn was leading his 14th Panzer Division toward Lutsk. Together, the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions formed the spearheads of Kleist’s advance into Ukraine. Unfortunately, the Southwestern Front's nominal advantage in armor was quickly evaporating in the face of the German assault. Given the circumstances, Kirponos had no choice but to direct his armor as it arrived on the scene, leading to piecemeal attacks that could be dealt with individually by Kleist. Throughout the initial fighting, Kirponos wisely maintained a strong reserve force, using them as a mobile fire brigade to plug gaps and repel dangerous Soviet counterattacks as they occurred. This piecemeal approach allowed him to avoid undue pressure in his efforts to hold the lines and gradually push the Germans back eastward.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, the Southwestern Front's counteroffensive had yet to materialize. The 14th Panzer Division was advancing on Lutsk when it encountered the 5th Army’s 1st Anti-Tank Brigade. The 1st Anti-Tank Brigade was perhaps the best armed anti-tank unit in the Southwestern Front. The Brigade was in possession of 48 of the adequate F-22 76.2mm guns as well as a number of other anti-tank weapons. The encounter at Lutsk was the first significant fighting between Soviet anti-tank forces and German Panzers. The Soviets were still road marching, and the Panzers caught them off guard. The brigade's commander quickly unlimbered his guns and brought them into position, opening fire on the advancing Germans. The fighting was fierce, but the Soviets lacked any significant supporting arms. This shortcoming led to a familiar outcome: while the Red Army fought bravely, it struggled to coordinate its resources effectively at the critical moment. In contrast, the Germans excelled in creating and exploiting local advantages, consistently turning them into larger successes. By fourteen hundred, the 22nd Mechanized Corps was in position to attack the 14th Panzer Division, but they could only deploy their 19th Tank Division. As was predictable, the attack did not go well. The light Soviet tanks were quickly shredded by the German combined arms. By eighteen hundred on the twenty-fourth, the Soviets were in full retreat behind Lutsk. German artillery wreaked havoc on the withdrawing units, resulting in the death of the 22nd Mechanized Corps commander.

In the south, near Lviv, the 17th Army was pushing ever closer. The Soviet 6th Army Commander, Lieutenant General Muzichenko, directed his 4th Mechanized Corps to launch a counterattack. Unfortunately, Muzichenko alternated between marching and counter-marching his tanks along the front line, using them to attack piecemeal without adequate support in a desperate attempt to shore up his defenses. This approach led to near destruction of the Corps’ combat power, with many tanks lost to enemy action and even more succumbing to mechanical failures on the roads. The bad state of the Soviet Union’s roads did not just hamper German movement. They were a constant thorn in Red Army operations and resulted in hundreds of casualties to mechanical faults. The poorly equipped tank recovery units and disorganized command structures did not help to alleviate these issues. On the 25th, further Red Army failures were evident. Dubno fell to the Germans, as did Lutsk. The 15th Mechanized Corps, under Major General Karpezo, could not be compelled to attack the exposed flank of the 11th Panzer Division. Karpezo baffled his superiors; the normally strict Red Army command structure struggled to motivate him to engage. This was an unusual failure for a commander of Zhukov’s caliber, as he had the full weight of the establishment behind him. Yet, Karpezo remained in command, continuing to defy expectations and orders from above.

Finally, on the 25th, Zhukov and Kirponos managed to assemble their forces for the planned counterstroke, though they were considerably weakened. It had taken three days, but the troops were finally in position. On the south side of the expanding bulge were the 15th Mechanized Corps and the newly arrived 8th Mechanized Corps. In the north, the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps had gathered at Rovno. The fighting began in the north, with the 9th Mechanized launching a small attack before quickly retreating to a defensive posture. The 19th Mechanized went all-in and was severely mauled at Dubno. The southern attack fared little better than its northern counterpart. The 15th Mechanized Corps remained in place, which allowed the 8th Mechanized Corps the opportunity to push back against the Germans. Unfortunately, the first units attacked directly from the march, with no time to familiarize themselves with the terrain, the layout of the Heer’s positions, or even to resupply with fuel and ammunition. The result was a slow-moving debacle. The fighting continued sporadically for the rest of the week.

On June 26th, the 12th Tank Division managed to penetrate the German lines. This breach was paradoxically unexpected, yet it was the very aim of the counterattack. Unfortunately, there was no plan in place to support the division's advance. The 16th Panzer Division was moved up as part of Kleist’s previously mentioned reserves and effectively halted the advance of the Soviet tanks. Just as this attack was reaching its climax, Luftwaffe reconnaissance reported a critical discovery: they had located the command posts of the two Red Army Corps. The distinctive radio trucks had revealed the positions of the two commanders. The Luftwaffe swiftly dispatched several groups of medium bombers, destroying the nerve centers of the most serious counterattack the Wehrmacht was facing. In the chaos, Karpezo was wounded, and the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General Ryabshev, was unable to maintain effective control of his units. However, he managed to regain his command the following day. A genuine victory was still within reach, despite the numerous missteps and confusion. The 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were cut off along with parts of the 75th Infantry Division. The 8th Mechanized Corps had successfully executed an envelopment. Front lines collapsed around Dubno as both sides became intermingled in the fight. The situation was stabilized by a timely intervention from Kleist, who was greatly aided by the composure of his local commanders. He directed a counterattack that cut off the unsupported corridor the 8th Mechanized had carved out during their advance. 

Despite the chaotic arrangements and various difficulties, the Soviet attack achieved some initial success. The offensive caught the Germans on the move and outside their prepared positions, with Soviet tanks sweeping aside hastily constructed German anti-tank defenses manned by motorcycle troops attached to the 48th Panzer Corps. Later, the 8th Mechanized Corps split, with some units amalgamating into Nikolai Popel's group, while a second force remained under the command of Ryabyshev. Popel's group consisted of about 300 tanks, including no fewer than 100 T-34 and KV tanks. On June twenty-seventh, Popel's forces launched a surprise attack, defeating the rear of the 11th Panzer Division and capturing Dubno, a strategically vital road crossing. This marked the most successful Soviet action of the battle, as it effectively cut off the supply lines of the German armored spearhead, the 11th Panzer Division. However, this advantage was not exploited by Soviet command, which failed to communicate with Popel and did not provide necessary supplies or reinforcements. As a result, Popel's group remained in Dubno, preparing for defense and losing the operational initiative.

The German high command considered the situation to be "serious." General Halder wrote this in the war diary"In the Army Group South sector, heavy fighting continues on the right flank of Panzer Group 1. The Russian 8th Tank Corps has effected a deep penetration of our front and is now in the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. This penetration has seriously disrupted our rear areas between Brody and Dubno. The enemy is threatening Dubno from the southwest... the enemy also has several separate tank groups acting in the rear of Panzer Group 1, which are managing to cover considerable distances." By June 28th, the Germans had gathered enormous forces. Popel's group came under attack from elements of the 16th Motorized Infantry Division, the 75th Infantry Division, two other infantry divisions, and the 16th Panzer Division. Encircled in Dubno, Popel defended his position until July first, when he was forced to retreat. The 8th Mechanized Corps found itself crushed in the midst of its best chance for victory, its vital connection to the rest of the Southwestern Front severed before it could be stabilized. The overall situation deteriorated rapidly. The German 6th Army arrived on the northern flank and managed to push the remaining Red Army units back into confusion. The last day of solid resistance was June 30th.

The impact of the hesitation and confusion in command on June twenty-seventh and its effect on the battle, as well as the German advance into Ukraine, is difficult to determine. When the Soviet forces captured Dubno and cut off the leading edge of the main German attack, Kirponos believed that the same German forces threatened to outflank and encircle the Soviet units attacking from the south. As a result, he ordered a halt to the offensive and a general retreat to rationalize and shorten his front line, aiming "to prevent the enemy tank groupings from penetrating into the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies," according to H. Baghramyan. After debating with the Front commander and his staff, Georgy Zhukov quickly countermanded these orders, issuing directives for a renewed attack just two hours later. This decision led to even more confusion, emblematic of the Soviet command’s struggles during the Battle of Brody. Rokossovsky, who commanded the 9th Mechanized Corps attacking from the north, balked at the new orders, stating, "we had once again received an order to counter-attack. However, the enemy outnumbered us to such a degree that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defenses." Meanwhile, Ryabyshev, commanding the 8th Mechanized Corps to the south, complied with the order and resumed the attack.

Ryabyshev appeared to side with Zhukov’s position at the time, arguing that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay, the Soviets might have been successful. However, subsequent events seemed to validate Kirponos's concerns that the attack was premature and could destabilize the integrity of the entire front. Shortly after the failed Soviet counter-attack, Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command of the combined Southwestern and Southern Front. Disaster soon unfolded at the Battle of Uman, where 100,000 Soviet soldiers were killed or captured and another 100,000 wounded when three Red Army formations, the 26th, 12th, and 18th Armies, were encircled as Army Group South renewed its advance by pivoting south from the positions it had achieved during the Battle of Dubno. Kirponos had foreshadowed this outcome in his arguments with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counter-attack at Dubno. The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led Zhukov to tell the Southwestern Front political officer, Nikita Khrushchev, "I am afraid your commander Kirponos here is pretty weak." This charge remained unanswered, as Kirponos died in the battle of Kiev after it was surrounded.

The Battle of Dubno was not the end of the Southwestern Front, but it served as a perfect microcosm of the Soviet war machine as it stood in June 1941. Wasted opportunities, command inadequacies, and poor tactics all contributed to the Red Army’s failures across the front in the first week of the war. Many units struggled to organize their own attacks, defenses, and logistics effectively. They rarely coordinated their efforts with higher echelons or peer units. While soldiers fought valiantly and with determination, such bravery alone does not win wars. By the end of the first week, Army Group South was in a strong position. There had been moments of crisis, but cool heads and effective coordination had helped the soldiers navigate through these challenges. Luftwaffe reconnaissance and air support had operated successfully, although the area of operations remained relatively small. Logistics had also not yet become a major issue for the field units. The Panzers had worked effectively in conjunction with the infantry commanders, a dynamic that was not consistently true during the first week of Operation Barbarossa.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Army Group South aimed for Ukraine, facing supply issues and coordination failures. Commanders struggled with communication and strategy, leading to piecemeal assaults. Though the Germans secured significant territory, the fight proved grueling. By the end of the week, both sides faced the harsh realities of war, setting the stage for continued conflict on the Eastern Front.

Eastern Front #3 Day 3 Operation Barbarossa: The First Encirclement

Last time we spoke about Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa. On the campaign's second day, Army Group North, led by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, aimed to seize Leningrad and prevent Soviet retreats. Initial assaults caught Soviet troops off guard, leading to devastating German victories. However, logistical challenges in harsh terrain began to hamper their advance. As Germany celebrated these wins, Soviet forces regrouped and mounted fierce counterattacks, demonstrating unexpected resilience amid chaos. In Finland, leveraging the situation, local activists orchestrated a rebellion in Kaunas, declaring independence and collaborating with German troops, marking a brief surge of hope among the populace. Yet, the brutality of war soon took center stage as Nazi units began committing horrific atrocities against Jewish communities. Amid these grim realities, soldiers faced not only daunting battles but also the moral implications of their actions. The tide of war began to reveal the brutal consequences of conflict, foreshadowing a dark period in history as both sides grappled with the unfolding horror of human suffering on the Eastern Front. 

This episode is: Day 3 Operation Barbarossa: The First Encirclement 

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello again, we are now on day 3 of Operation Barbarossa. Over the past two episodes we covered Army Group Center and Army Group North as they made their initial thrusts into the USSR. As the conflict unfolded, Army Group Center burst into the Soviet Union, fueled by an unstoppable momentum. The thrust was bolstered by the most formidable deployment of Luftwaffe assets ever seen on the Eastern Front. Imagine nearly 1,500 aircraft from the 2nd Air Fleet soaring through the skies, unleashing a relentless barrage on Soviet airfields, critical supply lines, and concentrations of troops. At first glance, the initial air superiority seemed like a foregone conclusion. However, this early success of the Luftwaffe belied deeper challenges lurking beneath the surface. Reconnaissance gaps and a glaring lack of close air support were quietly starting to impede the operational effectiveness of the German forces on the ground. As the campaign roared into action, German troops, led by Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group and Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, initiated a swift, coordinated advance. Their goal? To encircle entire Soviet armies. Key locations like Alytus and Grodno became battlegrounds where fierce tank clashes unfolded. Here, the Germans encountered the formidable T-34s of the Red Army, a new and powerful adversary. Despite their bravery, disorganization and a failure to integrate combined-arms tactics ultimately doomed the Soviet counterattacks. Today we are going to continue the story and this will set the stage for one of the most significant encirclements in modern military history at the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket.

We are now venturing back to the campaign led by Army Group Center, who are currently being supported by two air corps, 2nd Air Corps, under General of Aviation Loerzer, the 8th Air Corps under Colonel General Richthofen both of which were part of the 2nd Air Fleet, under Field Marshal Kesserling. The 8th Air Corps was tasked with supporting the 9th Army, especially Armoured Group 3, while the 2nd Air Corps  coordinated with the 4th Army, focusing primarily on Armoured Group 2. The previous successes of the Wehrmacht's land campaigns had showcased the enormous advantage Germany gained through effective combined-arms operations. Recognizing this critical synergy, Kesselring made it clear to his generals that the desires and strategies of the army were to be regarded as his own commands. This instruction underscored the necessity of collaboration, an essential element in the execution of their military plans. The commitment of air units to this campaign underscored the importance of Army Group Center as the spearhead of Operation Barbarossa. Around 1,500 planes took to the skies under the banner of the 2nd Air Fleet, boasting a formidable mix of modern light bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. In that crucial first week, these aircraft unleashed a series of raids on Soviet airfields and supply dumps, all in an effort to disrupt the Red Army’s ability to respond effectively to the invasion. By the end of this initial phase, it was clear: the Luftwaffe had overwhelmingly triumphed in the opening shots of the air war. Yet, even in this promising start, serious challenges began to emerge. 

Despite the impressive number of aircraft, there was never enough close air support available to adequately assist the frontline troops. Gaps in air reconnaissance quickly became an issue. This lack of information allowed Soviet troop concentrations to go unnoticed, resulting in missed opportunities and surprise counter-attacks. This failure to gather intelligence left the Corps and Army commanders with an incomplete tactical picture. However, amid these challenges, there were also significant successes for the close air support units of the air fleet. Throughout this tumultuous beginning, the sky remained a battleground of innovation and conflict, where both sides wrestled for dominance as the war unfolded. Some of the reasons for this was because the 8th Air Corps had been heavily involved in the capture of Crete, and with the battle concluding in early June, there was barely any time to prepare for Barbarossa. By June 21, the 8th Air Corps was critically short on resources: approximately 600 motor vehicles, 40 percent of its aircraft, and essential communication equipment were all lacking. This significant shortfall loomed large just days before the invasion. On that same day, Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen, the commander of the 8th Air Corps expressed deep concern, stating, “We are greatly concerned that our units are as yet unready.” Maintaining hundreds of aircraft at peak operational readiness proved to be a constant technical challenge, obscuring the stark difference between the total number of aircraft and those truly combat-ready. For instance, out of 425 dive-bombers, only 323 were actually fit for combat, and of the 98 'destroyers', merely 60 were operational. Among the 384 fighters, just 284 were combat-ready, while the total bomber force of 299 aircraft saw only 222 remain serviceable. Overall, while Air Fleet 2 boasted a total of 1,367 aircraft across all types, but only 994 were capable of executing combat operations. This issue wasn't limited to Air Fleet 2; throughout the whole Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe faced an average 25 percent fallout rate among its aircraft. Consequently, a combined strength of 2,995 aircraft translated into just 2,255 that were truly combat-ready. By the summer of 1941, it became increasingly evident that the Luftwaffe would only be able to fulfill its commitments if the war in the east could be won swiftly and with minimal losses. Practical concerns, such as oil availability, and strategic considerations regarding Britain, made a prolonged campaign simply untenable. The Luftwaffe was already stretched thin across multiple fronts, with approximately 1,566 aircraft tied down in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and within Germany itself. This significant dispersion of strength across less critical theaters hindered their ability to concentrate on the most vital front, the one with the narrowest window for success.

The left flank of Army Group Center was firmly anchored by the 6th Corps within the Suwalki salient. These determined troops advanced in a northwestern direction toward Vilnius, aiming to seize control of the critical bridges at Alytus on the Neman River. In their path lay several divisions of the Red Army. However, the Soviet 11th Army, led by Lieutenant General Morozov stretched thin across a wide front of 170 kilometers, offered little resistance to the relentless march of the German Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Group. It was no surprise, then, that in the early hours of the 3rd Panzer Group’s surge eastward, forward units reported encountering “only very weak or no enemy contact.” Luftwaffe reconnaissance confirmed this, identifying just one enemy artillery battery in their path. By the end of the day, Hoth’s panzer group had reached the Neman River, seizing captured bridges at Olita and Merkine. The penetration of the Soviet front was significant; Halder remarked that the panzer group had already gained the freedom of operational maneuver, but also noted in their war diary “Where the enemy appears, he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. As a result, the struggle will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign.” The strategic importance of Alytus was clear: it needed to be secured to maintain the momentum of the offensive. On June 22, the Germans achieved a crucial victory with the capture of Alytus. Under the command of Colonel General Hoth, the 3rd Panzer Group pushed forward with incredible speed, covering a distance of 65 kilometers from their starting point to the bridges at Alytus in less than ten hours.  After quickly brushing aside a small NKVD border guard post on the outskirts of the town, the Panzers began to cross the Neman River almost immediately. This rapid advance not only secured the vital crossing but also set the stage for further operations deeper into Soviet territory.

On the Soviet side, the invasion triggered nothing short of utter chaos, most strikingly evident in the Western Military District, which faced Army Group Center. Here, the command structure collapsed almost immediately due to a near-total loss of communication at most levels of the chain of command. This complete disarray made it impossible to gather coherent information about the current situation, severely hampering the development and execution of a coordinated Soviet response. As internal confusion mounted alongside external pressure from the German advance, the Western Military District descended into disintegration. This slide toward chaos was exacerbated by the Soviet High Command's misguided adherence to pre-war plans, which called for immediate counterattacks. However, due to the lack of proper preparation and direction for these efforts, they resulted in piecemeal assaults that proved ineffective while inflicting heavy casualties on Soviet forces.

To give an example, the 11th Army, operating under the command of the Soviet Northwestern Front, had begun to organize a counterattack against the 4th Panzer Group around Raseiniai. However, the situation was precarious; the 11th Army had only the 5th Tank Division available to respond to the German crossing at Alytus. To complicate matters further, the Soviet tanks faced a 30-kilometer road march to reach their positions, causing a crucial delay that allowed the German Panzers time to concentrate their forces. By the time the Soviet tanks were nearly in position, the Panzers had managed to deploy an entire regiment ready to cross the Neman River. Unfortunately for the Soviets, some of their tanks suffered mechanical issues and fell behind on the way. Nonetheless, they arrived in force with 44 T-34s, a mark of their formidable capabilities. In this first encounter, the German troops were taken by surprise by the T-34s. The Soviet tanks swiftly targeted the northern of the two bridges, effectively shutting it down, and destroyed a Pz. 38(t) on the site. However, the Soviet tanks faced a limitation of their own; they were short on armor-piercing ammunition. To minimize their exposure while still covering the bridge, they pulled back to a defilade position, continuing to keep the Panzers in check.

On the scene, Colonel Rothenburg, the German commander, quickly called in Luftwaffe support. The air force arrived shortly, unleashing high-explosive bombs on and around the Soviet positions in the northern sector. Just prior to this, the T-34s had received reinforcements in the form of additional T-28 medium tanks. Together, they formed a defensive line that kept the Germans just out of range of the Panzers’ light armament. While this confrontation unfolded at the northern bridge, more Panzers began crossing the southern bridge, only to encounter BT-7 tanks waiting to engage them. A minor stalemate developed in both sectors, but the Soviets quickly began to show signs of weakening. Unlike their German counterparts, they lacked the staying power needed to hold their ground under pressure. As evening fell, it became evident that the Soviets’ failure to provide adequate support for their tanks was detrimental. They struggled without sufficient infantry, artillery, and air support to bolster their defenses. Finally, the Germans managed to break through, regaining momentum and resuming their drive forward.

The next morning, the Soviet 5th Tank Division withdrew, having suffered substantial losses, approximately 70 tanks in total. This included at least 27 of the modern T-34s, which were in short supply during the early days of the war. Tragically, many of these tanks were lost due to operator error; two of them accidentally drove into the river, resulting in complete losses. The Germans, on the other hand, incurred losses of around 30 tanks, though only 11 of these were total losses. Significantly, all of the Soviet losses were irrecoverable, a stark contrast to the German experience. Several factors contributed to this discrepancy, but the most apparent was the chaotic nature of the Soviet retreat. The Soviets often fell back in disarray, which hindered their ability to recover and salvage their equipment. Even if they had been more organized, it remains questionable how well-equipped the Soviet Tank Divisions were with recovery equipment. The tables of organization of the Soviet Tank Division in 1941 authorized one crane truck and twenty recovery tractors. Most sources do not cover the status of this type of auxiliary equipment but considering what we know about the poor state of the authorized tank strengths, it is unlikely that any division had the proper recovery vehicles in place during the first days and weeks of the war. In the early weeks of the war, the Germans clearly excelled in this critical aspect of military operations, allowing them to maintain their momentum while the Soviets struggled to regroup.

Whatever delays and casualties these early Soviet counterattacks caused the German forces, the horrendous losses on the Soviet side have often led literature to portray a one-sided conflict that favors the narrative of an unrelenting German blitzkrieg. This focus tends to obscure an important reality: from the earliest stages of the war, German losses were far from negligible. Typically, German casualties did not stem from large-scale battles in conventional engagements with the Red Army. Instead, they were primarily the result of the disintegration of organized Soviet fighting formations. The breakdown in command and control led to numerous smaller skirmishes that, while not significant on their own, collectively inflicted a substantial toll on the invading forces. On only the third day of conflict, Halder noted that casualties were “bearable,” but he added, “Remarkably high losses among officers.” During this period, Soviet tactics, though crude, proved effective. Engagements were often initiated by small groups of Soviet soldiers, who would ambush unsuspecting German forces from carefully selected positions. This approach leveled the playing field against the German superiority in heavy weapons, mobility, and air power. The dense Belarusian forests and high summer cornfields provided excellent cover for these Soviet troops, allowing them to prepare ambushes along the roads essential to the German advance. As German columns stretched longer across the countryside, gaps inevitably opened between the fast-moving Panzers and the slower-trudging infantry. This left poorly defended supply columns exposed to attacks, even from small groups of soldiers without heavy weaponry. This situation sparked an immediate and effective form of guerrilla resistance, executed by soldiers armed with military-issued equipment rather than untrained peasants.

By June 24, the 3rd Panzer Group reported that the forests were teeming with fugitive Soviet soldiers who were “attacking from the flank and rear,” causing unrest and “slowing the advance.” Therefore, a request was made for reserves from Colonel-General Adolf Strauss’s 9th Army to be dispatched to “clean out the woods.” However, the vast area in question made this an impossible task, especially given the limited German reserves. In fact, at no point in the war did German security forces succeed in eliminating partisan resistance in Belarus. On the contrary, these forces only grew in number and effectiveness. A similar pattern of attacks plagued the 2nd Panzer Group’s rear area from the outset of the war. A former officer from the 3rd Panzer Division observed: “During the first two days of combat, unarmored troops and rear echelons suffered considerable losses inflicted by hostile enemy troops cut off from their main bodies. They hid beside the march routes, opened fire by surprise, and could only be defeated in intense hand-to-hand combat. German troops had not previously experienced this type of war.”

Now to the south of the Alytus area lay the Bialystok Salient, a broad protrusion of Soviet lines extending into German-controlled Poland. This salient was flanked by German forces on both its northern and southern sides, stretching approximately 250 kilometers at its widest point. The fortress of Brest anchored the southern end of the front along the Bug River. The dividing line between the Soviet Northwestern and Western Fronts ran just south of Alytus, creating a distinct advantage for Hoth’s Panzers as they operated along this divided area of responsibility. The bulk of the opposing Western Front forces remained concentrated within the Bialystok Salient. Although the utter disarray engulfing the Soviet Western Front positioned most of their counter-moves for failure, the impact of the Red Army’s new tanks was evident even in the most one-sided encounters. In an attempt to cut off the German penetration and seal the dangerous breach in the Soviet front, Lieutenant-General Dmitri Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, launched frantic counterattacks on June 24 and 25 against the left wing of Army Group Centre using his 11th and 6th Mechanized Corps. The 11th Mechanized Corps was comparatively weak, equipped with only 60 T-34s and KV-1s, supported by 200 older T-26s and BT series tanks. In contrast, the 6th Mechanized Corps fielded 960 tanks, with approximately half being the newer medium and heavy T-34 and KV-1 designs.

Unfortunately, plagued by communication issues and a lack of precise intelligence, the Soviet offensive was hopelessly ill-coordinated. As a result, it missed its intended target, Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group, and instead collided with the 20th and 8th Army Corps of the advancing 9th Army. Even before making contact, the counterattack, directed by Pavlov’s skilled operations officer, Lieutenant-General Ivan Boldin, was severely hindered by the relentless aerial assaults of Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen’s 8th Air Corps. Boldin’s scattered forces endured heavy losses even trying to reach their designated assembly areas in the Lunna–Indura–Sokolka region south of Grodno. His long, armored convoys became easy targets for the formidable Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers, which in some cases were equipped with phosphorus bombs. Complicating matters further, the T-34s and KV-1s had only recently been introduced to the two Mechanized Corps, arriving in April and May 1941. Many KV-1s still lacked ammunition, and crews for the new models were assigned only in late May and early June, leaving training rudimentary at best.

As a result, Boldin’s counter-stroke was merely a shadow of its intended strength. Nevertheless, the sight of massed Soviet tanks, particularly the newly seen T-34s and KV-1s, instilled panic among the German Panzerjäger anti-tank units as they watched round after round bounce off the Soviet armor. Urgent requests for more armor-piercing shells were sent out, while Richthofen’s squadrons provided critical close-air support. The near-total absence of aerial cover cost the Soviets dearly, and the offensive soon devolved into another catastrophic defeat with heavy losses. However, two significant factors emerged from this engagement. First, the battle delayed the advance of the 9th Army’s right wing and widened the gap between the 3rd Panzer Group and its infantry support. More importantly, this confrontation exposed the vulnerability of German units to attacks by the latest Soviet tank models, which, with Soviet factories now working at a furious pace, posed a dire threat for the Germans if the war dragged on beyond its expected timeframe.

A report about a junior Soviet officer, Lieutenant Pavel Gudz, commanding five KV-1s and two T-34s on the southern front during the war’s first day captures the scene vividly: “The Germans started bombing the column... A shell from a German anti-tank gun bounced off the tank’s heavy armor... Gudz, who was both the tank’s gunner and commander, fired a single shot in return, destroying the enemy gun. He and his platoon went on to knock out five German tanks, three armored personnel carriers, and several cars. After lunch, the Germans attacked again, and Gudz disabled three more tanks. His driver, Galkin, rammed another German tank, dislodging its track and forcing it into a ditch. The fields were covered with burned-out tanks and dead Germans.”

On June 25, elements of the 57th Panzer Corps, under General of Panzers Kuntzen captured Vilnius, while the 39th Panzer Corps, under General of Panzers Schmidt began advancing toward Minsk. They executed a wide flanking maneuver behind the Soviet 3rd Army, effectively trapping them in the early stages of what would evolve into the Bialystok-Minsk encirclement. Despite his firm belief that Army Group Centre's top priority should be the closure of the encirclement at Minsk, Halder favored sending elements of both Panzer groups toward the Dvina and Dnepr rivers to secure bridgeheads for the next stage of the advance. On June 29, Halder recorded in his diary for the first time his objective for Army Group Centre: the attack on Moscow. He expressed hope for the seizure of Rogachev and Mogilev along the Dnepr, stating that this would "open the road to Smolensk and, from there, the course to Moscow."

Meanwhile, at Hitler's headquarters, a very different picture was emerging. Hitler was also considering the continuation of the campaign following the elimination of the pocket. The critical question was whether the main thrust of operations should be directed toward Moscow or Leningrad. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch of the OKH was known to be in attendance at the Wolf's Lair on June 29, and while the records do not specify, he likely recommended the Moscow option to Hitler. Even if he did not, he certainly would have supported it. However, Hitler was more inclined to focus on cutting the Soviets off from the Baltic Sea, thereby denying them access to the North Sea. This strategy would secure Germany’s ore transports from Scandinavia and allow for the concentration of Finland’s strength for their attack in the east. Regarding an eventual thrust on Moscow, Hitler argued that an advance on Leningrad would secure the left flank of the later operation, and that, for the time being, the Soviet capital should simply be subjected to bombing. The following day, June 30, Hitler expanded on these sentiments, asserting that the addition of Panzer forces from Army Group Centre would facilitate the rapid seizure of Leningrad’s industrial area and that only after this should the attack on Moscow be launched.

In more immediate concerns, Brauchitsch reported that Hitler was once again expressing nervous anxiety about the depth of Schweppenburg’s 24TH Panzer Corps, which had reached Bobruisk and was building a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Beresina River on June 29. Brauchitsch reassured Hitler that this was simply flank protection for the main operation at Minsk. However, Halder, who was not present but later received a report from Brauchitsch, recognized that Guderian would settle for nothing less than the quickest possible crossing of the Dnepr. Halder personally supported Guderian in this endeavor. Yet, Hitler remained concerned that the 24th Panzer Corps had over-extended itself. He forbade army command from issuing any further orders for the eastward advance of the Panzer Corps, effectively tying Halder's hands.

Halder regarded this as a grave mistake but was unwilling to concede command of the campaign to Hitler. In his diary, Halder defiantly stated: “Let us hope that the middle levels of command will do the right thing on their own and without express orders, which we cannot issue because of the Führer’s orders to Brauchitsch.” A strict interpretation of his orders prohibited him from issuing a command to advance, but it did not explicitly require him to forbid action if it was undertaken independently by the generals themselves, which he assumed it would be. Using this tenuous reasoning, Halder convinced himself that he could still achieve his objectives without disobeying orders. While Germany’s leading generals clashed among themselves and with Hitler’s headquarters over direction for the eastern campaign, infighting among Germany’s political institutions was even more intense. Headed by some of the most unscrupulous personalities in the Third Reich, notably Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler, each man vied for the largest slice of the lucrative Soviet prize, seeking to expand their respective empires within the internal authorities of the Nazi state. Observing this chaotic scene, Goebbels, who himself was embroiled in a dispute with the OKW and the designated minister for the new eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg, over the dissemination of propaganda complained in his diary: “Always the same thing: spheres of authority.” He astutely added: “If we go down, it will be as a result of these disputes.”

Earlier, during the afternoon of June 22, German assault guns from the 8th Infantry Division took Grodno. As they advanced, they encountered the 29th Tank Division. Unfortunately for the Red Army, the local commander, Colonel Studnev, was not among the most competent leaders. Mistaking the assault guns for Panzers, he decided to engage from a distance. His poorly trained gunners wasted their ammunition with ineffective shots. Recognizing that their assault guns were unlikely to achieve significant results, the Germans took cover and called in close air support. Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers swiftly arrived and began attacking the stationary Soviet tanks. Meanwhile, the 8th Infantry Division engaged with their artillery, proving effective in destroying several light tanks. After enduring four hours of this combined arms assault, Studnev's men retreated, having lost 33 tanks while inflicting only a couple dozen casualties on the invaders. Importantly, this delay did not significantly hinder the Germans; in fact, the Panzers were never present in the area. They were busy pushing east and north at breakneck speed, seeking to envelop the very units that were so eagerly rushing to the border within the growing pocket.

On the southern half of the developing encirclement was the 2nd Panzer Group under Colonel General Guderian. His group represented the largest concentration of armored forces ever assembled in the short history of the Wehrmacht. Guderian was a prima donna by reputation even at this early stage of the war. However, he was a daring commander who never hesitated to argue with his higher command. He schemed to increase his responsibility and resources. In the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, Guderian's Panzer Group faced one of the longest marches to its objective: Minsk, situated over 400 kilometers from their starting point. For comparison, the march of the 3rd Panzer Group was notably shorter at only 300 kilometers. It was also anticipated that Guderian’s route would encounter some of the stiffest enemy resistance. The first week yielded mixed results. The Brest Fortress could not be overwhelmed and needed to be bypassed; infantry units from Field Marshal Kluge’s 4th Army were assigned to reduce it instead. Guderian’s tanks faced Red Army units immediately upon crossing the Bug River on the morning of June 22. The 14th Mechanized Corps launched a counterattack en masse, deploying over 200 tanks. However, nearly all of these were outdated light tanks from the previous decade. The newer and more advanced models, which were causing other German Panzer units significant trouble elsewhere along the front, were conspicuously absent from Guderian's opposition. Several factors combined to give the Panzers a decisive edge in this engagement. The T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 were still in limited production runs and would not make up the bulk of the Red Army’s armor forces until later in the war. Exact dates are disputed but it is likely that by late 1943 this generation of designs dominated the front-line armor units. Of course, on no side during the war was tank development static and many sub-models and evolutions of designs were admitted into service; some were better than others. They enjoyed tactical surprise, demonstrated superior organization, and had ready access to close air support, among other advantages. As a result, the Soviet counterattack was halted in its tracks, leading to severe losses bialfor the Red Army. While the Germans did suffer some tank losses, the counterattack had not significantly hindered their progress.

In the following days, Marshal Timoshenko, as the commander of the entire field army, sought to galvanize the Western Front into utilizing its armor to counter the invading forces. He directed several armored units to retake Grodno, still unaware that no Panzer units were present in the city. The 6th Mechanized Corps was ordered to march on Grodno and expel the Germans. The Luftwaffe’s extensive commitment to Army Group Center once again proved effective, as aerial reconnaissance detected the approaching tank columns on June 23. This intelligence was promptly relayed to 8th Flying Corps Headquarters, which dispatched aircraft to attack the advancing columns. Under the command of Colonel General Richthofen, the Luftwaffe destroyed 63 tanks, causing significant disruption to the Soviet march. Richthofen was a cousin of the infamous Red Baron of World War One fame, Captain Manfred von Richthofen. He was an ace in his own right and would go on to the highest levels of command in World War Two. He was an ardent supporter of Hitler and accepted bribes and other extra-legal benefits in the dictator’s service. He spent the last months of his life as an American POW before succumbing to a brain tumor in July 1945. 

When the 6th Mechanized Corps arrived in the Grodno area, it was a formidable force, on paper, the strongest collection of armor in the Red Army. Under Major General Khatskilevich, the corps boasted at least 100 KV tanks, nearly 200 T-34s, and hundreds of light tanks. However, there were significant logistical challenges. The light tanks required gasoline, while the medium and heavy tanks operated on diesel. This discrepancy meant that logistics would need to provide two types of fuel, with stocks depleting at uneven rates. Unfortunately for Khatskilevich, the closest major supply depot in Bialystok had been destroyed, forcing him to rely on his next supply source in Vawkavysk, located 75 kilometers to his rear. Recognizing the urgency, he sent whatever resources he could back to retrieve more fuel supplies. For the moment, the 6th Mechanized Corps found itself hindered by this fuel shortage. Additionally, the lack of radios and other communication equipment made it impossible to coordinate any action with the 11th Mechanized Corps. As a result, while the previously mentioned 29th Tank Division was enduring a devastating assault, Khatskilevich was unable to provide any assistance.

Only on June 24 did Major General Khatskilevich order an assault. Due to the ongoing diesel shortage, he could only deploy his light tanks, which were poorly positioned and ran directly into prepared anti-tank defenses. The attack was repulsed. On June 25, he attempted again, this time incorporating his medium and heavy tanks. However, success remained elusive. There was essentially little to no effective combination of artillery, infantry, and air support with the tanks, unlike the coordinated assaults the Germans had consistently demonstrated in the early days of the campaign. Consequently, any localized moments of success were swiftly crushed by the Wehrmacht’s combined arms approach, as the beleaguered Soviet tanks attacked in waves of increasing desperation. While the Soviet heavy tanks proved daunting for the Germans to handle, they, too, suffered from inept crews and poor coordination. Eventually, these tanks were either abandoned or destroyed by close-range heavy anti-tank fire. It wasn't until late in the afternoon that Western Front Headquarters realized they were squandering their armor. The Wehrmacht had not concentrated its armor at Grodno but had instead positioned it on the flanks of the salient. In horror, Pavlov recognized this too late and ordered the remnants of the 6th and 11th Mechanized Corps to pull back and cover Slonim to prevent Guderian from cutting off their main line of retreat. Unfortunately, this retreat did not go well; it effectively broke the units, leaving them as little more than a disorganized mob. The 17th Panzer Division arrived at Slonim late on the 24th, only to find the bridge blown. They quickly deployed pioneers to build a new bridge across the Schara River that night. 

Meanwhile, the rest of the 47th Panzer Corps caught up and pushed through to Baranavichy. The Bialystok pocket was now all but closed. Although Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group and Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group still needed to reach Minsk, there was now little standing in their way. The 12th and 20th Panzer Divisions reached the outskirts of Minsk on June 26. 

Contact finally established between Hoth and Guderian at Minsk, ostensibly closing the outer ring of the encirclement. However, in practice, the southeast side was far from being hermetically sealed. At Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Friedrich Fedor von Bock was anxious to advance toward the great rivers but was dismayed by the lost opportunities caused by higher command’s insistence on focusing on the Bialystok-Minsk pocket. Venting his frustration, Bock wrote: “That is the curse of the evil deed! If we turn near Minsk, there will inevitably be a stop there until the entire Bialystok-Minsk pocket has largely been cleared. I wanted to take possession of the Dnepr or at least the Beresina bridges quickly, so as not to have to fight for them later which, unfortunately, will now be the case!”

They began their assault the following day. The city was encircled by a ring of bunkers and fortifications, but these defenses were not manned with the full strength necessary for a proper hold. Minsk marked the easternmost point of an encirclement that had trapped the better part of three Soviet armies: the 3rd, 10th, and 13th Armies. These forces were loosely arranged in an oval stretching from Navahrudak in the west to Minsk in the east. The last major independent unit of the Western Front was the 4th Army, commanded by Major General Korobkov. He narrowly escaped encirclement along with his comrades near Minsk, primarily because Guderian’s Panzers had split him from the rest south of Baranovichi. While the 4th Army lived to fight another day, it suffered significant losses inside the pocket.

As Hoth’s Panzers assaulted Minsk, the fortifications continued to hold them back, resulting in casualties. The recent rainfall had turned the ground to mud, severely limiting their maneuverability as they fought through and around the city’s outskirts. Meanwhile, Guderian’s leading elements remained far from being able to seal the southern flank of the encirclement. The Luftwaffe relentlessly bombarded the city, causing widespread fires upon detonation. At one point, nearly half of Minsk was engulfed in flames, which made the defense of the city even more challenging. Finally, on June 28, the heart of Minsk was occupied by elements of the 12th Panzer Division. However, Guderian was still unable to close his end of the encirclement. It wasn’t until well after the fall of Minsk that his forces linked up with Hoth’s. By June 29, the encirclement was officially sealed, but there was just enough time for several units of the 13th Army to slip through the gap. 

However, Guderian was blind to such problems, and his post-war memoir glossed over the incomplete nature of the encirclement, seeking instead to celebrate his achievements at Minsk as an outstanding success. Reflecting on the final days of June, Guderian wrote: “The Russian forces, which had been in the Bialystok area and had been attempting in vain to break through our encircling pincers, were now completely surrounded. The foundations had been laid for the first great victory of the campaign.” The confident tone of these reflections hid a more genuine picture of the fighting that Guderian had conveyed in a letter to his wife on June 27. After describing the initial days as "strenuous," he mentioned the loss of several officers who had been close to him and the sadness it caused. When discussing the Red Army, he noted with a hint of grim resignation: “The enemy resists bravely and bitterly. The fighting, therefore, is very hard. One just has to put up with it.” By nature, Guderian was not a pessimist; indeed, he had previously been accused of viewing events through an overly optimistic lens. His letter simply conveyed the character of the new war in the east, which was marked by fervent hostility and fanaticism, unlike anything he had encountered before.

By the end of June, a begrudging acknowledgment of the Red Army's unexpectedly zealous resistance was growing among upper circles of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party. This reflected the stark contrast between the reality of war and the elevated confidence that had consumed the German leadership prior to the launch of operations. For many, this realization was just beginning to take hold. While it would be too much to suggest that anyone doubted Germany's ultimate triumph, the shock of facing genuine resistance was palpable. On June 29, Goebbels noted in his diary: “The Russians are fighting bravely. Their command is functioning better than during the first few days.” The following day, he remarked: “In foreign countries, our military situation is, if anything, being judged rather too optimistically, even by our enemies. They think our Wehrmacht capable of the most amazing achievements.” By July 1, despite general satisfaction with developments, Goebbels conveyed a clear sense of unease: “The Russians are putting up more of a fight than one would have expected. Our losses in men and equipment are not completely insignificant.”

Similarly, Bock described the ongoing challenge of defeating the sizable Soviet armies, noting that the swift breakthroughs to Minsk had not fully achieved this goal. Unlike previous campaigns, where surrounded enemy units acknowledged their defeat and surrendered willingly, the Red Army was far more resistant. The implications for Operation Barbarossa were profound. Reviewing events in his rear area on June 28, Bock observed: “Our losses are not inconsiderable. Thousands of Russian soldiers are hiding in the forests, far behind the front, some in civilian clothes… catching them all is impossible given the tremendous size of the area. One hundred kilometers behind the front, at Siemiatycze, the 293rd Division is still fighting for a row of strongly fortified bunkers, which have to be taken one at a time. In spite of the heaviest fire and the employment of every means, the crews refuse to give up. Each one has to be killed one at a time.”

Meanwhile the infantry armies of Army Group Center advanced and began the process of reducing the pocket, but this was no easy task. Even when Red Army units surrendered, the sheer size of the encirclement made it difficult to manage. Many soldiers continued to fight and die long after the Wehrmacht’s generals had deemed the situation resolved. It would be several days before the pocket was officially declared liquidated. Fighting remained intense until the very end. This battle became known as the Bialystok-Minsk pocket. It marked the first major operational success of Operation Barbarossa and was one of the largest encirclements in modern military history, rivaled only by the Dunkirk pocket. The vast majority of the Western Front was either destroyed, encircled, or disintegrating as they retreated from the advancing Germans.

In the aftermath of sealing the encirclement, Hitler intervened in the chain of command and ordered the Panzers to halt their advance. This move echoed his earlier decisions during the lead-up to Dunkirk, driven by a similar fear: he was concerned that the Panzers would leave the infantry behind, exposing their long and fragile logistical lines to a counterattack. Colonel General Halder, in his role as chief of staff of the OKH, argued against this decision. He was nominally the man responsible for such strategic choices, and in previous wars, he would have had the authority to proceed as he saw fit. However, Halder underestimated Hitler’s resolve regarding this matter, a miscalculation he would continue to make throughout his tenure. Halder, at least externally, was a man of complex motivations. He was bribed by Hitler throughout his tenure. He was certainly aware of the racial motivations of the Nazi regime and was comfortable exercising command in an Army engaged in a war of genocide as a matter of course. At the same time, he was sympathetic to the July 20 plotters and their attempted assassination of Hitler. Acquitted of war crimes, after the war he would go on to lay the groundwork behind the myth of the “Clean Wehrmacht.”

Ultimately, the Panzers were halted despite Halder's objections. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership was distraught but determined to continue the fight. Much of the Nazi leadership believed that the Soviet Union could not withstand such a severe blow as they had delivered at Minsk. They thought they had kicked in the door and expected the entire structure to crumble. They were mistaken. Stalin would not permit the Soviet Union to fall so easily. Timoshenko was appointed to lead the Western Front in Pavlov’s stead, and he immediately set about organizing defenses in front of Smolensk. The enemy's objective was now clear: the Panzers aimed to continue their advance along the Brest-Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow route. It was Timoshenko’s task to halt their progress.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Army Group Center advanced relentlessly, supported by a powerful Luftwaffe. Initial successes against poorly prepared Soviet troops gave rise to confidence, but logistical issues soon hampered German operations. As Soviet forces regrouped, fierce counterattacks emerged, revealing their resilience. The chaotic response from Soviet command only deepened their losses. Within days, the Germans encircled vast Soviet armies at Bialystok-Minsk, marking a significant operational victory.

Eastern Front #2 Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa: The North Army Attacks

Last time we spoke about Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa. On June 22, 1941, Operation Barbarossa commenced, marking the beginning of one of history's largest military campaigns. German soldiers received the shocking news just hours before the assault, rallying under Nazi ideology with grim determination. At dawn, artillery and air raids erupted, catching Soviet forces unprepared. The Wehrmacht launched a surprise attack, swiftly advancing deep into enemy territory, achieving significant early victories against a disorganized Soviet defense. As the first day wore on, German forces encountered fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers demonstrating unexpected resolve. Despite initial success, logistical challenges soon became evident, as the harsh terrain of the Eastern Front complicated the advance. Roads were poor, forcing troops to abandon vehicles and rely on manpower to pull them free. While high-ranking German leaders celebrated their swift progress, the reality for individual soldiers was increasingly sobering; they faced a determined Soviet army far from the feeble force they had anticipated. 

This episode is: Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa: The North Army Attacks

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello there. In the last episode we opened up the can of worms that was Operation Barbarossa, only for day one. In this podcast we are going to continue that story, but for cohesive sack we decided to tackle this by army group. So for the remainder of the week each episode will cover the different groups and today we are talking about Army Group North.

Prior to the invasion, Adolr Hitler emphasized that the most important objective was to prevent the Red Army from retreating in an orderly fashion. He stated that the blows against the Red Army must be sufficiently powerful to eliminate any chance of recovery. To achieve this, he asserted the necessity of deploying tank forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy's strongest units. Commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Army Group North was stationed in East Prussia. Its strategic objective was Leningrad, with operational goals that included capturing the territories of the Baltic republics and securing the northern flank of Army Group Centre in Northern Russia, specifically between the Western Dvina River and the Daugavpils-Kholm Army Group boundary.

Each of the German Army Groups was supported at the operational level by an Air Corps, except for Army Group Centre, which was supported by two Air Corps. A German Air Corps in 1941 was of variable strength but usually included at least 3 Air Wings of various types, including but not limited to Medium Bombers, Ground Attack and Fighter wings. There was a small Reconnaissance element in the Air Corps, but this was usually limited to a single flight of planes. Army Group North received support from the 1st Air Corps, led by Lt. General Förster, part of the 1st Air Fleet, led by Colonel General Keller. While this Corps lacked the dedicated ground attack Ju-87 Stuka wings found in other Air Corps, it compensated with a heavy concentration of Ju-88 medium bombers. In addition to the forces of the 1st Air Corps, there was also an ad-hoc organization led by Lieutenant Colonel von Wild, which was established to secure the coastline and ensure that the Soviet Navy could not disrupt the movement of the Heer along the coast.

As was the case along the entire front, the 1st Air Corps launched surprise attacks on Soviet air bases in its sector with brutal effectiveness. The Soviet response was minimal, hindered by a significant lack of modern equipment, poor command and control, and the shock of being attacked without any warning. The few Soviet fighters that managed to take to the air were completely outclassed by their German counterparts. Soviet losses in the initial days of the war were so staggering that even the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe found them hard to believe. It is estimated that 1,800 Soviet planes were destroyed on the first day, with hundreds more lost throughout the week. In the far north, the war opened with a massive Soviet bomber raid on June 25, targeting cities across Finland with approximately 500 medium bombers. This attack was a critical demonstration of the Red Air Force’s continuing strength. The Luftwaffe could not intercept them all, and the Finnish Air Force was in a similarly precarious position. Ultimately, this situation led to Finland officially joining the war, providing a short-term boost to the Nazi war effort.

So you might be asking yourself, how did Finland get sucked up into this? Let’s just summarize the bitter experience Finland had over the past couple of years. The 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact enabled the Soviet Union to exert pressure on the small Baltic republics and Finland, likely to improve its strategic position in Eastern Europe in the event of a broader conflict. The Baltic republics quickly acquiesced to Soviet demands for military bases and troop transfer rights, while Finland resolutely refused. When diplomatic efforts failed, military action was initiated, and on November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Finland, marking the beginning of the Winter War.

The Winter War served as a rude awakening for the Finns regarding the realities of international politics. Condemnation from the League of Nations and global outrage seemed to have little impact on Soviet policy. Although Sweden permitted volunteers to join the Finnish army, it refrained from sending military support or allowing passage to French or British troops, who were also mobilized in fewer numbers than initially promised. Even right-wing extremists were disillusioned to find that Nazi Germany provided no assistance and actively blocked material support from other nations. The Moscow Peace Treaty, which concluded the Winter War, was viewed as a significant injustice. The losses at the negotiation table, including Viipuri, Finland's second-largest city were perceived to be greater than those suffered on the battlefield. Finland lost one-fifth of its industrial capacity and 9% of its territory. Of the 12% of Finland's population living in these lost territories, only a few hundred remained; the remaining 420,000 relocated to the Finnish side of the new border.

Public opinion in Finland longed for the re-acquisition of the homes left behind by the 12% of the population who had been forced to flee Finnish Karelia in haste. Many placed their hopes in the peace conference that was generally expected to follow the war. Consequently, the term Välirauha "Interim Peace" gained popularity after the harsh terms of the peace treaty were announced. Although the peace treaty was signed, the state of war was not officially revoked due to the ongoing global conflict, the challenging food supply situation, and the poor condition of the Finnish military. Censorship remained in place and was utilized to suppress criticism of the Moscow Peace Treaty and blatant anti-Soviet sentiments. The continued state of war allowed President Kyösti Kallio to ask Field Marshal Mannerheim to remain as commander-in-chief, responsible for overseeing the reorganization of Finland's Armed Forces and fortifying the new border, a crucial task during these tumultuous times. Within a week after the peace treaty was signed, fortification work commenced along the 1,200 km long Salpalinja or "the Bolt Line", with a primary focus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Saimaa. Throughout the summer and autumn, Finland received military supplies purchased and donated during and immediately after the Winter War. However, it took several months before Mannerheim could provide a somewhat positive assessment of the army's condition. Military expenditures in 1940 rose to 45% of Finland's state budget, with military purchases prioritized over civilian needs. Mannerheim's position and the ongoing state of war allowed for effective military management, but this also created a troubling parallel government that occasionally clashed with civilian government structures. On March 13, the same day the Moscow Peace Treaty came into effect, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare requested the Foreign Office to initiate negotiations with Finland as soon as possible to foster positive relations. The under-secretary of MEW, Charles Hambro, was authorized to form a war trade treaty with Finland and traveled to Helsinki on April 7. He had previously exchanged letters with Ryti, and they quickly reached a basic understanding of the treaty's contents. The Finns were eager to commence trade; from their first meeting, a preliminary treaty was drafted and accepted immediately. However, Hambro needed approval from his superiors and emphasized that the treaty would not be considered official until a final version was negotiated. Under the treaty, Finland agreed to give control of its strategic material exports to Britain in exchange for armaments and other essential supplies. However, the following day, Germany invaded Norway, rendering the treaty unworkable due to the absence of safe trade routes between the two countries.

Germany has historically served as a counterbalance to Russia in the Baltic region. Even though Hitler's Third Reich had colluded with the Soviet invaders, Finland saw some value in pursuing warmer relations with Germany. Following the German occupation of Norway and particularly after the Allied evacuation from northern Norway, the relative importance of improving ties with Germany increased. On May 9, Finland inquired about the possibility of purchasing arms from Germany, but Germany refused to even entertain the discussion. Beginning in May 1940, Finland initiated a campaign to restore the amicable relations with Germany that had deteriorated during the last year of the 1930s. Finland hoped to capitalize on the fragile Nazi–Soviet relationship and the numerous personal connections between Finnish and German athletes, scientists, industrialists, and military officers. After the fall of France, in late June, the Finnish ambassador in Stockholm received diplomatic reports suggesting that Britain might soon be compelled to negotiate peace with Germany. The experiences of World War I highlighted the importance of maintaining close and friendly relations with the victors, prompting Finland to intensify its efforts to court Nazi Germany. A notable shift in the German attitude toward Finland was observed in late July when Ludwig Weissauer, a secret representative of the German Foreign Minister, visited Finland to inquire with Mannerheim and Ryti about Finland's willingness to defend itself against the Soviet Union. Mannerheim assessed that the Finnish army could withstand a few weeks of conflict without additional arms. Weissauer departed without securing any promises.

Unbeknownst to Finland, Adolf Hitler had begun planningOperation Barbarossa following the collapse of France. He had previously shown little interest in Finland before the Winter War, but he now recognized its potential as an operational base and the military value of the Finnish army. In the first weeks of August, German fears of a potential Soviet attack on Finland led Hitler to lift the arms embargo. Thus, arms deliveries that had been halted during the Winter War were resumed. The next German visitor was Joseph Veltjens, a representative of Hermann Göring, who arrived on August 18 to negotiate with Ryti and Mannerheim regarding German troop transfer rights between Finnmark in Northern Norway and the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia in exchange for arms and other materials. Initially, these arms shipments were transported via Sweden, but later they began arriving directly in Finland. This arrangement constituted a breach of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on Germany’s part and represented a material breach of the Moscow Peace Treaty for Finland, which had primarily aimed to restrict cooperation between Germany and Finland. There is some debate about whether the ailing President Kallio was informed of these developments; it is possible that his health deteriorated before he could be briefed confidentially. As part of the campaign to warm relations with the Third Reich, it seemed a natural progression to seek closer cooperation, especially since the much-disliked Moscow Peace Treaty had explicitly discouraged such partnerships. Censored propaganda in the Finnish press contributed to the country’s reorientation while employing measured means. Soviet negotiators had insisted that the troop transfer agreement to Hanko should not be published for parliamentary discussion or voting. This precedent made it easier for the Finnish government to keep the troop transfer agreement with the Germans secret until the first German troops arrived at the port of Vaasa on September 21. 

The arrival of German troops alleviated the insecurity felt by many Finns and was largely welcomed. Most opposition stemmed from concerns about the negotiation process rather than the transfer itself, as the Finnish populace was largely unaware of the specific details of the agreements with the Third Reich. The presence of German troops was seen as a deterrent against further Soviet threats and a counterbalance to the Soviet troop transfer rights. On November 21, the German troop transfer agreement was expanded to allow the movement of wounded soldiers and those on leave via Turku. German troops arrived and established quarters, depots, and bases along the rail lines from Vaasa and Oulu to Ylitornio and Rovaniemi, extending to roadways via Karesuvanto and Kilpisjärvi or Ivalo and Petsamo to Skibotn and Kirkenes in northern Norway. Roadwork to improve the winter road between Karesuvanto and Skibotn, as well as the construction of entirely new roads from Ivalo to Karasjok, was discussed and later funded by the Germans. On October 23, Ryti, Mannerheim, Minister of Defence Walden, and Chief of Staff Heinrichs decided to share information regarding Finland's defense plans for Lappland with the Wehrmacht to foster goodwill, despite the risk that this information could be passed on to the Soviet Union. When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov visited Berlin on November 12, he demanded that Germany cease its support for Finland and treat Finland similarly to the Baltic states. However, Hitler insisted that no new military actions should occur in Northern Europe before summer. Through unofficial channels, Finnish representatives were informed that "Finnish leaders can sleep peacefully; Hitler has opened his umbrella over Finland."

On May 24, 1941, a group of staff officers led by General Heinrichs left Finland to participate in discussions with the German High Command in Salzburg on May 25. During these meetings, the Germans outlined their plans for the northern part of Operation Barbarossa, expressing interest in using Finnish territory to launch attacks from Petsamo to Murmansk and from Salla to Kandalaksha. Heinrichs conveyed Finnish interest in Eastern Karelia, but the Germans recommended a passive stance. Negotiations continued the following day in Berlin with the Army High Command , where, in contrast to the previous day’s discussions, Germany requested that Finland form a strong attack formation ready to strike on either the eastern or western side of Lake Ladoga. The Finns promised to consider the proposal but informed the Germans that they could only arrange supplies along the Olonets-Petrozavodsk line. The issue of mobilization was also discussed, and it was decided that the Germans would send signal officers to facilitate confidential communication with Mannerheim’s headquarters in Mikkeli. Naval issues were addressed, primarily focused on securing sea lines over the Baltic Sea and the potential use of the Finnish navy in the upcoming conflict. During these negotiations, the Finns submitted various material requests, ranging from grain and fuel to aircraft and radio equipment.

Heinrichs' group returned to Finland on May 28 and reported their discussions to Mannerheim, Walden, and Ryti. On May 30, Ryti, Witting, Walden, Kivimäki, Mannerheim, Heinrichs, Talvela, and Aaro Pakaslahti from the Foreign Ministry met and accepted the results of the negotiations, establishing a list of key prerequisites: a guarantee of Finnish independence, restoration of pre-Winter War borders (or better), continued grain deliveries, and that Finnish troops would not cross the border before a Soviet incursion. The next round of negotiations took place in Helsinki from June 3 to 6, focusing on practical details. It was agreed that Germany would control the area north of Oulu, a region sparsely populated and not critical to the defense of southern provinces. The Finns also consented to provide two divisions, 30,000 men to the Germans in northern Finland and to allow the use of airfields in Helsinki and Kemijärvi for German operations with additional airfields at Kemi and Rovaniemi added later. 

Finland warned Germany that any attempts to establish a Quisling government would terminate cooperation, emphasizing the importance of Finland not being viewed as the aggressor and that no invasion should be launched from Finnish territory. Subsequent negotiations regarding naval operations continued on June 6 in Kiel, where it was agreed that the Kriegsmarine would mine the Gulf of Finland as soon as the war commenced. The arrival of German troops participating in Operation Barbarossa began on June 7 in Petsamo, where the SS Division Nord moved southwards, and on June 8 in the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia, where the German 169th Infantry Division was transported by rail to Rovaniemi, both divisions turning eastward on June 18. In response to these developments, Britain canceled all naval traffic to Petsamo starting June 14. From June 14 onward, several German minelayers and supporting motor torpedo boats arrived in Finland, some on official naval visits and others hidden in the southern archipelago. The Finnish parliament was informed for the first time on June 9 when the first mobilization orders were issued for troops required to safeguard the subsequent mobilization phases, including anti-air and border guard units. On June 16, two Finnish divisions were transferred to the German army in Lapland. On June 18, an airfield in Utti was evacuated by Finnish planes, and the Germans were permitted to use it for refueling starting June 19. German reconnaissance planes were stationed at Tikkakoski, near Jyväskylä, on June 20. On June 20, the Finnish government ordered the evacuation of 45,000 people from the Soviet border. The following day, June 21, Finland's Chief of the General Staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally informed by his German counterpart that the attack was set to begin.

Operation Barbarossa had commenced in the northern Baltic by the late hours of June 21, when German minelayers, previously hiding in the Finnish archipelago, laid two large minefields across the Gulf of Finland, one at the mouth of the Gulf and another in its central part. These minefields effectively confined the Soviet Baltic Fleet to the easternmost part of the Gulf of Finland until the end of the Continuation War. Additionally, three Finnish submarines participated in the mining operation, laying nine smaller fields between Suursaari Island and the Estonian coast, with the first mines being deployed by the Finnish submarine Vetehinen at 07:38 on June 22, 1941. Later that night, German bombers flying from East Prussian airfields flew over the Gulf of Finland toward Leningrad, mining the harbor and the Neva River. Finnish air defense observed that one group of bombers, likely responsible for the mining of the Neva, flew over southern Finland. On their return trip, these bombers refueled at Utti airfield before heading back to East Prussia. Finland feared that the Soviet Union would quickly occupy Åland and use it to block naval routes from Finland to Sweden and Germany, particularly in conjunction with the Hanko base. 

In response, Operation Kilpapurjehdus or "Sail Race" was launched in the early hours of June 22 to deliver Finnish troops to Åland. Soviet bombers attacked Finnish ships during the operation at 06:05 on June 22, before the Finnish forces could land on Åland, but fortunately, no damage was inflicted during the air assault. Individual Soviet artillery batteries began firing at Finnish positions from Hanko early in the morning, prompting the Finnish commander to seek permission to return fire; however, before this permission could be granted, the Soviet artillery ceased. On the morning of June 22, the German Gebirgskorps Norwegen initiated Operation Rentier, advancing from Northern Norway to Petsamo. The German ambassador began urgent negotiations with Sweden to facilitate the transfer of the German 163rd Infantry Division from Norway to Finland using Swedish railways, a request that Sweden granted on June 24. On June 22, both the Soviet Union and Finland declared their respective neutrality in the ongoing conflict, creating unease among Nazi leadership. Germany attempted to provoke a response from the Soviet Union through the use of the Finnish archipelago as a base and Finnish airfields for refueling. 

On the morning of June 22, Hitler proclaimed: "Together with their Finnish comrades in arms, the heroes from Narvik stand at the edge of the Arctic Ocean. German troops under the command of the conqueror of Norway and the Finnish freedom fighters under their Marshal’s command are protecting Finnish territory." Following the launch of Operation Barbarossa at approximately 3:15 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union sent seven bombers on a retaliatory airstrike into Finland, striking targets at 6:06 a.m. Helsinki time, as reported by the Finnish coastal defense ship Väinämöinen. On the morning of June 25, the Soviet Union launched another air offensive, deploying 460 fighters and bombers targeting 19 airfields in Finland. However, due to inaccurate intelligence and poor bombing accuracy, many raids struck Finnish cities and municipalities, causing significant damage. The Soviet forces lost 23 bombers during this operation, while Finnish forces reported no aircraft losses. Although the USSR claimed that the airstrikes were aimed at German targets, particularly airfields in Finland, the Finnish Parliament used these attacks as justification for approving a "defensive war." 

Finland did not permit direct German attacks from its territory against the Soviet Union, requiring German forces in Petsamo and Salla to hold their fire. Air attacks were also prohibited, and inclement weather in northern Finland hindered German flying capabilities. Only one attack from southern Finland against the White Sea Canal was approved but had to be canceled due to poor weather conditions. Occasional small arms fire occurred between Soviet and Finnish border guards, but overall, the front remained quiet. Both parties, along with the Germans, conducted active air reconnaissance over the border, yet no air battles ensued. The worst damage occurred in Turku, where the airfield became inoperable for a week, and the medieval Turku Castle was struck. Heavy damage also affected civilian targets in Kotka and Heinola, though casualties from the attacks were relatively limited. The Soviet Union justified the offensive as directed against German targets in Finland; however, even the British embassy acknowledged that the majority of the damage was inflicted on southern Finland, including airfields without any German forces present. Rovaniemi and Petsamo were the only locations with German troops at the time of the attack. Consequently, Foreign Minister Eden admitted to parliament on June 26 that the Soviet Union had initiated the war. A parliament meeting was scheduled for June 25, during which Prime Minister Rangell was set to announce Finland's neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict. However, due to the Soviet bombings, he instead declared that Finland was once again at war with the Soviet Union. Thus, the Continuation War commenced. 

Down in the mud, the Heer was advancing steadily northward despite stiff resistance from the Red Army. Along the coast, the 291st Infantry Division made a near-miraculous advance into Latvia. However, they were soon ordered to moderate their pace due to growing resistance in the center and the slower progress of the rest of the 18th Army on their right flank.The corps of the 18th Army were making decent progress overall. The 26th Infantry Corps was pushing through light resistance as they attempted to secure the crossroads at Siauliai. The swampy terrain complicated their march, but the 10th Rifle Division's efforts to hold them back were ultimately futile. The Soviets were caught by surprise, outnumbered, outflanked, and outmaneuvered. The 30th Infantry Corps on the right encountered even rougher terrain than their counterparts in the 26th Corps. Despite the challenging conditions, resistance was also light, as only the 90th Rifle Division stood in their way on the approach to Siauliai.

Hoepner’s two panzer corps encountered remarkably different levels of opposition from the Red Army forces in the area. By June 26th, General Erich von Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps had established a bridgehead at Dvinsk on the Dvina River. However, Manstein became a victim of his own success, having to pause operations for six days to await the arrival of General Ernst Busch’s 16th Army, which was threatened on its right flank due to the 9th Army's southern turn to begin encirclement east of Białystok. Manstein was also far ahead of the Fourth Panzer Group’s second panzer corps, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps, which had been delayed largely because of the aforementioned Soviet counterattacks at Rossienie. Lacking support, Manstein's halt was a prudent measure; however, as Halder’s diary notes, it allowed the Soviets the opportunity to fall back over the Dvina River. Halder also observed that in the Army Group’s rear area, "strong wedged-in enemy elements are causing the infantry a lot of trouble even far behind the front." The activities in the northern and southern army groups illustrated the interdependence of each sector on the overall progress of the war. Yet, even in this early phase, the armies' inability to maintain contact between neighboring units, pacify rear areas, and provide infantry support to the panzer spearheads highlighted the army's overextension, which was already becoming apparent. Securing the crossings of the Dvina River was critical for the future advance of the Army Group. Manstein reached the city on June 26. His advance of over three hundred kilometers was an impressive achievement, but it also isolated his corps from neighboring units on both sides. For the next three days, his men held onto the bridgehead despite serious counterattacks from the Soviet 27th Army. On June 29, infantry support from the 16th Army began to arrive. This should have signaled Manstein to launch another offensive, but orders came from Hoepner stating that Army Group North had halted the Panzers on the Dvina until the infantry could catch up along the entire front.

Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps made several small tactical blunders on the first day, resulting in a loss of initiative to the Soviet 8th Army and its parent Northwestern Front. While Manstein raced toward the Dvina, the 41st Panzer Corps faced the brunt of the Red Army’s counterattacks in the region. The Soviet 8th Army had positioned its reserves over a hundred kilometers from the border, a decision that had significant consequences. On one hand, the Army headquarters could not move its reserves up to support the frontline divisions, effectively dooming the 10th and 90th Rifle Divisions to a hopeless retreat without armor support. On the other hand, this distance prevented the bulk of the army from being encircled in the early days of fighting. This breathing space allowed for a counterattack to be organized.

As the commander of the Northwestern Front, Kuznetsov ordered a counterattack. He dispatched orders to the 27th and 8th Armies to begin preparations within hours of the opening hostilities. However, his ability to communicate orders was severely hindered due to the destruction of command bunkers, non-operative phone and power lines, and many officers losing control of their units. To complicate matters further, the speed of the Wehrmacht’s advance in some sectors rendered orders obsolete before they even arrived. Kuznetsov directed the 8th Army to mobilize its armor. Lieutenant General Sobeniknov organized his mechanized corps for the assault. The 12th Mechanized Corps would push from the north, attacking the 41st Panzer Corps at Tytuvenai. In the south, the Soviet 11th Army’s 3rd Mechanized Corps attacked from north of Kaunas in the direction of Raseiniai. Together, the two corps mustered around three hundred fifty tanks, while the two Panzer divisions of the 41st Corps possessed approximately three hundred ninety tanks.

Finally, after long delays, during the night of June 22, the tanks concentrated and prepared for their counterattack against Reinhardt’s panzer corps. However, this concentration was compromised by orders from the Soviet 8th Army, which diverted one of the tank divisions to mount a counterattack at the border. This unauthorized diversion highlighted the tenuous lines of communication within the Red Army's hierarchy. This situation also highlighted a division in tactical concepts. Kuznetsov aimed to concentrate his armor to counter the enemy's concentration, while his subordinate Sobeniknov preferred to use the tanks piecemeal to support his infantry. The inherent tension between these opposing strategies had played out in France just a year earlier, with predictable results. The Panzers had successfully outmaneuvered their opponents, who were reliant on infantry support, and they were doing so once again in the Soviet Union. Notably, General Charles De Gaulle was one of the few French commanders who advocated for the mass deployment of French tanks but had been consistently overruled. Confusion abounded, and the counterattack became a messy, ill-coordinated affair from the outset.

Besides the command-and-control issues, logistics were also problematic. The 12th Mechanized Corps lacked sufficient fuel for the road march to the assembly area, approximately sixty kilometers away. Major General Shestopalov attempted to coordinate supply convoys to fetch fuel during the night of June 22-23, but this proved to be nearly impossible. The roads were overcrowded, and ongoing confusion about unit locations aggravated the situation. On the morning of the 23rd, German Luftwaffe attacks further disrupted the corps' road march and supply efforts. It wasn’t until the following afternoon that one of Shestopalov's divisions reached the jumping-off point for the counterattack. This was the 28th Tank Division, which was equipped solely with light tanks. Although the division had two hundred and thirty tanks, it could have been a powerful attacking force if properly supported. Unfortunately, this was not to be. Colonel Chernyahovksy, the division commander, ordered an assault by the first regiment that arrived. The 55th Tank Regiment attacked with only forty light tanks. They advanced against the 21st Infantry Division, which successfully repulsed them with anti-tank and artillery fire. This piecemeal assault began at 2100 hours, but after only three hours, Chernyahovksy called off the attack, having lost seventeen of his forty tanks with nothing of consequence gained.

Near Raseiniai, things were calm for the moment as the 6th Panzer Division was in the process of refueling and rearming. Luftwaffe reconnaissance had located a column of Soviet armor on the road from Kedainiai; however, this report was lost somewhere along the way. On the morning of June 24, the division was unexpectedly struck by the 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps. This morning brought two new realities for the men of the 6th Panzer. They were caught off guard by the Soviet counterattack, and the 2nd Tank Division was primarily manned by the best medium and heavy tanks in the Red Army. Hitherto unknown to the Wehrmacht, T-34s, KV-1s, and the monstrous KV-2 roared into battle. The Wehrmacht had little intelligence indicating the existence of such tanks, let alone the number that the Red Army possessed. This is a notable example of the failures of the Wehrmacht’s and the Nazi regime’s intelligence services. Throughout the war, tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence consistently failed to provide meaningful warnings to the officers and soldiers on the ground. This issue was not isolated to the Eastern Front but was especially egregious in the campaigns in the east.

The shock of encountering these formidable tanks was compounded by the complete ineffectiveness of the division’s anti-tank weapons against them. Round after round bounced off the thick armor of the Soviet tanks. The Pak 36 was worse than useless; its thirty-seven-millimeter shell had become essentially obsolete by 1941, replaced by the larger and more capable fifty-millimeter Pak 38. The obsolescence of the Pak 36 should not be overstated to imply that it was completely useless. Instead, it was ineffective against the most modern tanks it encountered. This issue had already been apparent in 1940 in the west, where it was proven ineffective against the British Matilda Mk. II and the French B1 and S35. The Heer was aware of the weapon's shortcomings, which led to the development and deployment of the Pak 38 in 50mm. However, even the Pak 38 struggled against the T-34 and was ineffective against the Soviet heavy tanks. The Pak 40 in 75mm was already in development, but the first units would not be delivered until February 1942.

However, even the larger Pak 38 could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Soviet tanks. Eventually, three KV-2s broke through the division's front, overrunning the infantry. This marked the first time German infantry experienced the terrifying ordeal of being overrun by tanks, a scenario that the French and British had faced multiple times in the Western theater. The breakthrough shocked German commanders. It was only the third day of the war, and they were supposed to be crushing a surprised Red Army with obsolete equipment and poorly organized leadership. Instead, they found themselves confronted with the inadequacy of their own equipment and a failure in reconnaissance that prevented them from anticipating the attack. Leaders were stunned by the course of events a wake-up call for many soldiers and officers. As the KV-2s advanced, they attacked the division’s reserve while crossing the Dubya River. Intense fighting ensued, and the tanks began to overrun a field howitzer battery. Quick-thinking soldiers directed fire from the one-hundred-fifty-millimeter guns at point-blank range against the incoming KV-2s. Nevertheless, the heavy tanks shrugged off these attacks. It was only when howitzer fire physically destroyed the tracks of the tanks that they were put out of action. Although immobilized, the threat would persist until German infantry dealt with the tanks the hard way by hand. Sources do not provide a precise account of how these tanks were put out of action, but inferring from other actions allows some insight into how it was likely accomplished. Infantry would have had to physically mount the tanks, open the hatches, and drop grenades inside. Alternatively, they would need to wait for the Red Tankers to voluntarily exit their vehicles to either gun them down or take them prisoner.

This singular breakthrough did not change the outcome of the battle. The Soviet tanks remained too disorganized, manned by poorly trained crews who, in some cases, did not know how to operate their vehicles fully or work together in small-unit tactics. The 2nd Tank Division’s attack sputtered out as piecemeal assaults ran out of fuel and ammunition. The fighting was not over yet. Reinhardt was maneuvering his 1st Panzer Division and elements of the 36th Infantry Division around the open flank of the 2nd Tank Division, while Manstein’s Panzers advanced toward Kedainiai behind the Soviet lines. By the night of the 24th, General Solyankin had been surrounded but refused to surrender. On the morning of the 25th, he attempted a breakout with his remaining tanks. This effort was quashed, but not without drama, as the KV tanks attacked and nearly broke through the German lines. The soldiers on the ground were beginning to appreciate the value of their anti-aircraft guns in combating the heavy tanks. The 88 mm anti-aircraft gun would eventually become legendary in this new role, though these were the earliest days of its employment. This application was not without its failures, stemming from desperation as everything else had been tried, and aside from isolated instances like howitzers destroying tracks, all other methods had failed. The 88mm Flak gun, in various mountings at this point in the war, was a Corps-level asset intended for use as a stationary emplacement to defend local supply and command centers against air attacks. It was effective in this role. Its success as an anti-tank gun stemmed from its high velocity and substantial shell weight. The Germans were not the only ones to discover that anti-aircraft guns could be effectively repurposed for anti-tank work. Eventually, the Soviets adopted a modified version of their M1939 85mm gun for tank use, as did the Americans with their M3 90mm gun. The British utilized their QF 3.7-inch gun in anti-tank and field artillery roles, but they never officially adopted it or a modified version for those purposes. The 2nd Tank Division would hold out until sometime on the 26th when Solyankin was killed. Shortly thereafter, Reinhardt’s Corps was able to advance, though sporadic fighting likely continued in isolated pockets even after the Heer declared the battle over.

By June 26, both of the Northwestern Front’s counter-strokes had failed. The northern sector of the front was shattered, and Army Group North was taking full advantage of the situation. The Red Army retreated in complete disorder. Any division that had not been broken or surrounded in the first days was rendered combat ineffective due to exhaustion. Kuznetsov received orders from the Stavka in Moscow to continue counterattacking and to drive northwest from Kaunas to cut off the advancing Panzers. This was impossible, especially since Kaunas had fallen on the 24th, where the Soviet 11th Army struggled to hold the line against the assault by the 2nd Infantry Corps. To address the situation, the other tank division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps was sent to the front around Kaunas in an attempt to repair the holes in the lines. This approach was fundamentally flawed, as had already been demonstrated in the north by the 12th Mechanized Corps. Piecemeal assaults by isolated tanks proved ineffective in making meaningful progress against the German army. Nonetheless, the division was deployed to the front, where they were promptly overrun and forced to retreat toward Vilnius. This retreat opened a dangerous gap in the front, cleaving the Northwestern Front in two as Manstein advanced and the other elements of Army Group North continued their relentless pursuit.

Kaunas had been taken so easily because of a local uprising. In June 1940, the Lithuanian government submitted to a Soviet ultimatum, leading to Lithuania's occupation, transformation into the Lithuanian SSR, and incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Soviets began implementing various Sovietization policies, including the nationalization of private property and mass arrests of political activists and others deemed "enemies of the people." These arrests targeted many prominent politicians, such as Aleksandras Stulginskis, Juozas Urbšys, Leonas Bistras, Antanas Merkys, Pranas Dovydaitis, Petras Klimas, government officials, military officers, and members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union. The Lithuanian Army was reorganized as the 29th Rifle Corps of the Red Army. Additionally, all non-communist cultural, religious, and political organizations were closed. The economic situation steadily worsened, and the standard of living declined. A year later, just a week before the uprising, approximately 17,000 Lithuanians, mainly from the intelligentsia were deported to Siberia with their families, where many perished due to inhumane living conditions. This deportation became the most significant precipitating event that incited popular support for the uprising and fostered a positive predisposition toward the German invasion. Those who escaped the deportations or arrests spontaneously organized into armed groups hidden in the forests, awaiting a broader uprising.

The Lithuanian Activist Front  or “LAF”, formed in the fall of 1940, seeking to re-establish Lithuanian independence. Founded by Kazys Škirpa in Berlin, the LAF sought to unify the Lithuanian resistance, organizing and conserving resources for the planned uprising against the Soviets. It acted as an umbrella organization, with many groups adopting the LAF name even if they were not directly connected to the LAF in Berlin. The LAF established its military-political headquarters in Vilnius and its organizational headquarters in Kaunas. However, communication and coordination between the centers in Berlin, Kaunas, and Vilnius were poor. The Vilnius headquarters suffered significantly from Soviet arrests, especially in early June 1941, and became largely defunct. Many arrested activists were executed in December 1941 in the Soviet Union.

In March 1941, the LAF in Berlin published a memorandum titled “Dear Enslaved Brothers”, providing instructions for preparing for the impending war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Insurgents were instructed to secure strategic locations such as prisons, railroads, bridges, communication hubs, and factories, protecting them against potential sabotage by the retreating Red Army. Meanwhile, the Central Headquarters was to organize a provisional government and declare independence. In April, a list of provisional government members was compiled, reserving the prime minister's post for Škirpa, with four ministers from Vilnius, six from Kaunas, and one from Berlin. The members were to represent a wide spectrum of pre-war political parties and claimed to represent the majority of the Lithuanian people. However, some have suggested that not all designated ministers were aware of their proposed appointments to the provisional government. On June 14, Nazi authorities in Berlin insisted that Škirpa and his activists refrain from forming any government or making public declarations without their prior approval. Škirpa agreed to this but had little control over the activists in Lithuania itself.

The uprising began in the early morning of the 22nd coinciding with the first day of the war. The LAF concentrated its main forces in Kaunas.  The LAF decided that its primary goal was not to engage the Soviets directly but to secure the city and declare independence. By the evening of the 22nd, the Lithuanians had taken control of the Presidential Palace, post office, telephone and telegraph stations, and radio stations. Control of the telephone systems allowed them to disconnect all known communist numbers, enabling communication without the need for passwords or codes. The Soviets had sabotaged the radio station, and repairs were done overnight from June 22 to 23, with medical students delivering spare parts in an ambulance. Despite concerns that not enough Lithuanian forces were guarding the radio tower, on the morning of June 23, Leonas Prapuolenis announced the declaration of Lithuanian independence and the list of members of the provisional government. The broadcast was repeated several times in Lithuanian, German, and French. On the morning of June 23, insurgents raided Soviet armories in Šančiai, Panemunė, and Vilijampolė. Now armed, the Lithuanians spread throughout the city, with special attention given to the Vilijampolė Bridge across the Neris River, as they expected the Germans to enter the city via this route. However, when the Lithuanians arrived, they found the bridge wired with explosives. Forty Soviet troops and three armored vehicles guarded the bridge, waiting for the right moment to detonate it. 

The retreating Soviets prematurely destroyed the bridges over the Nemunas River, forcing Red Army units in Suvalkija to bypass Kaunas, which likely saved the insurgents in that city. The Metalas factory became the headquarters for insurgents in Šančiai, who attempted to prevent Soviet soldiers from crossing the Neman River by boat or from constructing a pontoon bridge. In this fighting, about 100 insurgents were killed, and 100 Soviets were taken prisoner, along with a large cache of equipment, including three tanks that no one knew how to operate. Other groups secured police stations, shops, and warehouses, and attempted to re-establish order in the city. The insurgents hastily organized their own police and freed approximately 2,000 political prisoners. Colonel Piotr Ivanov, commander of the Red Army's 188th Rifle Division, reported to the 11th Army staff that during the retreat of his division through Kaunas, "local counterrevolutionaries from the shelters purposefully and severely fired upon the Red Army, causing heavy losses of soldiers and military equipment."

By June 24, 1941, the Red Army's tank units in Jonava were ordered to retake Kaunas. The insurgents radioed the Germans for assistance, and the Luftwaffe bombed the tank units, preventing them from reaching the city. This marked the first coordinated action between Lithuanian and German forces. Lieutenant Flohret and four privates, the first German scouts to enter Kaunas on June 24, found the city in friendly hands. The next day, the main German forces marched into the city without impediment, almost in a parade. On June 26, the German military command ordered the disbandment and disarmament of the rebel groups. Two days later, Lithuanian guards and patrols were relieved of their duties. 

After defeating the simultaneous attacks at Raseiniai and Tytuvenai, Reinhardt’s Corps pushed past the flank of the retreating 8th Army and positioned itself alongside the 56th Panzer Corps. They reached the Dvina River at Jekabpils, approximately ninety kilometers north of Daugavpils. It is unclear exactly when they arrived in force, but it was on or before June 30. Army Group North’s orders to halt at the Dvina also applied to Reinhardt’s Panzers. The Panzer commanders fiercely protested this frustrating halt, but Field Marshal Reinhardt stood his ground. He believed that the strategic situation was not as clear-cut as he desired and felt that his lengthening right flank was a vulnerability that needed to be addressed. After all, the Soviet forces in the area had not been encircled; they had merely retreated, still posing a threat from Vilnius, even in their weakened state. Busch’s 16th Army was still engaged in combat and making its way to the Dvina, facing the longest and most arduous route of Army Group North, which was evident in their slow advance. In contrast, the 18th Army was advancing rapidly through Latvia and was only a few kilometers from Riga.

The Soviet situation was grim. The Northwestern Front was now divided into two unequal halves, with few prepared defenses available for the remaining forces. The tank divisions had been decimated, and the logistics of the armies had been ravaged by the Luftwaffe and the rapidly changing character of the front lines. Kuznetsov faced serious pressure from Stavka to repair the situation. Partially due to their poor understanding of the conditions on the ground, they continued to order massive counter-attacks that were impossible to execute. They were unaware that some of the units they were ordering had ceased to exist. The first week of the war had started with disaster, and the situation did not improve. Despite many examples of personal bravery, determined resistance, and the battle-tested capabilities of the Red Army’s superior tanks, the Northwestern Front had been pushed back from its prepared defenses, was in open retreat, and was unable to maintain a coherent line of defense. Einsatzgruppen men marched into Kaunas alongside the German Army on June 24. Almost immediately, a pogrom was initiated by the Einsatzgruppen. Most of the killings in the first days were carried out by locals who were sanctioned by the Nazis. The organized murder began within days of the occupation and would not cease for years.

Starting on June 25, Nazi-organized units attacked Jewish civilians in Slobodka, Vilijampolė, a Jewish suburb of Kaunas that was home to the world-famous Slabodka yeshiva. According to Rabbi Ephraim Oshry, while Germans were present on the bridge to Slobodka, it was Lithuanian volunteers who perpetrated the murders of the Jews. The rabbi of Slobodka, Rav Zalman Osovsky, was bound to a chair; "his head was laid upon an open volume of gemora a volume of the Talmud, and they sawed his head off." Following this, both his wife and son were also murdered. His head was displayed in a window of their residence, bearing a sign that read: "This is what we'll do to all the Jews." As of June 28, 1941, Nazi official Walter Stahlecker reported that 3,800 people had been killed in Kaunas and a further 1,200 in surrounding towns. Karl Jaeger, the Nazi commander of the mobile killing squad Einsatzkommando 3, wrote on December 1, 1941, that Nazis and Lithuanian partisans had killed 7,800 Jews in Kovno between June 24 and July 6, 1941. Jaeger recorded that 4,000 of those killed were victims of Lithuanian partisans alone.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Wehrmacht, driven by Nazi ideology, achieved early victories but soon faced fierce resistance and logistical challenges in harsh terrain. As optimism waned, the Soviet army began mounting counterattacks, demonstrating surprising resilience. Amid global tensions, Finland leveraged the chaos, seizing control in Kaunas alongside advancing German troops. However, the brutality escalated with atrocities against Jews, marking the grim realities of war.

Eastern Front #1 Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa

Last time we spoke about the myth of the German Blitzkrieg. As summer approached in 1941, Hitler readied his forces for Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union aimed at securing rapid victory. Despite Stalin's restructured Red Army, both sides faced logistical challenges. Hitler's goal was to annihilate the Red Army, while his generals prioritized capturing Moscow, leading to debates and miscommunication. The Wehrmacht’s initial successes relied more on luck and enemy blunders than revolutionary tactics like Blitzkrieg, a concept popularized after the war by German generals seeking to explain their swift victories in France. However, these tactics were not as groundbreaking as portrayed; they stemmed from long-standing principles of maneuverability. As the campaign progressed, the reality of a harsh Eastern Front began to set in, casting doubt among German leaders about their ability to sustain their rapid advances amidst logistical nightmares, foreshadowing the monumental struggles that lay ahead.

This episode is: Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Its finally time to begin the Eastern Front. For the last few weeks we went through 11 prelude episodes and 1 special, but the time has come for Germany to unleash Operation Barbarossa. But before we begin I have to mention a few things going forward. We are now embarking on an incredible journey through the vast and complex campaigns of the Eastern Front, a scale that is truly monumental. While the distances involved might remind some of our Pacific War series, the nature of these land campaigns means that they engaged far more troops. Millions of soldiers from both sides were mobilized, organized into hundreds of divisions and thousands of regiments, creating a colossal theatre of war. Given the immense scale, it's important to note that we cannot possibly cover every movement of every unit within the confines of the youtube episode format, let alone this humble podcast. I am going to do my best to give you the macro and micro picture of this colossal event. Ironically the scope of it begins on a huge scale as I am sure most of you know, Barbarossa is simply insane. 

The soldiers of the Heer remained largely unaware of Operation Barbarossa until the late afternoon of June 21st. Only then did they receive the shocking news through a proclamation from Adolf Hitler, announcing that the long-anticipated conflict would soon begin. For many of these soldiers, this revelation was breathtaking, yet it was met with a surprising sense of confidence rather than fear. Most soldiers had anticipated that such a day might eventually come, and their response was characterized by a grim determination. They firmly believed in the ideological righteousness of their impending invasion, convinced that their mission was justified and necessary. With the start time for the operation looming just a few hours away, sometimes as little as six hours after they had received Hitler's message, they swiftly set to work preparing themselves for the challenge ahead. In this charged atmosphere, there was little room for doubt. The soldiers focused on their tasks, their minds geared towards executing the orders that would soon propel them into one of history's largest military engagements. With the weight of their convictions behind them, they were ready to embark on a campaign that would forever alter the course of the war.

Adolf Hitler was convinced that a series of decisive defeats would lead to the collapse of Joseph Stalin's government. He expressed this belief to General Alfred Jodl, stating, "We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down." This mindset reflected a broader expectation among many high-ranking officials within the German military, who shared the belief that a swift and overwhelming victory was imminent. Field Marshal Paul von Kleist later reminisced about this prevailing sentiment in a conversation with Basil Liddell Hart after the war. He remarked, "Our hopes of victory were largely predicated on the assumption that the invasion would trigger a political upheaval in Russia. There was an excessive expectation that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suffered significant defeats." This optimism was further nurtured by Hitler's political advisers, who painted an overly simplistic picture of the political landscape in the Soviet Union. Von Kleist acknowledged that, as soldiers, they lacked sufficient understanding of the intricate political dynamics at play to challenge these assumptions. This misplaced confidence in a quick resolution would ultimately prove to be a critical misjudgment as the campaign unfolded and the realities of the Eastern Front became starkly evident.

Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was notably opposed to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. He articulated his stance with striking clarity, stating, "I can summarize my opinion on a German-Russian conflict in one sentence: if every burned-out Russian city were as valuable to us as a sunk English battleship, I would support a German-Russian war this summer. However, I believe we can only defeat Russia militarily, but such a conflict would ultimately be detrimental to us economically." Ribbentrop acknowledged the allure of delivering a decisive blow to the Communist system, suggesting that there was a certain logic in allowing the continent of Europe and Asia to unite against the Anglo-Saxon powers and their allies. Yet, he emphasized one critical point: "The decisive factor is whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England." He expressed concern that a German attack on Russia would actually bolster English morale, framing it as an indication of German doubt in the success of the war against England. According to Ribbentrop, this military venture would not only signal that the conflict would persist for a longer duration but could also inadvertently prolong it. By diverting attention and resources toward the Eastern Front, Germany risked undermining its campaign against Britain, thereby complicating an already challenging war effort.

General Walter Warlimont issued a chilling order to all military commanders in the German Army regarding the planned occupation of the Soviet Union. The directive outlined several ruthless measures aimed at eradicating any political opposition. The key points included: Liquidation of Political Officials: The order explicitly stated that all political officials and leaders were to be eliminated. This directive underscored the Nazi regime’s determination to dismantle any structures of Soviet authority and suppress potential resistance. Disciplinary Authority: In cases where political officials were captured by German troops, an officer with the authority to impose disciplinary punishment would decide whether the individual should be liquidated. The mere fact that a person was identified as a political official was sufficient justification for this deadly decision. Treatment of Political Leaders: The order also specified that political leaders within the Soviet armed forces (Red Army) would not be recognized as prisoners of war. Rather, they were to be executed at the earliest opportunity, specifically stating that such actions should occur in prisoner-of-war transit camps at the latest. This directive revealed the brutal approach taken by the German military against perceived enemies, reflecting a broader strategy of annihilation aimed at consolidating control over the occupied territories and eliminating any political influence that could challenge Nazi authority.

The attack commenced with the thunderous roar of artillery fire just after 0300 hours. As dawn began to break in the northern regions of the Soviet Union, the sound of the opening salvos shattered the early morning calm. Above, Luftwaffe bombers streaked across the sky, their engines shrieking as they flew toward crucial targets, including ammunition depots, military headquarters, and other strategic installations. At the tactical level, the Soviet military was caught entirely off guard. A crucial lack of communication meant that no alert had been issued to front-line troops, leaving them unprepared for the onslaught. Key infrastructure was left defenseless; bridges remained unguarded, and artillery positions were unmanned, creating a significant vulnerability that the German forces were poised to exploit. In addition, many Soviet aircraft stood idle on tarmacs, completely unprepared for action as the attack unfolded. This lack of readiness would have dire consequences for the Soviet response, as the Wehrmacht took swift advantage of the element of surprise, launching a fierce assault that would set the tone for the devastating campaign that lay ahead.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Leeb's Army Group North was tasked with a crucial mission, with its area of operations extending from the Baltic port city of Memel in the northwest to the vicinity of Suwalki in the south. The left flank of this vast formation was commanded by Colonel General Georg Kuechler, who oversaw the 18th Army. As the divisions of the 18th Army advanced across the border, they did so with a surprising lack of fanfare. This muted initiation was a direct consequence of the German high command's strategy, which centered heavy artillery preparations primarily in areas opposite the advancing Panzer groups, diverting attention from Kuechler's forces. Kuechler's command comprised six infantry divisions, stretched across a front of approximately one hundred kilometers, with an additional division held in reserve for contingency operations. In stark contrast, the opposing Red Army mustered only three Rifle divisions organized into two corps. Notably, the 10th Rifle Division bore the brunt of the assault, holding a significant stretch of nearly eighty kilometers of the front that the 18th Army was targeting. By midday on the first day of the offensive, Kuechler was pleased to report that his troops had achieved advances ranging from eight to ten kilometers along the entire front. This progress was particularly noteworthy given that many forward Soviet units appeared to be out of position, contrary to the expectations set by the OKH. Although the fighting was fierce in several border towns, overall resistance was assessed as light, a fact that deviated from the German command’s anticipations of a more robust Soviet defense. 

Despite this relative ease, substantial victories remained elusive across most sectors. Nevertheless, one unit stood out amid the prevailing conditions: the independent 291st Infantry Division, which was rapidly advancing through disarrayed Soviet positions. By the end of the first day, this division had surged nearly 65 kilometers into enemy territory, effectively traversing the vast Lithuanian countryside before securing a strategic bridgehead into Latvia. The remaining five divisions of the 18th Army, the 1st, 11th, 21st, 61st, and 217th Infantry, also made commendable progress as the day drew to a close. While they encountered sporadic resistance and engaged in tough fighting in certain locations, the overall lack of determined opposition allowed them to maintain momentum. This initial success set the stage for further operations in the coming days, as Kuechler’s forces aimed to exploit the disarray within the Soviet ranks.

On the right flank of the 18th Army was the 4th Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Ernst von Hoepner. Hoepner played a critical role in the campaign to come. His personal resistance to Hitler’s orders would end his career however and eventually his life later in the war. He orchestrated the operations of 602 tanks distributed among 3 panzer divisions, which were organized under the command of two Corps leaders: General Erich von Manstein, at the helm of the 56th Panzer Corps, and General Reinhardt, who directed the 41st Panzer Corps. These men both would go on to much higher commands later in the war. Manstein's singular objective was to drive his forces toward the critical bridge over the Dubyssa River at Ariogala, a strategic point essential for the continued advance into Soviet territory. If this bridge was destroyed before it could be secured, Army Group North would be delayed by weeks, if not months. The terrain was especially hard to traverse, and this bridge was one of the only passages fit for tanks over the Dubyssa river and its gorges.

The lead element of Manstein’s offensive was Major General Brandenberger’s 8th Panzer Division. As they approached the town of Girdziai, positioned a mere 13 kilometers from the border, they encountered fierce resistance from the Soviet 125th Rifle Division. The defenses around Girdziai were formidable, prompting German commanders to attempt a tactical bypass of the town. However, despite the opposition, the relentless advance of the German Panzers continued. By late evening, the 56th Panzer Corps came to a halt for the day after an impressive advance. The Corps had successfully mobilized troops and tanks over a distance of 92 kilometers from its starting point, achieving all of its primary objectives. Girdziai, though it had temporarily thwarted the advance of major elements, ultimately succumbed in the late afternoon, allowing Manstein’s forces to press onward. Meanwhile, the 41st Panzer Corps operated on the left flank of the Panzer Group, engaged in its own fierce battles. As they pressed forward, German troops encountered staunch resistance from the Red Army, which fought tenaciously in the densely wooded areas lining the attack route. Despite their efforts, Reinhardt’s Corps could not secure all of its planned objectives for the day, falling short of the essential crossings at Raseinai. The challenges faced in these wooded terrains highlighted the determined resistance of the Soviet forces and the obstacles that lay ahead for the advancing Panzers.

On the southern flank of Army Group North was the 16th Army, commanded by Colonel General Busch. Busch was an ardent supporter of Hitler, using this connection to get himself out of trouble and into higher positions throughout the war. Tasked with securing a front measuring 100 kilometers, the 16th Army played a pivotal role in repelling the Soviet 16th Rifle Corps to safeguard the left flank of the advancing Panzers. At the outset of the offensive, the Soviets began to retreat in a state of disarray, reflecting the initial effectiveness of the German strategy. However, as the day wore on, communication became increasingly unreliable, with reports indicating that contact was lost with some subordinate units of the 16th Rifle Corps. As the day progressed, German forces found that resistance from the Soviet troops was stiffening. Small unit commanders within the Wehrmacht reported being engaged by Soviet forces emerging from areas that had been bypassed during the advance. This situation created a sense of uncertainty, as secure positions were elusive, and the Heer soon discovered that this reality was pervasive throughout the Soviet Union. If you were to look at a map of operation barbarossa it would fill you mind with overwhelmed German avances, but this does not necessarily reflect the reality. The Germans struggled for the entirety of their occupation of the Soviet Union to properly secure and make safe any rear area. Organized Partisans ensured that nowhere was safe for the invaders. This compared with the relatively docile occupied France and the Low Countries, where serious resistance would not become a problem until much later in the war. 

Particularly in this sector, small bands of Red Army soldiers demonstrated remarkable resolve and combat skill, often catching their German adversaries off guard with sudden counterattacks. It was evident to all involved that this campaign would not unfold as smoothly as the blitzkrieg in France had just a year prior. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the 16th Army had achieved tangible success. Its divisions made better-than-expected progress in several areas, and despite the challenges faced, they had not encountered significant delays in their advance. The day’s outcomes bolstered the morale of the German troops, setting a hopeful tone for the ongoing operations, even as the specter of a determined enemy loomed ever larger. Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was designated as the primary effort of the entire campaign. As such, it commanded the widest front and the most extensive resources. Bock’s lines stretched from Suwalki in the north to the notorious Pripyat Marshes in the south. The left flank of this formidable advance was anchored by General Hermann Hoth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group. As the advance commenced, Bock’s forces were preceded by a considerable artillery barrage, complemented by Luftwaffe close air support that relentlessly bombarded positions held by the Soviet 11th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kirill Morozov. Notably, Morozov had strategically positioned his forces slightly behind the border, allowing for some protection against being completely overrun during this initial onslaught. Even so, parts of the 57th Panzer Corps managed a remarkable advance of up to 70 kilometers on that first day. Hoth’s command also included two infantry corps: the 5th and 6th Corps. These formations, moving at a slower pace than their armored counterparts, did not cross the border until 04:00 hours. Nevertheless, they managed to foot march an impressive 40 kilometers before halting for the day, enduring some level of combat during their progress. Another of Hoth’s Panzer Corps, the 39th, advanced on the left flank, closest to the dividing line of the Army Group. With a front only 20 kilometers wide, this corps was densely packed and faced little opposition, encountering only fierce house-to-house fighting in a small village near the border. As pertaining to General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer group’s war diary after completing the first day of Operation Barbarossa, “Where the enemy appears he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. The struggle, as a result, will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign”. By 09:40 hours, aerial reconnaissance reported significant numbers of unidentified Red Army soldiers withdrawing toward the Neman River, seemingly attempting to regroup and fortify their defensive lines.

Capitalizing on this retreat, the 7th Panzer Division raced toward the crossings at the town of Alytus. The 7th Panzer Division already had some standing as one of the best divisions in the Heer. It had been commanded in France by then Major General Rommel, who built his reputation first in the daring assaults after the breakout of the Panzers near Sedan. By 12:45 hours, the German forces had secured the bridges, providing a vital foothold. However, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, the commander of the Soviet Northwestern Front, had other plans. He dispatched his 5th Tank Division to disrupt the German advance and push the Panzers back over the Neman River. The first elements to arrive were 44 T-34 tanks, which, facing only 20 German tanks, seemed poised to turn the tide. This should have spelled doom for the German advance; however, the ineptitude of the inexperienced Soviet tank crews, combined with timely Luftwaffe air support, meant that the T-34s were effectively neutralized in place. This encounter was a total victory for the Wehrmacht. The presence of the superior Soviet tanks was barely noticed at the highest levels of the Heer’s command, but soldiers who had encountered them first hand were shaken. One soldier recounted how a T-34 had absorbed dozens of anti-tank rounds without effect. This was a portent of things to come, though it would be weeks before the highest levels of the Heer took notice of the superior Soviet tanks. While this engagement delayed the advance by several hours, it cost the 7th Panzer Division a not insignificant portion of its combat strength. Ultimately, by the end of the day, the 39th Panzer Corps had successfully secured its bridgehead across the Neman River and began to drive a wedge between the Soviet Northwestern and Western Front commands. This advancement set the stage for the anticipated encirclement of the Western Front. Commanders on both sides recognized the significance of the growing gap and directed their best efforts toward sealing it, knowing that the outcome of this maneuver might determine the success of the campaign.

Next in line was the 9th Army, commanded by Colonel General Strauss. His forces were deployed along a formidable front spanning 200 kilometers. At 03:00 hours, Strauss’s troops crossed the line in conjunction with the rest of the front. His primary focus was on the left flank, where 3 of his divisions advanced from Suwalki toward Grodno. They soon found themselves engaged in fierce combat against the Soviet 29th Tank Division of the 3rd Army, which mounted a determined resistance. This sector proved to be no easy battleground. Elements of the 9th Army would become some of the first German troops to encounter the Soviet heavy KV-1 and medium T-34 tanks, although only 2 KV-1s and 26 T-34s were present during this initial engagement. The KV-1 and T-34 tanks had not been produced in nearly the same numbers as the lighter tanks of the Red Army, and those that had been produced had not been concentrated. It was not uncommon to have 1 T-34 for every ten lighter tanks, like the T-37 or T-26.

Details about the confrontation remain scarce, but it appears that these Soviet tanks were largely ineffective in their debut against the well-trained Heer. However, this would not hold true in future encounters, as the Soviets would quickly adapt to the challenges presented by the German forces. Despite the fierce opposition, the 9th Army made significant progress, fighting their way to the outskirts of Grodno. However, the city itself would not fall until the following day. At that time, Lieutenant General Vasily Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet 3rd Army, which was headquartered in Grodno. By the close of the day, Kuznetsov found himself in a perilous situation, facing the real threat of encirclement. As the day unfolded, his superiors struggled to grasp the true extent of his predicament, a situation that was not uncommon on this day or in the days that followed. German special forces operating in the region had successfully disrupted communication lines, further complicating the command and coordination of Soviet forces. This disruption would continue to plague the Stavka (the Soviet high command) throughout the campaign, as it sought to counter the rapid and aggressive maneuvers of the Wehrmacht. By the end of the day, the 9th Army had not only advanced along their entire front but also achieved the majority of their first-day objectives. This success enhanced the overall momentum of the German offensive and underscored the effectiveness of their strategic planning in the early stages of the campaign.

On the right flank of Strauss’s army was Field Marshal Heinz Guderian’s 4th Army, commanding a front that measured 100 kilometers. Despite having a significant area of responsibility, this was still only half the size of the 9th Army’s front. Unlike many of the other infantry armies engaged in the offensive, Kluge’s assault was preceded by a substantial artillery and aerial bombardment, designed to soften enemy defenses and pave the way for the main offensive. The Army’s assault engineers had to push across the Bug River in order to clear the border area and build bridges for the oncoming main body of troops. This went off without a hitch. By 12:30 hours. However, once across the river, the 9th Army began to encounter more serious resistance from the Soviet forces. This unexpected opposition slowed the German operations somewhat, as troops learned, just like their comrades in other sectors on this day, that the bypassed Soviet forces were not surrendering without a fight. The Red Army soldiers displayed remarkable tenacity, often engaging in fierce resistance even when cut off, a contrast to the experiences of the Heer during their previous campaigns in the West. This determined defense by the Soviets took the German soldiers by surprise, challenging their expectations and underscoring the resilience of the Red Army in this early phase of the Eastern Front conflict. As the day progressed, the 4th Army, although facing delays, continued to adapt to the evolving situation. The initial advantage of surprise began to erode as the fierce fighting tested the mettle and resolve of Kluge's troops, indicating that the campaign in the East would demand more from them than the swift victories of their past engagements in Western Europe.

Despite the intense fighting, the Soviet Western Front, commanded by General of the Army Pavlov, was disintegrating under the relentless pressure of the German advance. The most pressing issue facing Pavlov was the command and control of his armies. He struggled to establish communication with the headquarters of several divisions, leaving them unable to effectively command their subordinate units. The day before Operation Barbarossa commenced, Pavlov had personally petitioned Joseph Stalin for permission to mobilize his forces, but his request was summarily denied. This denial would prove catastrophic for the Red Army, severely impacting their ability to mount a cohesive defense. Nowhere was this lack of preparedness more evident than in the sectors facing Army Group Center. As the first day of battle drew to a close, Soviet divisions found themselves scattered and ill-equipped. Many units possessed little more than rudimentary plans to resist the impending German assault, demonstrating a severe lack of coordination and resources. In this chaotic environment, the 4th Army made only limited progress, advancing an average of 10 to 30 kilometers along the front. Among the Soviet formations, it was the 263rd Infantry Division that achieved the greatest success on this day, managing to secure the town of Bryansk. However, this modest gain was overshadowed by the overall disarray of the Soviet forces, highlighting the dire situation that Pavlov faced as the campaign unfolded. The inadequate response to the German offensive illustrated the broader challenges that the Red Army would need to overcome in the days to come, as they grappled with both internal disorganization and external aggression.

Anchoring the right flank of Army Group Center was Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, which operated along a front of 100 kilometers. Guderian is another of the various Generals who would go on to play an outsized role in the outcome of the war. His habit of disobeying direct orders from even the highest of authorities would get him in trouble as the war progressed, but he managed to get himself in and out of trouble due to his willingness to play coy with Hitler. The OKH and Army Group Center ensured that Guderian's Panzers were among the most heavily supported forces in the entire theater, receiving the highest priority for Luftwaffe assets and being assigned the bulk of the Army Group’s dedicated formations. These dedicated formations included assault guns battalions, artillery batteries, anti-tank and flamethrower support among others. As the assault commenced on the morning of June 22, 1941, the 12th Infantry Corps launched an attack to encircle the fortress at Brest. The Brest fortress was exceptionally unprepared for the assault and many of the defenders fled in the earliest hours. However, those that stayed behind put up a heroic defense of the citadel that lasted until at least June 30, 1941. In 1965 it was memorialized as a “Hero Fortress” , a unique decoration in Soviet History. Its individual equivalent is the “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Twelve cities were eventually decorated as “Hero City” as well for various roles in the war. The fortifications were manned by approximately 9,000 soldiers from various Soviet units who fought tenaciously and refused to surrender. 

The 2nd Panzer Group, operating 190 kilometers to the south of Hoth, encountered a considerably more challenging advance. While some bridges across the Bug River, acting as the German-Soviet border, were successfully seized during the initial German assault, it would require the German Army’s assault engineer teams to figure out how to cross the Bug River for not just infantry but also heavy vehicles and Panzers. Compounding the difficulties, General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen, commander of the 47th Panzer Corps, which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized Division, and the 167th Infantry Division, reported significant challenges in crossing the captured bridges. The approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic, severely hindering the movement of troops and equipment. This necessitated the construction of pontoon bridges, causing delays in their penetration. However, by midday, at least nine bridges were operational. To expedite the crossing, the 18th Panzer Division utilized 80 specially outfitted Panzer III and IV tanks to ford the Bug. These were known as Teuchpanzers. They had originally been designed for the abandoned Operation Sealion. These special amphibious conversions were viewed with some suspicion by the men that used them. However, they worked perfectly on this day. They were equipped much like modern fording capable tanks. The tanks were sealed against any water inflow and set up with a large air breather tube. These tanks were instrumental in defending the expanding bridgehead as engineers continued their work on the pontoon bridges.

Before noon, the 47th Panzer Corps successfully crossed the Lesna River, approximately 10 kilometers beyond the city of Brest-Litovsk, moving further into Soviet territory. To the right of the 12th Infantry Corps was the 24th Panzer Corps, whose main effort was aimed at advancing as far as possible toward Minsk, located more than 300 kilometers away. Although it was not anticipated that they would reach the city before the end of the first week, it was vital to push toward Minsk quickly to achieve the grand encirclement intended by Adolf Hitler. Standing in their way was Lieutenant General Korobkov’s 4th Army. Late in the day, the 22nd Tank Division was committed to the fight. However, German air superiority sealed the fate of the Soviet tank columns, with the Wehrmacht’s coordination in the field proving overwhelming for the inexperienced and unprepared Red Army troops. By the end of the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the 47th and 24th Panzer Corps had advanced approximately 20 kilometers. While this was not as spectacular as the gains achieved in other areas of the front, it was notable given the stiff resistance they encountered and the serious terrain obstacles they had to overcome. This initial movement set the stage for further advances in the coming days as the German forces continued to push into Soviet territory. 

Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, was divided into two halves by the Carpathian Mountains. The southern sector, situated along the Prut River in Romania, would not initiate offensive operations until July 2. Therefore, the forces stationed there, including the German 11th Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, remained passive during the first week of Operation Barbarossa and will not be covered this week. In contrast, the northern sector held the majority of the Army Group’s combat power. On its northern flank was the 6th Army, led by Field Marshal Friedrich Reichenau. Half of the divisions within the army were designated to support the 1st Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Hermann Kleist. These armored forces moved across the border in coordination with the rest of the front and engaged in fierce combat against Soviet positions fortified by the 15th Rifle Corps.

The northernmost units, particularly the 44th Infantry Corps, faced exceptionally stiff resistance from well-prepared Soviet defenders. As the day progressed, they endured hundreds of casualties and managed only an average advance of 15 kilometers under heavy enemy fire. In the southern portion of the front, the 17th Infantry Corps engaged in combat as well, but initially encountered far less resistance compared to the 44th Infantry Corps. However, this relative calm changed dramatically before midday as soldiers from the 15th Rifle Corps fought desperately to defend their bunkers. Even after German forces believed many of the bunkers had been cleared, Soviet defenders continued to mount tenacious resistance, demonstrating their determination to hold their positions. This fierce fighting persisted until the day's end. Despite the challenges, elements of the 6th Army were able to advance approximately 15 kilometers beyond the border in some sectors. This progress, while limited in comparison to the advances in other sections of the front, showcased the tenacity of both sides and set the stage for the ensuing battles as the campaign unfolded.

The supporting infantry of the 1st Panzer Group relentlessly battered the Soviet bunkers along the Bug River. By midday, a small gap had been opened, allowing Colonel General Hermann Kleist’s Panzers to spring into action and begin their assault. However, the advance was soon hampered by bunkers that had been accidentally bypassed by the infantry in front of them, leading to fierce fighting and mounting casualties. As a result of these challenges, only one of the five Panzer divisions within the 1st Panzer Group managed to cross the border on the first day: the 11th Panzer Division, commanded by Major General Crüwell. This division advanced a relatively modest distance of 25 kilometers, but given the circumstances, it represented a significant gain for the German southern front on the first day of Operation Barbarossa. While the Red Army was unprepared for the vast offensive along the entire front, the defenses along the Bug River had one advantage: Soviet forces were able to resist from prepared defensive positions. The armies defending this region possessed more tanks than anywhere else on the Eastern Front. Although these tanks were employed with a level of incompetence, they still managed to score some hits against the advancing German forces. Despite the initial setbacks, it became clear that the Soviet defenders would continue to provide resistance in the days to come, using their fortifications and remaining armored assets to contest the German advance along the Bug. The fighting in this sector would prove to be a harbinger of the challenges that awaited both sides as the campaign unfolded. Theories emerged that the Soviet Union was seeking to preemptively attack Romania or Romania and Germany together are unfounded in reality. The Red Army was in the middle of a massive reorganization that rendered it incapable of offensive action. Colonel Glantz, considered by many to be the foremost expert on the subject of the Eastern Front, has definitely put the topic to bed in his 1998 book, Stumbling Colossus. 

The first day of Operation Barbarossa was a definitive success, with many of the objectives for the initial assault not only met but exceeded. Prior to the launch of the offensive that morning, numerous leaders within the Wehrmacht had expressed concerns that while strategic surprise was achievable, tactical surprise would be unlikely. However, by the end of the day, these apprehensions had proven completely unfounded. The Germans had achieved an unprecedented level of tactical and strategic surprise, an accomplishment that seemed fantastical just weeks prior. This successful outcome marked the latest in a series of remarkable victories that contributed to the growing legend of the Wehrmacht. Following their swift conquests in Poland, France, and the Low Countries, the rapid gains in the Soviet Union further solidified their reputation as an unstoppable military machine. The intoxicating success of the first day fueled unbridled optimism among many of the highest-ranking leaders, particularly Adolf Hitler. This victory allowed them to indulge in their expectations for the coming days of Operation Barbarossa, as it seemed that another of Hitler’s audacious gambles had paid off. The mood was buoyant, with visions of further rapid advancements and ultimate victory overshadowing any lingering doubts about the challenges that lay ahead.

However, there was a darker side to the first day of Operation Barbarossa. Beneath the surface of the victories celebrated in the opening hours, the average German soldier was quickly learning that the Red Army was not composed of mere conscripts deemed as "Untermensch" with no will to fight. Instead, they encountered determined and cunning professional soldiers who displayed remarkable courage and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. Complicating the narrative of victory, logistics soon proved to be a significant issue for the Wehrmacht. Some of Hoth’s Panzers had run out of fuel during the fighting, and Kluge’s men discovered that the roads of the Soviet Union were a far cry from those of France. Throughout Army Group Center, units found that what had been marked as proper roads on their maps were, in reality, little more than sandy trails carved through dense forests. This lack of reliable infrastructure meant that trucks often became mired in the terrain, necessitating the use of manpower and horses to pull them free. The inefficiency of these tracks posed further challenges, as tanks consumed significantly more fuel when traversing such rough terrain. Additionally, the roads were seldom wide enough to accommodate two-way traffic, complicating the routing of troops and supplies. For many of the junior officers and soldiers engaged in the combat, it became increasingly evident that there would be no easy days on the Eastern Front. The initial successes had come at a high cost, and the harsh reality of the campaign loomed large, hinting at the grueling challenges that lay ahead.

Stalin and his command staff were taken aback by the swiftness and brutality of the German invasion. For days, if not weeks, rumors had been swirling in the capital regarding a potential attack. Just hours before the Germans launched their offensive, Stalin had personally ordered his men not to mobilize, fearing that such a move might provoke Hitler. Perhaps, reminiscing about the events of September 1939, he hoped that a last-minute diplomatic deal could be struck to avert war. He was gravely mistaken.

 

Hitler was resolute in his plans for invasion, driven by a necessity rooted in his ideological beliefs. This madness propelled him to commence the largest military campaign in history, one that would ultimately be doomed to fail. As the first few hours of the invasion unfolded, Stalin’s high command began to reassess their strategy and resolve to resist the onslaught. They were determined not to allow the Red Army to collapse without a fight. Under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Soviet Generals swiftly issued orders for immediate counter-attacks while simultaneously planning larger counter-offensives for the days ahead. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Thus on June 22 of 1941, Hitler has unleashed Operation Barbarossa, one of the largest military operations of all time. German soldiers, fueled by Nazi ideology, prepared with grim determination as they received orders just hours before the assault. The attack began with artillery and air raids at dawn, catching the Soviets off guard. Initial successes marked the first day, with German forces advancing deep into enemy territory, despite facing unexpected resistance. However, the harsh realities of the Eastern Front, including logistical challenges and resilient Soviet defenders, foreshadowed a grueling campaign ahead, one that would test the Wehrmacht's might like never before.

Eastern Front SPECIAL #1 The Development of Blitzkrieg

Last time we spoke about the Hitler’s decision to go to war. As June 1941 approached, Hitler prepared for Operation Barbarossa, an audacious plan to invade the Soviet Union before decisively defeating Britain. Stalin, sensing danger after the Winter War, had restructured the Red Army, but both sides were plagued by logistical woes. Hitler's directive emphasized destroying the Red Army, while his generals, led by Halder, argued for capturing Moscow first. Ignoring Soviet warnings, the Wehrmacht faced weakened armored divisions and critical supply shortages, stemming from a lack of standardized equipment and logistical planning. As the campaign unfolded, divisions became diluted, and the vastness of the front posed significant challenges. War games conducted by Paulus revealed critical insights about Soviet reinforcement capacities, indicating that rapid mobilization could counter German advances. The audacity of the invasion clashed with the grim reality of Nazi genocide plans, shaping a conflict that would become one of history's darkest chapters. Would this confrontation lead to Hitler's ruin, or could he outmaneuver his greatest rival?

This Special episode is: the Development of Blitzkrieg

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Yes, this week we actually have a special episode, just before we dive into Operation Barbarossa! What a horrible way to tease you all I know. 

Now for today we are delving into a concept that has shaped our understanding of World War II, Blitzkrieg. When we hear the term, vivid images may come to mind: daring Panzer commanders leading their troops from the turrets of their tanks, crashing through unsuspecting Allied soldiers, with the ominous screech of Stukas overhead and infantry riding behind in half-tracks. However, these depictions are more myth than reality, largely crafted through decades of propaganda. Much of this narrative was constructed after the war by none other than the Panzer generals themselves. Figures like Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian played pivotal roles in this movement, striving to cultivate an image of a glorious Wehrmacht, one that was supposedly only thwarted by the stubbornness of the mad dictator, Adolf Hitler. This self-serving imagery not only enhanced their own reputations but also cast a shadow over the complex realities of the war.

Let’s take a closer look at what people actually mean when they use the term Blitzkrieg. Generally, it refers to German military operations conducted from 1939 to 1941. At its core, Blitzkrieg is often characterized by the speed and efficiency with which these operations were executed, hence, the term translates to “lightning war.” A prime example of this concept can be seen in the Battle for France in 1940. In that campaign, German forces dealt a staggering blow to the French and British armies in a matter of days, nearly knocking them out of the war. The initial phase of the Battle of France was nothing short of catastrophic, as the British Expeditionary Force or “BEF” and the French Army were on the verge of annihilation. However, it’s crucial to note that this rapid offensive did not mark the end of hostilities in France. In fact, serious fighting continued for another three weeks following the evacuation at Dunkirk. While the Battle of France concluded relatively quickly, around six weeks total, the German tactics were not as decisive as they were often portrayed. For comparison, let’s look back at the Schlieffen Plan from 1914, which reached its climax in front of Paris within four weeks. The Schlieffen Plan was Germany’s military strategy in the early 20th century, designed to avoid a two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. Conceived by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905, the plan aimed for a rapid German victory over France by invading through neutral Belgium and encircling Paris from the north. Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take longer to mobilize its vast army, giving Germany time to defeat France quickly and then redirect forces to the Eastern Front. The plan relied heavily on speed, coordination, and violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war when Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. In execution, the plan faltered. The right wing of the German army, intended to sweep through Belgium and northern France, was weakened to reinforce the left, slowing momentum. Belgium’s resistance, logistical problems, and the unexpectedly fast Russian mobilization forced Germany to divert troops eastward earlier than planned. By September 1914, German forces were halted at the First Battle of the Marne. 

The Germans were bogged down at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical issues, and effective Allied resistance. The German army, following the Schlieffen Plan, had advanced rapidly through Belgium and northern France, aiming to encircle Paris and force a quick French surrender. However, the rapid advance stretched their supply lines thin, leaving troops exhausted and short on food, ammunition, and reinforcements. Crucially, German command weakened the right flank, the part of the army responsible for encircling Paris, to reinforce other sectors, undermining the original plan. As German armies moved south of the Marne River, a significant gap opened between the First and Second Armies. Allied forces, particularly the French under General Joffre and the British Expeditionary Force, identified and exploited this vulnerability. The French famously used Parisian taxis to rush reinforcements to the front, helping launch a strong counterattack. Fearing encirclement and unable to maintain their offensive, German commanders ordered a retreat to more defensible positions. This retreat marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the end of mobile warfare on the Western Front. The armies dug in, and what followed was a prolonged, grinding stalemate marked by trench warfare.

In 1940, however, there was no such miracle for the French. This so-called Blitzkrieg had not achieved a swift and definitive victory; instead, it revealed multiple underlying issues that contributed to France's downfall. There were numerous reasons behind the collapse of the French forces, and their performance was shockingly poor. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, very few in the Allied world were willing to confront the uncomfortable truth that the failures of France and Britain played a significant role in this unexpected outcome. It was far easier to believe that the Germans had created something revolutionary, a unique approach to warfare, that had caught the French and British armies off guard.

 

The reality was that the Germans had never anticipated the war would unfold as successfully as it did. Even the operational plan for the Battle of France emerged from a recognition that the overall strategic situation was grim. Invading France through the Low Countries was the only viable option for bringing substantial German forces across the Rhine. Interestingly, the early drafts of the 1940 plan resembled something directly from the desk of Helmuth von Moltke back in 1908, offering little innovation or new strategy. The German General Staff had spent years analyzing the failures of the 1914 campaign and concluded that there was little hope for a fresh or groundbreaking approach. They believed that only time, luck, and superior organization could allow them to overcome the Allied forces. In May 1940, the actual plan put into action was a reaction to unexpected circumstances. The Allies accidentally acquired a copy of the German plans, prompting the General Staff and Hitler to realize their operational blueprint had been compromised. 

Known as the Mechelen Incident, d on January 10, 1940, during the Phoney War phase a German aircraft, carrying the plans for the German invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, codenamed Fall Gelb or Case Yellow, crash-landed in Belgium near Vucht, now part of Maasmechelen. It was certainl a case of oopsy daisies. The pilot, Major Erich Hoenmanns, was flying a Messerschmitt Bf 108 when low fog caused him to lose his bearings. While trying to reorient himself by heading toward the River Rhine, he inadvertently crossed into Belgian airspace after mistakenly flying over the frozen Rhine. He then encountered mechanical failure after inadvertently cutting off the fuel supply to the engine, forcing him to land in a nearby field. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, both he and his passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, survived. Reinberger was carrying key documents related to the planned invasion, a fact that alarmed both men upon realizing the implications of their crash and their accidental entry into Belgium. In a frenzied attempt to destroy these documents, Reinberger tried, but failed initially, to set them on fire. He eventually managed to burn some, but Belgian border guards discovered the scene, leading to the capture of Hoenmanns and Reinberger.

The reaction in Berlin was one of shock and anger upon learning that their plans had fallen into enemy hands. Adolf Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of senior Luftwaffe commanders and debated the potential compromise of their military strategy. Despite the initial panic, it was determined that the attack would proceed as planned. Following much deliberation, they decided to develop a new strategy, partly crafted by General Erich von Manstein. This innovative plan called for a rapid thrust through the Ardennes, with the goal of driving to the coast to encircle and cut off the primary Allied field armies positioned in the Low Countries. While this plan was bold, it wasn't entirely original to Manstein; elements of it had been discussed in earlier planning stages but had been dismissed. It was only the urgent need for a fresh strategy to meet Hitler’s timeline for an invasion of France that led to the adoption of Manstein’s ideas. Moreover, this approach conveniently placed Manstein in a key position at the heart of the Wehrmacht’s main offensive. As chief of staff to Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Army Group responsible for this area, Manstein's influence and strategic vision became critical to the operation's success.

Now we don’t need to delve into the intricate details of the planning or execution of the Battle of France. Instead, it's important to clarify one crucial point: those involved in German military planning did not initially view the battle as a “Blitzkrieg.” While the term "lightning war" has become iconic, it was perceived by the German high command primarily as a strategic concept, rather than the operational doctrine that contemporary audiences often associate it with. Historically, German and Prussian military theorists had grappled with their nation's strategic challenges, particularly following their defeat by Napoleon. This pivotal moment shaped their military thinking for decades. One of the central dilemmas they faced was the fear that any conflict could escalate into a prolonged struggle, a scenario that the resources and political stability of Germany could ill afford. From prior to World War I, military planning had emphasized the importance of avoiding a two-front war, allowing the nation to concentrate its resources and efforts on a single front. This strategy was vital for Germany's aim of achieving a swift resolution to conflicts. It’s crucial to note that Germany was not unique in its desire for short wars; the prevailing sentiment across many nations at the time was a general reluctance to engage in lengthy conflicts. The concept of a short war was a common thread in strategic planning, and it would be misleading to suggest that Germany’s approach was radically different from that of its contemporaries. Understanding this context, we can see that Blitzkrieg was not strictly a doctrine of operations nor a specific set of tactical maneuvers. For the Wehrmacht in 1940, it represented more of an abstract idea, loosely connected to the long-standing principles of German strategic thought that had been evolving since 1870. This concept would later manifest in a unique combination of speed, surprise, and coordinated assaults, but its origins lay in a broader strategic mindset that prioritized quick and decisive victories over drawn-out warfare.

If Blitzkrieg wasn’t the driving force behind Germany’s remarkable victory over France and Britain in 1940, what accounted for this stunning achievement? One significant factor was sheer luck. Reflecting on the campaign, General Heinz Guderian mused that their success felt “almost a miracle.” A combination of fortunate circumstances and a series of critical missteps by the Allies played a fundamental role in the outcome. The Allies’ mistakes were compounded by poor communication between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army, which ultimately allowed the Germans the crucial time they needed to execute their decisive maneuvers. This became especially evident following the breakthrough across the Meuse River, where the Germans seized the initiative. As the situation unfolded, the Allies consistently faltered in their response. In France, the political landscape was rapidly deteriorating, leading to significant confusion. The day the Germans launched their invasion, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, which added another layer of instability during a critical moment. Meanwhile, the French military command experienced turbulence as well, with changes in Army leadership occurring at the height of the campaign. Debates over British support in the field intensified, and inadequate reserves were deployed in a piecemeal fashion. Incompetent military leadership, poor coordination, and muddled political directives all significantly contributed to the success of the German campaign. Yet, despite these advantages, the level of success the Wehrmacht achieved was unexpected, even for their own generals. Hitler and his advisors expressed concerns that their forces were becoming overextended and could be vulnerable to a counterattack from the Allies. Ultimately, it was a combination of fortunate circumstances and these various factors that shielded the Germans from facing the consequences of potentially overreaching their capabilities.

The tactics employed in World War II were fundamentally shaped by the experiences and lessons learned during World War I. This was true for every army around the globe at that time. Each nation emerged from the First World War with a unique understanding of warfare, shaped by their specific experiences and challenges. However, a few key insights were universally recognized. Firstly, it became evident that armor, infantry, artillery, and reconnaissance units needed to operate in harmony. The concept of "combined arms" was not merely a theoretical idea; it was increasingly understood as a vital necessity for effective military operations. Effective coordination among these branches was crucial for overcoming the complexities of modern warfare. Secondly, by 1939, there was widespread consensus that aerial power would play a critical role on the battlefield. The question was no longer whether to incorporate air support into military strategies, but rather how to best integrate these elements to maximize their effectiveness. Military planners and political leaders debated strategies for employing combined arms, seeking the most effective methods for coordination and execution. This evolving understanding led to innovative doctrines that emphasized speed, flexibility, and the importance of communication among different branches of the military. Countries began experimenting with various formations and tactics, ultimately paving the way for revolutionary approaches to warfare that would be realized during the conflict.

The French military recognized that their overarching strategy needed to emphasize the use of combined arms in continuous defensive lines. To achieve this, they implemented infantry-tank teams that operated at the pace of infantry, prioritizing reliability over speed. While this approach limited the rapid mobility of their forces, it was designed to ensure that the coordination and effectiveness of armored units were maintained alongside their infantry counterparts. In 1940, French tanks were among the best in the world, significantly outclassing their German counterparts in terms of armor and armaments. However, substantial flaws were embedded within their tactical framework concerning these continuous defensive lines. French military leaders had not been trained to deploy their units in aggressive, independent assaults, as such maneuvers might disturb the carefully controlled lines determined by higher command. This rigidity hindered their operational flexibility and responsiveness. Moreover, difficulties in equipment acquisition left many French tanks without radios, severely impacting their communication capabilities on the battlefield. This lack of effective communication further complicated coordination among combined arms teams, limiting their effectiveness in rapidly evolving combat situations. On the other hand, the British government believed that supporting the French on the continent necessitated a strong naval and air presence, with limited ground forces. Consequently, the British field army was relatively small, consisting of troops that were better trained in colonial policing than in executing large-scale combined arms maneuvers alongside their French allies. Although the British fielded notable tanks, such as the Matilda, their focus was not on large maneuver elements. The insufficient scale and coordination on the French side meant that the British also did not prioritize the development of such capabilities. This strategic divide between the French and British forces contributed to the challenges both nations faced during the early stages of World War II, as they struggled to adapt their tactical approaches to the realities of modern warfare.

The primary lesson the Germans gleaned from the brutal trench warfare of World War I was that maneuverability was paramount in modern combat. They recognized that the stagnation of movement had transformed the conflict into a horrific slugging match, resulting in millions of casualties. This static warfare, devoid of maneuver, had become an industrial exercise in destruction, one that Germany, due to its limited manpower and resources, could not sustain in the long run. The sheer weight of the combined British and French forces matched their own, and with the arrival of American troops, the prospect of victory slipped further out of reach. Throughout the war, the Germans had consistently outmaneuvered their Russian opponents, a strategy that allowed them to effectively manage their limited resources while achieving tactical successes on the Eastern Front. However, in the West, opportunities for these maneuvers had been severely curtailed, leading to stalemate and attrition. To counter this, Germany dedicated the interwar period to mastering the principles of combined arms warfare, focusing on how to create formations that could execute swift maneuvers and independent actions. This effort culminated in the development of the Panzer division, an innovative military structure that emphasized speed, maneuverability, and operational flexibility. The Panzer divisions were meticulously designed to facilitate rapid movement and to empower local commanders to make decisions on the battlefield without waiting for orders from higher-ups. This decentralized command structure allowed for greater responsiveness and adaptability during combat operations. Over time, these divisions would evolve into Panzer Corps and Panzer Armies, further enhancing the German military's ability to perform combined arms operations effectively. This focus on maneuverable warfare not only defined German tactics but also set a new standard for military strategy in the years leading up to World War II.

However, this strategic vision was far from perfect. Germany faced significant challenges in building a robust industrial base capable of mass-equipping its armies with the advanced mechanized units envisioned in their plans. Germany took a very long time to initiate a full wartime economy during World War II due to a mix of ideological, political, and strategic factors, all of which severely impacted production efficiency in the early years of the war. When the war began in 1939, Adolf Hitler deliberately avoided transitioning Germany into a total war economy. He wanted to maintain civilian morale and avoid the harsh sacrifices Germans had experienced during World War I, especially food shortages and labor conscription. Consumer goods production continued, cinemas stayed open, and rationing was minimal in the early years. Hitler believed that a Blitzkrieg strategy would lead to quick victories and negate the need for total mobilization. This mindset was supported by Nazi ideology and bureaucracy. Hitler's government was fragmented, with various competing agencies, like the Wehrmacht, the SS, and different ministries, all vying for control. Economic planning was disorganized, with no centralized authority to oversee efficient industrial production. Industry leaders were left to make decisions based on profit and political loyalty, rather than wartime necessity. Germany also did not fully utilize its available labor force. For ideological reasons, the Nazis were reluctant to employ women in heavy industry as extensively as the Allies or the Soviet Union. Instead, they increasingly relied on forced labor from occupied countries, which was inefficient, underpaid, and poorly managed. By 1942, Germany had suffered major setbacks, especially on the Eastern Front, and Hitler realized that a more serious mobilization was needed. This is when Albert Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments and War Production. Speer introduced rationalization measures, streamlined production, reduced duplication, and centralized control of industry. Under his leadership, German armaments output significantly increased, even amid intensified Allied bombing. However, these improvements came late. The delays in shifting to a war economy meant that Germany missed its chance to build overwhelming material superiority early in the conflict. Allied powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, vastly outproduced Germany by the mid-war years. US industry operated at full capacity, and the USSR, despite massive losses, reorganized its economy behind the Urals for war-focused production. This all resulted in unstable production lines, making it difficult to develop standardized equipment and maintain a long-term acquisitions pipeline. Consequently, the German military resorted to a mixed approach. They developed a small number of elite mechanized divisions, equipped to the highest standards with the latest technology. In contrast, additional infantry divisions were motorized to a degree, utilizing truck-drawn artillery to enhance their mobility, while the majority of the army remained largely traditional in structure. These standard infantry units, reminiscent of their historical counterparts, carried their supplies on their backs, with horse-drawn wagons following behind to transport heavier equipment.

As a result, the infantry of the Heer could only move at a pace consistent with historical infantry tactics: approximately five kilometers per hour, neither faster nor slower. This limitation proved to be a significant shortcoming, particularly on the Eastern Front. The infantry struggled to keep pace with the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions, leading to logistical challenges. Frequently, the panzers and motorized infantry found themselves forced to pause their advances, waiting for the slower-moving infantry to catch up and take their positions. This situation undermined the very advantages in speed and maneuverability that the Germans had sought to create, disrupting the flow of the campaign and hindering effective combat operations. In essence, while the innovative structures like the Panzer divisions were designed to revolutionize warfare, the failure to fully mechanize and equip their entire army would ultimately constrain Germany's tactical flexibility and responsiveness, especially in the vast theaters of the East.

The doctrine governing the employment of panzer divisions in the German army is notably difficult to define. In a post-war interview, General Heinz Guderian’s deputy, General Hermann Schweppenburg, asserted that there was no cohesive doctrine for employing panzer divisions throughout the conflict. This assertion has sparked endless debates across forums, academic papers, and casual discussions in cafes since the war concluded. However, taking Schweppenburg’s claim at face value requires us to traverse generational and cultural divides in a manner that may prove unattainable. There is no universally accepted benchmark to ensure that we share a common understanding of what he meant by the absence of doctrine. Unfortunately, no one could ask him for clarification now, given that he has been deceased for over half a century. Therefore, we must base our analysis on common sense and the evidence available to us. It is essential to consider the context in which these panzer divisions operated. While Schweppenburg may have perceived a lack of formal doctrine, various operational principles and methodologies were indeed developed and employed throughout the war. The German military did prioritize speed, flexibility, and combined arms operations, reflecting the lessons learned from both World Wars. The effective use of panzer divisions often relied on the initiative and adaptability of local commanders, who were empowered to make real-time decisions in response to the fluid nature of battle. This decentralized command structure, although not a formal doctrine in the traditional sense, created a framework for coordination that was essential to the success of their armored units. Ultimately, while it may be tempting to view the absence of a formal doctrine as a weakness, it can also be interpreted as a strength, one that allowed for a responsiveness to the dynamic conditions of warfare. We must critically assess the available evidence and acknowledge the complexities therein, recognizing that the execution of panzer operations was shaped as much by opportunistic innovation as by any rigidly defined doctrine.

 

First, what is doctrine? While there are many interpretations of the term, a concise definition from the United States Marine Corps encapsulates its essence: “Doctrine is the fundamental principles, including tactics, techniques, and procedures, by which forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.” Importantly, this definition does not necessitate the existence of a formal written document. In this context, General Schweppenburg's assertion may hold validity if he was referring specifically to the absence of a documented doctrine outlining the principles of armored force employment. However, it is crucial to recognize that there existed common understandings among panzer commanders regarding their roles and responsibilities within the German army. Without these shared insights and precepts, chaos would have likely ensued, rendering cooperative actions among units nearly impossible. The absence of a formal document does not imply a lack of coherence in operational strategies. On the contrary, the effectiveness of panzer divisions was predicated on a foundational commonality of purpose and approach. Commanders across the board shared an understanding of the strategic objectives and the methods necessary to achieve them, which facilitated coordination and unity of effort in combat situations. This implicit doctrine, built upon shared experiences and lessons learned, allowed the German military to execute complex maneuvers effectively and adapt to the dynamic conditions of warfare.

What we know about actual panzer doctrine can be corroborated through operational histories. The Panzer divisions were regarded as self-contained mobile forces specifically tasked with breaking through enemy lines. After achieving this breakthrough, they were assigned various missions, the most common of which included cutting enemy lines of communication, disrupting retreats, and targeting logistics. During Operation Barbarossa, this doctrine was vividly illustrated in the battles of Minsk, Smolensk, and Kyiv. Large independent panzer units were directed to penetrate Soviet lines and establish connections behind the enemy's main body. In this operational framework, infantry units were to advance behind the panzers, securing the lines of communication essential for sustaining the panzer forces. Once encirclement was achieved, efforts would shift to reducing the encircled pocket, a tactic known as the Kesselacht, or cauldron battle. This concept was historically rooted in the strategies of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke and later adapted by his successors, including those influenced by Schlieffen's principles. These encirclement battles involved infantry forces advancing from all sides into the pocket to reduce its size. Ultimately, the destruction of the encircled enemy forces would be achieved either through a decisive assault or the enemy's surrender. However, the aforementioned slow pace of infantry movement often led to situations where panzer units found themselves bogged down in heavy fighting unsuited to their capabilities while waiting for infantry to relieve them. Once the pocket was fully encircled and secured, or once relief was achieved, the Panzers would continue their advance. These encirclement strategies were designed to operate on a massive scale, often targeting entire field armies and, in the cases of Minsk and Kyiv, large Soviet army groups. Yet, the scale of these operations was not always consistent. Tensions frequently arose between Hitler and his generals regarding the aggressiveness of the panzer advances. Hitler often expressed concern that field commanders were overextending themselves, advocating for more manageable encirclement operations. This was notably evident in France in 1940, when he ordered a pause in the panzer advance to allow the infantry time to catch up and secure the communication lines for Kleist’s panzer group. Similar disagreements occurred after the battle of Minsk in 1941, when Hitler and Army Group Center's commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, clashed over the size of future encirclement attempts. Surprisingly, in this instance, Hitler was unable to impose his strategy on the seasoned Field Marshal. Army Group Center proceeded with large-scale encirclements, culminating in the significant encirclement operation at Smolensk in July 1941.

The emphasis on encirclement battles was not solely beneficial to the Panzers and motorized units; all branches of the German military were encouraged to seek encirclement whenever possible. The 1933 Heer Field Service Regulations called for artillery, infantry, armor, and air support to work together down to the company level. This cooperation was primarily to be facilitated through direct communication among the respective commanders. The regulations stipulated that artillery commanders should position their command posts as close as possible to those of infantry commanders. If personal communication was not feasible, liaison officers were to be assigned to link the respective units. Additionally, the use of radios and telephones was recommended wherever possible. The inclusion of radio and telephone communication at the end of this hierarchy may seem counterintuitive. However, the Germans were acutely aware of how easily telephone lines could be severed by enemy artillery fire, while radios were susceptible to jamming and interception. Electronic warfare was absolutely utilized by both sides on the Eastern front, but it does not get as much attention in secondary accounts of the war. Perhaps the most noteworthy example was at Kursk where the Red Army and the Wehrmacht battled it out over the radio waves, jamming, intercepting and triangulation of the other sides observers and command posts. 

During the North Africa Campaign of World War II, radio communications were essential for both Axis and Allied forces operating across the vast, open desert. The terrain demanded mobile, long-range radio systems, but this also made transmissions highly vulnerable to interception, jamming, and triangulation, tools that became critical in the evolving landscape of electronic warfare. Interception played a particularly important role. British intelligence units, especially the Y Service and those linked to Ultra at Bletchley Park, routinely intercepted German and Italian radio traffic. German forces often used open channels or weak encryption, allowing the British to gain valuable insights into Axis troop movements, supply lines, and battle plans. This intelligence edge was a major factor in key victories, such as the Second Battle of El Alamein, where Allied forces were able to preempt German strategies. Jamming techniques were also employed, though they were less refined than in later stages of the war. Both the British and Germans attempted to disrupt enemy communications by broadcasting on similar frequencies, particularly during major offensives or air-ground coordination efforts. However, the technology was still developing, and jamming sometimes interfered with friendly transmissions as well. Triangulation became a highly effective method for locating enemy radio operators. British forces used mobile direction-finding units mounted on vehicles to track the origin of German transmissions across the desert. When combined with intercepted messages, this allowed commanders to accurately identify the positions of enemy headquarters and convoys, enabling more precise attacks. Altogether, the effective use of radio interception, jamming, and triangulation gave the Allies a significant advantage in the North African theater, demonstrating the growing power of signals intelligence in modern warfare. By the way, if you haven't checked it out yet, me and my Co-host Garauv over on Echoes of War podcast did a 10 episode series on the entire North Africa Campaign, I highly recommend it. 

Needless to say the Nazi regime utilized a lot of propaganda that contributed to the myths perpetuated by generals long after the war concluded, take for example the idealization of the "clean Wehrmacht." This romantic notion of advancing panzers emerged not only at the war's conclusion but also started soon after the Germans captured Paris, which they viewed as a stepping stone towards imminent victory. The propaganda machinery of the Third Reich rapidly began producing films, news stories, and radio broadcasts that framed the Wehrmacht's success in the West as an inevitable result of German superiority. These narratives circulated widely within the army and across the conquered territories of Europe. The impact of this propaganda was immediate, with German officers, who should have recognized the realities of warfare, beginning to believe their own rhetoric. Many perceived their operational success in the so-called Blitzkrieg as evidence of unparalleled military brilliance. The swift collapses of the Low Countries, France, Poland, and the British Expeditionary Force reinforced their belief that they had created something unique in military history.

However, this belief was fundamentally flawed. The Wehrmacht of 1939-1940 capitalized on the unpreparedness of their enemies for a war of maneuver, leveraging superior training and communication capabilities to outflank the bewildered Allies. This was not a unique ability, nor was it one that could not be replicated by other nations. As the Wehrmacht geared up for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1940-1941, the professionalism that had characterized German planning for decades began to erode. Generals increasingly assumed best-case scenarios for their maneuvers while neglecting the significant obstacles they would face. These critical missteps would soon become apparent within weeks of the start of Operation Barbarossa. Before long, many high-ranking officers in the Wehrmacht would begin to doubt the war's outcome, with some losing all hope of victory long before the onset of winter.

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As blitzkrieg tactics, asserting speed and coordination, manifested in the rapid defeat of France, they obscured deeper issues. While the myths surrounding Germany's military prowess grew, luck played a crucial role in their early victories. As blunders unfolded in the east, doubts about the war's outcome began to gnaw at German high command, foreshadowing the inevitable struggle ahead.