Eastern Front #5 Red Army on the Run

 

Last time we spoke about Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine. As Operation Barbarossa unfolded, Army Group South advanced into Ukraine, driven by the need to secure critical oil reserves for Germany’s war machine. Initial gains were swift, as the German forces used air superiority to capture key positions. However, logistical issues quickly surfaced, revealing the vulnerabilities of their supply lines. Soviet General Kirponos, although initially caught off guard, managed to organize defenses and counterattacks thanks to a well-structured communication system. Despite their numerical advantages, the Red Army was plagued by disorganization and outdated tactics. The clash at Dubno highlighted this struggle, with Soviet forces launching piecemeal assaults that were easily countered by the more coordinated German defenses. As battles raged, both sides faced the brutal realities of war, heavy losses and the harsh conditions of the Eastern Front. 

This episode is the Red Army on the Run

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello there, welcome back, we have just got through week one of Operation Barbarossa and now its time to head into week two.  

In the opening days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe achieved remarkable success, obliterating a staggering number of Soviet aircraft. The air battle on the Eastern Front was indeed a chaotic spectacle, yet it's important to note that it wasn't as one-sided as some histories have portrayed. In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe unleashed devastation upon the Soviet Air Force, racking up staggering losses that reached into the thousands. One source reported that by the end of June, the Luftwaffe had destroyed 4,614 Soviet aircraft, with 3,176 of those taken out on the ground and 1,438 in aerial combat. In stark contrast, German losses amounted to just 330 planes. These figures highlight a clear German superiority in the skies, but for various reasons, this supremacy was fleeting. Following the doctrines of blitzkrieg, the Luftwaffe's primary objective in the East was to gain immediate control of the airspace above Soviet territory. In an impressive display of force, they achieved total domination of the skies within just two days, inflicting chaos on Soviet airfields in the western districts. This victory enabled the Luftwaffe to shift focus toward supporting ground operations. 

However, lurking behind the front lines were thousands of Soviet aircraft, strategically stationed further back from the border and in the Soviet interior. These planes had managed to survive the initial onslaught and would eventually be relocated to new airfields. During this brief window of Luftwaffe dominance, concerns began to surface. Major General Hoffman von Waldau, head of the Luftwaffe's operations department, conveyed his worries to Halder on July 1st. "The air force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy," he warned. "It's quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes." Just two days later, he further reflected in his diary that the Soviet military capabilities were significantly stronger than pre-war assessments indicated. “The material quality is better than expected. Though we achieved great successes with relatively low losses, a large number of Soviet aircraft remain to be destroyed.” Despite the Luftwaffe's initial triumphs, they now faced the daunting challenge of balancing support for the army while contending with a resurgent Soviet aerial presence. As the operational theater expanded at a rapid pace, the Luftwaffe's already limited resources became stretched thin. Air bases had to be relocated eastward to newly established, poorly equipped airfields, where inadequate supply lines hindered their effectiveness just as much as they did for the ground troops. These new airfields were also particularly vulnerable to attacks from roaming enemy groups infiltrating the rear areas. While the Luftwaffe experienced significant successes, the Soviet Air Force was not without its victories. In July 1941, Soviet pilots managed to raid German airfields, inflicting damage on the Luftwaffe as well. One Soviet pilot vividly recalled an attack near Bobruisk: “Approaching our target, the Shturmoviks flew low to the ground. As our leader turned to launch the assault, missiles struck the rows of bombers, causing explosions. Tracer bullets shredded the wings adorned with black crosses. Just above the earth, our Shturmoviks released their hundred-kilo bombs, igniting Junkers and Messerschmitts prepped for takeoff. We arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from launching their operations! Our regiment repeatedly struck Bobruisk airfield, causing significant damage and destroying dozens of bombers and Messerschmitts.”

As the frontlines surged forward, reconnaissance units struggled to keep pace with the fast-moving Panzer divisions. Even though the initial weeks of the campaign had seemed relatively light in terms of losses, skepticism lingered among key figures. On July 1st, Major General Waldau, commander of the 10th Air Corps, communicated a stark warning to the head of the Army High Command, General Halder. He expressed concerns that the Luftwaffe had drastically underestimated the strength of the Soviet Air Force, now estimating their numbers to exceed 8000 aircraft. Halder was taken aback, unable to accept such a figure. Just days before, the Luftwaffe's own strength had barely surpassed 3500 planes. The idea that the Soviets could have lost over four thousand planes and still possess a similar number ready for battle seemed implausible. Halder wasn’t alone in his disbelief. The senior leadership of the Luftwaffe shared his sentiment, dismissing Waldau’s grim assessment. They were riding high on the belief that they had secured a monumental victory, and any contrary evidence only dampened their spirits. To their credit, they had indeed decimated a significant portion of the Soviet Air Force, and their influence remained pivotal in the ongoing battlefield struggles around Minsk, Kyiv, and Leningrad. However, their major flaw lay in their unwillingness to acknowledge that the war was far from over. The early weeks of the conflict revealed a harsh truth: victory could not be seized in a single stroke. A decisive triumph was proving elusive, regardless of how fiercely the Luftwaffe's commanders clung to their beliefs. This goes to a larger point about whether or not Germany could ever have managed a truly decisive victory over the USSR. A decisive battle is one that decides a war. This is an elusive concept at any rate and one that is debated at the highest levels of intellectual circles in military theory. The now dominant understanding of the Second World War as an industrial conflict decided on the production lines and the mines of the combatants precludes any discussion of “decisive battles.”

As the second week of the war unfolded, Army Group North continued to make significant strides. On July 1st, they captured Riga, and Pskov was now within reach. The Soviet Northwestern Front was in disarray, with roughly twenty out of the thirty-one divisions that began the campaign operating at less than half strength. In response to this dire situation, Colonel General F. Kuznetsov was replaced by Lieutenant General Sobennikov. Sobennikov had been the 8th Army commander during the first week of the war. He was replaced in this role by Lieutenant General Ivanov. To further bolster the command structure, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Stavka, Lieutenant General Vatutin, was sent to the front headquarters. This marked one of the early instances of a practice that would become a hallmark of the war. The Stavka regularly dispatched representatives to front commands, serving as both advisors and overseers to ensure that orders were executed precisely. For now, Vatutin faced the daunting task of restoring the front lines and preventing further German breakthroughs. However, he wasn’t given any additional resources to accomplish this monumental challenge.

From the German perspective, the initial weeks in the North were marked by rapid advances interspersed with periods of regrouping. The only significant combat during the first week of the invasion occurred at Raseiniai, as discussed in our previous podcast. The Red Army fought fiercely wherever it could, but much of the early phase of Operation Barbarossa was characterized by a chaotic retreat. The Northwestern Front was sacrificing territory in a desperate attempt to stall Colonel General Hoepner’s Panzer spearheads. The 4th Panzer Group maneuvered between the infantry divisions of Army Group North as they swung northeast and then north through the Baltic region. Positioned as the southern spearhead was Colonel General Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps, which made rapid progress in the initial days of the war but faced a fierce Soviet counterattack that they had to fend off without support. Meanwhile, Colonel General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps engaged at Raseiniai, participating in one of the largest tank battles witnessed thus far in the conflict. By July 3rd, the Panzers were once again on the move. Manstein managed to secure Rezenke but soon found his forces mired in the treacherous swamps, slowing their advance. 

Reinhardt took over as the lead, capturing Ostrov on July 4th and reaching the outskirts of Pskov by the 7th. Riga fell to the 26th Infantry Corps on July 1st. Field Marshal Leeb relayed orders from Hitler for Hoepner to push past Lake Ladoga and capture Leningrad, with the advance limited to Velikiye Luki. Velikiye Luki is not very far east of the current line of advance of the Army Group at this point. Its role as a marker was intended to limit the Panzer’s eastward drive and to keep them in line with the strategic objective of Leningrad. At this time, the Wehrmacht was still operating under the understanding that destruction of the Red Army had essentially been achieved. This meant that the pursuit of strategic objectives like the major cities of the USSR could be attacked. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev were on the chopping block. This proved to be a point of contention between Hitler and the Heer as the campaign progressed. By July 6th, the Northwestern Front was essentially in ruins. The Northern Front, under Lieutenant General M. Popov, was now the last line of defense standing between Army Group North and Leningrad. Popov faced the Finnish forces to the north and was ill-equipped to confront the full might of the Wehrmacht advancing from the south. The Stavka knew they needed to act and quickly.

Things were going almost as poorly for the Western Front. The Minsk-Bialystok pocket was rapidly closing, trapping a significant portion of the Western Front within its confines. Minsk had fallen during the first week, and by July 5th, Colonel Generals Hoth and Guderian succeeded in linking up east of the city. Initial reports from the Wehrmacht estimated that upwards of 3,000 Red Army tanks had been destroyed by the end of the second week of the operation. However, these numbers were misleading. The German estimates were flawed in two key respects. First, there simply weren't 3,000 Soviet tanks in the area; more reliable Soviet figures indicated that the actual number was closer to 2,500. Second, the quantity of abandoned tanks was not as significant a metric as Wehrmacht leaders believed. They were still operating under the assumption that this would be a short war. To them, destroying Soviet tanks meant fewer guns on the road to Moscow. However, the USSR was already bracing for a protracted conflict. In a long war, the crucial element isn’t just the number of tanks, but the resilience and experience of their crews. The Minsk operation, though incredibly swift, did not seal an airtight pocket. Thousands of Red Army soldiers managed to abandon their equipment and slip through the thin German lines. They carried with them experience, determination, and a steadfast will to continue the fight.

A lot of this was due to struggles for control over divisions. General Kluge was focused on sealing the pocket tightly to capture as many prisoners as possible, but Guderian sought to continue the advance eastward as quickly as possible. To Kluge, maintaining control over the gains at Minsk held more weight than risking further advancement. In contrast, Guderian felt that delaying to round up every last prisoner was a waste of valuable time and resources. He believed that keeping the momentum of the advance was crucial to keeping the enemy off balance, and he wanted to push ahead toward the next objective. This clash of perspectives revealed the fundamental strategic rift within the German command. Seeking resolution, both men turned to higher authorities for support, but Bock and Halder were eager for both options and ultimately backed neither fully. This compromise clouded Kluge’s victory and left Guderian’s offensive noticeably under-resourced. The reality was that German forces were attempting too much. Guderian was right to advocate for a rapid solution through deep penetration, but he underestimated the threat to his rear between Slonim and Minsk, as well as the strength of the opposition further east, for which he would urgently need Kluge’s infantry. Hoth faced a similar dilemma, but for the Panzer generals, bold action in the face of danger was a hallmark of their previous victories. Neither Kluge nor Guderian was willing to back away from the risks of advancing, nor would they yield to the cautious reservations of the army commanders. Even after the war, Guderian asserted that the biggest obstacle to his advance was the persistent doubts of Field Marshal von Kluge, who, as Guderian noted, was “inclined to stop the advance of the Panzers at every difficulty arising in the rear.” Despite his strong conviction that Army Group Centre's primary goal should be to close the ring at Minsk, Halder favored sending elements from both Panzer groups towards the Dvina and Dnepr rivers to secure bridgeheads for the next phase of the advance. On June 29th, Halder made a significant entry in his diary, revealing for the first time that the ultimate objective of Army Group Centre was an attack on Moscow. He expressed hopes of seizing Rogachev and Mogilev on the Dnepr, declaring that this would “open the road to Smolensk and from there the course to Moscow.”

As July began, the Red Army faced pressing concerns that extended far beyond securing a supply of experienced tank crews. First and foremost, the disaster that struck Pavlov’s forces was largely due to their appalling strategic deployment deep into the Bialystok salient, which left them half encircled by the Germans even before the invasion began. Additionally, the element of strategic surprise, which played a crucial role in determining Pavlov’s fate, had been severely compromised due to significantly disrupted communications. However, the encirclement of Pavlov’s armies west of Minsk did not spell the end of the Soviet Western Front, as the German generals might have hoped. Soviet pre-war planning had established a first strategic echelon positioned between 20 and 100 kilometers from the border, intended to counter-attack and halt the enemy advance. This would pave the way for a general Soviet offensive carried out by a second strategic echelon located much farther back, between 100 and 400 kilometers away. With the first strategic echelon doomed to defeat, Pavlov was ordered back to Moscow. General Pavlov was relieved of his command of the Western Front and replaced by Marshal of the Soviet Union, Timoshenko. Pavlov was arrested and later tried for “Criminal Behavior in the Face of the Enemy.” He was executed late in July, alongside his chief of staff. Unfortunately, he could not save the majority of the armies under his command. The 3rd, 4th, 10th, and 13th Armies were now trapped west of Minsk. The 2nd Panzer Group successfully advanced to the Berezina River, capturing crossings at Borisov, nearly one hundred kilometers east of Minsk. Meanwhile, Guderian’s 3rd Panzer Group had pushed south to Bobruisk, almost two hundred kilometers southeast of the city. Timoshenko received a brief reprieve as the Panzers were forced to pause at the Berezina, turning inward to fully encircle the pocket they had created during their advance. This temporary halt provided Timoshenko with the space and time needed to formulate a new defensive line.

The strong-willed Timoshenko, upon his arrival at the Western Front headquarters, promptly took on the vital task of defending the Dnepr River line. He utilized all available resources from the second strategic echelon and mobilized the civilian population to construct defensive works. In stark contrast to Germany, the Soviet Union was fully gearing up for a long and grueling war. On June 22, 1941, the Supreme Soviet drafted most reservists born between 1905 and 1918 into the ranks of the Red Army. Additionally, an emergency labor decree conscripted all able-bodied men aged 18 to 45 and women between 18 and 40, who were not already employed, to assist in building defenses. By June 24, martial law was declared across the western part of the Soviet Union. Two days later, mandatory overtime of up to three hours a day was instituted at the discretion of factory managers, and all leaves and holidays were suspended. For the western regions already overrun by the Germans, Stalin’s first public address on July 3 issued a rallying call to the occupied Soviet people: “Foment partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to forests, stores, and transport. Conditions in the occupied regions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all of his accomplices.”

Although the Red Army had reserves, they needed time to position them effectively. These reserves were crucial if Timoshenko aimed to rebuild the Western Front. He had remnants of ten rifle divisions and the 20th Mechanized Corps, but they were without tanks. His primary objective was to prevent the Panzer Groups from crossing the Dvina and Dnepr rivers. To bolster his efforts, he gained access to the five reserve armies of Marshal Budenny's Reserve Front. Originally, the Soviet defensive plan had envisioned these forces forming the backbone of a strategic counteroffensive to crush the German Army in Belarus. However, that plan was now scrapped, and the reserve field armies were redirected to establish a new defensive line in front of Smolensk. To fill the void left in the Soviet reserves, the Stavka mobilized two new armies and positioned them along the road to Moscow from Smolensk. The 24th and 28th Armies were the first of the wartime mobilized field armies of the Red Army. They were soon followed by dozens more. Following this deployment, four additional armies were assembled, organized around a core of NKVD border guards. Led by NKVD generals, these units were stationed around Moscow. However, these reserve armies were not fully staffed or equipped; in many cases, they were mere shadows of effective forces, supplemented by daily arrivals of new conscripts. The Red Army had a larger reservoir of regular units, but these were located in the Far East, and it would take time for them to be redeployed. Even though the reserve front armies were effectively emergency measures designed to give Timoshenko a fighting chance against Army Group Center, their existence remained unknown to the Germans. The Heer would soon discover them as they inadvertently bumped into these forces in the coming days and weeks.

On July 4th, the Soviet 22nd Army launched an attack against the 57th Panzer Corps at Polotsk, while the 20th Army struck at the 39th Panzer Corps near Lepel. The 20th Army received support from the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps, each equipped with at least 1,000 tanks for the assault. However, the 39th Panzer Corps was widely dispersed as they were road marching toward Orsha, and they did not anticipate encountering large enemy formations. In a crucial misstep, the Soviets attacked without sufficient reconnaissance of the area and struggled to coordinate their efforts between the two corps. The 20th Army staff was unprepared to take command, and there was no formal agreement on the division of responsibilities between the two Soviet generals. This lack of coordination became the downfall of Timoshenko’s counterattack. The challenges of effectively managing the cumbersome mechanized corps were becoming evident along the frontlines in these initial weeks of the war. The Red Army simply did not possess the command-and-control capacity necessary for organizing large-scale counteroffensives involving hundreds or even thousands of tanks. The outcomes mirrored earlier battles but on a larger scale: soldiers fought valiantly, while field officers struggled to execute orders, leading to repeated attacks.

Despite their bravery, the Germans fended off the assaults with impressive resilience. It is estimated that, of the 2,000 tanks the Soviets had mobilized on paper, more than 800 were destroyed, with dozens, possibly hundreds, out of commission due to mechanical failures. One notable incident involved 44 brand-new KV-1 tanks ordered from the Kirov factory to support the assault. Unfortunately, seven of these tanks sustained burned-out clutches during the short road march, rendering them inoperable and requiring recovery for repairs. Such diversions of resources were intolerable in the early days of July 1941, yet they persisted. By the end of the week, approximately half of the remaining tanks were put out of action due to poor driving, resulting in damaged clutch packs.  In the popular mythology of the Second World War, it is a common theme that German tanks were over engineered and unreliable. The Panther is often the stereotypical example of this tendency. The Soviet tanks are represented as the ideal opposite; sturdy and simply built. This can be dismissed as a childish simplification of the reality on the ground. Tanks are complex pieces of machinery with dozens of interacting systems made of thousands of parts. All early models will have teething problems as the kinks in the design are worked out. As well, no tank is reliable without proper maintenance and a well-trained crew. While the fighting succeeded in slowing the German advance, it did not stop it. Smolensk remained firmly in the sights of Army Group Center, and the Minsk-Bialystok pockets were on the verge of complete collapse by the end of the second week. The casualties were staggering; the Soviets lost around 400,000 soldiers under Pavlov’s command. As both sides braced for what would be an even larger conflict at Smolensk, the stage was set for a decisive clash as the second week of the war came to a close at the center of the Eastern Front.

For the under-resourced Army Group South, the war unfolded differently than for their counterparts in Army Groups Center and North. There were no massive pockets of Soviet soldiers ready for encirclement through daring Panzer attacks, nor was there the wide-open countryside left behind by the Red Army as they retreated to fight another day. Instead, they faced a grueling attritional conflict, with every kilometer fought and bled for. The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General Kirponos, struggled to concentrate his forces for the Stavka’s planned counter-offensive. He was committing everything he could get his hands on in a desperate effort to buy time for his front to organize the counter-offensive, but this attempt was failing. On July 2nd, the southern portion of Army Group South launched a significant attack into Moldavia. 

This was part of Operation München, a joint German-Romanian offensive to recapture Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Hertsa region, all of which had been ceded by Romania to the Soviet Union a year earlier during the Soviet occupation of these territories. The operation commenced during the night of July 2–3, 1941, and would go on for 24 days. The Axis forces involved included the Romanian 3rd Army, commanded by General Petre Dumitrescu, positioned in the north; the German Eleventh Army, along with subordinated Romanian units under General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, in the center; and the Romanian Fourth Army, led by General Nicolae Ciupercă, in the south. Sadly, the invasion was accompanied by a genocide against the Jewish population of Bessarabia. The combat operations in Southern Bessarabia were among the most complex of the entire campaign, involving artillery, warships, aviation, and troops from both sides. The Soviet Danube Flotilla was composed of five river monitors, 22 armed and armored motorboats, and seven minesweeping boats. In contrast, the Romanian Danube Flotilla had seven river monitors but only around four smaller armed boats. Fighting in this sector began days before the main operation, with the first skirmish between Soviet and Romanian warships occurring on June 23. During this engagement, Soviet vessels attempted to break the Romanian naval blockade.

On June 26, in support of a sea-borne raid on Constanța, Soviet armored motor gunboats landed troops at Chilia Veche, capturing most of the Romanian 15th Marine Infantry Battalion, resulting in Romanian losses of 468 troops. The remaining soldiers of the battalion, supported by one armed boat and two motorboats, managed to defend Stipoc Island against further Soviet assaults. Meanwhile, the Romanian 17th Marine Infantry Battalion successfully held the Periprava sector throughout the operation, repelling numerous Soviet attacks and even sinking four Soviet armored boats with their artillery. The offensive officially began on July 2, with Romanian forces advancing north. By July 5, Cernăuți, the capital of Northern Bukovina, was captured by the 3rd and 23rd Vânători de Munte Battalions. On July 16, Chișinău, the capital of Bessarabia, fell after intense fighting, primarily led by Romanian forces spearheaded by the 1st Romanian Armored Division (Divizia 1 Blindată), which was equipped mainly with 126 R-2 light tanks. Ultimately, the Soviet Danube Flotilla suffered significant losses, with two river monitors damaged, five armored motorboats sunk, and one more damaged during the confrontations. On July 18–19, the flotilla withdrew from the Danube Delta. Consequently, on July 22, the Romanians occupied Reni, Izmail, Kiliia, and Vylkove. By July 26, the entire region was under Romanian-German control. Finally, on August 17, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were formally re-integrated into the Romanian state.

Around Lviv, the 1st Panzer Group continued to make progress despite facing stiff resistance. By July 2nd, they were spread out between Lviv and Rovno, having successfully defeated the Soviets in the opening battle of Dubno. However, cracks were beginning to show in the command structure of the Wehrmacht. Field Marshal Rundstedt and Colonel General Kleist expressed their strong belief that the 1st Panzer Group should concentrate on encircling and destroying the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies. They viewed this as the primary objective in line with Hitler's strategic goals: the annihilation of the Red Army as a fighting force. Commanders on the ground realized that the Southwestern Front possessed large reserves. Without significant encirclements in the south, Kirponos would eventually be able to reorganize his forces and potentially overwhelm the smaller German units. In contrast, Hitler preferred that Kleist push toward Kyiv. After further discussions, the 1st Panzer Group was divided to pursue these conflicting objectives. The eastern thrust was spearheaded by the 3rd Panzer Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry Mackensen, the son of Field Marshal August von Mackensen of First World War Fame. They surged through the disorganized remnants of the Soviet Mechanized Corps in the area, breaching the so-called Stalin Line by July 7th. Despite the efforts of the 9th, 15th, 19th, and 22nd Mechanized Corps to plug the gap, they were unable to hold back the German advance. Lieutenant Colonel Raczek, commanding on the front, was given a battlegroup and ordered to push as far east as possible. The coming week of fighting would ultimately determine the outcome of Hitler's risky decision to split the Panzers of Army Group South.

Speed and surprise were the cornerstones of the German victories from Pskov to Lviv. The triumphs were never about having larger armies or launching stronger attacks. However, the view from the Wolf’s Lair differed significantly from that of Hitler’s generals. The wolf’s Lair was Hitler’s complex of bunkers, shelters and barracks near Masuria, Poland. He used this location as his command center throughout the war from its completion in 1941 until 1944 when the complex was demolished after the official retreat to Berlin. It was also the scene of the 1944 assassination plot. The 20 July plot AKA Operation Valkyrie was carried out in one of the briefing rooms of the complex. By this point, Hitler had developed a strong bias against much of the Army’s senior leadership and was constantly at odds with them. He had previously lectured Field Marshal Bock about overreaching at Minsk, and now he was convinced that Rundstedt was not aggressive enough. Caught in the crossfire was Colonel-General Halder, the chief of the OKH. Having been outmaneuvered during the planning stages of the invasion, he saw this as his opportunity to regain Hitler’s favor. Halder had assured Hitler that the destruction of the Red Army was essentially a foregone conclusion. He evidently believed it himself, as on July 3rd, he wrote in his diary that the war was all but won. Halder’s Diary Entry, July 3rd, 1941. “On the whole one can already now say that the objective to destroy the mass of the Russian army in front of the Dvina and Dnepr [Rivers] has been accomplished. I do not doubt . . . that eastwards of the Dvina and Dnepr we would only have to contend with partial enemy forces, not strong enough to hinder realisation of the German operational plan. Thus it is probably not too much to say, when I claim that the campaign against Russia was won within fourteen days. Naturally it is not yet over. The wide open spaces and the stubborn resistance, conducted with all means, will still claim our efforts for many more weeks to come. Once we are across the Dvina and Dnepr, it will have less to do with the destruction of enemy forces than with taking from the enemy his centres of production and thereby preventing him from raising a new army from his enormous industrial potential and inexhaustible reserves of manpower”. 

Halder’s buoyant outlook was also reflected at the Wolf’s Lair, where Below later reported that “the month of July found most in an optimistic frame of mind at FHQ [Führer Headquarters]. Hitler saw himself confirmed in his judgment. Neither Brauchitsch and Halder, nor Keitel and Jodl, had a word to say to the contrary.” While Joseph Goebbels exhibited an unshakeable confidence in the final outcome of the campaign, he maintained a more realistic tone when discussing the demands and difficulties of the fighting. On July 2, he noted, “In total, the fighting is very hard and bitter... The Red regime has mobilized the people. Plus, there is the proverbial stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers have their hands full.” Although Goebbels was closer to the mark than many in the High Command, he still fell short of grasping the realities faced by the men at the front and the looming danger of fighting in the endless east. Siegfried Knappe, a lieutenant in the 9th Army’s 87th Infantry Division, recounted a revealing exchange with Major-General von Studnitz during the march to Minsk.

“‘How do you think the campaign has gone so far?’ he asked. ‘Great,’ I replied enthusiastically. ‘Everything seems to be going according to plan.’ He paused for a moment, lost in thought. Finally, he responded, ‘I was in Russia during the last war. I have experienced the Russian winter. It is savage, unlike anything we’ve ever faced. It will come—and it will come soon. We’re only in this small part of Russia. Ahead of us lies a vast, empty country, and if we do not take Moscow before the weather turns bitter cold, I worry about what will happen.’ He was clearly not optimistic. I was amazed by his words, but I recognized that he was intelligent, experienced, and capable. I began to tone down my own optimism after that.” As the second week of fighting came to a close, Smolensk loomed on the horizon. However, neither the Wehrmacht nor the Red Army fully grasped just how critical and costly this next battle would be.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As the second week of Operation Barbarossa unfolded, the German Luftwaffe dominated the skies, inflicting heavy losses on the Soviet Air Force. The Soviets, facing initial chaos and disorganization, began reorganizing under General Timoshenko’s command. Despite early German successes, the Red Army showed resilience, managing to regroup and prepare for a prolonged conflict. Both sides suffered tremendous losses, setting the stage for a brutal and costly struggle as they headed toward the decisive battle of Smolensk.