Eastern Front #7 the Fall of Smolensk

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Smolensk. The Wehrmacht, having swiftly advanced through the Soviet Union, prepared to engage the Red Army in fierce combat. The Luftwaffe had dominated the skies, severely diminishing Soviet air power. However, unbeknownst to the Germans, the Soviets, under General Timoshenko, were regrouping and mobilizing hidden reserves, readying themselves for a counteroffensive. Amidst logistical chaos and heavy losses, the Soviets utilized their cadre system, rapidly generating new field armies. While the Germans celebrated captures, they failed to recognize the Soviets' latent strength. As the Germans advanced toward Smolensk, the Red Army struggled but exhibited resilience, relocating factories eastward to maintain wartime production. This industrial mobilization became vital, allowing the Soviets to outproduce the Germans in tanks and aircraft by late 1941. The intense fighting around Smolensk evidenced the brutal realities of warfare, with both sides suffering greatly. 

This episode is the Fall of Smolensk

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

A heavy smoke of battle clings to the air above the city of Smolensk, a crucial location in western Russia. It’s July 15, 1941, and the gates to Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union are creaking ominously under the relentless pressure of the German advance. Army Group Center, under the command of General Fedor von Bock, is launching a fierce attack against the newly fortified defenses of the Western Front, commanded by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. He is desperately fighting to hold Smolensk, a strategically vital city that stands as a key to unlocking the road to Moscow. We witnessed the Wehrmacht commencing their assault on Smolensk. Meanwhile, in the north, their drive toward Leningrad continued relentlessly, and in the south, Army Group South had pivoted to encircle Uman after being thwarted in their advance on Kyiv.

In the early days of July, while army commanders were focused on the day-to-day challenges of the campaign, Adolf Hitler began to look further ahead. His well-known hesitance about continuing the operation beyond the great rivers towards Moscow was a source of concern for both General Franz Halder and General Walther von Brauchitsch. However, they believed that the ongoing successes of the campaign offered the best assurance for maintaining a forward advance across all fronts. As early as July 3 and 4, Hitler voiced his interest in halting the panzer groups under General Heinz Guderian and using them to support flanking advances instead. On July 5, General Alfred Jodl contacted Brauchitsch by telephone, urging him to meet with Hitler and present his views on the strategic choices for the northern and southern fronts. Jodl posed several crucial questions regarding both the necessity and feasibility of these operations, highlighting the growing tension between the OKW and OKH over the future direction of the campaign. He stressed the urgency of the army's involvement in the discussion, stating, “Given that the Führer’s thoughts, and those of others, are shifting towards an early turning of the panzer groups toward the northeast or south, General Jodl considers it essential that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army promptly meets with the Führer for a discussion.”

The meeting took place at Hitler’s headquarters on July 8, with Halder accompanying Brauchitsch. Both men presented before Hitler and his staff. Brauchitsch began by summarizing the latest tactical reports, after which Halder outlined the army’s assessment of the enemy situation and progress within the three army groups. The tone of Halder’s presentation was characteristically optimistic, aimed at instilling confidence in the army's management of the war and reaffirming its strategic direction. Halder firmly believed that the German forces were now in a commanding position to secure victory. He cited the most recent intelligence report from Colonel Kinzel, which indicated that of the 164 identified Soviet rifle divisions, 89 had been either completely or largely eliminated. From the remaining 75 divisions, 46 were actively opposing the German front, while 18 were engaged on other fronts, 14 in Finland and four in the Caucasus. The last 11 divisions were likely held in reserve deep within Soviet territory. Kinzel’s report also stated, “The enemy is no longer able to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features.” He emphasized that Army Group Centre, already stronger than its opponents, now enjoyed a crushing superiority that could be maintained even if the Soviets brought up fresh units.

The environment created by Halder’s buoyant report fostered a sense of confidence about the war's progress and minimized the urgency to make a decisive operational decision regarding Bock’s panzer groups. This optimistic atmosphere briefly inspired a sense of reconciliation between Hitler and Halder, opening up avenues for compromise that had previously seemed impossible, particularly concerning the direction towards Moscow. Hitler articulated his ‘ideal solution’ for continuing the campaign: Army Group North was to accomplish its assigned tasks in the Baltic states and Leningrad using its own resources. Meanwhile, Army Group Centre was tasked with eliminating the last remnants of organized Soviet resistance along the overstretched front north of the Pripet Marshes, which, he suggested, would thereby open the road to Moscow. Upon reaching their designated positions east of Smolensk, Hoth’s forces could halt and either assist Leeb, if necessary, or press on eastward with the goal of encircling Moscow. Guderian’s forces could then strike in a southern or southeastern direction in coordination with Army Group South.

Meanwhile the Soviet Air Force, commonly known by its acronym, the VVS, was still grappling with the repercussions of the disastrous events of June. The early campaigns of Operation Barbarossa had decimated their fleet, resulting in the loss of more than half of their available aircraft. By mid-July, however, the VVS began to regain some footing, managing to contest the Luftwaffe’s previously assumed air superiority. Despite the Luftwaffe's dominance during the initial stages of the operation, they faced their own limitations: there were simply not enough planes, infrastructure, or trained pilots to sustain their aggressive tactics. This shortage meant that some of the Red Army's counter-attacks went unnoticed in the early stages of their planning, but it also allowed the VVS to harass and distract Wehrmacht columns as they advanced. By mid-July 1941, the Luftwaffe’s capabilities were being pushed to the breaking point. The VVS was actively strafing and bombing German troops on the southern approaches to Smolensk, a city critical for both sides. Though these attacks often amounted to little more than a nuisance, they had a significant psychological impact on the German soldiers. Many in the Wehrmacht had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was all but defeated, that its military might lay in ruins, and that their only task now was to mop up the remnants of resistance. Yet, they found themselves facing a determined adversary, launching air attacks that the Luftwaffe seemed unable to stop or prevent. This unexpected persistence from the VVS not only challenged the German advance but also forced the Wehrmacht to reconsider their assumptions about a swift victory.

The relentless drive towards Leningrad was taking a significant toll on Army Group North. After the explosive initial success of Operation Barbarossa, the campaign was now encountering a series of stumbling blocks in the north. On the northern flank of Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb’s Army Group North was making more favorable progress. However, as the esteemed General Erich von Manstein, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, would later note, “the enemy, though pushed back to the east, was still not destroyed, something that would soon become evident.” After successfully capturing Riga, the capital of Latvia, Leeb was compelled to continue his eastward push to support the left flank of General Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre. Simultaneously, he needed to mount a significant offensive northward into Estonia to protect his own left flank. This strategic situation was stretching Army Group North's front width rapidly. As the smallest of the three German army groups, this expansion would soon prove to heavily tax its offensive momentum. On July 16, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, the commander of Army Group North’s Panzer Group 4, expressed his dissatisfaction with the stalled advance towards Leningrad in a letter to his wife. He wrote, "The deciding cause remains our weakness. The number of divisions is as inadequate as their equipment. The men are tired, the losses are increasing, and the rate of vehicle breakdowns is on the rise." His candid assessment highlighted the growing strains on the German forces as they faced not only the challenges of combat but also the detrimental effects of fatigue and equipment shortages.

While the Red Army had not succeeded in completely halting the Wehrmacht's advance in the Baltic region, many counterattacks launched by the Northwestern Front were failing, yielding few, if any, tangible results. However, the sheer weight of the Soviet Union's manpower and equipment advantages was gradually beginning to tip the scales against the Nazi invaders. In a critical miscalculation, General Erich von Manstein had allowed several units of his Corps to stumble directly into an ambush that had been meticulously set up at the end of the previous week. Now, the 8th Panzer Division found itself struggling for survival as it became completely cut off and encircled. This ambush, orchestrated by Lieutenant General Vasily Vatutin, who had taken over as the chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, was a carefully planned operation aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities of the German forces.  Nikolai Vatutin was a bright up and coming officer at this point. He had the personal attention of Stalin. He would go on to achieve front level command in 1942. Vatutin made his reputation on aggressive and intelligently designed attacks. In 1941, he was still perfecting his craft, but would go on to display his trademark aggressiveness. Perhaps most famously in the Stalingrad campaign and Operation Little Saturn, where his men destroyed the Italian 8th Army in the wake of the encirclement of the German 6th Army inside Stalingrad. 

The assault began with what appeared to be weak resistance in front of the stretched-out 8th Panzer, luring them further into the trap. On July 15, the trap was sprung. The main force of the Soviet 11th Army launched a coordinated attack, bolstered by two specially assembled shock groups. On the northern flank of the offensive were the 21st Tank Division, the 237th Rifle Division, and the 70th Rifle Division, all primed for the assault. To the south, this offensive was supported by the 180th, 182nd, and 183rd Rifle Divisions. The 8th Panzer was further accompanied on its left flank by the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, but aside from this, Manstein had precious little to reinforce his position. The assault commenced on July 15, and within hours, the 57th Panzer Corps was fragmented, torn into three isolated groups. The first group included the majority of the 8th Panzer Division, the second contained the 3rd Motorized Infantry, and the third, positioned outside of the encirclement, comprised the remnants of the beleaguered 56th Panzer Corps.

Lieutenant General Vasily Vatutin had meticulously planned his trap, ensuring that he possessed both local air superiority and a significant artillery advantage. Meanwhile, the German 16th Army, located to the southwest, was unable to provide assistance to General Erich von Manstein because the German Panzers had advanced far ahead of their accompanying infantry, making it impossible to close the gap in time to save them. Even if they had been in a better position, Vatutin had anticipated this scenario; he ordered the Soviet 27th Army to launch an attack on Colonel General Busch’s infantry units to ensure there was no possibility of relief.

As the situation deteriorated, Manstein could not rectify the crisis alone. He reached out to Colonel-General Erich Hoepner for help after the first day of fighting. Responding to this urgent plea, Hoepner redirected the SS Totenkopf Division and other elements to assist Manstein’s encircled forces. The fighting was fierce and continued until it began to taper off by the third day. By dawn on June 19, it became clear that Vatutin’s trap had failed; his forces were unable to maintain the encirclement. The Wehrmacht managed to pull its troops back from their positions in Soltsy, but this retreat came at a heavy cost. The 8th Panzer Division had reported approximately 150 operational tanks on the morning of June 15. By the 19th, that number had dwindled to around 80. Losses in large campaigns are always difficult to pinpoint, but the Eastern Front presents larger issues of counting casualties. Different definitions of losses interfere with counts, as do political, military and other motivations. The 8th Panzer lost no more than 70 tanks in the Battle for Soltsy. Permanent losses were higher than usual, as the Wehrmacht abandoned the field. It is unclear the exact amount of tanks or other vehicles denied to the 8th Panzer as a result of the battle. While the Soviet losses from this engagement remain unclear, it was evident that their units had faced tough resistance and were hard-pressed to maintain their fighting capability.

Although Vatutin did not succeed in completely destroying the 8th Panzer Division, the attempt to encircle them at Soltsy marked a notable achievement in the early battles. Unfortunately for Vatutin, his commanders struggled to coordinate their attacks effectively, and the execution of small-unit tactics left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the operation did inflict significant damage, critically blunting the strength of the 56th Panzer Corps. Recovery would take considerable time for the 4th Panzer Group, as they found themselves critically short of tanks in the days and weeks ahead while inching closer to Leningrad. Army Group North lost four precious days of summer weather as operations essentially ground to a halt, with Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb and Hoepner focused on extricating Manstein’s Corps from dire straits. In a further testament to the impact of Vatutin’s assault, Army Group North suspended all major operations towards Leningrad for about three weeks. Securing their left flank in Estonia became paramount, while the right flank of Hoepner’s Panzer Group remained in disarray following the battle at Soltsy.

The Finnish forces, organized into the Army of Karelia under the command of General Heinrichs, had concentrated their strength for a decisive offensive. General Heinrichs was the principal Finnish field commander during what the Finns called the “continuation war.” He was the Chief of the General Staff and had served with a volunteer Prussian unit in the First World War. On July 10, they launched their assault, aiming to push aside the Red Army and reclaim the territory lost during the Winter War. While the Finns were motivated to regain their lost lands, this objective did not fully align with Adolf Hitler’s broader ambitions. Nevertheless, the Finnish military managed to maintain a degree of independence from German control, despite the fact that the Germans needed and desired more support from the Finnish Army than the Finnish government was willing to provide. The Finnish offensive continued throughout July and August, and we will revisit their campaigns in the coming weeks as key developments unfold. In this initial phase, they pressed forward against the Soviet 7th Army along the Northern Front, attempting to split the territory between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega in two. Achieving this could allow the Finnish forces to take control of the entire area at will, thereby compelling the Russians to retreat into the vast expanses of Northwestern Russia.

The German strategic plan centered on utilizing Finnish forces to encircle Leningrad and systematically reduce the city’s defenses. In this collaboration, the Finns were envisioned as the anvil, while the Wehrmacht would act as the hammer. However, as the weeks progressed, this seemingly straightforward plan began to encounter significant complications. One of the foremost challenges was the marshy terrain, which severely hampered mobile operations at the scale the Germans had envisioned. Panzer Group 4 was already feeling the effects of this difficult terrain, particularly around Soltsy. Moreover, the Finns and Germans often found themselves at odds regarding the level of effort required from the Finnish Army. These disagreements, compounded by the challenging terrain, the staunch resistance of the Red Army, and the seasonal limitations, ultimately proved to be critical factors that undermined the success of their joint objectives.

Around Smolensk, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko was desperately trying to hold back the advancing tide of Hoth’s and Guderian’s panzers as they pushed further east. The wave of German armor brought with it an encirclement that rivaled any in history; the Western Front was being engulfed just as it had been at Minsk and Bialystok. On July 15, Lieutenant General Bolterstern’s 29th Motorized Infantry Division stormed into the southern reaches of Smolensk. This division was bolstered by a strong mix of Sturmgeschütz (StuGs), Flammpanzer vehicles, and Nebelwerfers, enabling them to spend the entire day clearing out the city south of the Dnipro River. For those interested the Flammpanzer was a Panzer II with the main gun replaced by a flamethrower and the Nebelwerfer was a towed rocket launcher with six 15cm tubes. In the early hours of July 16, two regiments crossed the river and began assaulting the rest of the city. Newly promoted Lieutenant General Konstantin Rokossovsky had taken command of the fresh 19th Army just a day before. However, the 19th Army was barely a scratch force, consisting of just one scattered rifle regiment tasked with garrisoning the city. Bolterstern’s troops worked their way through Smolensk, systematically attacking, surrounding, and defeating Rokossovsky’s men in detail. By 2300 hours, Soviet resistance had completely collapsed. As had been the case at Minsk, the Wehrmacht captured a major city with its agile motorized units before the Soviets could mount an effective response. The city had fallen, but the Soviet Union’s debacle in Smolensk was far from over.

On July 15, the collapse of Timoshenko’s front at Smolensk was predicted by Panzer Group 3 to be only days away, a sentiment echoed by many soldiers in the ranks. Karl Fuchs, a tank gunner in the 7th Panzer Division, wrote home on July 15: “We are now positioned outside the city of Smolensk and have penetrated the highly acclaimed Stalin lines. I would imagine that within eight to ten days, this campaign will be over.” Similarly, Ernst Guicking, a soldier from the 52nd Infantry Division, wrote to his wife on July 14: “If you could see the frantic advance here, you would surely be completely speechless. Something like this has never been recorded in the history of the world. The main thing is that the campaign will soon be over; we are all convinced of that.” Walter Tilemann, an orphan from a German family living in the Soviet Union, noted after being adopted by a German unit early in the campaign, “The word ‘Blitzkrieg’ did not seem to be an empty phrase. Many believed in it and that the war would soon be won.” However, he also added, “It was more hope than belief, accompanied by a dull feeling that it must not turn out differently.” Waffen-SS General Max Simon later attested to the valor of Soviet infantry and their capacity for resistance in the war’s early phases. He emphasized that Germany’s failure to recognize this tenacity was a significant shortcoming. “Very soon we had to admit that we were up against a very different adversary than we had expected, and I believe that this underestimation was one of the reasons for the unfortunate course the campaign in Russia took.” Further events, such as the capture of Stalin’s son on July 18, who served as a battery commander in the 14th Tank Division, seemed to suggest that the disintegration of the Red Army was closer than ever. Throughout July 1941, accolades for success began to flow. The Knight’s Cross was awarded to Lemelsen, Schweppenburg, and Model, commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, while Schmidt, Hoth, Guderian, and Richthofen, commander of the 8th Air Corps received the prestigious Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.

On July 17, Field Marshal Bock could survey the battlefield with a sense of well-deserved pride. In less than four weeks, Army Group Centre had orchestrated its second historically significant encirclement. He had directed two of the largest battles the world had ever witnessed, and remarkably, with minimal losses to his forces. Most of Timoshenko’s Western Front lay either destroyed or encircled, with the 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies trapped in the pocket. The only remaining question was whether the Wehrmacht would possess enough strength at the tip of the spear to prevent significant leakage from this encirclement, something they had failed to achieve at Minsk. That oversight had led to severe recriminations and disputes between the OKH, Hitler, and the field commanders. Bock was resolute in his determination not to let this happen again.

However, several obstacles hindered Bock's objectives. One of the most significant challenges was the bypassed city of Mogilev, located to the southwest of Smolensk. Bock recorded in his diary: ‘Geyer thinks all the reports on the enemy are exaggerated and doesn’t believe that there are serious enemy forces near Mogilev or in the pocket around Smolensk.’ In fact, Mogilev was garrisoned by a significant portion of the 13th Army, under the command of Major-General F. A. Bakunin, who led the 61st Rifle Corps. Within the fortress and the surrounding countryside were approximately one hundred thousand Soviet soldiers, still organized and prepared to fight. Seven Rifle and two Tank divisions posed a credible threat of a breakout if not addressed properly. Bakunin was tasked with ensuring the city's defense on all sides, mobilizing workers’ militias and transforming Mogilev into what one historian described as the “Belorussian Madrid.”. In response, Guderian dispatched General of Panzers Schweppenburg with his 24th Corps to secure Mogilev and prevent any potential breakout or relief from the nearby Soviet 21st Army. This decision represented a critical weakening of Guderian’s spearhead, which was intended to thrust behind Smolensk and cut off the remnants of Timoshenko’s Western Front. Guderian had already lost the 47th Corps to pocket security duties at Smolensk, leaving his Panzergroup with only one Corps to fulfill its strategic objectives. To address the situation, Guderian planned for the 46th Corps, under General of Panzers Vietinghoff, to advance rapidly toward Yelna.

In addition to the dilution of Guderian’s forces, Bock faced the challenge of his increasingly exposed southern right flank. Army Group South was making slow progress and could not close the gap, leaving the area from Mogilev to Gomel still open territory. This flank required protection, which in turn consumed Bock’s available infantry for the reduction of both Mogilev and the Smolensk pocket. Compounding these issues, Hitler was convinced of an impending Red Army counterattack at Velikiye Luki in the northern reaches of Bock’s area of responsibility. Ironically, just days earlier, he had denied Halder’s request to redirect some of Army Group North’s panzers to that area. On July 13, Halder believed that Velikiye Luki would be the point where the Red Army could concentrate its greatest force. It is possible that his intelligence reports had confused Vatutin’s offensive at Soltsy with an attack on Velikiye Luki. Regardless, Hitler denied the request. However, by July 17, he had become convinced that Velikiye Luki was indeed a point of concern. He overrode both Halder’s and Bock’s objections, directing significant portions of Hoth’s forces to counter this perceived threat.

All of these factors combined to create a perfect storm. The Panzers were crucial to Operation Barbarossa; the Wehrmacht had designed its entire campaign around leveraging the strength and mobility of the Panzer Corps' combined arms teams to overwhelm the Red Army. Achieving this required the Panzer Corps to maintain a focus on singular objectives. At no point during the Eastern Front campaign did the Wehrmacht enjoy significant numerical superiority; even local advantages were often challenging to secure. It was only through speed and concentration that they had achieved this level of success. The incompetence of the Red Army played an equally important role in the Wehrmacht’s stunning victories at Minsk and Smolensk as the Panzers themselves.

Even the more perceptive Bock did not fully appreciate just how much fight remained in Timoshenko’s Western Front. His stated intention to destroy this force through renewed offensive action reflected a misunderstanding of the weakened state of his own forces. Army Group Centre’s ailing condition, compounded by worsening shortages and severe overextension, was indeed serious. As their advance reached its limits, the initiative temporarily shifted to the Stavka, which seized the opportunity to thrust the German armies into their first military crisis of the war. While the beleaguered Soviet 20th, 19th, and 16th Armies fought for their survival within the large pocket around Smolensk, the Stavka, under Stalin’s direction, concluded that it was time for a major counteroffensive to relieve the nearly encircled formations and retake Smolensk. Timoshenko’s command was bolstered by the entire first echelon of the new Front of Reserve Armies, comprising the 29th, 30th, 24th, and 28th Armies, that had been raised throughout June and July. On July 20, Stalin informed Timoshenko of the upcoming offensive, stating: “Until now, you have counted on help in the form of two or three divisions at a time, but nothing really has come of this. Therefore, it is time to abandon this practice and begin to create a fist of 7–8 divisions with cavalry on the flanks.” With the capacity to deliver powerful attacks finally in place, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Chief of the General Staff, devised a plan to launch simultaneous concentric strikes against Army Group Centre from each of the four new armies. Unbeknownst to the German generals, they had reached the high point of the summer blitzkrieg in the east.

Thus the Stavka was desperately attempting to raise a third tier of armies on the road to Moscow. Rokossovsky was appointed to lead an effort to reclaim some lost ground. He was given command of the 101st Tank Division and the 69th Motorized Rifle Division. The 7th Panzer Division had captured Yartsevo, located east of Smolensk, and Rokossovsky was ordered to force them out. He commenced his assault on the city on July 21, with the attack continuing into the following week. At the same time, Guderian was proving to be a troublesome figure. Bock directly ordered him to take his 46th Corps and finally close the Smolensk pocket. However, Guderian refused, becoming increasingly fixated on the idea of pushing eastward. To this end, he sent the 46th Corps to Yelna. By this time, the last Soviet corridor out of the Smolensk pocket was defended by fewer than fifteen light tanks. Yelna was captured on the 20th, but only then was Guderian persuaded to close the corridor. By the time he redirected the 17th Panzer Division to this task, several rifle divisions had already taken positions in the area. Guderian’s refusal to follow orders in a timely manner did not result in discernible discipline but cost his men a straightforward victory, allowing the Red Army to evacuate many of the otherwise doomed soldiers from the pocket. It was only late in the third week of July that the pocket would be completely closed.

In Ukraine, Army Group South was fully engaged in a major encirclement battle centered around Uman, which became known as the Uman Pocket. On July 15, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny arrived in the theater to take direct command of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts. His first decision was to abandon the Dniester defensive line in order to establish a defense around the city of Uman, aiming to cover a perceived gap in his lines between Kyiv and the Dniester River. Unfortunately, this strategy had the opposite effect. He rearranged armies in the area, placing them into positions without regard for the command responsibilities of his nominal subordinates. Meanwhile, Kleist had already begun deploying his forces in a southern hook after they had been turned back in front of Kyiv the previous week. On the center-right, the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions rapidly pushed the disheveled 6th Army back toward Uman. As the Soviets retreated, a gap opened in their lines. Kleist quickly recognized this opportunity and rushed the 9th Panzer Division into the breach, forming the encirclement. On July 21, the 6th Army launched a last-ditch armored counterattack at Monastryche. While merely a delaying action, it managed to buy enough time for the remnants of the 6th Army’s infantry to retreat to Uman, deepening the pocket. Fighting continued in the area for the rest of the week and extended well into August. Though the fate of the 6th and 12th Armies was not yet sealed, the outlook was grim as the third week of July came to a close.

As the third week of July came to a close, the situation across the front was bleak for the Soviet Union. Smolensk, the key to Moscow and the heart of the USSR, was in German hands, taken with little resistance. Like Minsk, it had fallen to relatively small Panzer units during a rapid advance. In front of Smolensk, three field armies were trapped with little hope of avoiding destruction, effectively rendering the Western Front destroyed for the second time in less than a month. There was a brief glimmer of success with Vatutin’s near destruction of a Panzer division at Soltsy, but even this was only partial, as the Panzers managed to escape. In the south, Kyiv had been defended, but large portions of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts now faced the prospect of encirclement at Uman.

Meanhile the armies of Army Group Centre were tightening the noose around the colossal pocket around Smolensk, Adolf Hitler, at his East Prussian headquarters, was already contemplating the next phase of operations. On July 17, he returned to his preferred strategy of swinging Hoth’s panzer group north to support Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb’s advance on Leningrad, while simultaneously diverting Guderian’s panzer group south. This move would be bolstered by strong infantry support from General Weichs, aiming to create a new pocket in conjunction with Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Hitler exhibited little interest in launching an attack on Moscow and, perhaps sensing that such a move might spark a dispute with the OKH, proceeded to formalize his strategic vision without consulting them. Dated July 19, War Directive 33 formalized the divergent northern and southern thrusts of Bock's panzer forces, relegating the advance on Moscow to the remaining infantry on Bock’s front, a feeble concession to satisfy the OKH. In Hitler’s mind, the conclusion of the battle at Smolensk would expose the road to the east, leaving little opposition for Army Group Centre. He envisioned using its armored units to envelop the Soviet forces still resisting in the north and south. The tone of the directive implied that the war on the central front was already won. “It proclaims that the second series of battles in the East has ended,” and asserts that “mopping up” operations are needed to eliminate the remaining resistance in Army Group Centre. Following this, the next phase of the campaign would focus on “preventing any sizable enemy forces from withdrawing into the depths of Russia and wiping them out.” Even for someone as prone to delusions of grandeur as Hitler, depicting the military situation on the Eastern Front in such terms revealed a striking detachment from reality. This attitude reflected both his overweening self-confidence and the excessive bias in the information flowing through the high command. Timoshenko’s Western Front was far from defeated, and the Soviet high command was certainly not contemplating a hasty retreat to the east.

An entry from the diary of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, on July 18, captures this stark contrast in perception regarding the war's progression: Hitler went to war believing that the struggle against Bolshevism might lead the Anglo-Saxon countries to end the conflict. Von Ribbentrop did not agree; in fact, he was convinced that Churchill is ready to make an alliance even with the devil himself if he can only destroy Nazism. And this time he was right. Now the struggle is hard and bloody, and the German people, who are tired, wonder why. Frau Mollier used harsh terms. She said Hitler is a blockhead. In fact, the war is harder than the Germans had foreseen. The advance continues, but it is slow, and harassed by the very vigorous Soviet counterattacks. Colonel Ame´ and General Squero, who made a report on the military situation today, believe that the Russians will succeed in maintaining a front even during the winter. If this is true, Germany has started a haemorrhage that will have incalculable consequences.

Just as Hitler was unswervingly fixated by victory, Halder too remained defiantly optimistic in spite of a notable downturn in the confident mood at OKH. On 20 July Halder noted in his diary: The gruelling battles involving some groups of our motorised forces, in which the infantry arriving from the west can only slowly become involved, together with the time taken on bad roads which restrict movement and the exhaustion of the troops who have been marching and fighting without rest, have dampened the spirits at high command. Nowhere is this better seen than in the thorough despair into which Brauchitsch had been plunged. However there is really no call for this. While Halder appeared unfazed by the military situation, the implications of Hitler’s new war directive, War Directive 33, were undoubtedly a significant concern for him. It remains unclear how Halder responded to this directive, as there is no mention of it in his diary on the issuance date, July 19. However, a discussion with Hitler seems plausible, especially since just two days later, on July 21, during Hitler’s visit to Leeb’s Army Group North, the prospect of Hoth’s panzer group advancing northward had become considerably less certain. Leeb recorded in his diary, “The Führer spoke of the possibility that Panzer Group 3 would turn to the north.” Additionally, the OKW war diary for the same day (July 21) framed the northern operations as a decision requiring resolution “at the latest in 5 days” and concluded: In this regard it could then happen, that Panzer Group 2 turns to the south, so that for the thrust on Moscow only infantry armies of Army Group Centre remain. This eventuality does not worry the Fuhrer because Moscow is for him only a ¨ geographical term.

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Amidst chaos, the Soviets mobilized hidden reserves and relocated factories, boosting their wartime production. On July 15, fierce combat erupted, with German forces surrounding Smolensk. Despite initial successes, they underestimated Soviet resilience. General Vatutin launched a counteroffensive, aiming to encircle German units, showcasing the stubbornness and adaptability of the Red Army. The battle underscored the harsh realities of war, leading to significant losses on both sides, marking a crucial turning point in the Eastern Front of WWII.