The Eastern Front Week by Week

Eastern Front SPECIAL #1 The Development of Blitzkrieg

Last time we spoke about the Hitler’s decision to go to war. As June 1941 approached, Hitler prepared for Operation Barbarossa, an audacious plan to invade the Soviet Union before decisively defeating Britain. Stalin, sensing danger after the Winter War, had restructured the Red Army, but both sides were plagued by logistical woes. Hitler's directive emphasized destroying the Red Army, while his generals, led by Halder, argued for capturing Moscow first. Ignoring Soviet warnings, the Wehrmacht faced weakened armored divisions and critical supply shortages, stemming from a lack of standardized equipment and logistical planning. As the campaign unfolded, divisions became diluted, and the vastness of the front posed significant challenges. War games conducted by Paulus revealed critical insights about Soviet reinforcement capacities, indicating that rapid mobilization could counter German advances. The audacity of the invasion clashed with the grim reality of Nazi genocide plans, shaping a conflict that would become one of history's darkest chapters. Would this confrontation lead to Hitler's ruin, or could he outmaneuver his greatest rival?

This Special episode is: the Development of Blitzkrieg

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Yes, this week we actually have a special episode, just before we dive into Operation Barbarossa! What a horrible way to tease you all I know. 

Now for today we are delving into a concept that has shaped our understanding of World War II, Blitzkrieg. When we hear the term, vivid images may come to mind: daring Panzer commanders leading their troops from the turrets of their tanks, crashing through unsuspecting Allied soldiers, with the ominous screech of Stukas overhead and infantry riding behind in half-tracks. However, these depictions are more myth than reality, largely crafted through decades of propaganda. Much of this narrative was constructed after the war by none other than the Panzer generals themselves. Figures like Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian played pivotal roles in this movement, striving to cultivate an image of a glorious Wehrmacht, one that was supposedly only thwarted by the stubbornness of the mad dictator, Adolf Hitler. This self-serving imagery not only enhanced their own reputations but also cast a shadow over the complex realities of the war.

Let’s take a closer look at what people actually mean when they use the term Blitzkrieg. Generally, it refers to German military operations conducted from 1939 to 1941. At its core, Blitzkrieg is often characterized by the speed and efficiency with which these operations were executed, hence, the term translates to “lightning war.” A prime example of this concept can be seen in the Battle for France in 1940. In that campaign, German forces dealt a staggering blow to the French and British armies in a matter of days, nearly knocking them out of the war. The initial phase of the Battle of France was nothing short of catastrophic, as the British Expeditionary Force or “BEF” and the French Army were on the verge of annihilation. However, it’s crucial to note that this rapid offensive did not mark the end of hostilities in France. In fact, serious fighting continued for another three weeks following the evacuation at Dunkirk. While the Battle of France concluded relatively quickly, around six weeks total, the German tactics were not as decisive as they were often portrayed. For comparison, let’s look back at the Schlieffen Plan from 1914, which reached its climax in front of Paris within four weeks. The Schlieffen Plan was Germany’s military strategy in the early 20th century, designed to avoid a two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. Conceived by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905, the plan aimed for a rapid German victory over France by invading through neutral Belgium and encircling Paris from the north. Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take longer to mobilize its vast army, giving Germany time to defeat France quickly and then redirect forces to the Eastern Front. The plan relied heavily on speed, coordination, and violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war when Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. In execution, the plan faltered. The right wing of the German army, intended to sweep through Belgium and northern France, was weakened to reinforce the left, slowing momentum. Belgium’s resistance, logistical problems, and the unexpectedly fast Russian mobilization forced Germany to divert troops eastward earlier than planned. By September 1914, German forces were halted at the First Battle of the Marne. 

The Germans were bogged down at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical issues, and effective Allied resistance. The German army, following the Schlieffen Plan, had advanced rapidly through Belgium and northern France, aiming to encircle Paris and force a quick French surrender. However, the rapid advance stretched their supply lines thin, leaving troops exhausted and short on food, ammunition, and reinforcements. Crucially, German command weakened the right flank, the part of the army responsible for encircling Paris, to reinforce other sectors, undermining the original plan. As German armies moved south of the Marne River, a significant gap opened between the First and Second Armies. Allied forces, particularly the French under General Joffre and the British Expeditionary Force, identified and exploited this vulnerability. The French famously used Parisian taxis to rush reinforcements to the front, helping launch a strong counterattack. Fearing encirclement and unable to maintain their offensive, German commanders ordered a retreat to more defensible positions. This retreat marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the end of mobile warfare on the Western Front. The armies dug in, and what followed was a prolonged, grinding stalemate marked by trench warfare.

In 1940, however, there was no such miracle for the French. This so-called Blitzkrieg had not achieved a swift and definitive victory; instead, it revealed multiple underlying issues that contributed to France's downfall. There were numerous reasons behind the collapse of the French forces, and their performance was shockingly poor. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, very few in the Allied world were willing to confront the uncomfortable truth that the failures of France and Britain played a significant role in this unexpected outcome. It was far easier to believe that the Germans had created something revolutionary, a unique approach to warfare, that had caught the French and British armies off guard.

 

The reality was that the Germans had never anticipated the war would unfold as successfully as it did. Even the operational plan for the Battle of France emerged from a recognition that the overall strategic situation was grim. Invading France through the Low Countries was the only viable option for bringing substantial German forces across the Rhine. Interestingly, the early drafts of the 1940 plan resembled something directly from the desk of Helmuth von Moltke back in 1908, offering little innovation or new strategy. The German General Staff had spent years analyzing the failures of the 1914 campaign and concluded that there was little hope for a fresh or groundbreaking approach. They believed that only time, luck, and superior organization could allow them to overcome the Allied forces. In May 1940, the actual plan put into action was a reaction to unexpected circumstances. The Allies accidentally acquired a copy of the German plans, prompting the General Staff and Hitler to realize their operational blueprint had been compromised. 

Known as the Mechelen Incident, d on January 10, 1940, during the Phoney War phase a German aircraft, carrying the plans for the German invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, codenamed Fall Gelb or Case Yellow, crash-landed in Belgium near Vucht, now part of Maasmechelen. It was certainl a case of oopsy daisies. The pilot, Major Erich Hoenmanns, was flying a Messerschmitt Bf 108 when low fog caused him to lose his bearings. While trying to reorient himself by heading toward the River Rhine, he inadvertently crossed into Belgian airspace after mistakenly flying over the frozen Rhine. He then encountered mechanical failure after inadvertently cutting off the fuel supply to the engine, forcing him to land in a nearby field. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, both he and his passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, survived. Reinberger was carrying key documents related to the planned invasion, a fact that alarmed both men upon realizing the implications of their crash and their accidental entry into Belgium. In a frenzied attempt to destroy these documents, Reinberger tried, but failed initially, to set them on fire. He eventually managed to burn some, but Belgian border guards discovered the scene, leading to the capture of Hoenmanns and Reinberger.

The reaction in Berlin was one of shock and anger upon learning that their plans had fallen into enemy hands. Adolf Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of senior Luftwaffe commanders and debated the potential compromise of their military strategy. Despite the initial panic, it was determined that the attack would proceed as planned. Following much deliberation, they decided to develop a new strategy, partly crafted by General Erich von Manstein. This innovative plan called for a rapid thrust through the Ardennes, with the goal of driving to the coast to encircle and cut off the primary Allied field armies positioned in the Low Countries. While this plan was bold, it wasn't entirely original to Manstein; elements of it had been discussed in earlier planning stages but had been dismissed. It was only the urgent need for a fresh strategy to meet Hitler’s timeline for an invasion of France that led to the adoption of Manstein’s ideas. Moreover, this approach conveniently placed Manstein in a key position at the heart of the Wehrmacht’s main offensive. As chief of staff to Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Army Group responsible for this area, Manstein's influence and strategic vision became critical to the operation's success.

Now we don’t need to delve into the intricate details of the planning or execution of the Battle of France. Instead, it's important to clarify one crucial point: those involved in German military planning did not initially view the battle as a “Blitzkrieg.” While the term "lightning war" has become iconic, it was perceived by the German high command primarily as a strategic concept, rather than the operational doctrine that contemporary audiences often associate it with. Historically, German and Prussian military theorists had grappled with their nation's strategic challenges, particularly following their defeat by Napoleon. This pivotal moment shaped their military thinking for decades. One of the central dilemmas they faced was the fear that any conflict could escalate into a prolonged struggle, a scenario that the resources and political stability of Germany could ill afford. From prior to World War I, military planning had emphasized the importance of avoiding a two-front war, allowing the nation to concentrate its resources and efforts on a single front. This strategy was vital for Germany's aim of achieving a swift resolution to conflicts. It’s crucial to note that Germany was not unique in its desire for short wars; the prevailing sentiment across many nations at the time was a general reluctance to engage in lengthy conflicts. The concept of a short war was a common thread in strategic planning, and it would be misleading to suggest that Germany’s approach was radically different from that of its contemporaries. Understanding this context, we can see that Blitzkrieg was not strictly a doctrine of operations nor a specific set of tactical maneuvers. For the Wehrmacht in 1940, it represented more of an abstract idea, loosely connected to the long-standing principles of German strategic thought that had been evolving since 1870. This concept would later manifest in a unique combination of speed, surprise, and coordinated assaults, but its origins lay in a broader strategic mindset that prioritized quick and decisive victories over drawn-out warfare.

If Blitzkrieg wasn’t the driving force behind Germany’s remarkable victory over France and Britain in 1940, what accounted for this stunning achievement? One significant factor was sheer luck. Reflecting on the campaign, General Heinz Guderian mused that their success felt “almost a miracle.” A combination of fortunate circumstances and a series of critical missteps by the Allies played a fundamental role in the outcome. The Allies’ mistakes were compounded by poor communication between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army, which ultimately allowed the Germans the crucial time they needed to execute their decisive maneuvers. This became especially evident following the breakthrough across the Meuse River, where the Germans seized the initiative. As the situation unfolded, the Allies consistently faltered in their response. In France, the political landscape was rapidly deteriorating, leading to significant confusion. The day the Germans launched their invasion, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, which added another layer of instability during a critical moment. Meanwhile, the French military command experienced turbulence as well, with changes in Army leadership occurring at the height of the campaign. Debates over British support in the field intensified, and inadequate reserves were deployed in a piecemeal fashion. Incompetent military leadership, poor coordination, and muddled political directives all significantly contributed to the success of the German campaign. Yet, despite these advantages, the level of success the Wehrmacht achieved was unexpected, even for their own generals. Hitler and his advisors expressed concerns that their forces were becoming overextended and could be vulnerable to a counterattack from the Allies. Ultimately, it was a combination of fortunate circumstances and these various factors that shielded the Germans from facing the consequences of potentially overreaching their capabilities.

The tactics employed in World War II were fundamentally shaped by the experiences and lessons learned during World War I. This was true for every army around the globe at that time. Each nation emerged from the First World War with a unique understanding of warfare, shaped by their specific experiences and challenges. However, a few key insights were universally recognized. Firstly, it became evident that armor, infantry, artillery, and reconnaissance units needed to operate in harmony. The concept of "combined arms" was not merely a theoretical idea; it was increasingly understood as a vital necessity for effective military operations. Effective coordination among these branches was crucial for overcoming the complexities of modern warfare. Secondly, by 1939, there was widespread consensus that aerial power would play a critical role on the battlefield. The question was no longer whether to incorporate air support into military strategies, but rather how to best integrate these elements to maximize their effectiveness. Military planners and political leaders debated strategies for employing combined arms, seeking the most effective methods for coordination and execution. This evolving understanding led to innovative doctrines that emphasized speed, flexibility, and the importance of communication among different branches of the military. Countries began experimenting with various formations and tactics, ultimately paving the way for revolutionary approaches to warfare that would be realized during the conflict.

The French military recognized that their overarching strategy needed to emphasize the use of combined arms in continuous defensive lines. To achieve this, they implemented infantry-tank teams that operated at the pace of infantry, prioritizing reliability over speed. While this approach limited the rapid mobility of their forces, it was designed to ensure that the coordination and effectiveness of armored units were maintained alongside their infantry counterparts. In 1940, French tanks were among the best in the world, significantly outclassing their German counterparts in terms of armor and armaments. However, substantial flaws were embedded within their tactical framework concerning these continuous defensive lines. French military leaders had not been trained to deploy their units in aggressive, independent assaults, as such maneuvers might disturb the carefully controlled lines determined by higher command. This rigidity hindered their operational flexibility and responsiveness. Moreover, difficulties in equipment acquisition left many French tanks without radios, severely impacting their communication capabilities on the battlefield. This lack of effective communication further complicated coordination among combined arms teams, limiting their effectiveness in rapidly evolving combat situations. On the other hand, the British government believed that supporting the French on the continent necessitated a strong naval and air presence, with limited ground forces. Consequently, the British field army was relatively small, consisting of troops that were better trained in colonial policing than in executing large-scale combined arms maneuvers alongside their French allies. Although the British fielded notable tanks, such as the Matilda, their focus was not on large maneuver elements. The insufficient scale and coordination on the French side meant that the British also did not prioritize the development of such capabilities. This strategic divide between the French and British forces contributed to the challenges both nations faced during the early stages of World War II, as they struggled to adapt their tactical approaches to the realities of modern warfare.

The primary lesson the Germans gleaned from the brutal trench warfare of World War I was that maneuverability was paramount in modern combat. They recognized that the stagnation of movement had transformed the conflict into a horrific slugging match, resulting in millions of casualties. This static warfare, devoid of maneuver, had become an industrial exercise in destruction, one that Germany, due to its limited manpower and resources, could not sustain in the long run. The sheer weight of the combined British and French forces matched their own, and with the arrival of American troops, the prospect of victory slipped further out of reach. Throughout the war, the Germans had consistently outmaneuvered their Russian opponents, a strategy that allowed them to effectively manage their limited resources while achieving tactical successes on the Eastern Front. However, in the West, opportunities for these maneuvers had been severely curtailed, leading to stalemate and attrition. To counter this, Germany dedicated the interwar period to mastering the principles of combined arms warfare, focusing on how to create formations that could execute swift maneuvers and independent actions. This effort culminated in the development of the Panzer division, an innovative military structure that emphasized speed, maneuverability, and operational flexibility. The Panzer divisions were meticulously designed to facilitate rapid movement and to empower local commanders to make decisions on the battlefield without waiting for orders from higher-ups. This decentralized command structure allowed for greater responsiveness and adaptability during combat operations. Over time, these divisions would evolve into Panzer Corps and Panzer Armies, further enhancing the German military's ability to perform combined arms operations effectively. This focus on maneuverable warfare not only defined German tactics but also set a new standard for military strategy in the years leading up to World War II.

However, this strategic vision was far from perfect. Germany faced significant challenges in building a robust industrial base capable of mass-equipping its armies with the advanced mechanized units envisioned in their plans. Germany took a very long time to initiate a full wartime economy during World War II due to a mix of ideological, political, and strategic factors, all of which severely impacted production efficiency in the early years of the war. When the war began in 1939, Adolf Hitler deliberately avoided transitioning Germany into a total war economy. He wanted to maintain civilian morale and avoid the harsh sacrifices Germans had experienced during World War I, especially food shortages and labor conscription. Consumer goods production continued, cinemas stayed open, and rationing was minimal in the early years. Hitler believed that a Blitzkrieg strategy would lead to quick victories and negate the need for total mobilization. This mindset was supported by Nazi ideology and bureaucracy. Hitler's government was fragmented, with various competing agencies, like the Wehrmacht, the SS, and different ministries, all vying for control. Economic planning was disorganized, with no centralized authority to oversee efficient industrial production. Industry leaders were left to make decisions based on profit and political loyalty, rather than wartime necessity. Germany also did not fully utilize its available labor force. For ideological reasons, the Nazis were reluctant to employ women in heavy industry as extensively as the Allies or the Soviet Union. Instead, they increasingly relied on forced labor from occupied countries, which was inefficient, underpaid, and poorly managed. By 1942, Germany had suffered major setbacks, especially on the Eastern Front, and Hitler realized that a more serious mobilization was needed. This is when Albert Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments and War Production. Speer introduced rationalization measures, streamlined production, reduced duplication, and centralized control of industry. Under his leadership, German armaments output significantly increased, even amid intensified Allied bombing. However, these improvements came late. The delays in shifting to a war economy meant that Germany missed its chance to build overwhelming material superiority early in the conflict. Allied powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, vastly outproduced Germany by the mid-war years. US industry operated at full capacity, and the USSR, despite massive losses, reorganized its economy behind the Urals for war-focused production. This all resulted in unstable production lines, making it difficult to develop standardized equipment and maintain a long-term acquisitions pipeline. Consequently, the German military resorted to a mixed approach. They developed a small number of elite mechanized divisions, equipped to the highest standards with the latest technology. In contrast, additional infantry divisions were motorized to a degree, utilizing truck-drawn artillery to enhance their mobility, while the majority of the army remained largely traditional in structure. These standard infantry units, reminiscent of their historical counterparts, carried their supplies on their backs, with horse-drawn wagons following behind to transport heavier equipment.

As a result, the infantry of the Heer could only move at a pace consistent with historical infantry tactics: approximately five kilometers per hour, neither faster nor slower. This limitation proved to be a significant shortcoming, particularly on the Eastern Front. The infantry struggled to keep pace with the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions, leading to logistical challenges. Frequently, the panzers and motorized infantry found themselves forced to pause their advances, waiting for the slower-moving infantry to catch up and take their positions. This situation undermined the very advantages in speed and maneuverability that the Germans had sought to create, disrupting the flow of the campaign and hindering effective combat operations. In essence, while the innovative structures like the Panzer divisions were designed to revolutionize warfare, the failure to fully mechanize and equip their entire army would ultimately constrain Germany's tactical flexibility and responsiveness, especially in the vast theaters of the East.

The doctrine governing the employment of panzer divisions in the German army is notably difficult to define. In a post-war interview, General Heinz Guderian’s deputy, General Hermann Schweppenburg, asserted that there was no cohesive doctrine for employing panzer divisions throughout the conflict. This assertion has sparked endless debates across forums, academic papers, and casual discussions in cafes since the war concluded. However, taking Schweppenburg’s claim at face value requires us to traverse generational and cultural divides in a manner that may prove unattainable. There is no universally accepted benchmark to ensure that we share a common understanding of what he meant by the absence of doctrine. Unfortunately, no one could ask him for clarification now, given that he has been deceased for over half a century. Therefore, we must base our analysis on common sense and the evidence available to us. It is essential to consider the context in which these panzer divisions operated. While Schweppenburg may have perceived a lack of formal doctrine, various operational principles and methodologies were indeed developed and employed throughout the war. The German military did prioritize speed, flexibility, and combined arms operations, reflecting the lessons learned from both World Wars. The effective use of panzer divisions often relied on the initiative and adaptability of local commanders, who were empowered to make real-time decisions in response to the fluid nature of battle. This decentralized command structure, although not a formal doctrine in the traditional sense, created a framework for coordination that was essential to the success of their armored units. Ultimately, while it may be tempting to view the absence of a formal doctrine as a weakness, it can also be interpreted as a strength, one that allowed for a responsiveness to the dynamic conditions of warfare. We must critically assess the available evidence and acknowledge the complexities therein, recognizing that the execution of panzer operations was shaped as much by opportunistic innovation as by any rigidly defined doctrine.

 

First, what is doctrine? While there are many interpretations of the term, a concise definition from the United States Marine Corps encapsulates its essence: “Doctrine is the fundamental principles, including tactics, techniques, and procedures, by which forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.” Importantly, this definition does not necessitate the existence of a formal written document. In this context, General Schweppenburg's assertion may hold validity if he was referring specifically to the absence of a documented doctrine outlining the principles of armored force employment. However, it is crucial to recognize that there existed common understandings among panzer commanders regarding their roles and responsibilities within the German army. Without these shared insights and precepts, chaos would have likely ensued, rendering cooperative actions among units nearly impossible. The absence of a formal document does not imply a lack of coherence in operational strategies. On the contrary, the effectiveness of panzer divisions was predicated on a foundational commonality of purpose and approach. Commanders across the board shared an understanding of the strategic objectives and the methods necessary to achieve them, which facilitated coordination and unity of effort in combat situations. This implicit doctrine, built upon shared experiences and lessons learned, allowed the German military to execute complex maneuvers effectively and adapt to the dynamic conditions of warfare.

What we know about actual panzer doctrine can be corroborated through operational histories. The Panzer divisions were regarded as self-contained mobile forces specifically tasked with breaking through enemy lines. After achieving this breakthrough, they were assigned various missions, the most common of which included cutting enemy lines of communication, disrupting retreats, and targeting logistics. During Operation Barbarossa, this doctrine was vividly illustrated in the battles of Minsk, Smolensk, and Kyiv. Large independent panzer units were directed to penetrate Soviet lines and establish connections behind the enemy's main body. In this operational framework, infantry units were to advance behind the panzers, securing the lines of communication essential for sustaining the panzer forces. Once encirclement was achieved, efforts would shift to reducing the encircled pocket, a tactic known as the Kesselacht, or cauldron battle. This concept was historically rooted in the strategies of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke and later adapted by his successors, including those influenced by Schlieffen's principles. These encirclement battles involved infantry forces advancing from all sides into the pocket to reduce its size. Ultimately, the destruction of the encircled enemy forces would be achieved either through a decisive assault or the enemy's surrender. However, the aforementioned slow pace of infantry movement often led to situations where panzer units found themselves bogged down in heavy fighting unsuited to their capabilities while waiting for infantry to relieve them. Once the pocket was fully encircled and secured, or once relief was achieved, the Panzers would continue their advance. These encirclement strategies were designed to operate on a massive scale, often targeting entire field armies and, in the cases of Minsk and Kyiv, large Soviet army groups. Yet, the scale of these operations was not always consistent. Tensions frequently arose between Hitler and his generals regarding the aggressiveness of the panzer advances. Hitler often expressed concern that field commanders were overextending themselves, advocating for more manageable encirclement operations. This was notably evident in France in 1940, when he ordered a pause in the panzer advance to allow the infantry time to catch up and secure the communication lines for Kleist’s panzer group. Similar disagreements occurred after the battle of Minsk in 1941, when Hitler and Army Group Center's commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, clashed over the size of future encirclement attempts. Surprisingly, in this instance, Hitler was unable to impose his strategy on the seasoned Field Marshal. Army Group Center proceeded with large-scale encirclements, culminating in the significant encirclement operation at Smolensk in July 1941.

The emphasis on encirclement battles was not solely beneficial to the Panzers and motorized units; all branches of the German military were encouraged to seek encirclement whenever possible. The 1933 Heer Field Service Regulations called for artillery, infantry, armor, and air support to work together down to the company level. This cooperation was primarily to be facilitated through direct communication among the respective commanders. The regulations stipulated that artillery commanders should position their command posts as close as possible to those of infantry commanders. If personal communication was not feasible, liaison officers were to be assigned to link the respective units. Additionally, the use of radios and telephones was recommended wherever possible. The inclusion of radio and telephone communication at the end of this hierarchy may seem counterintuitive. However, the Germans were acutely aware of how easily telephone lines could be severed by enemy artillery fire, while radios were susceptible to jamming and interception. Electronic warfare was absolutely utilized by both sides on the Eastern front, but it does not get as much attention in secondary accounts of the war. Perhaps the most noteworthy example was at Kursk where the Red Army and the Wehrmacht battled it out over the radio waves, jamming, intercepting and triangulation of the other sides observers and command posts. 

During the North Africa Campaign of World War II, radio communications were essential for both Axis and Allied forces operating across the vast, open desert. The terrain demanded mobile, long-range radio systems, but this also made transmissions highly vulnerable to interception, jamming, and triangulation, tools that became critical in the evolving landscape of electronic warfare. Interception played a particularly important role. British intelligence units, especially the Y Service and those linked to Ultra at Bletchley Park, routinely intercepted German and Italian radio traffic. German forces often used open channels or weak encryption, allowing the British to gain valuable insights into Axis troop movements, supply lines, and battle plans. This intelligence edge was a major factor in key victories, such as the Second Battle of El Alamein, where Allied forces were able to preempt German strategies. Jamming techniques were also employed, though they were less refined than in later stages of the war. Both the British and Germans attempted to disrupt enemy communications by broadcasting on similar frequencies, particularly during major offensives or air-ground coordination efforts. However, the technology was still developing, and jamming sometimes interfered with friendly transmissions as well. Triangulation became a highly effective method for locating enemy radio operators. British forces used mobile direction-finding units mounted on vehicles to track the origin of German transmissions across the desert. When combined with intercepted messages, this allowed commanders to accurately identify the positions of enemy headquarters and convoys, enabling more precise attacks. Altogether, the effective use of radio interception, jamming, and triangulation gave the Allies a significant advantage in the North African theater, demonstrating the growing power of signals intelligence in modern warfare. By the way, if you haven't checked it out yet, me and my Co-host Garauv over on Echoes of War podcast did a 10 episode series on the entire North Africa Campaign, I highly recommend it. 

Needless to say the Nazi regime utilized a lot of propaganda that contributed to the myths perpetuated by generals long after the war concluded, take for example the idealization of the "clean Wehrmacht." This romantic notion of advancing panzers emerged not only at the war's conclusion but also started soon after the Germans captured Paris, which they viewed as a stepping stone towards imminent victory. The propaganda machinery of the Third Reich rapidly began producing films, news stories, and radio broadcasts that framed the Wehrmacht's success in the West as an inevitable result of German superiority. These narratives circulated widely within the army and across the conquered territories of Europe. The impact of this propaganda was immediate, with German officers, who should have recognized the realities of warfare, beginning to believe their own rhetoric. Many perceived their operational success in the so-called Blitzkrieg as evidence of unparalleled military brilliance. The swift collapses of the Low Countries, France, Poland, and the British Expeditionary Force reinforced their belief that they had created something unique in military history.

However, this belief was fundamentally flawed. The Wehrmacht of 1939-1940 capitalized on the unpreparedness of their enemies for a war of maneuver, leveraging superior training and communication capabilities to outflank the bewildered Allies. This was not a unique ability, nor was it one that could not be replicated by other nations. As the Wehrmacht geared up for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1940-1941, the professionalism that had characterized German planning for decades began to erode. Generals increasingly assumed best-case scenarios for their maneuvers while neglecting the significant obstacles they would face. These critical missteps would soon become apparent within weeks of the start of Operation Barbarossa. Before long, many high-ranking officers in the Wehrmacht would begin to doubt the war's outcome, with some losing all hope of victory long before the onset of winter.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As blitzkrieg tactics, asserting speed and coordination, manifested in the rapid defeat of France, they obscured deeper issues. While the myths surrounding Germany's military prowess grew, luck played a crucial role in their early victories. As blunders unfolded in the east, doubts about the war's outcome began to gnaw at German high command, foreshadowing the inevitable struggle ahead.

Eastern Front Prelude #0.11 Hitler’s decision to go to War

Last time we spoke about the planning for Operation Barbarossa. In 1940, as Europe faced the aftermath of the swift German Blitzkrieg, Stalin realized the imminent threat to the Soviet Union. Following the Winter War with Finland, he restructured the Red Army, appointing General Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov's remarkable military background shaped his strategies for upcoming conflicts. However, despite receiving numerous warnings about a German invasion, Stalin hesitated, believing the alarms to be fabrications. As tensions escalated, the Soviet military was still underprepared, facing critical shortages of equipment and personnel. On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their attack, exploiting the Red Army's disorganization and lack of readiness. Stalin, desperate to fortify defenses, rushed military production but was starkly unprepared for the rapid devastation that ensued. This catastrophic failure would haunt the Soviet Union as they struggled to adapt and respond to the unexpected German onslaught in the early days of Operation Barbarossa.

This episode is Prelude #11 Hitler’s decision to go to War

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

In the last episode we examined how Hitler began WW2 against western europe and the planning behind Operation Barbarossa. Today we are going to dive into Hitler’s ultimate decision for war against the Soviet Union.

In December of 1940, a pivotal moment in World War II unfolded when Adolf Hitler signed War Directive Twenty-One. Hitler’s war directives were a sort of executive order that he signed and published as a means of putting his priorities into action by the regime’s various mechanisms. Throughout the war, he would sign 74 of them, the last ones devolving to little more than his ideological rants and attempts to intervene in the smallest tactical decisions. You know Hitler sandbagging his own generals and such. This critical order called for the German Army and Air Force to begin preparations for a bold and aggressive invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler recognized that this operation would likely need to occur before Germany could conclusively defeat Britain, underscoring the urgency and precariousness of the Nazi strategy. War Directive Twenty-One provided a rough outline for the invasion, revealing Hitler’s expansive ambitions. The planned advance was to stretch from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, encapsulating a massive swath of territory. The directive's strategic vision targeted the annihilation of the majority of the Red Army, alongside a crucial goal, capturing the strategic city of Leningrad.

Interestingly, this initial draft revealed that any push toward Moscow was envisioned as a subsequent objective, to be contemplated only after achieving the first goals of the campaign. Hitler’s strategy highlighted an astonishing military undertaking: he stipulated that the German forces would not advance beyond a delineation he had in mind, spanning roughly from Arkhangelsk in the north to the Volga River in the south. This indicated a monumental task, covering a staggering 2,000 kilometers from the starting point of the German forces. To put this in perspective, the German front was already vast, measuring 1,400 kilometers wide, but by the end of the planned campaign, it was expected to expand to over 2,100 kilometers. War Directive Twenty-One proposed a campaign unparalleled in military history, setting the stage for what would be the most ambitious military operation ever executed. 

Ambitions aside, the planning for the invasion highlighted significant issues within the Wehrmacht from the very beginning. A critical source of tension was the stark contrast in strategic vision between Adolf Hitler and his generals at the Oberkommando des Heeres or “OKH”, the German Army High Command. It was subordinated to OKW or “Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht”. OKW was the German Military’s unified military high command. Hitler rarely followed the chain of command and regularly consulted with OKH staff without first talking to OKW and vice versa. Being someone who suffers the life of bureaucracy, working for what is essentially the federal government of Canada, won't get into details, I can assure that this was a bold strategy cotton. At the helm was Colonel General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff. Halder was a professional officer who had been selected to be the next chief of the Army General Staff after the resignation of his predecessor General Ludwig Beck over disagreements with Hitler concerning the latter’s plan for Czechoslovakia. Although a loyal supporter of the Nazi regime, Halder firmly believed that Hitler was mistaken and misled in his approach to conquering the USSR. Hitler’s strategy emphasized the destruction of the Red Army as the primary objective of any campaign, suggesting that this would pave the way for the subsequent seizure of vital industrial and agricultural centers in Ukraine. He prioritized swift and decisive action aimed at neutralizing Soviet military capability, viewing it as essential for a favorable outcome.

In contrast, Halder advocated for focusing efforts on capturing Moscow first, arguing that securing the Soviet capital would destabilize the Soviet government and lead to a quicker resolution of the conflict. He believed that after taking Moscow, the Wehrmacht could negotiate for the economic and industrial resources necessary for a prolonged war in the West. This fundamental difference in perspective reflected not only tactical considerations but also divergent visions for the overall campaign in the East. These conflicting strategies created a hazardous environment where, although Hitler ordered one campaign plan to be developed and prepared, Halder and his subordinates only committed half-heartedly to fulfilling Hitler's directives. Instead, they began laying the groundwork to implement their strategy, banking on the idea that initial victories in the campaign would provide an opportunity to persuade Hitler of the merits of their plan. They believed that demonstrating success on the battlefield could sway the Führer to adopt their approach, thereby enabling a more focused and effective strategy in the East.

Beyond strategic disagreements, the Wehrmacht faced several fundamental issues that severely impacted its campaign in the East. A critical challenge was the sorry state of equipment standardization, which affected everything from the readiness of fighting units to the intricacies of logistics planning. During the buildup for operations, Colonel General Halder’s staff discovered that the Heer, aka the German Army was equipped with no fewer than 150 different models of trucks, each produced by various German manufacturers. This hodgepodge of vehicles created significant logistical headaches. Many of the trucks used to transport supplies and maintain mobility for the Panzer and motorized forces were actually civilian models that had been requisitioned during previous campaigns in Poland and France. This diverse assortment of vehicles meant that it was impossible to establish a comprehensive inventory of spare parts, which had dire implications for maintenance and the longevity of the trucks. As the units faced the harsh conditions of the 1,200-kilometer march to Moscow, the reliability of their transportation would inevitably suffer.

Many of you might gloss over what essentially amounts to a logistical issue, however, logistics is honestly what defeated the Axis during WW2. No members of the Axis held significant oil, excluding Romania who was dishing it out to them all, but it was not nearly enough. On top of that, Germany had a beautiful way of making automotive vehicles, but it was also glaringly idiotic. To overly simplify, the Ford assembly line, created by Henry Ford had workers creating all the different parts that made up a car over assembly lines. This meant the worker teams each made separate parts that would be placed together at the end basically. For Germany it was mostly the opposite. The German workers would build up their vehicles or panzers from start to finish, providing excellent craftsmen for sure, but it was unbelievably inefficient compared to the US and other allied nations. The Germans would be dishing out panzers at pathetic rates compared to their enemies and worse yet, all the German manufacturing companies did not standardize their parts. This meant there was a ungodly amount of different parts for all their vehicles, requiring specializations for repairs teams and a ton of reserve parts that all need to be brought to the front lines. In comparison, the Allied repair teams all used standardized parts, even shared between the British and Americans. The Allies were out producing, out repairing the Axis like no tomorrow, it proved to be a decisive factor in the North African campaign, which me and my cohost Gaurav over at Echoes of War Podcast did a 10 episode series on, go check it out. On top of all of that, the German economy did not even became a full war time economy until 1944 when Albert Speer took over and honestly he freaked out at what he found out was going on. German manufacturers were literally stealing from each other, all scrambling for steel, sometimes sabotaging another and outright refusing to cooperate on designing and other factors. While many tank bro’s get wet in their pants thinking about the glory that was the Tiger 1, in the end 3 beat up Shermans could take them down, or T-34’s at a fraction of the cost. Das Auto indeed.

By May of 1940, the ten Panzer divisions each averaged 256 tanks. However, by June of 1941, the number of Panzer divisions had increased to twenty, but their average strength had diluted to just 190 tanks per division. More importantly, the strongest Panzer divisions in 1940 were the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Panzer, each boasting over 300 tanks. In marked contrast, by 1941, the most powerful divisions shifted to the 6th, 7th, and 20th Panzer, with only one of them exceeding 250 tanks. This dilution of the Wehrmacht’s critical armored capability was deemed necessary to provide broader coverage across the vast front envisioned for Operation Barbarossa. While this strategy allowed for greater territorial reach, it came at a significant cost: a marked reduction in the striking power of the Panzer divisions. The very core of the German military's offensive capability was weakened, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the entire campaign in the East.

Despite the challenges posed by the restructuring of the Wehrmacht, there was a silver lining. Many of the now decidedly obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II tanks were being phased out and replaced with more modern armored vehicles. Among these replacements were the Czech-built Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t), along with the more robust Panzer IV and Panzer III models. Notably, about 700 of the newly introduced Panzer III were the Ausführung F variant, equipped with a significantly improved 5-centimeter gun. This weapon boasted superior armor penetration capabilities, making it effective against the lighter Soviet tanks that the Heer would encounter in the East. To get in more gritty details, the 5 cm KwK 38 was the close cousin of the PaK. 37 wheeled anti-tank gun that was also being introduced into service around this time. Unfortunately, neither of these weapons proved to be a match for the best Soviet armor that would be encountered in the coming campaign. Eventually they would be replaced by the 5 cm KwK 39 with a longer barrel. Even this proved inadequate. At that point, the Panzer III would reach its maximum development capacity, and the Panzer IV would take over the anti-tank role, eventually being fitted with the 7.5 cm KwK 40. This upgrade was an essential enhancement compared to the older tank models, which were increasingly outmatched on the battlefield. However, this mix of tank models soon became a logistical headache that would plague the German war effort in the East. As the distances between frontline troops and the industrial heart of the Nazi war machine expanded, ensuring the availability of spare parts for this diverse array of armored vehicles posed significant challenges. The complexity of maintaining and supplying such an eclectic fleet of tanks would complicate operations, making the already daunting logistics of war even more arduous. As the campaign progressed, the Wehrmacht's ability to sustain its operations would be increasingly tested, revealing the stark limitations of an overly diversified vehicle inventory during the intense and prolonged engagements in the Soviet Union.

Logistics planning for Operation Barbarossa uncovered serious problems that had only been minor issues during the previous campaigns in the West. While the standardization issues with trucks we discussed earlier contributed to these logistical headaches, sheer numbers also became a critical concern. The Heer faced a significant shortfall in trucks as early as February of 1940, and this situation would worsen dramatically over time. German industry was only managing to replace about half of the losses sustained, leaving the army struggling to maintain its mobility. Adding to the complexity, requisitions from civilians and captured stocks further complicated the standardization issues. Although these measures provided a temporary reprieve, they were not a sustainable solution to the broader problem of equipment replacement. Compounding the challenges for logistics planners in 1941, was the fact that Soviet railroads operated on a wider gauge track than the standard used throughout the rest of Europe. Yes, what could seem such a minor detail as the gauge of the track would have a profound effect during WW2. As you can imagine, the most powerful land based logistical method, even to this very day, is by rail. The Germans depended heavily on rail and to be honest upon horse and mule. 

The Soviet rail gauge in 1941 was defined as 1524 mm between the rails. In 1970, the Soviet Gauge was standardized as 1520 mm. European rail gauge at this time was 1435 mm. This is now known as “standard gauge.” Most if not all of the continental track was set to this size before the turn of the century. The notable exception was the Iberian Peninsula which ran 1672 mm in Spain and 1664 mm in Portugal. This discrepancy became a formidable obstacle in transporting supplies and reinforcements to the front lines. There were essentially two possible solutions to this problem: the Germans could either capture substantial amounts of Soviet rolling stock and locomotives or re-lay the railroad tracks to conform to the narrower European standard. The first option hinged on operational luck, a variable steeped in uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly in the chaos of war. The second solution would demand vast amounts of manpower and time, resources that were already stretched thin due to the expansive nature of the campaign. As logistical planners looked toward the challenges ahead, they faced a daunting reality: without effective and responsive logistics, the Wehrmacht's operational success in the East could be severely compromised.

The actual plans and troop dispositions for the invasion of the Soviet Union went through three major phases of planning. The first phase was an operational study conducted by Major General Marcks. Marcks was the chief of staff of the 18th Army. He was selected for this first draft because he was a longtime friend of Halder and had a reputation for being a competent mind. Additionally, Halder had already asked him to start sketching out a draft. His planning received official sanction on July 29, 1940, well before Adolf Hitler issued War Directive Twenty-One. Marcks' initial plan called for the establishment of two army groups: one positioned north of the Pripyat Marshes and the other to the south. The Northern Army Group was designed to be the dominant force and the main effort of the campaign. In his assessment, Marcks estimated the strength of the Red Army on its western front at 96 infantry divisions, 23 cavalry divisions, and 28 motorized brigades. Interestingly, it seems that Marcks was not fully aware of the existence of the Soviet tank divisions or the mechanized corps, which would later prove significant in the conflict.

To counter the estimated strength of the Red Army, Marcks utilized figures that included the planned continued expansion of the Heer, ultimately assigning a total of 147 divisions for the operation. This formidable force consisted of 110 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 24 Panzer divisions, and 12 motorized infantry divisions. The breakdown of troop allocations was as follows: the Northern Army Group would receive 50 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 motorized divisions, and 15 Panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Southern Army Group would be allocated 5 Panzer divisions, 6 motorized divisions, and 24 infantry divisions. The remaining divisions were earmarked to form a substantial operational reserve, intended to plug any gaps that might arise as the army groups advanced into the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. This early planning phase was critical in setting the stage for what would become one of the largest military operations in history, reflecting both strategic ambition and the challenges ahead. The source material is unclear on exactly how the Wehrmacht thought the Soviet tank arm was fielded in the army. A fair guess might be that they understood the Red Army to be organized along the French model which had tanks in brigades and regiments attached to rifle divisions and corps. Ultimately, this is a significant sign of the poor state of Wehrmacht intelligence at this time. 

Major General Marcks divided his operational concept for the invasion into four distinct phases. Phase One focused on the army groups pushing the Red Army back approximately 400 kilometers, with the objective of encircling the bulk of Soviet forces. This initial push was essential to secure a quick victory, as failing to achieve this would lead to significant complications.Phase Two would involve a renewed attempt to break through any new defensive lines established by the Soviets, aiming to encircle the defenders over a distance of 100 to 200 kilometers. Marcks projected that these first two phases should be completed within a span of seven weeks. However, he recognized the risks: if the initial operations failed, the outcome could devolve into positional warfare, where secure lines of communication would be jeopardized. Units of the Red Army that could not be decisively surrounded and defeated would eventually drain the strength of the invasion force. Scattered Soviet troops could pose threats to supply lines, demanding the attention of larger Wehrmacht units to eliminate these threats. Phase Three of the operations called for a simultaneous advance through Eastern Ukraine, along with the strategic capture of both Moscow and Leningrad. This was an ambitious vision and Marcks emphasized that it was heavily contingent on the success of the first two phases, along with a robust logistics framework to support the campaign. Finally, Phase Four was even more audacious, envisioning a broad push towards Arkhangelsk in the north and Rostov in the south, with Gorki marking the easternmost limit of the advance. This expansive objective reflected not only the ambitious nature of the plan but also the extensive logistical challenges the Wehrmacht would face in executing such a sweeping campaign. At this stage, the strength of the Heer’s logistics would be measured by the number and condition of the trucks, as well as the progress made in conversion of the Soviet rail gauge. 

Major General Marcks also developed a geostrategic analysis of Germany's position following an invasion of the Soviet Union. He cautioned that an immediate alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would be unavoidable, which would likely lead to increased economic aid from the United States, a nation already heavily committed to supporting the UK. Marcks was astute enough to recognize that the Western Allies would seize any opportunity to land in Europe and begin efforts to liberate their fallen allies. He stressed that Germany would struggle to conduct a war on two fronts effectively. To mitigate this impending crisis, Marcks emphasized the necessity for the Wehrmacht to defeat the Soviet Union swiftly. While he acknowledged that such a rapid victory could not be guaranteed, he firmly believed that capturing Moscow was crucial to achieving this goal. In this regard, he echoed the sentiments of his friend Colonel General Halder, who was at that moment attempting to persuade Hitler to pursue this very course of action. The operational plan Marcks proposed represented an incredibly ambitious undertaking, all within a 17 week timeline. Yet, it was not the most audacious plan devised by the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the Soviet Union. That dubious honor belongs to the subsequent plan, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg.

On September 19, 1940, Colonel Walter Warlimont’s National Defense Division of the OKW presented its proposal for a new campaign, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg. This plan, now known as the "Lossberg Study," outlined four key objectives for the Eastern campaign:

To destroy enemy forces in Western Russia.

1. To prevent capable enemy units from retreating into the interior.
2. To isolate Western Russia from the sea.
3. To seize crucial Russian resource areas.

Lossberg’s plan called for three army groups: North, Center, and South. It aimed for a primary advance on Moscow via Smolensk while also allowing part of Army Group Center to divert northward to assist Army Group North. Additionally, the plan included a southern advance by German and Finnish forces through Karelia.

Among all German studies, Lossberg’s was unique in addressing the deficiencies of the Russian road and rail network. He asserted, “All German operations must be supported in their later stages by reliable Russian railways, as a transport system solely based on roads will be insufficient in the vast expanses.” There were two main ways to meet this requirement:

1. By seizing enough enemy rolling stock and locomotives to utilize existing tracks.
2. By converting Russian tracks to European Standard Gauge.

Both approaches presented challenges. One solution was to leverage naval power. If the Wehrmacht could swiftly capture and repair eastern Baltic ports and eliminate the Soviet Baltic Fleet, most logistical needs for AGN could be fulfilled by sea, allowing engines and rolling stock to support the other two army groups. In the campaign’s second phase, supplies transported by sea could sustain advances toward the Volga, Gorki, and Archangel. The incorporation of sea supply in the OKW plan was a significant development, marking the first time planners considered the impact of naval power on the campaign. Historically, the German High Command had displayed a marked ignorance of maritime strategy, a failing more evident now than ever. At this point, the Navy was unaware of the impending invasion, and the OKM staff had not participated in the planning process. The OKH studies conducted thus far appeared as if created by individuals who believed the world ended at the shoreline. The Lossberg Study changed this perspective.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg conducted his study concurrently with Major General Marcks’ planning efforts. Unlike Marcks, who operated under the aegis of Colonel General Halder, the chief of staff for the OKH, Lossberg worked under Colonel General Jodl, the chief of staff for the OKW. The OKW and OKH were engaged in a serious rivalry for influence within the Nazi state at this point, and OKH was losing ground. One area where their influence would hold strong was the operations in the east. Nevertheless, OKW still commissioned their own study of potential operations. While Lossberg's plan bore similarities to Marcks', it featured three notable differences. First, Lossberg divided the field army into three army groups rather than two, a change that would prove to be significant and enduring in the context of the invasion strategy. Unfortunately, an exact order of battle for his plan is elusive, and it remains unclear whether Lossberg even formalized one. Halder was still fundamentally in charge of crafting operational plans and leveraged the full extent of his historical responsibilities to authorize Marcks’ study, lending it considerable weight. In contrast, Jodl, despite being nominally superior within the OKW, lacked the gravitas associated with Halder’s position. His role was much less clearly defined, and while this sometimes allowed him to seize power in areas beyond the Army’s purview, it could also act as a hindrance. In this instance, it proved to be more of a disadvantage for him.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg faced significant limitations in developing a comprehensive operational plan due to the lack of resources and staff at his disposal, a direct result of his boss, Colonel General Jodl, not having those resources. Consequently, Lossberg’s plan was more truncated in detail compared to Marcks’ extensive study, despite having access to the completed version of that plan. His primary mission was not to devise the operational blueprint for the Heer, but rather to keep Jodl informed of potential strategies and scenarios that could emerge. Jodl needed ammunition in his power struggle with Halder, and Lossberg's insights were to provide that. The ultimate aim of this struggle was to influence the outcome of the planning process, and in that respect, Lossberg's contributions did have a notable impact. The three-army group disposition in his plan is a clear reflection of his influence.

The second key difference in Lossberg’s approach was his evaluation of the logistics situation. He recognized that without capturing significant amounts of Soviet gauge rolling stock, the strain on the existing truck resources would be insurmountable. He proposed that as much supply as possible be funneled through captured ports in the Baltic and Black Sea, a strategy that would eventually be integrated into the final invasion plan. The third major distinction between Lossberg’s study and that of Marcks was his identification of potential support among the local populace in the Soviet Union. He noted that the Baltic states were still in the process of being incorporated into the Union, and that Stalin faced considerable opposition, although mostly unarmed. Ukraine was also recognized as a possible source of support against the Soviets. However, while these ideas presented intriguing possibilities, they overlooked the racial ideology that underpinned the Nazi state. The regime was engaged in an aggressive war of conquest, not one of liberation. The encouragement of local independence was fundamentally at odds with the Nazis’ genocidal ambitions and their desire for cultural domination over all non-German peoples. We will delve deeper into these themes shortly, but first, let’s discuss the final iteration of the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The final plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was organized and supervised by Lieutenant General Paulus. Paulus would go on to become infamous for his command of the 6th Army in Stalingrad. At this point however, he was a well-respected staff officer who had worked for Guderian and Lutz. At this point, he had been made the Quartermaster General of the Army, the same position that Ludendorff had held when he was military dictator in all but name during the latter part of the First World War. The position did not carry the same power in Paulus’ time but was still one of real prestige and influence. Operating under a mandate from Halder, Paulus was tasked with refining the work done up to that point, and he approached this through comprehensive wargames. He initiated these exercises in December, benefiting from Hitler's clarified political directives and updated intelligence and force estimations provided by the OKH staff. Paulus’ studies centered around the concept of three army groups, mirroring the structure proposed in Lossberg’s plan. One of Paulus’ most significant contributions was his insightful assessment of the Red Army’s force regeneration capabilities, a factor that the previous planners had largely overlooked. While both Marcks and Lossberg had assumed that the destruction of the main enemy forces, coupled with the occupation of the most developed regions of the western Soviet Union, would render the Red Army incapable of rebuilding, Paulus was far less optimistic. He estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize 30 to 40 new divisions to reinforce the main defense within the first three months of the war. These divisions would come from newly conscripted soldiers and force transfers from other theaters of conflict. Furthermore, he projected that this number could rise to a total of 100 new divisions within just six months of the invasion’s commencement. This potential for rapid expansion was unprecedented and would have been difficult for the Nazi leadership to fully comprehend. In military history, there had never been an instance of such a quick mobilization of forces. The idea that the Soviet Union could muster 30 to 40 new divisions in such a short timeframe challenged many of the Nazi leaders' beliefs and assumptions, running counter to their entire ideological framework. Yet, as we will see, the reality was even more striking, the Red Army not only met these expectations but actually exceeded them. This resilience would prove to be a significant factor in the unfolding conflict.

In addition to this critical insight, Paulus’ wargaming also revealed another key lesson: neither of the flanking Army Groups, the North or South, was sufficiently strong to accomplish their respective objectives. This shortfall led to a significant bulge along the front, with Army Group Center advancing much farther than its northern and southern counterparts, leaving its flanks exposed. To address this vulnerability, the two weaker groups would need to request Panzer support. This support was essential, as Army Group Center would struggle to adequately cover its flanks, decisively crush its encircled enemies, and support its own front. The resulting weakening of the center ultimately led to a grinding halt of the advance on Moscow, providing the Soviets with the time and space they needed to organize a more effective resistance. Paulus concluded that the advance through the center had to be the primary effort, regardless of other objectives, and that Moscow should be the singular target for all three Army Groups. This conclusion may have seemed the only reasonable one, or perhaps Paulus recognized that Halder would be unwilling to accept any alternative strategy. At this time, Halder was deeply entrenched in his own struggle for influence over Hitler. He was desperate to persuade the Führer of the “Moscow above all else” framing of the campaign. It remains unclear whether Halder genuinely believed this was the best path to victory or if he was merely trying to demonstrate his strategic competency to Hitler.

The final topic we’ll cover this week is the profound impact of Nazi plans for genocide on the operational considerations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. These plans were fundamental to the entire Nazi conception of the war and its purpose. The regime believed that only through war could Germany achieve its goal of acquiring land, ominously termed “Living Space.” To secure this living space, it was essential to clear the region of those they deemed racially inferior, which meant nothing short of genocide and ethnic cleansing on a scale that dwarfed anything else in history. This was enshrined in the General Plan East, which had roots in Hitler’s earliest ideas about expansion. On an operational level, the Nazis committed significant resources to execute this horrifying plan. Einsatzgruppen formations were prioritized within the Heer’s logistics plans. The Einsatzgruppen or “Special Task Forces” were the death squads of the SS. They were tasked with roving the rear areas in the wake of the Wehrmacht. They especially targeted Jews as part of the final solution, but were not hesitant to murder anyone else. The  Einsatzgruppen would number around 3,000 men. They were allocated special privileges for transportation and supplies. Efforts were made throughout the campaign to accommodate the Einsatzgruppen in their murderous mission. These units would follow the front-line troops, systematically carrying out mass murders throughout the Soviet Union. They operated with the cooperation of many regular army personnel and, at times, received active assistance. No one was to escape this war unscathed, physically, morally, or otherwise. This brutal strategy not only shaped the course of the invasion but also left an indelible mark on the psyche of those involved, transforming the war into a harrowing chapter of human history.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In June 1941, Hitler planned to launch Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union, aiming to destroy its military before fully conquering Britain. Despite initial planning, the Wehrmacht faced critical logistical issues and ignored warnings about Soviet defenses. Strategic disagreements arose between Hitler and his generals regarding objectives, with General Halder advocating for capturing Moscow first. Would the whole rotten structure cave in when they kicked the door? Or was Hitler about to engage his greatest rival yet? 

 

Eastern Front Prelude #0.10 Planning Operation Barbarossa

Last time we spoke about the Blitzkrieg in Western Europe. In 1939, Europe teetered on the brink of war as tensions surged following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler, which divided Eastern Europe. With fierce ambition, Germany initiated its blitzkrieg strategy, invading Poland swiftly and decisively. In a mere thirty-five days, Polish defenses crumbled under overwhelming German might. Following Poland’s fall, Hitler’s forces turned to Denmark and Norway, capturing these territories with remarkable speed, establishing German dominance in Scandinavia. The focus then shifted westward, as Belgium and the Netherlands were quickly overrun, leading to the rapid collapse of French defenses. By June 14, 1940, the Germans stormed into Paris, signaling the end of France's defense. This sequence of events unfolded with shocking speed, causing global astonishment. The blitzkrieg campaign established Germany as a formidable force, setting the stage for a conflict that would engulf the world and dramatically alter its landscape.

This episode is Prelude #10 Planning Operation Barbarossa 

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are edging closer to the beginning of the Eastern Front. Following the disastrous Winter War with Finland, Stalin aimed to reorganize the Red Army. Fresh from the purges, he also opted for a reshuffling of leadership. While tensions ran high, very few, if any, leaders of the Red Army faced purges due to the outcomes of the Winter War. In February 1940, General of the Army Zhukov was summoned to Moscow to assume the role of Chief of the General Staff. Now Zhukov will be a towering figure in this series, so why not go through a short bio on him?

Zhukov was born into a struggling peasant family of Russian descent in Strelkovka, located in the Maloyaroslavsky District of the Kaluga Governorate in western Russia, about 62 miles east of Moscow. His father, Konstantin, who was orphaned at the age of two and later adopted by Anuska Zhukova, worked as a cobbler. His mother, Ustin'ya, was a peasant laborer. Zhukov was believed to have taken after his mother, claiming he inherited her physical strength; Ustin'ya was reportedly capable of handling tough tasks, such as transporting 200-pound sacks of grain over long distances. At a time when most individuals from the lower and working classes in Russia received only two years of education, Zhukov completed a three-year primary schooling at his local school. He later became an apprentice to his uncle Mikhail in Moscow, learning the furrier trade. While working with his uncle, Zhukov enhanced his education by reading various subjects, including the Russian and German languages, science, geography, and mathematics, alongside his cousin Alexander. He also enrolled in night school, completing courses as time allowed while working in his uncle's shop. By 1914, he finished his apprenticeship and started his own fur business, employing three young workers. 

In 1915, Zhukov was drafted into the Imperial Russian Army, serving in the 10th Dragoon Novgorod Regiment, where he was wounded during combat against the Germans at Kharkov. Throughout World War I, he was awarded the Cross of St. George twice for his bravery and was promoted to non-commissioned officer ranks due to his valor in battle. After the October Revolution of 1917, he joined the Bolsheviks, where his background of poverty served as an advantage in party circles. Following a severe bout of typhus, he participated in the Russian Civil War, serving in the Second Cavalry Brigade under Commander Semyon Timoshenko, which was later incorporated into the 1st Cavalry Army led by Semyon Budyonny. In 1920, he completed a cavalry officer training course and received his commission as an officer. In recognition of his role in suppressing the Tambov Rebellion in 1921, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Zhukov rapidly progressed through the ranks, becoming the commander of a cavalry troop and squadron, then the deputy commander of a cavalry regiment. By late May 1923, he was appointed as the commander of the 39th Cavalry Regiment. The following year, he entered the Higher School of Cavalry and graduated in 1924, after which he returned to command the same regiment. According to Friedrich von Mellenthin, "It is not generally realized that Zhukov received much of his early training in Germany. Together with other Russian officers, and by arrangement with the Reichswehr, he attended courses at German military schools in the 1920s. He spent some time attached to a cavalry regiment under Colonel Dingler, who vividly recalled Zhukov's boisterous behavior and the large amounts of liquor he and his comrades consumed after dinner. Nevertheless, it is evident that Zhukov made good use of his time in military training." Zhukov attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1929 until his graduation in 1930. In May 1930, he became commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division. By February 1931, he was appointed as the Assistant Inspector of Cavalry for the Red Army.

In May 1933, Zhukov became the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division. During the Great Purge, when thousands of officers were arrested and executed; Zhukov and those associated with the First Cavalry Army were spared, as they were involved in conflicts with the Japanese near Manchuria. By 1937, he commanded the 3rd Cavalry Corps and later the 6th Cavalry Corps. In 1938, he was appointed as the deputy cavalry commander of the Belorussian Military District. Later in 1938, Zhukov was assigned to lead the First Soviet Mongolian People's Army, engaging in combat against Japan’s Kwantung Army along the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Japanese-held state of Manchukuo. The Soviet-Japanese border clashes lasted from 1938 to 1939. What started as a border skirmish quickly escalated into a full-scale war, with the Japanese advancing with around 80,000 troops, 180 tanks, and 450 aircraft. This escalation led to the crucial battle of Khalkhin Gol. Zhukov called for significant reinforcements, and on August 20, 1939, his Soviet offensive commenced. 

Following a substantial artillery barrage, nearly 500 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks advanced, backed by over 500 fighters and bombers, marking the Soviet Air Force's first fighter-bomber operation. Initially, the offensive seemed like a standard frontal assault. However, Zhukov executed a pincer movement, a classic cavalry strategy holding back two tank brigades before ordering them to advance around both flanks, supported by motorized artillery, infantry, and other tanks. This bold maneuver successfully encircled the Japanese 6th Army and captured their vulnerable supply lines. By August 31, the Japanese forces were expelled from the contested border, resulting in a clear Soviet victory. This campaign held importance beyond its immediate tactical and local consequences. Zhukov tested and refined techniques that would later be employed against the Germans on the Eastern Front during WW2. His innovative tactics included using underwater bridges and enhancing the cohesion and effectiveness of inexperienced units by integrating a handful of seasoned veterans to improve morale and overall training.

The assessment of the issues faced by the BT tanks led to replacements of their flammable gasoline engines with diesel engines. This battle provided critical insights that contributed to the successful development of the T-34 medium tank utilized in WW2. Following this campaign, veterans were systematically reassigned to newer units to disseminate their combat experience. For his success, Zhukov was honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union. However, the campaign, and particularly Zhukov's groundbreaking tank strategies, remained relatively unknown outside the Soviet Union. Zhukov viewed Khalkhin Gol as crucial preparation for future operations in WW2. By May 1940, he attained the rank of army general, becoming one of only eight senior Red Army officers.

Upon taking command, a comprehensive reorganization of the country's defense forces was initiated. There is some debate regarding how much of this restructuring was Zhukov's idea, but he demonstrated the same level of competence in this new position as he had in the field. The army in the western region of the country was divided into five specialized military districts, which were designed to create defensive fronts to withstand any invasion while the primary forces were mobilized. These districts were based in Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, Kyiv, and Odesa, respectively becoming known as the Northern, North-Western, Western, South-Western, and Southern Fronts. Essentially, these were provisional staff organizations that would be supplemented with mobilized units as determined by the Stavka.

At the time, it was widely recognized that the upper echelons of the Army's command structure had been profoundly impacted by the purges. However, what remained unclear was the fate of the mid-level officers responsible for leading the divisions and regiments of the Red Army in 1941. These individuals were generally younger than their counterparts in the Wehrmacht, and in many instances, division commanders lacked any formal military training. To complicate matters, many of these officers had very little time to prepare their troops. Developing skilled tactical leaders requires time, and experience must be acquired through the operation of units. Effective maneuvers need to be planned and executed on training grounds to educate officers on the principles of division-level combat. Regrettably for the Red Army, this crucial experience would have to be gained in the theater of war. Post-war literature excoriates Red Army leaders for “Human Wave” tactics. This is only partially a legitimate criticism. Such wasteful tactics certainly happened, but they were primarily due to poor state of command and control. Division, Corps and even some Army commanders had no experience in maneuvering large units in battle. Even when they did, the desperate strategic situation was often such that there was no choice but to conduct large scale frontal assaults on prepared German positions. As the war progressed, officers of all ranks gained experience in tactical movement. Additionally, the strategic situation improved slowly. This allowed for assaults to be well supported with Artillery, Armor and Air. By 1945 “Human Waves” were a relic of the past. Combat was still bloody, but it was not desperate assaults of 1941. 

The country's defense against a threat from the west was structured into strategic layers. There were two layers of the regular army and a forward defense element at the border. This border defense comprised NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in "fortified regions." These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and manning the fortifications along the USSR's border. By June 1941, there were fifty-seven fortified regions, with forty-two located in the west, totaling one hundred ninety thousand personnel. The NKVD Border Guards had around one hundred sixty-five thousand members across their various units and detachments. The goal was for these forces to resist any invasion while the rest of the Army mobilized and positioned for counterattacks. If that failed, they would create a substantial obstacle to slow the enemy down. However, their location near the border required them to be ready before any invasion attempt to effectively delay or repel the enemy. Unfortunately, this objective was not achievable on the day of the attack, as Stalin's late order to prepare the troops did not allow sufficient time for them to take their positions. Lastly, the NKVD Railroad Security forces, consisting of approximately sixty-two thousand men, were deployed around the country’s railroad depots, bridges, and other key logistics areas.

The country's defense against a western threat was structured into strategic levels. It consisted of two strategic echelons of the regular army and a forward border defense unit. This border defense was formed by the NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in the "fortified regions." The NKVD Border Guard detachments were independent units who were armed and equipped as light infantry but fell under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or NKVD. This was in opposition to the Red Army’s Fortified Regions, which were division sized elements intended to be able to build and man bunkers along the border. Both types of units were emplaced along the border to a depth of approximately 20km. 

These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and staffing the fortifications along the USSR's border. On June 22, 1941, the Fortified Regions only had 47% of their men and 27% of their officers. Around 50% of the authorized fortifications had been built. This, when combined with the late authorization to go over to full alert from Moscow, spelled disaster for the defense of the border. 

The subsequent line of defense is often called the first strategic echelon, comprising the initial standalone units of the Red Army. This force consisted of fifteen field armies divided into the five Fronts mentioned earlier, totaling one hundred sixty-six divisions. On the Northern Front, the 7th, 14th, and 23rd Armies comprised twenty-two divisions, supported by reserves including three independent rifle divisions and a motorized corps. They were positioned along the Soviet-Finnish border, extending from Leningrad to the Barents Sea. The Northwestern Front, covering the areas of the former Baltic Republics, had three field armies available. The 27th Army was in reserve around the Ostrov area alongside the 5th Airborne Corps, while the 8th and 11th Armies were stationed along the front that faced German East Prussia down to Vilnius. Together, these forces totaled twenty-nine divisions. The Western Front consisted of four armies, three of which were positioned along the border with German-occupied Poland. The 3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies were deployed near the border, with the 13th Army held in reserve further behind the lines near Minsk. Overall, this front, including reserves, had forty-three divisions.The Southwestern Front was the largest of the Red Army’s formations. The 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies were deployed along the front, supported by substantial reserves situated behind them. With four rifle divisions, two motorized divisions, and an airborne corps, the Southwestern Front possessed considerable strength that could create secondary lines to safeguard the retreat of its forward forces, a luxury that none of its counterparts would enjoy during the initial days of the invasion.

The Southern front was the smallest, comprising just one field army. Its fourteen divisions were stationed along the Romanian border near the port of Odesa. In contrast, the 9th Army was considerably larger than its northern counterparts, partly because of the extensive area it needed to cover. This region was also not perceived as a probable zone of operations. While the source material is vague on this point, it’s possible that Stalin did not anticipate the Romanians would actively engage against the Soviet Union. It was clear that Germany had become the dominant political force in internal Romanian politics by this point. Stalin was under no illusions of this. It had been one of the flaring points in the rising tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. Bessarbia had been occupied in June 1940. The German campaigns in the Balkans and Greece were seen as counterweights to Soviet influence in the region. 

Behind these field armies, the Stavka Reserve was positioned in the second strategic echelon, consisting of fifty-seven divisions spread across six field armies. Three of these armies, the 19th, 21st, and 22nd, were stationed west of Moscow, each positioned behind one of the main fronts. The 20th Army was located near the capital, while the 16th and 24th Armies were stationed in Siberia, based in Chita. They were set to advance westward eventually, but for now, they served to maintain the Red Army’s presence along the lengthy stretch of the Soviet Union, linking the Far Eastern Front to the capital. In this deployment framework, plans were crafted for the country's defense. The armies in the first strategic echelon were expected to bear the primary impact of the enemy invasion. Aiming to strengthen the border guards and occupy the defensive positions along the border, they would require time to mobilize. Within this echelon, the initial operational reserve was designated to be the main component of the Red Army's counterattack capability. In this context, an Operational Reserve can be distinguished from a Strategic Reserve. The first type are units that may be fed into battle, usually piecemeal to short up weakened defenses or a to help carry forward a struggling attack. Units in a Strategic Reserve are typically used as a bloc in order to build a counter-offensive capability on a wide scale. Any breaches in the border defense would be managed by these forces, while the Red Army's strategy focused on creating substantial counterattacks to strike back at the invaders utilizing the Stavka Reserve.

After France's defeat, it became clear that a war with Germany and its allies was likely unavoidable. Following some discussions, the consensus emerged that the most probable approach would involve fighting on two fronts: Germany and its European partners would launch attacks in the West, while Japan would aggressively target the armies in the Far East. Although plans were frequently adjusted, the overarching strategy was to ensure that the border forces could effectively hold off the invaders while the majority of the Red Army was mobilized and positioned for a major counter-offensive in the West. This operation was primarily envisioned to come from the Southwestern front, advancing northwest towards Lublin, continuing to Lodz, and ultimately reaching Danzig. Such a daring maneuver aimed to isolate the enemy along the border. Throughout the latter half of 1940, discussions persisted regarding the focal point of the German offensive. In October, Stalin asserted his belief that the Germans would primarily target Ukraine and its rich natural resources. Ironically, during this same period Hitler was struggling with his General Staff about where the main effort should be focused. No explicit agreement was reached beyond the destruction of the Red Army being the first priority. This indecision would come to haunt the Wehrmacht’s war effort throughout 1941. Hitler eventually decided that Ukraine would be the first priority, but only after months of indecisive combat had drained the resources of the Wehrmacht. 

Despite the challenges, the Soviet Union began implementing several defensive measures. A significant portion of their efforts focused on expanding industrial capabilities to produce equipment and ammunition. They placed substantial orders for large quantities of the latest tank models, the T-34 and the KV-1. While it would take time for these tanks to reach frontline units in sufficient quantities, it was crucial to establish production capacity as soon as possible. This urgency stemmed partly from the Soviet Union's ongoing shortage of machinery necessary for mass weapon and ammunition production. While Stalin sought to gain favor with Hitler by increasing exports to Germany, Hitler was reducing deliveries to the Soviet Union. To address this gap, Stalin placed extensive orders for machinery at German factories, highlighting the long way the Soviet Union had to go to establish a robust industrial base for a protracted conflict. By the summer of 1941, it was well understood among the top leadership that the production capacity was inadequate. There was a significant shortfall of anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, and even modern field artillery, and ammunition for these weapons was also being produced in insufficient quantities.

In addition to the fundamental reorganization of the frontier into designated areas of responsibility, there was the requirement for a thorough overhaul of the Red Army's order of battle. The independent tank units had been suspended sometime after the invasion of Poland, and following the observation of the German campaigns in the West, the Stavka recognized the error of this decision. They began to reinstate these units, founding tank divisions and mechanized corps that were included in the Red Army’s organizational structure. However, these formations were fundamentally different from the German concept of Panzer groups, which were designed for strategic objectives like breakthroughs and subsequent encirclements. The classic example of this was the 1940 campaign in France and the low countries. Infantry units held down the bulk of the enemy army, and the panzers selected a strategic weak point, orchestrated a breakthrough and then conducted a sweeping envelopment, cutting off the enemy’s lines of retreat. 

In contrast, Soviet tank units were allocated to individual field armies for localized breakthrough operations and counterattacks. While the Red Army's doctrine would later evolve, it remained relatively rudimentary in 1941. These reformed units were essentially being built from the ground up, a process that required considerable time, resources, and personnel. Many of the tank divisions were significantly understrength on June 22, 1941. Although exact figures for each unit are difficult to ascertain, three divisions serve as a broadly representative example of the Red Army as a whole. The tank divisions were critically lacking in the modern equipment they were supposed to possess. For instance, the 1st Tank Division had less than ten percent of its authorized 62 KV-1 heavy tanks, while the medium tank battalions fared no better, with only 38 percent of their authorized strength of 206 T-34 tanks. The failure to adequately equip these divisions with modern tanks was further exacerbated by the presence of obsolete tanks, creating a misleading impression of strength that would later trouble commanders in the early months of the campaign. Overall, there were 40 tank divisions in the Western Theatre. To achieve full authorized strength, 8240 T-34s and 2480 KV-1s were needed. However, by June, 967 T-34s and 508 KV-1s had been delivered. Across the theatre, the Red Army managed to acquire just 11 percent of the required medium tanks and twenty percent of the necessary heavy tanks.

The tank arm was not the only aspect of the Red Army that faced significant issues in the final days of peace. In the early 1940s, the standard structure of rifle divisions was modified to a more streamlined format. This change was partly because tanks were removed from their role of infantry support, where they had previously been included in the infantry division. This is similar to the French model, where infantry divisions had organic medium and heavy tank elements that would support the infantry division’s breakthrough. This was another theory of armor employment that was borne out of the experience of the first world war. It proved to be the inferior model in many respects to the German theory of massed armored formations conducting breakthroughs on their own accord. The Red Army’s leadership was merely following the trends of theory development as they saw it. They were not alone. The US Army was also continuing development of their concept of armor employment in response to German successes in Western Europe. 

However, this reduction in division size on paper did not reflect the actual strength of the units in the field. Some rifle divisions deployed in the western theater were so undermanned that it bordered on absurdity. The peacetime personnel levels of the Red Army were set by Stavka, following decisions made by the NKO regarding readiness measures. NKO is the acronym for the Soviet Union’s equivalent to the Modern US Department of Defense. Stavka was the military high command, but they ultimately reported to the NKO head, called the People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union. In June 1941 this position was held by Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko. After the invasion began, he was also named the Chairman of Stavka, but eventually gave both of these positions to Stalin. These strengths were periodically reviewed, fluctuating up or down, but they never reached the full mobilization strength of approximately 14,500 soldiers. By June 1941, the authorized strength had risen to as high as 85%. While this represented progress, not all divisions achieved this level. Some divisions were recorded as having less than 42% of their authorized personnel. This figure was further diminished by absences due to leave, illness, or desertion.

The Red Air Force faced significant challenges in its efforts to rebuild and redeploy in the west based on the new strategic framework. Drawing lessons from the Winter War and the Spanish Civil War, the Red Air Force revised its mission objectives. Prior to these conflicts, the emphasis had been on long-range bombing aimed at destroying enemy airfields and industrial facilities. However, the updated strategies prioritized tactical air superiority and close air support over such missions. This shift was a logical decision, one that resonated with air forces globally. Nonetheless, difficulties emerged with the strategies implemented to achieve these new objectives. The air force was organized into regiments, with aircraft assigned to Front and Army commanders, allowing them to deploy the planes as they preferred. In practice, this led to the widespread dispersion of the Red Air Force to satisfy local commanders' needs. Consequently, smaller frontier airfields became overcrowded with aircraft due to command-and-control complications. This overcrowding resulted in many planes being stationed too close to the border, lacking the space and time necessary to respond effectively to German air formations. As a result, thousands of aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the early days of the invasion, caught off guard by surprise attacks. The pride of the Soviet military was on the brink of being systematically eliminated. In addition to these placement issues, the Red Air Force also struggled with modernization, as insufficient industrial capacity had been allocated for the production and delivery of the advanced aircraft required.

The mobilization plans were not fully realized when the Germans launched their invasion, and actual implementation was even less developed. The fundamental flaw in the Red Army’s mobilization strategy was its reliance on the assumption that they would receive advance warning before any attack. In retrospect, this assumption seems absurd and outdated. The slow-moving armies of World War I had adhered to lengthy mobilization timelines that often took weeks or even months. However, given the context of that time, it was not unreasonable to believe that the Red Army would have sufficient time for mobilization. The unmistakable signs of the German army's mobilization and deployment in 1939 were evident to all. The Poles were unprepared, largely due to internal indecision and external pressures from the UK and France that a mobilization of the Polish Army would give the Germans reason to invade. This proved to be a senseless hesitancy on their part that cost the Poles their country. Appeasing Hitler, even in the short term did not stay his hand. Stalin would have to learn this lesson for himself, even after watching it happen many times before. 

By 1940, the only uncertainty was about the main thrust of the Wehrmacht, not whether they had prepared and mobilized. Much of this uncertainty stemmed from the density of their deployments, allowing forces in one location to strike in various directions. The Red Army was justified in expecting a warning to facilitate mobilization; in fact, they received ample warnings. What was missing was the authorization to mobilize, which came from Stalin himself. It was unpredictable that Stalin would hesitate and issue orders against mobilizing when every indicator suggested otherwise. Front-line intelligence signaled to Stavka, and covert sources within the Soviet Union indicated an impending attack. Both the US and UK provided warnings concerning Germany's intentions. In early 1941, the US Government informed the Soviet Ambassador that Germany was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring. The British also communicated that they were aware of Germany's invasion plans. Stalin chose to ignore these alerts. Even in April, despite firm warnings from the British government that Hitler was preparing to invade, Stalin remained dismissive. The British Government was not fazed by Stalin’s refusal to see the truth and continued to regularly warn his government of the attack. As late as June 18th, they had told the Soviet Ambassador that the German attack was “inevitable” and would come not later than the middle of June. Only three more days would pass before they were proved right. 

Stalin routinely characterized these alerts as “English provocations” and “clumsy fabrications.” This decision-making failure, rather than a lack of warnings, spelled doom for the Red Army. While discussions of tactical and strategic surprise are common in analyses of the invasion's early days, they are often overstated. Many individual units were not in position because they were not permitted to deploy. They were not fully staffed because, in many instances, mobilization had not been authorized. Soldiers cannot simply appear when requested by Colonels or Generals; they must be summoned from their civilian lives, organized, and assigned to their units. These responsibilities fall to the highest levels of any bureaucracy. In the Soviet Union, as in many other countries, such decisions were made by top authorities. Stalin chose to restrain the army, and they ultimately paid the consequences of that choice.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Stalin watched in horror as the Germans conquered most of western Europe in a lighting fast sweep. All Stalin could do was speed up the training and military production of the USSR, hoping he could bide enough time to meet the enormous threat to his west. Despite numerous warnings, he was not prepared for the storm that was coming.

Eastern Front Prelude # 0.9 The Blitzkrieg of Western Europe

Last time we spoke about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In a turbulent prelude to World War II, tensions soared as Hitler's rise transformed Europe’s landscape. The Soviet Union, wary of Germany's ambitions, sought alliances with Britain and France, aiming to deter further aggression. However, when these alliances faltered, Stalin turned to Nazi Germany, leading to the historic Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. This shocking agreement allowed both powers to divide Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, into spheres of influence, ensuring mutual non-aggression. As Europe braced for conflict, this pact altered geopolitical dynamics, alarming nations like Japan, who feared a united Axis front. The pact bought Stalin time to fortify his western borders, while Hitler prepared for rapid expansion. Thus, the seeds of a devastating conflict were sown, illustrating how failed diplomacy and ideological clashes shaped the world’s fate, setting the stage for global warfare that would ensue. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remains a chilling reminder of alliances forged amid chaos.

This episode is Prelude #9 The Blitzkrieg of Western Europe

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are diving into the outbreak of WW2. Buckle up. During the summer of 1939, Germany was gearing up to invade Poland. This operation, known as Case White, aimed for the main force of the Wehrmacht to penetrate Polish defenses in a pincer movement culminating in Warsaw. For the invasion, the German Army, referred to as the Heer, was organized into two major Army Groups, with a smaller group stationed in the west to deter any French or British advances. In the West, Colonel General Ritter von Leeb commanded Army Group C, tasked with defending the Westwall, which extended from Duisburg in the north to Mainz in the center and the Swiss border in the south. Although he was technically in charge of three field armies, the 1st, 5th, and 7th, their strengths were largely superficial, meant to project the appearance of a much larger force to intimidate the French and British. No tanks were available in the west, and Leeb's troops relied solely on Luftwaffe reconnaissance and anti-aircraft units for support.

In the Polish theater of operations, the Army was organized into two groups for the invasion. The primary focus was assigned to Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt, who led Army Group South. His mission was to move his forces from Silesia in a northerly direction toward Warsaw via Lodz. Rundstedt commanded three field armies: the 8th, 10th, and 14th, along with most of the Panzer divisions. At this point, there were only six Panzer divisions in the entire army. Additionally, there were four Leichte, or “Light,” divisions, each consisting of one Panzer battalion combined with an infantry brigade and an artillery regiment. These combined divisions had just 39 tanks. There are different opinions regarding the role of the Leichte divisions. Some paint them as a stop gap solution to motorize the army pending production of more tanks. Others say they were an experimental attempt to modernize the cavalry as reconnaissance divisions. The truth, as always, is probably a mixture of both. While they were more mobile than traditional infantry divisions, they were approximately half the size of a motorized infantry division, which did not have tanks. Rundstedt was in charge of all four Light Divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th. He also oversaw four of the six Panzer divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th.

The other military formation in the Polish theater was Army Group North, led by Colonel General von Bock. He commanded two field armies: the 3rd Army, stationed in East Prussia, ready to advance southward to converge with Army Group South in Warsaw, and the 4th Army in Pomerania, aiming to secure the Polish Corridor. Bock was also assigned a motorized corps under the General of Panzer Troops Guderian, which included one panzer division. Additionally, he received Panzer-Division Kempf, a combined task force of Panzer and SS regiments that fell short of the typical division strength. Panzer Division Kempf is notable for more than its odd combination of SS and panzer troops. It was made up of one light panzer regiment, the Waffen-SS Regiment SS Deutschland, and an unnumbered SS Artillery regiment. The OKH held in reserve a total of one panzer division, thirteen infantry divisions, and two mountain infantry divisions. Eleven of the thirteen infantry divisions were kept in strategic reserve to address any significant operations in the west that might threaten Army Group C, while the remaining troops were designated as reserves for the campaign in Poland. Overall, the Germans were deploying a formidable force of one million five hundred thousand soldiers, supported by two thousand seven hundred fifty tanks and nine thousand artillery pieces of various sizes.

To confront the cluster of German troops in the west, the Poles assembled seven field armies along with an independent corps. One of the field armies was kept in reserve, with divisions stationed near Warsaw and Sandomierz. The Polish field armies were not numbered, but instead were given regional names. The six armies on the front were: 

1. The Carpathian Army, commanding: MG Fabryey. 2. The Krakow Army, commanding BG Szylling. 3. The Lodz Army, commanding: MG Rommel . 4. The Poznan Army, commanding MG Kutrzeba . 5. The Modlin Army. commanding: Bg Przedrzymirski-Krukowicz. 6. The Pomorze Army. commanding: LTG Bortnowski. The reserve army was the Prussia Army commanding: MG Dab-Biernacki. Independent Corps was known as the Narew Group. Commanding: BG Mlot-Fijalkowski. This constituted the majority of the Polish forces; however, many units were still in the process of mobilization when the Germans launched their attack.

The invasion of Poland would be preceded by a false flag operation, quite reminiscent of the Mukden Incident or Marco Polo Bridge Incident, used to guise the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China proper.

Operation Himmler, also known as Operation Konserve, was a covert false flag operation conducted by Nazi Germany in 1939, primarily aimed at creating a pretext for the German invasion of Poland. The operation was orchestrated under the supervision of Heinrich Himmler, with key figures including Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Müller involved in its planning. In the months leading up to the invasion, a propaganda campaign was launched by German authorities, especially by Adolf Hitler, accusing Polish officials of ethnic cleansing against Germans living in Poland. This narrative served to justify the impending military actions and to sway international opinion against Poland. Most of the deceptive incidents attributed to Polish aggression occurred on August 31, 1939. Initially scheduled to begin on August 26, the operation's actual launch was delayed due to shifting diplomatic circumstances. German operatives, including members of the SS, executed staged attacks wearing Polish uniforms. This saw them attack German border posts and broadcast messages in Polish from seized radio stations. They left behind the bodies of concentration camp prisoners dressed in Polish uniforms as evidence of Polish brutality. The most infamous of these incidents was the Gleiwitz incident, where operatives seized a radio station to deliver anti-German propaganda, further fueling the justification for war. On September 1, 1939, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, claiming that several border incidents twenty-one on the night before were acts of Polish aggression. He framed the invasion of Poland as a defensive measure to protect Germany from perceived threats, despite the fact that these "threats" were fabricated during the operation.

On September 1, 1939, at around 4:45 AM, Hitler’s military campaign was set in motion. Throughout the previous year, the UK and France had assured support for the Polish government, but now they hesitated. It wasn’t until September 3 that they were able to declare war. In the meantime, the Wehrmacht was rapidly advancing. Every hour was critical as Polish cities faced bombardment and German tanks began to encircle the strongest units of the Polish army. By September 8, the 4th Panzer Division was engaged on the outskirts of Warsaw, while the French had not yet completed their mobilization. By September 15, Warsaw was surrounded, and the fight for Poland was nearly concluded. In the days prior, Hitler had questioned the Soviets about their intentions regarding Poland. Stalin delayed until he recognized that Poland would soon fall. On September 17, he ordered the Red Army to cross the border. Two Army Fronts were formed for the invasion: the Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts. These were temporary formations, assigned a mix of units ranging from independent brigades to entire field armies. The main force consisted of three "mobile groups," which were essentially army-sized units of tanks, cavalry, and motorized infantry. Stalin aimed for Soviet troops to extend deep into Polish territory, hoping to reduce reliance on German withdrawals to meet the demarcation lines outlined in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, thereby avoiding any potential conflict. The Poles, already on the brink of defeat, fell back quickly in response to this new onslaught. On September 27, a German delegation met with Molotov to discuss altering the initial plans for dividing Eastern Europe. After several days of discussions, a modification was agreed upon. Originally, Lithuania had been designated to the German sphere of influence, but it was now transferred to the Soviet Union. In return, Germany received Lublin and all of Warsaw.

The campaign concluded on October 6th, with the final Polish resistance surrendering under General Kleeburg at Kock, situated between the Bug and Wieprz rivers. This came just thirty-five days after the German invasion began. Poland was devastated. While few believed the Polish Army could defeat the Germans, the rapidity of their victory was unexpected. French Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin had informed his government that he anticipated the resistance to continue at least until spring. Although the campaign ended swiftly, it was challenging and resulted in significant losses for the German Army. The Heer experienced approximately fifty thousand casualties, including dead and wounded. While these losses were relatively light for a campaign of such scale, each one was felt deeply in an army reliant on a small, experienced cadre of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. The Germans also lost around two hundred tanks, which was less detrimental to the army's overall strength compared to personnel losses, as many of the destroyed tanks were older models like the Panzer I and II. This situation revealed flaws in the organization and tactics of the Panzer divisions. It would take time to replace the lost resources and fully integrate the lessons learned from this campaign.

Even before the conflict escalated in Poland, Stalin began his actions in the Baltic states. His goal was to assert Soviet control over the territories assigned to him by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact just weeks prior. Facing the threat of invasion, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed agreements allowing Soviet troops to station themselves within their borders. This was merely a precursor, and by the summer of 1940, Stalin commanded the occupation of all three countries. By August, they had been integrated as republics of the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Finns managed to withstand Soviet advances, leading to the Winter War in late 1939. Although the Soviet Union annexed some Finnish land, it came at a significant cost. 

With Poland now conquered, the focus shifted to the West. Gamelin attempted to take advantage of the weeks that followed to further mobilize the Army and initiated a limited offensive in the Saar during the war's early days. This operation was quite restricted, involving troops from three field armies. Nonetheless, it was stopped after advancing only a few miles. The French forces remained in place until October 16th, when they retreated in response to a weak German counterattack. No additional fighting occurred in the West for the rest of 1939. This period marked Germany’s most vulnerable point since 1936, yet the French failed to capitalize on the opportunity. The reasons for this retreat, be it incompetence, lack of resolve, or inadequate intelligence, remain unclear. Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht commenced its transfer from the east and began preparing for actions in the west. As winter approached, Hitler turned his focus northward. Germany depended on Swedish iron ore for its industries, which during winter was transported through Norway before being loaded onto ships bound for Germany. Swedish iron ore was transported through the Baltic sea during the summer months, but in the winter, too much of the route was blocked by large ice floes. This shipping route was vulnerable to interference from the Royal Navy as the vessels sailed through the North Sea instead of the more secure Baltic Sea. Therefore, securing Denmark and Norway became essential. Plans for an operation were developed, aiming for a coordinated attack on both countries in early April of 1940. It was determined that the Scandinavian nations needed to be secured before any offensive against France and the Low Countries could proceed. 

Before the invasion, Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, which lasted less than a year. Initially, Germany aimed to persuade Denmark to allow access to its military bases. However, Adolf Hitler ultimately ordered the invasion, shifting to a more aggressive strategy to secure Norway's vital resources, particularly iron ore shipping routes from Narvik. The establishment of radar systems in Denmark was part of an effort to protect German territories from potential British air attacks later on. The German High Command devised a multi-faceted attack plan. Paratroopers were to secure strategic points such as airfields and bridges. Ships were tasked with landing troops at key coastal cities like Copenhagen and along the Jutland Peninsula. Ground forces were set to advance quickly across Danish territory.

On the morning of April 9, at 04:15, German troops began breaching the Danish border in multiple locations. The Danish military, which was unprepared and scattered, struggled to mount an effective defense. Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning feared heavy bombings similar to those witnessed in Poland and ordered an end to resistance within mere hours of the invasion, citing the untenable position of the Danish forces. The initial clashes included sporadic resistance from Danish troops, particularly at Lundtoftbjerg and Aabenraa. Danish units attempted to set up roadblocks and engage German forces but were quickly overwhelmed by superior numbers and equipment. For instance, at Lundtoftbjerg, a Danish anti-tank unit faced off against a German column, managing to disable some German vehicles before being forced back. Danish forces made determined efforts to defend specific towns like Haderslev and Tønder, inflicting some casualties on advancing German troops. However, prolonged resistance was impossible, and by around 08:34, Denmark formally capitulated after only six hours of fighting.

The rapid fall of Denmark led to a notably lenient occupation by German forces, as they allowed Danish authorities to retain some degree of autonomy in managing domestic affairs. The Royal Danish Army was largely disbanded, and a small unit called the Life Guards was retained. The swift occupation of Denmark was viewed with disdain by Allied forces, leading to perceptions of the Danes as passive in the face of aggression. The phrase Aldrig mere 9 April “Never again April 9” has since become a popular saying in Denmark, reflecting a collective wish to never again experience such a sudden and humiliating defeat. Yet Denmark was to only be part of a larger invasion.

Following the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, the UK shifted its plans to occupy northern Norway. However, after negotiations and military planning, conflicts of interest and the evolving geopolitical situation led to an escalation on Germany's part. In December 1939, Hitler ordered a preliminary assessment for a Norwegian invasion, solidifying Germany's intention to capture strategic ports and airfields. Under the codename "Operation Weserübung," the Germans planned to invade Denmark and Norway in rapid succession. General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was appointed commander for the operation, which included the deployment of infantry, mountain divisions, and paratroopers. The Luftwaffe was key to the operation, intending to secure air superiority with around 1,000 aircraft. On April 5, 1940, the British initiated the mining of Norwegian waters in a bid to provoke a German response. The Allies had planned their intervention in Norway as a two-fold mission. 1. To prevent Hitler from securing the Baltic and 2. To prepare to support Finland in its war against the Soviet Union. In France, public opinion was strongly in favor of intervention against the Soviets during this time.

The German invasion was launched on April 9, 1940, involved around 120,000 German troops and significant naval and air support, targeting key locations such as Oslo, Narvik, and Trondheim. At Oslo, German forces encountered resistance but secured the capital quickly after dealing with coastal defenses. The German cruiser Blücher was sunk by Norwegian forces at Oscarsborg Fortress, which delayed the invasion. The port of Narvik was one of the most critical of the Norwegian campaign. The port became crucial for German access to Swedish iron ore and witnessed fierce fighting. After several engagements, including the First and Second Battles of Narvik, the Allies initially retook the city before being forced into retreat due to the changing nature of the broader conflict in Europe.

The Allies had mobilized a force of about 38,000 troops, which included British, French, and Polish units. Despite some early successes, such as the landings at Narvik, the Allies struggled with coordination and support logistics due to the swift German advance. Following the German success in France, which we will get into later, the Allies were compelled to withdraw from Norway. The successful evacuation efforts from locations like Narvik were challenged by heavy German air superiority and the efficient use of U-boat patrols by the Germans.

The battle for Norway was a complex situation that unfolded over several weeks, but the outcome was rarely in question. The Germans deployed five divisions, backed by comprehensive naval and air support. The Norwegians were taken by surprise, poorly equipped, and faced internal turmoil due to a coup attempt. While this coup ultimately failed, it transformed Norway into little more than a puppet state for Berlin. In Moscow, Stalin felt a sense of relief; he had been concerned that the Allies might draw the Soviet Union into the broader conflict following the Winter War. With Germany's occupation of Norway, it became evident that any chance for the Allies to strike against the Soviets was lost. 

The fighting in Norway would continue until early June, but the region was secure enough for Hitler to proceed with plans for Western Europe. He clearly indicated to his Generals that Belgium and the Netherlands' neutrality would not be honored. Initial strategies for invading France aimed to replicate the Schlieffen Plan from 1914; however, this was abandoned in favor of a proposal from the relatively junior Lieutenant General Manstein. His plan involved a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest while creating a diversion in the Low Countries to lure the Allied forces out of France. The majority of the panzer divisions would then advance through the Ardennes to sever the Allied armies' connection to France, enabling the large encirclement that had been central to German military strategy since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

The Germans devised a meticulous strategy involving diversionary forces that would enter Belgium to lure British and French troops away from their established positions. A second contingent would traverse the Ardennes Forest, circumventing the Maginot Line, with the objective of disconnecting the northern Allied forces from those in the south. The French hoped to rely not only on the fortified concrete defenses of the Maginot Line but also on the natural barrier provided by the Ardennes Forest, which they believed was impassable. The German objective was clear: to conquer Holland and Luxembourg before taking Belgium and France, ultimately advancing towards the English Channel while dismantling any Allied resistance and capturing Paris. With this plan, a brief crossing of the English Channel would suffice for the German military to invade Britain. The success of the "Blitzkrieg" tactics, championed by General Guderian in Poland, expedited the invasion process and equipped German forces with invaluable experience.

In contrast to Norway, the Low Countries had been anticipating an invasion for several months. Both the Netherlands and Belgium were nearly fully mobilized and had established agreements for their collective defense. Together, they had roughly 900,000 troops, although a significant portion of their equipment was outdated and of questionable quality. Their combined air force numbered fewer than 900 planes, with even fewer being modern combat aircraft. A well-armed and trained British Expeditionary Force was located just south of the Belgian border with France. Along with the French armies positioned immediately south of the Belgian frontier from Sedan to the sea, there were about 750,000 potential reinforcements available to the Dutch and Belgian forces. Although there was a sizeable Allied air presence in reserve, it was insignificant compared to the strength of the Luftwaffe.

In May 1940, the German military's strength consisted of approximately 3.5 million troops, over 5,500 aircraft, and 10 panzer divisions. The Allies could deploy a similar number of tanks, but these were scattered among infantry units instead of being organized into concentrated armored divisions, and many tanks were without radios. The Dutch defense strategy relied significantly on flooding certain areas that an invading army might cross. The Belgian defenses were more formidable; their defensive line followed the Meuse River up to Liège, then extended along the Albert Canal, a waterway with steep banks that created a significant barrier. At the heart of the Belgian defense were a series of forts along the canal, with Eben Emael being the largest and seemingly impregnable fortress, overseeing the routes to the Dutch city of Maastricht and crucial bridges across the Albert Canal. However, as a joint Dutch-Belgian defensive line, this system had a critical flaw: it did not connect the Albert Canal and Belgian Meuse defenses with the Dutch lines, creating a gap that significantly contributed to the rapid isolation and defeat of the Netherlands.

The Allies anticipated that the German attack would align with the Schlieffen Plan used during WW1. Indeed, the German plancode named “Fall Gelb” or “Case Yellow” strategy proposed by Chief of the Army General Staff Franz Halder followed this model. Even before the plan fell into Belgian hands in January 1940, Hitler had dismissed it as too conservative and lacking ambition. He was thus open to Lieut. Gen. Erich von Manstein's bold alternative. The offensive was to be executed by three army groups: Army Group C, led by Gen. Wilhelm von Leeb, would feint against the Maginot Line, while Gen. Fedor von Bock's Army Group B would execute the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands. This would draw Allied forces into Belgium, consistent with their expectations of a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan. Meanwhile, Gen. Gerd von Rundstedt would command the third army group, Army Group A, consisting of 1.5 million men and over 1,500 tanks, executing an armored assault through the Ardennes, bypassing both the Maginot Line and the Allies' strongest divisions.

On May 10, when the Germans invaded the Netherlands, their ground attacks launched from multiple locations, all aimed at The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam. The most formidable of these assaults swept through Dutch Limburg towards Maastricht, quickly achieving success and cutting off a large part of the Netherlands from reinforcements coming from the south. The gap in the defense lay between the Belgian lines, which at Liège and just west of Maastricht turned west along the Albert Canal, and the Dutch water defense positions located about 40 to 50 miles to the north. The only feasible route to bring Allied or Belgian troops to the Rotterdam area, aside from via sea, was across the long bridge over the Meuse at Moerdijk. However, this bridge was captured on the first day of the attack by German paratroopers, who held it firmly until the main body of German ground forces could arrive.

In Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and The Hague, German airborne forces took control of crucial airfields and bridges, while Dutch commanders fretted over potential sabotage by fifth column agents. Within hours of the German attack's onset, British and French troops abandoned their positions in northern France and raced north through Belgium to confront the enemy. The French Ninth Army advanced from near Sedan, the endpoint of the Maginot Line. The French relied on the Ardennes, which they deemed impassable to armored forces, to protect their right flank. This incorrect assumption would become a key factor in Germany's triumph and France's defeat.

Resistance centers in the Netherlands faced intense aerial bombardment. By May 12, German tanks were nearing Rotterdam, and the next day, Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers escaped to England, where they formed a government in exile. On May 14, recognizing the dire situation, Dutch commander-in-chief Gen. Henri Gerard Winkelman surrendered the armies stationed north and east of the Schelde River, which included nearly the entire Netherlands. On the same day, as the commander of Dutch forces in Rotterdam was negotiating the city's surrender, numerous Heinkel He-111 bombers appeared overhead. The subsequent air raid devastated the city center and led to the immediate surrender of Rotterdam. While it took several additional days for the Germans to defeat the remaining Dutch forces in Zeeland, “Fortress Holland” was conquered in just a week. 

On the first day of the invasion, German forces near Maastricht crossed the Albert Canal into Belgium after successfully neutralizing the fortress of Eben Emael through a daring predawn airborne assault. Several hundred elite Fallschirmjäger paratroopers quietly landed in gliders on top of the fort and began to methodically destroy the turrets and casemates using shaped charges. Once daylight arrived, they were joined by an additional 300 infantrymen who parachuted in. By noon on May 11, the garrison of 1,000 had surrendered, clearing the route to Liège. The Germans kept the details of their operation so secret that Allied strategists suspected Eben Emael had fallen due to betrayal, and the true circumstances surrounding its capture would remain unknown until after the war.

On May 13, elements of Panzer Group Kleist, led by General Paul Ludwig von Kleist, crossed the Meuse River. By the next day, the Germans had effectively breached the Meuse-Albert Canal line and entered France just west of Sedan. Continuous assaults from Stuka dive-bombers severely impacted the morale of the French defenders in this area; French commanders had been so confident that an attack through the Ardennes was impossible that the troops stationed there were almost entirely devoid of antitank and antiaircraft weapons. In contrast, the Maginot Line remained unbroken; however, the German incursion occurred at a weak point along the Belgian frontier, where the defenses were undermanned with lower-quality troops. Nonetheless, the region that the Maginot Line aimed to protect had been invaded, necessitating the eventual evacuation of the line itself.

On May 15, Heinz Guderian’s 19th Panzer Corps breached the French defenses and advanced west into open territory. The speed of this advance was remarkable, and by the standards of previous warfare, it represented a looming disaster. The German armored thrust was narrow, with thinly held if any flanks, and its front was roughly 150 miles ahead of the main body of the German forces. To the north lay the entire Belgian army, most of the British Expeditionary Force “BEF”, and at least two French armies, totaling nearly one million troops, while the rest of the French forces were positioned behind and south of them. Guderian’s superiors attempted to slow his advance to consolidate their forces, but he recognized the critical need to maintain momentum. Describing his forward movement as “reconnaissance in force,” Guderian continued his push. On May 17, he crossed the Oise River, entering the Somme valley, and raced toward its mouth at Abbeville. By May 20, Guderian had reached the English Channel, effectively cutting off communication between the Allied forces to the north and south. He took a brief pause to allow German mechanized units to reinforce his flank along the Somme before shifting northward to threaten the Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk on May 22.

 

Other German units also achieved remarkable successes. General Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse near Dinant, Belgium, on May 13, quickly establishing a bridgehead on the west bank. On May 15, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s 76thPanzer Corps forced its way across the Meuse at Monthermé, breaking the French lines. Both Rommel and Reinhardt advanced west into open country. Alongside Guderian, they had created a 60-mile gap in the French defenses. Rommel’s division advanced so rapidly that it could maintain only sporadic communication with the Army High Command, leading to its nickname as a “ghost division,” as both Germans and French were uncertain of its precise location or next move. Meanwhile, Reinhardt’s corps approached the Channel ports south of the British rear at Arras.

On May 15, Gamelin informed French Premier Paul Reynaud that Paris could fall within two days. In response, Reynaud reinstated retired General Maxime Weygand, who was 73, to succeed Gamelin as commander in chief. However, Weygand did not arrive from Syria until May 19, leaving a significant gap in leadership just as German armored units advanced rapidly through Flanders. Upon taking command, Weygand immediately dismissed over a dozen generals and promoted fighting colonels, including Charles de Gaulle, to replace them. He aimed to target the German salient in the Somme Valley, but the French response was hindered by civilian refugees clogging the roads toward the front lines.

Bock’s Army Group B quickly dismantled the Dyle Line, a defensive structure from Antwerp to the French border. Antwerp and Brussels fell swiftly, and by May 19, BEF commander Gen. John Gort had begun considering evacuation by sea. On May 21, Gort launched an unexpected counterattack against Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division at Arras. Two BEF tank battalions, supported by two infantry battalions and elements from a French mechanized infantry division, struck south, briefly disrupting the 7th Panzer and parts of the Totenkopf Waffen-SS division. Despite lacking air support, sufficient artillery, or reliable intelligence on German troop movements, this British assault shocked the German army. However, due to severe disruptions in Allied communications, this localized success could not be leveraged, making Arras little more than a fleeting setback for the Germans.

While Army Group A threatened the precarious Allied position on the Channel coast from the south, Walther von Reichenau’s Sixth Army pushed the beleaguered Belgian defenders to their limits. On May 24, German forces were crossing the canal defense line near Dunkirk, the last port available for BEF evacuation, when an inexplicable order from Hitler halted their advance and commanded them to pull back to the canal. This order transformed the Allies’ retreat into a race to evacuate before the Germans encircled them. Evacuations began in earnest on May 27, becoming urgent the next day when Belgian King Leopold III surrendered his army amid a chaotic retreat and millions of civilian refugees trapped in the “Flanders pocket.”

 

Between May 26 and June 4, 1940, around 340,000 Allied troops were evacuated from Dunkirk to England. The Royal Air Force temporarily established air superiority over the Luftwaffe in the area, while the Royal Navy, with impressive coordination and the help of French naval vessels, remained close to shore to oversee the evacuation, rescuing thousands of men using overloaded destroyers and smaller craft. Additionally, approximately 700 civilian boats joined in the rescue operation. The remarkable success of the Dunkirk evacuation was partly due to the fighter cover provided by the Royal Air Force from the English coast and partly because of Hitler’s critical order on May 24 to halt the German advance. This order was based on several factors: primarily, Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, mistakenly assured Hitler that his air force could eliminate the trapped Allied troops; and Hitler appeared to believe Britain might be more inclined to accept peace terms if its pride wasn’t injured by witnessing its army surrender. After three days, Hitler rescinded his order, permitting the German armored forces to advance toward Dunkirk. However, they encountered stronger British resistance, who had fortified their defenses in the interim. Almost immediately, Hitler halted the advance again, redirecting his armored forces south to prepare for the complete conquest of France. By June 4, when the operation concluded, approximately 198,000 British and 140,000 French and Belgian troops had been saved.

By early June 1940, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands had fallen. The British forces had been pushed into the sea, and the Germans had captured over one million Allied soldiers within three weeks. The newly established French front along the Somme and the Aisne was called the Weygand Line. This line was longer than the original Franco-Belgian border, but the forces available to defend it were significantly reduced in both numbers and morale. The French had lost 30 divisions by this point, yet Weygand managed to assemble 49 divisions to cover the new front, leaving just 17 to defend the Maginot Line. The Germans had strengthened their 10 well-experienced armored divisions with fresh tank reinforcements, while their 130 infantry divisions remained largely intact. For the upcoming offensive, German forces were reorganized, with two new armies, the 2nd and 9th, positioned along the Aisne sector, between the Oise and the Meuse. Guderian was tasked with commanding a group of two armored corps that were prepared for action in that area. Meanwhile, Kleist retained two corps to attack from the bridgeheads over the Somme at Amiens and Péronne in a pincer movement aimed at converging on the lower Oise near Creil. The remaining armored corps was set to advance between Amiens and the coast.

At 4:00 AM on June 5, 1940, the German offensive commenced, targeting the western area between Laon and the Channel with a barrage of dive-bombers and a strong assault of mechanized and armored troops. It quickly became clear that the immediate German goal was not solely to capture Paris but to completely annihilate the remaining French armies on the battlefield. For the first two days, resistance along the Somme was fierce, but on June 7, the westernmost armored corps, led by Rommel, broke through toward Rouen. By June 8, German forces had crossed the Avre at Roye, and the capture of Noyon allowed them to advance over the Oise. The French were compelled to retreat generally from the coast to a position east of Soissons, along a front extending about 100 miles.

The defense then crumbled into disorder, and on June 9, the Germans encountered little serious opposition in crossing the Seine. However, Kleist’s pincer maneuver did not unfold as planned. The left pincer, advancing from Péronne, faced strong resistance north of Compiègne. The OKH decided to withdraw Kleist’s group and redirect it east to support a breakthrough in Champagne. This offensive did not begin until June 9 but progressed rapidly. Infantry secured crossings over the Aisne, while Guderian’s tanks surged through the breach toward Chalons-sur-Marne and then eastward. The advance quickly moved across the Langres Plateau to Besançon and the Swiss border, isolating all French forces within the Maginot Line.

On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, was completely unprepared to capitalize on Germany’s invasion of Poland. To benefit from the Pact of Steel, it seemed essential for Mussolini to take action before Germany independently pushed the Allies to seek peace. However, both the declaration and Italy’s involvement had little impact on the outcome of the Battle of France. Although Italy had around 30 divisions ready along its Alpine frontier, they postponed their attack on southeastern France until June 20, by which time the situation was nearly resolved. When they finally launched their offensive, it made minimal headway against the French defenses.

At the same time, German forces were advancing toward the French capital. Prime Minister Reynaud and his government had already retreated from Paris to Tours, as there appeared to be no strategic reason to defend the city. On June 12, Weygand informed Reynaud and other ministers that France's war was lost and that further fighting would be futile. This assessment was undeniably accurate, as entire French armies were collapsing under the German assault. On the same day, the 51st Highland Division, a British Expeditionary Force unit operating under French command, was facing defeat at Saint-Valéry-en-Caux. Unable to reach Dunkirk, Cherbourg, or any other evacuation ports and having run out of supplies and ammunition, Major General Victor Fortune and his 10,000 troops surrendered to the Germans. Fortune became the highest-ranking British prisoner of war captured by Germany. On June 14, the French army evacuated Paris, and the Germans entered the city later that day.

The official armistice between Germany and France was signed on June 21st, just six weeks after the campaign began. The world was taken aback, as France's army had been held in high regard globally. Even Hitler's generals hadn't anticipated such an outcome. The rapid victories in Poland, Scandinavia, and the West unfolded like a flash, leading the British and American press to popularize the term "Blitzkrieg." For the Wehrmacht, these campaigns represented the pinnacle of German military success. However, as they started to buy into their own propaganda, they began to lose their professionalism. Planning and the strict adherence to orders, which had defined German military tradition since Frederick the Great, were sidelined. This insubordination would later become a significant issue in subsequent campaigns.

The response in the Soviet Union was one of shock and denial. Stalin had centered his entire strategy in the previous year around a prolonged conflict in the West. With France now out of the war and the UK seemingly weakened, adjustments needed to be made. The Red Army was still grappling with its own shortcomings from the Winter War against Finland, which had prompted a reorganization following that setback. As a result, a sense of panic began to emerge. By late summer, the Red Army initiated significant troop redeployments to the Western Military Districts. On July 21st, Hitler instructed his generals to start formulating plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union. Tensions were escalating, and both sides were in a race against time to prepare.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In 1939, as Europe stood on the brink of war, Stalin allied with Hitler, signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to divide Eastern Europe. Germany swiftly invaded Poland, employing a brutal blitzkrieg strategy. Afterwards Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France fell as the world devolved into WW2. 

Eastern Front Prelude #0.8 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Last time we spoke about the Spanish Civil War. In the backdrop of 1930s Spain, a storm brews as political tensions peak following the abdication of King Alfonso 13th. The establishment of the Second Spanish Republic ignites hopes of reform among the progressive populace but alienates conservative factions. This polarization breeds violence, with the left, led by socialists and anarchists, clashing with monarchists and fascists. In July 1936, a military coup, spearheaded by General Francisco Franco, sparks the Spanish Civil War. As battles rage, international powers intervene, with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy backing Franco, while the Soviet Union supports the Republicans. Amidst brutal conflict, notable events unfold, like the devastating bombing of Guernica, which embodies the war's horrors and ignites global outrage. By 1939, after years of ferocious fighting, Franco emerges victorious, establishing a dictatorship that endures for decades, forever altering Spain's trajectory. The war, a precursor to WWII, becomes a haunting reminder of the cost of ideological battles.

This episode is Prelude #8 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are diving into the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the events right before the outbreak of WW2! Since its establishment, the Soviet Union was apprehensive about the possibility of German revanchism. This concern intensified when Hitler rose to prominence and seized power in the early 1930s. Stalin emphasized that the Soviets would strive to overcome the country’s diplomatic isolation, particularly concerning France and the United Kingdom, which had been allies during World War I. He urged them to acknowledge the new European security landscape under Hitler's regime and sought to revive the Triple Entente, encouraging Britain and France to engage in negotiations on this issue. Basically it was a large case of the enemies of my enemy are my friends. 

By 1935, it was evident to everyone in the Soviet Union that multilateral treaties were essential for effectively deterring Hitler's expansionist ambitions. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, worked tirelessly to forge a mutual defense pact with France. This task proved challenging, particularly due to political opportunists in France who seized the negotiations as an opportunity to portray the Soviets as the real threat to peace in Europe. Ultimately, the treaty was signed on May 2, 1935, and established a mutual defense agreement between the Soviet Union and France. It was intended to provide support in case of an attack by Germany or any other aggressor. The treaty aimed to bolster France's security and form a united front against fascism in Europe. However, it lacked specific military commitments and was often seen as more symbolic than practical. The French, lacking enthusiasm, diluted the treaty by stipulating that commitments to the Soviet Union would only become obligatory after the League of Nations was formally involved and the other signatories of the Treaty of Locarno had been consulted. Essentially, it amounted to a hollow promise of support. The Soviets were undeterred by this setback. Following the Soviet-French treaty, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed their own mutual assistance treaty on May 16, 1935. This agreement committed the Soviet Union to support Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack, offering military assistance and cooperation. The treaty aimed to strengthen Czech defenses, particularly against German expansionism. However the treaty was ultimately weakened when France and the United Kingdom pressured Czechoslovakia into accepting Germany's terms during the Sudetenland crisis. 

As I mentioned in a previous episode, prior to the annexation, Czechoslovakia had built a robust system of fortifications along its borders, particularly in the Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak defensive strategy relied heavily on this region's fortifications, which were among the most advanced in Europe at that time. With a mountainous landscape, the Sudetenland provided an excellent defensive position, enabling Czechoslovak forces to monitor and potentially repel any German advances. However, the Sudetenland also hosted a significant German-speaking population that fostered a sense of discontent and irredentism. Adolf Hitler exploited these sentiments, claiming to protect ethnic Germans and leveraging them as a pretext for invasion. Hitler's aggressive diplomacy culminated in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, where Britain and France acquiesced to Germany's demands, effectively allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland without Czechoslovak involvement.

With the Sudetenland's annexation, Czechoslovakia lost its most fortified and defensible borders. The mountainous terrain, which had offered protection, was now directly exposed to German military advances. The surrender of the Sudetenland led to a massive decline in morale among the Czechoslovak military and the population. Many Czechoslovaks felt betrayed by the Western powers, leading to a lack of national unity that hindered cohesive resistance efforts. The annexation diminished Czechoslovakia's industrial capacity, as many of its weapon production facilities were located in the Sudetenland. This negatively impacted the country’s ability to maintain and supply its military. The Munich Agreement also indicated to Czechoslovakia that it could not rely on its allies, Britain and France, for support, leading to increased isolation. In turn this feeling of abandonment discouraged any serious mutual defense aligned with other Eastern and Central European nations. As a means of survival Czechoslovakia began aligning itself with Germany. In turn Germany desperately needed Czechoslovakia armament capabilities. 

Czechoslovakia maintained a modern army comprising 35 divisions and was a key producer of machine guns, tanks, and artillery, primarily manufactured at the Škoda factory in Plzeň. Many Czech factories continued to create their own designs before transitioning to German specifications. Czechoslovakia was home to several prominent manufacturing companies, and entire steel and chemical production facilities were relocated and reconstructed in Linz, a region that remains heavily industrialized in Austria. In a Reichstag speech, Hitler emphasized the strategic significance of the occupation, highlighting that Germany acquired 2,175 field cannons, 469 tanks, 500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43,000 machine guns, 1,090,000 military rifles, 114,000 pistols, approximately one billion rounds of ammunition, and three million anti-aircraft shells by occupying Czechoslovakia. This vast arsenal was enough to equip around half of the Wehrmacht at that time. Czechoslovak arms later played a crucial role in Germany's invasions of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940.

All of this left the Soviets without justification to intervene and save the nation, even if Stalin had genuinely wanted to act. Although the Soviet Union claimed they were ready to assist Czechoslovakia in its resistance, it was evident that there was no feasible way to do so. Geographic constraints meant that without Poland's consent, Soviet troops could not reach Czechoslovakia. The Polish government resisted the pressure to grant this permission due to valid concerns about Soviet intentions toward Polish territory. At this point, it remains unclear whether the Soviets had any hostile designs. However, their later ambition to annex parts of Poland and fully integrate the country into the Soviet sphere was evident in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which we will address later. Poland’s refusal to allow Soviet forces passage through its land ultimately sealed Czechoslovakia’s fate, representing a significant failure in negotiations to include the Soviet Union in a collective defense pact following the Czechoslovak crisis.

The Munich Conference, led some of the western powers to naively believe Hitler was content and that Czechslvakia represented his final territorial aspirations in Europe. He would violate this promise within mere months however. It was during this time that France and Britain recognized the true threat posed by Hitler. By March 1939, they concluded that the Soviet Union was crucial for effectively deterring further German expansion under Hitler. However, this did not mean that the Triple Entente of 1914 was restored; in fact, the opposite occurred. The British and French governments delayed diplomatic discussions until a military agreement could be reached. Under General Gamelin, the French military would be the primary beneficiaries of an alliance with the Soviets. The French army would once again bear the brunt of the conflict in Western Europe, just as it had in World War I. The Red Army was at least comparable to the French army in terms of numbers, and its involvement in the fight could mean the difference between a desperate last stand and a viable operational strategy capable of defeating the Wehrmacht. The French military and government recognized this clearly, and it was the foundation of their strategy of appeasement toward Hitler. Despite this understanding, General Gamelin did not advocate for the military discussions that his political superiors insisted should happen first. In April, the British and French governments issued unilateral declarations to ensure Polish sovereignty. They urged the Soviet Union to do the same, but Stalin and Foreign Minister Litvinov were wary of being drawn into a conflict against the Germans while the Allies remained passive.

Stalin was also wary of Britain and Frances intentions and extremely eager to secure the Soviet Union's borders. Within this conundrum, Stalin sought out non-aggression pacts as a means to avoid direct conflict with Germany. It was the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in 1939 for a collective security agreement against Nazi Germany that further pushed Stalin towards a rapprochement with Hitler. Negotiations for what would be known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact began in the summer of 1939. The main architects of the agreement were German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov. A little bit about these two figures. Ribbentrop was born into a wealthy family in Hamburg on April 30, 1893. His father was a prosperous merchant. He pursued studies in a variety of disciplines but ultimately joined the family liquor business. Despite a relatively comfortable upbringing, he harbored ambitions that would lead him into the political arena. Ribbentrop’s path shifted dramatically with the outbreak of World War I. He enlisted in the Imperial German Army and served as an officer. His wartime experiences and the social changes that followed the war deeply influenced his political ideology. After the war, he returned to Germany and attempted to rebuild his career in business, but his focus eventually turned towards politics. In the early 1920s, Ribbentrop became involved with the nationalist and conservative movements in Germany. He joined the German National People's Party (DNVP) and began to associate with influential political figures, gradually aligning himself with the National Socialist German Workers' Party. His connections in high society and business circles helped him gain a foothold within the Nazi Party.

By the late 1920s, Ribbentrop had established himself as a prominent member of the Nazi Party, known for his persuasive oratory and ambitious nature. In 1929, he was appointed the Nazi Party's foreign policy advisor, a critical role that allowed him to develop his diplomatic skills and contacts. Ribbentrop’s first significant diplomatic achievement was in 1934 when he negotiated a non-aggression pact with Poland. This agreement marked a turning point in Germany's foreign relations, leading to a temporary thaw in diplomatic ties. His success in this endeavor elevated his reputation within the party. In 1936, he was appointed as Germany’s ambassador to Great Britain, where he attempted to foster diplomatic relations and convince British leaders of Nazi Germany's intentions. In 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking over from Konstantin von Neurath. As Foreign Minister, he played a crucial role in shaping Nazi Germany’s foreign policy. He was a staunch advocate of aggressive expansionist policies and was instrumental in the signing of various pacts that would solidify Germany’s alliances, including the Munich Agreement, which allowed for the annexation of Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.

Molotov, born as Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Skryabin, came from a modest background and pursued education in law. He became politically active in the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in the early 20th century. After the October Revolution of 1917, he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party, gaining a reputation for his organizational skills and loyalty to the party line. In the 1920s, Molotov distinguished himself as an adept politician while serving in various government positions. He became a member of the Soviet government’s Council of People's Commissars and was appointed Chairman of the Council in 1930, effectively becoming the de facto head of the Soviet government. Molotov was instrumental in implementing the First Five-Year Plan, focusing on rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization, which laid the groundwork for the Soviet Union’s economic transformation. Molotov’s career in foreign affairs began to take shape in the 1930s. He was appointed as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1939, succeeding Maxim Litvinov. His appointment marked a significant shift in Soviet foreign policy, particularly as the regime sought to secure its borders and establish alliances. Molotov's early years in foreign affairs were characterized by a pragmatic approach to international relations driven by the Communist Party's ideological goals.

Ribbentrop sought to neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany by ensuring Soviet non-aggression, allowing Hitler to invade Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. The talks were conducted in secret and were characterized by mutual suspicion and a pragmatic approach to diplomacy. The Soviet leadership believed the pact would provide them with time to prepare for any future conflict with Germany, while Germany saw it as a means to secure its eastern flank. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The agreement contained several key provisions. Both parties pledged not to attack each other or support any attack against the other for the duration of the pact. The most significant aspect of the pact was a series of secret protocols that delineated spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. They agreed on the division of Poland and the Baltic States, with the Soviets expected to gain control over the eastern regions, while Germany would take the west. Both nations agreed to facilitate economic relations, exchanging raw materials for industrial goods, establishing a framework for cooperation beyond mere military non-aggression. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shocked the world. Many had expected the Soviet Union to align with Britain and France against Nazi aggression. You know who was the most shocked by this, the Empire of Japan.

Japan had been closely observing the rise of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union’s communism with a mix of admiration and apprehension. Both countries were seen as ideologically opposed; fascism and communism were expected to be at odds rather than collaborating. The signing of the pact indicated a surprising willingness from both powers to overlook their ideological differences for mutual benefit. For Japan, this was alarming, as it suggested that both nations might coordinate their actions, potentially threatening Japanese interests in Asia. Japan had been engaged in territorial conflicts with the Soviet Union, particularly during the late 1930s, such as the battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. The Pact effectively meant that the Soviet Union would not oppose German military actions, allowing for a more aggressive stance from Germany without fear of a two-front war. This left Japan vulnerable, as the Soviet Union could now focus its military efforts elsewhere, potentially leading to increased tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan had imperial ambitions in East Asia, particularly in China and the broader Pacific region. The Pact indicated that Germany and the Soviet Union were willing to agree upon spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, which could hint at future agreements in Asia as well. Japan had hoped for German support in its territorial expansions, particularly against the Soviet Union, which now seemed less likely. This realization prompted fears that Japan would face an increasingly isolated position as Germany cozied up to the Soviet Union.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact significantly shifted alliances and affected the dynamics of World War II. Japan was concerned that the weakening of Western powers relative to the strengthening of an Axis alliance, which included Germany and Italy, would lead to an intensifying race for dominance in Asia. Japan had been anticipating potential conflicts with Western powers, like the United States and Britain and worried that the Pact would embolden the Axis, making it harder to navigate its own imperial ambitions without facing coordinated opposition. In response to their shock and the evolving circumstances in Europe, Japan moved to solidify its own alliances. This led to the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, further entrenching itself in the Axis powers. However, Japan's initial reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was one of concern and recalibration of its foreign policy, as it reshaped their military and diplomatic strategies in the face of newly apparent threats. On May 22nd, Hitler and Mussolini made an irrevocable decision to unite their nations and their destinies. Their foreign ministers announced a formal military alliance, known as the “Pact of Steel.” But why did Germany and Italy join forces?

Both Germany and Italy were governed by fascist regimes led by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, respectively. Their shared ideology centered around nationalism, militarism, and anti-communism, promoting the idea of powerful, authoritarian states. This ideological alignment fostered a sense of camaraderie and mutual support, as both leaders viewed their fascist principles as a bulwark against the spread of communism, particularly the Soviet Union. Germany and Italy also had aggressive expansionist aspirations. Hitler aimed to establish German dominance in Europe, seeking Lebensraum for the German people, particularly in Eastern Europe. Mussolini, inspired by the Roman Empire, desired to build a new Italian Empire, particularly in Africa and the Mediterranean region. The Pact of Steel provided a framework for cooperation in achieving these expansionist goals. It signified a commitment to support each other militarily in their respective pursuits.

In the years leading up to the war, both Germany and Italy faced increasing diplomatic isolation from the major Western powers, primarily Britain and France. Their attempts to expand their influence were met with opposition, pushing them closer together. The Pact was a response to this isolation, signaling a united front against Western democracies. By establishing a formal alliance, they aimed to strengthen their position and deter any potential intervention from Britain and France. The Pact of Steel included provisions for military cooperation, emphasizing mutual assistance in times of war and coordination in military strategy. This military alignment was crucial for both countries, as they sought to bolster their armed forces and enhance their military capabilities. Joint military planning and support were expected to give them an edge in any forthcoming conflicts. The Spanish Civil War also highlighted the necessity of military collaboration between Italy and Germany. Both countries intervened in support of Francisco Franco's Nationalists, sharing resources and strategies. Their involvement in Spain solidified their military partnership and demonstrated the benefits of cooperation, further paving the way for the Pact of Steel. The aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles had left Germany humiliated, while Italy felt denied the territorial gains promised to it after the war. Their shared grievances and the desire to overturn the post-World War I order created a foundation for their alliance, as both sought revenge and restoration of their national pride. Although this alliance would later prove to be a detrimental partnership, causing significant suffering for both sides, it was initially viewed positively as Hitler demonstrated to the Allies and the Soviet Union that he was ready for a full-scale war. Throughout the summer, there were ongoing discussions between the Soviets and Germans regarding a possible agreement. At the same time, the Japanese intensified their pressure on the Soviet Union in the Far East. By June, the Battle of Khalkin Gol was escalating, significantly raising tensions as the Soviets were resolute in their stance. Although the situation in the east remained tense by late July, it quickly stabilized. General Zhukov then finalized the details of the meticulously planned battle he had been preparing throughout the summer.

At this time, trade negotiations with Germany were reinitiated, with the understanding that a successful agreement could significantly impact the situation in Poland. Time was of the essence for everyone involved. Hitler had instructed the Wehrmacht to be ready to commence operations by September 1st. Britain and France had already pledged to defend Poland against Germany, yet their governments were still grappling with how to implement this commitment effectively. During this period, General Gamelin suggested that the French Army would be prepared to advance across the Rhine into Germany around September 16th. The British Army remained too small to play a substantial role in ground operations, but plans for a naval blockade against Germany were being developed. These plans were essentially reruns of the plans of the first world war. The Royal Navy’s blockade in that war had been effective, and the surface fleet of the Kreigsmarine was not the threat that the Imperial High Seas Fleet had been. The urgency of the situation was clear to all parties. Ultimately, Britain and France sent a military mission to coordinate with the Red Army’s leaders and establish a unified plan of action. However, they were too slow, lacked understanding of the vast country’s security needs, and were not willing to make the concessions Stalin required.

Hitler did not embody any of these characteristics. Discussions between the ambassadors and foreign ministers of the two dictatorships were progressing, with neither party eager to be the first to reach a decisive moment. By August 19, the Soviets had presented the German Ambassador with the preliminary terms of a non-aggression pact. This agreement was finalized with minimal alterations by August 23. The Allied military mission reacted with disbelief upon hearing the news. They informed their governments and began their journey back home. The non-aggression pact would later be referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after the foreign ministers of the two nations. At the time, a secret additional protocol was not disclosed. On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares; its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Despite the intense diplomatic efforts during the summer of 1939, the Soviet Union was readying itself to confront the Nazi regime in a life-and-death struggle. Soviet rearmament initiatives outlined in the five-year plans were designed to prepare the nation for a potentially devastating war with Germany. These plans were not yet finalized, and as noted, the modernization of the Soviet military was still in progress in 1939. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was viewed not as a lasting peace but as a strategy to buy time and create space to fortify the Western borders of Stalin's empire. Similarly, Hitler was focused on his own western boundaries, where he faced France and the UK.

Although this motivation was present, Stalin's Great Purge complicated these efforts and was partially driven by them. The purge was based on an alleged conspiracy in which high-ranking state and military officials were thought to be collaborating with the Nazis. A significant aspect of this conspiracy involved Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was accused of conspiring with the Wehrmacht to overthrow Stalin and undermine the Soviet Union's defenses. This conspiracy theory was never substantiated, and Tukhachevsky was officially cleared of wrongdoing in 1957. This happened under the so-called “Khrushchev thaw” that happened after Khrushchev took power following Stalin’s death. This program was designed to ease internal tension after the years of terror under the former leader. Tukhachevsky was just one of millions of Stalin’s purge victims to be officially rehabilitated. 

Nevertheless, there was considerable internal tension in the Soviet Union throughout the late 1930s regarding German interference. For Hitler, meddling in Soviet internal affairs was appealing, but instead of investing time, money, and resources to support potential plotters, he chose to let Stalin's paranoia escalate. The Nazi leadership recognized the purge's impact on the Red Army and allowed it to proceed. In fact, Hitler's famous misjudgment of the Soviet Union's resilience partly stemmed from overemphasizing reports regarding the damage inflicted on the state and military by the purges. Alongside this was reports from the Winter War with Finland that indicated to Hitler that the Red Army was a paper tiger. His remarks on the eve of Operation Barbarossa summarize his thoughts perfectly: “We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.” The Nazi government never denied its involvement in the purported conspiracy, and this silence only fueled the speculation. The most tangible involvement from Hitler's regime came not from his direct orders but from one of his subordinates, Reinhard Heydrich. Heydrich was one of the most notorious SS men in the entire Nazi regime. He organized Kristallnacht, the Einsatzgruppen death squads, and is considered the architect of the Final Solution. He became head of the SD or SicherheittsDienste, which was the intelligence office of the SS and was responsible as the principal non-military intelligence agency in the Nazi regime. At the Nuremberg trials, they were declared to be a criminal organization alongside the Gestapo. Their leader at the end of the War, Ernst Kaltenbrunner was hanged as a war criminal in 1946. As head of the SD, Heydrich created documents that implicated Tukhachevsky and others and ensured they were seized by the NKVD. The NKVD or People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs was the security and secret police agency of the Soviet Union until its evolution into two different agencies in the late 1940s. The NKVD was responsible for many crimes, including the majority of the extra-judicial killings of Stalin’s purge. They are also responsible for the infamous Katyn Massacre and thousands of incidents of murder throughout the war. It remains unclear how much, if at all, Stalin relied on these documents in his decision-making regarding the purge.

Hitler was also in the midst of a purge, though it was less violent and extensive than the one occurring in the Soviet Union. Sixteen Wehrmacht generals were retired, and Hitler assumed control of the OKW, the unified general staff for the entire German military. This non-violent purge ousted then-War Minister General von Blomberg and the Army's commander-in-chief, General von Fritsch. General von Blomberg was retired in disgrace over allegations that his new wife was a former prostitute. He sat out the entire war. He eventually testified at the Nuremberg trials, but was not charged.

Both men opposed Hitler’s complete control over the military and had expressed disagreements with his policy of provoking the British and French, fearing that such confrontations could lead to a war Germany could not win. They were joined by several other senior Wehrmacht leaders. Many of these individuals continued to support Hitler after the diplomatic successes of 1938 and the military victories of 1939. This is not to overlook the Oster plot, which implicated dozens of senior officers but failed to go through with any action. As well, the 20 July Plot of 1944 also involved many senior officers but few if any of the conspirator’s escaped punishment or suicide in the aftermath of that coup attempt. This reshuffle did not reach the scale of Stalin’s purges, primarily because Hitler recognized the potential military consequences of such an initiative. The total Nazification of the Wehrmacht was a more gradual process aimed at systematically eliminating politically unreliable officers while trying to win over those who could be bribed. In fact, bribery of Army generals became a formal, though unofficial, policy in 1940.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shocked the entire world. In many ways it came about because of numerous failures between many nations trying to find a way to thwart Germany’s aggressive actions. Ironically in the end the pact would prove to be a tool that Germany would use to enact the war in the east.

 

Eastern Front Prelude #0.7 The Spanish Civil War

Last time we spoke about Soviet Conflicts of the 1930s. In the aftermath of World War I, Germany descended into chaos, setting the stage for Adolf Hitler's rise to power. Seizing on public disillusionment, he dismantled democracy and expanded Germany's territory, straining relations across Europe. Concurrently, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union embarked on rapid industrialization under the Five-Year Plans, marred by brutal purges that instilled fear among citizens. The intertwining of these authoritarian regimes heightened tensions, leading to conflict throughout the continent. Amidst this turmoil, the Soviets engaged in several key conflicts with neighboring states, particularly in Manchuria, Xinjiang and Finland. Their rivalry with Japan over territories culminated in fierce skirmishes, especially at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, where the Red Army showcased its capabilities. Ultimately, the political upheavals and territorial ambitions of both Hitler and Stalin set the stage for the global conflict that became World War II, reshaping the world landscape forever.

This episode is Prelude #7 The Spanish Civil War

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are going to be delving into the Spanish Civil War, an event many came to refer to as the dress rehearsal of WW2. Spain had long been marked by political instability. The monarchy, which had ruled for centuries, faced growing discontent in the early 20th century. The abdication of King Alfonso 13th in 1931 led to the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic. The new government was characterized by its progressive reforms, such as land redistribution, labor rights, and secularization of education. However, this alienated conservative and religious sectors of society, particularly the military, the Catholic Church, and landowners.Spain's social structure was also sharply divided. The rural population, especially in the south, struggled with poverty, illiteracy, and oppressive landlordism. The rise of labor unions and anarchist movements sought to address these inequalities but faced violent repression from the authorities. In urban areas, a burgeoning middle class emerged, advocating for political and economic reforms. The clash between the conservative force defending the status quo and the leftist groups pushing for change created a highly polarized environment.

The 1930s saw the rise of extremist ideologies in Spain. On the left, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party or “PSOE” and anarchist groups like the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo or “CNT” both gained momentum. On the right, factions such as the monarchists, conservative politicians, and fascist movements like the Falange emerged, promoting a return to traditional values and strong centralized authority. This ideological struggle exacerbated existing tensions and laid the groundwork for conflict.

The global economic crisis of the 1930s further strained Spain. Unemployment soared, and agricultural prices plummeted, leading to widespread hardship. The government's attempts to implement reforms and stabilize the economy were met with resistance from conservative factions who feared losing their privileges and power. Economic instability fueled social unrest, causing strikes and protests to become more frequent and violent. Attempts to create a broad-based coalition government in the Republic faced significant challenges. The government switched between various political alignments, leftist coalitions, moderate governments, and power-sharing arrangements, each unable to effectively address the rising tensions. The fragmentation of political parties into competing factions made governance increasingly difficult, leading to a power vacuum that extremist groups exploited. As political tensions escalated, both sides began forming armed militias. The left established groups like the Juventud Socialista and the FAI “Iberian Anarchist Federation”, while the right saw the rise of the Spanish Legion and later, the Carlists. These militias often clashed on the streets, increasing violence and fear among the populace.

In the six years leading up to the Spanish Civil War, which began in 1936, Spain experienced the rule of three military dictators and witnessed one failed revolution. These three were all military men who had been appointed by the King to the office of Prime Minister. All three men had varying degrees of power. The first, Miguel Primo de Rivera, was  a classical dictator who controlled the country for seven years. The second was his successor, Dámaso Berenguer, often described as the toothless dictator. The last man before the establishment of the Republic in 1931 was Juan Bautista Aznar-Cabañas. He had all the potential power of de Rivera, but allowed it to slip away and the republic to form. 

The country was deeply divided along partisan lines, which undermined any sense of national unity. The attempted revolution of 1933 was mainly instigated by extreme left-wing parties in reaction to the electoral success of right-wing politicians. Although this revolution initially gained traction in various regions, it was ultimately suppressed, albeit with some challenges. Many leaders within the Spanish Army began to view the leftist parties as threats to security and stability, fearing they would contribute to the country’s disintegration. This perspective fueled agitation among military and government figures. These agitators did not share a single political ideology; instead, they encompassed a diverse range of right-wing beliefs, including Fascism, Catholic supremacy, and various Monarchist factions. These groups are very broad labels encompassing several distinct philosophies and political movements within themselves. In the context of the Spanish Civil War, the Fascists were probably closer in fashion to the Italians than to the Nazi’s of Hitler. The Catholic supremacists believed in the supremacy of the national church and its role in governing morality and society in conjunction with the monarch. In the Monarchist camp, there were two main movements. The first was the Carlists, who supported the claim of Don Carlos, Count of Molina. The second was the Alfonsists that supported the restoration of the last King, Alfonso 13th.

In the 1936 elections, the left-leaning parties emerged victorious, leading to some unrest. This turmoil was partly caused by their supporters, who celebrated excessively, engaging in acts of burning and looting. The new government faced a difficult choice regarding the restoration of order, as they wanted to avoid appearing to oppress their own supporters. However, they recognized the necessity of military backing both to reestablish order and to govern effectively. Within weeks of the election and the subsequent chaos, a national conspiracy began to take shape.  By the mid-1930s, discontent among the military was palpable, particularly due to perceived leftist policies that threatened traditional military values. A significant group of military officers, including Generals Francisco Franco, Emilio Mola, and José Sanjurjo, began plotting to seize power. Francisco Franco Bahamonde was born on December 4, 1892, in Ferrol, a naval city in northwest Spain. Coming from a military family, he entered the Spanish Army at a young age. He quickly rose through the ranks due to his exceptional capabilities as a soldier and tactician. By the 1920s, Franco had made a name for himself during Spain’s colonial campaigns in Morocco, where he distinguished himself as a ruthless and effective leader of the Spanish Foreign Legion.  Franco was initially appointed to lead the Spanish military in Morocco. 

The conspiracy he took a leading role in was fueled by discontent with the republican government, which they viewed as ineffective and dangerously leftist. The conspirators aimed to initiate a coup that would restore Spain to conservative and monarchist rule. The plan was to coordinate a series of uprisings across the country, with the initial uprising scheduled for July 18, 1936. The conspirators expected immediate military support and a swift victory. However, they encountered various levels of resistance and complexity, significantly complicating their plans.

On July 17, 1936, a military coup began in Spanish Morocco, led by General Juan Yagüe and supported by right-wing groups. Franco’s response was pivotal. He received support from the Army of Africa and used this to launch a substantial military campaign. Franco led a successful landing on the mainland, and unrest spread quickly to other regions, particularly in the north and south of Spain. While some military garrisons were initially successful in their coup attempts, many urban areas and regions aligned with leftist parties, such as Catalonia and Madrid, resisted, resulting in fierce fighting and chaos. As the military rebellion took shape, Spain was fractured into two main factions: the Nationalists, led by Franco and aspiring to establish a fascist government, and the Republicans, comprising various leftist groups, including communists, anarchists, and socialists, who defended the republic.

Within months, hundreds of thousands of volunteers from diverse backgrounds around the globe rushed to fight for both sides. By late 1936, organized military units began to operate within the country. The Germans were the first to provide substantial military aid. This assistance began in the early days of the attempted coup. Starting around July 29th, the newly formed Luftwaffe began ferrying troops and supplies from the Nationalist base in Morocco to areas in Spain under control. Over the next two weeks, they successfully transported at least ten thousand of Franco's finest troops from the Army of Africa, which he had commanded when the war erupted. Although more personnel and equipment were intended to cross the Strait of Gibraltar, most of the small Spanish Navy remained loyal to the Republican Government. To address this, Hitler sent the Panzerschiffs Deutschland and Admiral Scheer to escort Franco’s transports. These ships were formidable, equipped with greater firepower than anything the Spanish Navy could deploy, especially after the defection of its best vessel, the Canarias. The Canarias was a Spanish built version of the Royal Navy’s County class heavy cruisers. She was modified for the needs of the Spanish Navy, but otherwise was similar to her British cousins. However, she was exactly the sort of ship that the Kreigsmarine had in mind as prey when they designed the Panzerschiffs. While the Spanish Navy did possess dreadnoughts, such as the Espana and the Jaime I, these older pre-World War I designs had not been sufficiently modernized and were thus outclassed by the Panzerschiffs. The German cruisers effectively deterred any threats during the initial transfers across the Strait of Gibraltar. Benito Mussolini was keen to join the conflict, seeing it as an opportunity to increase Italy's influence in the Mediterranean and showcase the strength of his military. In the early weeks of the war, he ordered ninety aircraft to be sent to the Nationalist forces, but the delivery took longer than expected. The Luftwaffe’s airlift of Franco’s troops included some Italian pilots flying their own transport planes. Furthermore, additional Italian naval units took part in the ongoing convoy escort missions.

The United Kingdom was apprehensive about the leftist Republican Government, with many of its leaders secretly backing the Nationalist cause. Tensions within the British Empire were already high, and the threat of a civil war in the Mediterranean added to the strain, potentially destabilizing the delicate balance of power in Europe. Consequently, they quickly sought to establish a non-intervention pact among global powers, which required weeks of diplomatic negotiations. Ultimately, the French, Germans, Italians, Soviets, the United States, and smaller nations like Belgium and Czechoslovakia reached a non-intervention agreement, along with the formation of a committee to oversee compliance. However, this turned out to be little more than a façade, as the League of Nations was ineffective at enforcing the agreement. Meanwhile, Hitler and Mussolini capitalized on the inaction of other powers, intensifying their aggressive support for the Nationalists.

As the weeks progressed into months, German and Italian support escalated far beyond what General Franco had initially requested during the early stages of the coup attempt. The Germans established the Condor Legion, equipped with the Luftwaffe's most advanced weaponry. The Ju-52 transport became the backbone of the legion, originally developed from a civilian aircraft designed for passengers and cargo. It was repurposed for military applications and later became one of the most iconic planes used by the Wehrmacht in their campaigns of conquest throughout Europe and Africa. Another Junkers model, the Ju-87 Stuka, also made its debut in the Spanish skies. Heinkel's notorious He-111 was deployed as well, conducting attacks on Republican airfields and terrorizing civilians, particularly in Guernica. The Bombing of Guernica is one of the most infamous military actions of the entire civil war.

The Basque region, seeking autonomy and opposing Franco’s dictatorship, aligned with the Republicans. Guernica, the capital of the Basque Country, thus became a key location due to its political and symbolic significance. On the afternoon of April 26, 1937, the Condor Legion executed an aerial bombing campaign against Guernica. The operation began around 4:30 PM and lasted for several hours. The German air force, under the pretext of supporting Franco’s troops, targeted the town with a combination of high-explosive bombs and incendiary devices. The planes carried out repeated bombing runs, aiming to create chaos and instill terror among the civilian population. The town was largely undefended, with no significant military presence, which made it an easy target. The attack resulted in widespread destruction of buildings, including homes, shops, and the town's historical structures. The use of incendiaries led to fires that consumed large segments of Guernica.

The casualty figures from the bombing vary, with estimates ranging from hundreds to over a thousand civilian deaths. The attack not only caused physical destruction but also left deep psychological scars on the civilian population. Many residents were forced to flee, and the raid led to significant disruption in the local community. The bombing of Guernica shocked the world and garnered international condemnation. It highlighted the devastating impact of modern warfare on civilians and raised awareness about the atrocities committed during the Spanish Civil War. The event served as a vivid example of the moral implications of war tactics and the lengths to which regimes might go to further their objectives. Guernica's bombing inspired powerful artistic responses, most famously Pablo Picasso’s painting "Guernica," created in 1937. The artwork depicts the horror of the bombing and has become an iconic symbol of the tragedies of war, reflecting the suffering and chaos experienced by the victims. Picasso’s work helped bring global attention to the Spanish Civil War, exemplifying how art can influence public perception and political discourse.

The He-111 was not the sole or even the majority type used in the bombing of Guernica, but it is perhaps the most recognizable and serves as a useful stand-in for narrative imagery. Lastly, I should mention the Bf-109 fighter, which would ultimately become the second most produced military aircraft in history, with approximately thirty thousand units manufactured during its production run.

The Bf 109's origins can be traced back to the mid-1930s when the German Air Ministry sought a modern fighter to replace the outdated biplanes in service. In response, Willy Messerschmitt, the chief designer at Bayerische Flugzeugwerke , began designing a sleek, low-wing monoplane with a focus on speed, agility, and firepower. The aircraft's first prototype, the Bf 109 V1, took to the skies in September 1935. It was powered by a Rolls-Royce Kestrel engine, which provided adequate performance for testing. However, the design quickly evolved to incorporate a more powerful engine, leading to the Bf 109 V2 prototype featuring the Junkers Jumo 210 engine. This modification enhanced performance, setting the stage for subsequent variants. By 1937, the Bf 109 entered mass production, with the initial variant being the Bf 109 B. This model was primarily used for training purposes. However, it was the Bf 109 E “Emil”, introduced in 1939, that established the aircraft's reputation as a formidable fighter. Featuring a more powerful Daimler-Benz DB 601 engine and improved armament, including four 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns and the option for a 20 mm MG FF cannon, the Bf 109 E became the backbone of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain.

The Condor Legion operated only with a limited number of squadrons of aircraft, but its impact on the war was significant owing to the overall inadequacy of the air forces on both sides. The Republican government had a disjointed assortment of aircraft types from various nations, which hampered the effectiveness of their Air Force, as their logistics, training, and capabilities remained fragmented throughout the conflict. Additionally, the Germans deployed officers from every branch of the Wehrmacht, not only to observe and advise the Nationalist forces but also to learn from their experiences. The Luftwaffe contributed the most to the Condor Legion and, consequently, received the majority of advisory roles. This included leadership positions like that of Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, who would later be known for his command in defending occupied Europe against the Combined Bomber Offensive.

The main analysis of the combat was led by General Helmuth Wilberg, who was recognized as both a skilled theorist and an effective commander. His staff included several distinguished individuals, such as future Field Marshals and Generals. Lieutenant General Adolf Galland, serving as squadron commander, would ultimately be credited with 104 confirmed kills during the World War. Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen held the position of chief of staff before becoming the commander of the legion in Spain, where he gained notoriety for orchestrating the bombing of Guernica. Additionally, General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma oversaw the small ground combat unit of the Condor Legion.

The ground combat forces of the Condor Legion were relatively small and had minimal impact on the war's outcome. When the Legion was withdrawn, only about four hundred tank crew badges were awarded throughout the entire campaign. However, it’s important to note that there were never four hundred tank crews present at one time in Spain under the Condor Legion. Such a number would have represented a significant contribution, far exceeding what Hitler would have permitted at that time. Four hundred Panzer I tanks would require eight hundred crew members, as each tank needed two, while Panzer II tanks needed three crew members each. This figure doesn’t even account for the personnel required for repairs and maintenance. Ultimately, the support provided by the Condor Legion was overshadowed by the Italian contribution. At its peak, the Corpo Truppe Volontarie had over seven hundred fifty aircraft and seventy-five thousand troops in Spain fighting alongside Franco. The Italians were consistently the strongest supporters of either side during the Spanish Civil War, actively working to secure Franco’s victory. This was mostly because Mussolini was an ardent supporter of Franco, unlike Hitler who saw the Civil War as means to distract the Western Democracies from his own buildup and preparations for conquering Europe. 

On the flip side, the Republicans faced difficulties in securing support from other countries. The French provided a few aircraft initially, but further assistance was halted due to political tensions in Paris. Meanwhile, the British and Americans remained committed to the non-intervention pact. Volunteers from around the globe offered their help, though they supplied minimal material support. Although the Soviet Union formally agreed to the non-intervention policy, it also sent substantial aid to the Republican forces discreetly. Stalin navigated a delicate situation by openly disregarding the agreement while attempting to maintain diplomatic relations with France and Britain to counter Hitler's influence. By October 1936, Stalin appointed Yan Berzin to lead the Red Army's small yet expanding advisory mission in Spain. Berzin, a high-ranking military intelligence officer, reflects the nature of Stalin's strategy, as a general was not chosen for the role. At this time, one of the main concerns was the internal security of the military. The generals of the Red Army were wary of overseas engagements that involved independent military commands and the potential for interacting with politically unreliable foreigners. Stalin was in the early stages of his great purge, and Berzin himself would become a victim of it in 1937.

The Soviets insisted that the Republican forces cover the costs for the equipment being sent to them, leading to the transfer of the country's gold reserves to Moscow. This transfer was officially for safekeeping, but the reality was different. The Soviets tapped into these reserves to finance the equipment, applying exchange rates that primarily benefited Moscow. In contrast, the Germans and Italians provided most of their assistance either at no cost or in exchange for future concessions, which Franco was eager to grant. In the final months of 1936, the Soviet Union significantly increased its support by sending a substantial amount of equipment and personnel to Spain. Although exact figures are challenging to determine, during those early months, Soviet contributions far surpassed those of the Fascist dictators. However, this disparity did not last, and the Soviet Union would later fall behind in its support. The aid provided to the Republicans was of mixed quality. Some of the equipment was exceptional, outperforming much of the aid from Germany and Italy. The Soviet T-26 tank is a prime example, consistently outperforming its Nationalist counterparts. In the air, however, the situation was more complex. Initially, the Polikarpov I-16 excelled against the first Fascist fighters, the Heinkel He-51 and Arado Ar-68. Yet, these biplanes were outdated, and the newer Messerschmitt Bf-109s posed a serious challenge to the bulky Polikarpov. In total, the Republicans received approximately 680 planes from the Soviet Union and manufactured an additional 250 using Soviet designs.

The Soviet Union's contributions fluctuated annually, influenced by political dynamics in Moscow as Stalin executed his purges and expressed concerns about alienating potential allies. By 1938, Stalin was believed to have recognized that a Republican victory would likely lead to the Soviet Union's isolation from Europe, resulting in the future Allies collaborating with Hitler and Mussolini to bolster the anti-Comintern pact. Regardless of whether this outcome was genuinely probable, it’s significant that Stalin adapted his policies in response to these perceived threats.

One of the enduring myths about foreign involvement in the Spanish Civil War is that it served as a testing ground for the combined arms strategies that would eventually be employed in World War II. This misconception crumbles under thorough scrutiny. The military strategies employed in the Spanish Civil War were not as advanced or organized as those that emerged in World War II. The Nationalists and Republicans struggled with command structure, logistics, and coordination. The concept of combined arms, integrating infantry, armor, artillery, and air support was never fully realized in Spain. Units often operated in isolation, and the effective coordination between different branches was limited. The ideological nature of the conflict shifted military priorities significantly. Both sides were more focused on achieving political objectives than on developing cohesive military strategies. This ideological fervor overshadowed the operational needs of warfare and hindered the systematic integration of tactics.

While the Spanish Civil War saw the introduction of aircraft, tanks, and other military technology, the operational tactics to utilize these technologies effectively were not fully developed. The Germans tested their Luftwaffe tactics during the conflict, but the overall technological environment of the Spanish Civil War was rudimentary compared to the massive industrial war mechanisms seen in WWII. The strategies and doctrines developed in Spain were specific to the context of the conflict. For example, the use of tanks was often hampered by difficult terrain and the lack of a coherent combined arms doctrine, leading to a reliance on infantry tactics instead. Likewise, the lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War were more or less ignored by major powers once World War II commenced. Instead, military planners in various countries, particularly Germany, evolved their tactics independently.

At no point did either side possess a sufficient number of tanks to form the mass maneuver units that characterized the French and German armored divisions of 1940. Moreover, the notion of Blitzkrieg was never an official doctrine of the Wehrmacht. General Franco did not align well with the Wehrmacht's ideal of a commanding officer; he was methodical, slow, and overly engrossed in political and diplomatic matters compared to the more decisive and insular German officer corps. Consequently, German officers of the Heer offered him minimal support and sometimes even campaigned against him with Hitler. The Republican forces lacked the discipline and unified command present in the Red Army, which was effectively utilized in the latter years of World War II. They also faced the internal strife from various political factions that disrupted operations in Spain and continued to affect the war effort.

Overall, neither the German Heer nor the Red Army showed much interest in the conflict in Spain. Many prominent figures considered it at best a distraction and at worst a potential threat to their careers. The NKVD was extremely active in Spain in this period. They were led by Colonel Orlov. He helped initiate the Great Purge in the military mission to Spain in 1937, only to become a victim of the purge himself. He fled to the United States, where he lived until his death in 1973. While in charge of the NKVD in Spain he conducted a terror campaign to filter out any suspected Trotskyites within the ranks of the Soviet military mission and the Republican forces. As a result, the lessons learned were primarily technical assessments of the equipment deployed in comparison to that of possible adversaries. Both Stalin and Hitler were careful to limit their military involvement in the war, recognizing it as a political risk and a potential drain on their land forces. They believed a larger war was imminent in Europe, and Spain's outcome would not significantly affect that situation. However, wasting thousands of tanks and aircraft while the Army was attempting to expand could derail those preparations, potentially impacting the outcome of any future conflict.

As for the military events that made up the Spanish Civil War. By July of 1936, the Nationalists quickly gained control of large swathes of Spain, particularly in the north and west. They captured important urban centers, including Toledo and Salamanca. Upon gaining control of key territories, Franco consolidated power and established a military junta known as the National Defense Board. Simultaneously, the Republicans organized resistance. They quickly formed militias composed of anarchists, communists, and socialists, aiming to counteract the coup. International Brigades, composed of volunteers from various countries, arrived to support the Republican cause, emphasizing the ideological significance of the conflict.

After initial successes, the Nationalists turned their attention to Madrid, hoping to capture the capital to decisively end the conflict. The siege began in November 1936, and Republican forces mounted a staunch defense of the city, leading to intense urban warfare. The Nationalists employed heavy artillery and air support, using the German Condor Legion which bombed civilian targets, such as Guernica in April 1937, which we highlighted. The Battle of Madrid showcased the resilience of the Republicans, who managed to hold off the Nationalist advance despite facing severe shortages and internal conflict among their ranks. Ultimately, the siege would last until March 1937, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Following the failure to take Madrid, Nationalist forces launched an offensive at Jarama Valley to cut off Republican access to Madrid. The Battle of Jarama was marked by ferocious fighting, including trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Republican troops managed to hold their ground, allowing for strategic withdrawals and regrouping despite losing thousands of soldiers in the process. In March, Nationalist forces attempted to seize Guadalajara but were met with unexpected resistance from the International Brigades and Spanish Republican troops. The Republicans executed an effective counter-attack, leading to a significant Nationalist defeat and showcasing the ability of the Republican side to rebound in key moments.

The Nationalists next targeted northern regions of Spain, where Basque and Asturian provinces were undergoing heavy industrial development and had significant strategic resources. The Battle of Bilbao and the subsequent fall of the Basque Country, alongside the sieges of cities like Santander, resulted in the loss of critical territory for the Republicans.In late 1937, Republicans launched an offensive to recapture Teruel, which was ultimately successful but left both sides depleted. The Nationalists counterattacked in early 1938 in a campaign to encircle Republicans, leading to the significant Francoist victory in the critical Ebro River Region. In the summer of 1938, Republicans initiated a major offensive along the Ebro River, striving to regain momentum and secure vital territory. The Nationalists responded with effective military tactics, ultimately leading to the encirclement and decimation of Republican forces. This battle culminated in the Republicans’ retreat, signifying a turning point toward Nationalist dominance. By early 1939, the Republican position had become increasingly untenable. Nationalist forces launched successful offensives capturing cities like Barcelona and advancing into the heart of Republican-held territory. On April 1, 1939, Franco declared victory, leading to a dictatorship that would last until his death in 1975. Yeah, 1975, it always shocks me to remember how long he maintained power.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Spanish Civil war quickly devolved into what basically was a proxy war between numerous great powers. For various reasons many nations got involved to different degrees and this ultimately led Franco to emerge victorious. Meanwhile it also showcased the might of certain nations like Germany.

Eastern Front Prelude # 0.6 Soviet Conflicts of the 1930s

Last time we spoke about Stalin’s Purges. In the aftermath of World War I, Germany faced chaos and despair, giving rise to Adolf Hitler, who capitalized on public disillusionment. The Weimar Republic struggled amid economic turmoil, while Hitler's National Socialist Party gained traction, ultimately leading to his appointment as Chancellor in 1933. He enacted measures that dismantled democracy and aggressively expanded Germany's territory, laying the groundwork for future conflict. Simultaneously, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union embarked on rapid industrialization through ambitious Five-Year Plans, aiming to transform agriculture and boost heavy industry. However, this progress was overshadowed by brutal purges designed to eliminate dissent. As Stalin solidified his power, the repression created a climate of fear within society.The actions of both regimes intensified tensions throughout Europe, setting the stage for impending conflict. This interplay of political upheaval and authoritarian control in Germany and the USSR would play a crucial role in the escalation to World War II.

This episode is Prelude #6 Soviet Conflicts of the 1930s

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Today we are going to be exploring major conflicts the Soviet Union ran into with her neighbors. Ironically the vast majority of this episode is actually wars that I covered in the Fall and Rise of China Podcast such as the Sino-Soviet War, Xinjiang Wars, Mukden Incident and border skirmishes in Manchuria. If you want a much more in depth look at any of those check them out.

The Soviets were engaged in the Far East from the early days of the civil war, continuing a long-standing tradition of East-West interactions that have persisted through Eastern Europe for over a thousand years. In 1920, Mongolia was occupied by White forces, remaining under their control until 1924, when Soviet troops successfully defeated them. This victory was only achieved with the support of local guerrillas led by Damdin Sükhbaatar, who became one of the founding figures of the Mongolian People’s Republic. This event decisively aligned Mongolia with Moscow, which would have significant implications for future conflicts with China and Japan. 

The Empires of Japan and Russia had come into conflict, competing for influence over Manchuria. After coming out of isolation in the latter part of the 19th century, Japan developed a strong interest in Manchuria. This region was rich in natural resources such as coal and iron, as well as fertile land, all of which Japan lacked. It also offered additional space for Japan's rapidly growing population. Moreover, Japan was concerned that Russian expansion into Manchuria would threaten its interests in Korea and, by extension, Japan itself. As Yamagata Aritomo famously said, “Korea is a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan.” 

Then in 1899 the Boxer Rebellion broke out seeing Japan and Russia join a 8 nation alliance to combat the Qing Dynasty in league with the Boxers. While they were technically allies, Japan was very wary of Russia at this time. That is because Russia had invaded Manchuria for the war effort and after the Boxer Rebellion was quelled, well the Russians did not go home. Thus in 1904 this led to the Russo-Japanese War. In February 1904, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, initiating the war. The conflict quickly escalated, with Japan demonstrating its naval superiority and effective military strategies. Major battles, such as the Siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Tsushima, showcased Japan's modernized forces and naval strength, leading to significant Russian losses. Despite being a major European power, Russia faced logistical challenges and underestimation of Japanese capabilities. Japan's victories not only shocked the world but also shifted the balance of power in East Asia. Internationally, the conflict drew attention, leading to US President Theodore Roosevelt's intervention in negotiations. The war concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, brokered by Roosevelt. Japan gained recognition as a formidable military power, acquiring territories such as Korea and parts of Manchuria, which significantly altered the political landscape of Asia. However it was truly a pyrrhic victory for Japan. Both nations lost insane numbers of men and funds. For Russia it led to the revolution that collapsed her empire. For Japan, they felt Roosevelt had cheated them from the rewards of their victory and led them to war against the US by 1941. 

In the 1920s, Manchuria was a crucial area for both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Soviet Union, following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent power struggles among warlords. Zhang Zuolin, a prominent warlord, had considerable control over the region and was seen as a threat to Soviet interests, especially after he signed an agreement with Japan. The Soviet Union aimed to safeguard its borders and influence in the region, particularly in the face of potential Japanese aggression. The Soviet Union, feeling threatened by Zhang's increasing ties with Japan, sought to undermine his authority. Conflict emerged over the management of the CER, a vital railway for both Soviet and Chinese interests. The Soviet Union had previously promised to return control of the CER to China, as per the 1924 agreement. However, the implementation of this promise was complicated by competing interests. The Soviets aimed to maintain a certain level of influence over the railway, fearing the escalation of Chinese control would weaken their grip on Manchuria. 

Then Zhang Zuolin was assassinated on June 4th of 1928 by Kwantung Army operatives. Actually it’s a murky story, but there is a possibility the KGB was also involved. Regardless the Japanese sought his death to install a more pro-Japanese Chinese general they had been grooming called Yang Yutin. However, the assassination plot was leaked to Zhang Xueliang, the son of Zhang Zuolin. The Young Marshal became the new leader and firmly joined forces with Chiang Kai-Shek’s new Nationalist Government. Basically the entire thing totally backfired on the Japanese. One of the first things Zhang Xueliang took notice of as a leader was the precarious situation with the CER. In 1929, the Northeastern Army, under Zhang Xueliang, attempted to reassert Chinese control over the CER, leading to heightened tensions with the Soviets, who were keen on retaining joint control. The situation escalated when Chinese authorities seized Soviet officials associated with the railway, prompting a strong Soviet military response.

In response to these provocations, the Soviet Union mobilized a large military force, with approximately 156,000 troops, marking it as one of the largest deployments since the Russian Civil War. The conflict officially began on August 17, 1929, with the Soviet attack on Chalainor. Although the Soviets faced initial setbacks, they quickly regrouped and developed a strategy to encircle and neutralize Chinese resistance. The Soviets implemented a series of carefully coordinated military operations, including naval strategies that involved advancing their fleets up important rivers, capturing strategic locations like Lahasusu, and executing a two-phase attack to undermine Chinese ground forces. Their efforts culminated in several victories, showcasing the reformed Red Army's capabilities.

By late November 1929, after sustained military pressure and strategic maneuvers, the Chinese forces were substantially weakened and demoralized. On December 13, a treaty known as the Khabarovsk Protocol was signed, which reaffirmed Soviet control over the CER but also indicated a return to the status quo based on the earlier treaties. The Soviet Union effectively regained control of the railway after having demonstrated military prowess and diplomatic maneuvering. The conflict revealed the vulnerabilities within the Chinese military command and highlighted the Soviets' willingness to use both diplomacy and military force. The Soviet victory bolstered communist propaganda and demonstrated the USSR's contemporary military capabilities, influencing perceptions in the West regarding Soviet power and strategy.

Taking a side step from Manchuria for a moment, the Soviets also shared a border with China at Xinjiang. In the early 1930s, Xinjiang was officially recognized as a province of China but had largely operated autonomously for many years. In 1930, Sheng Shicai served as the military governor under the Kuomintang government in Xinjiang. However, he was not the sole authority and faced competition from other power players. Following a clash with these rivals, he sought assistance from the Soviet Government, which provided substantial military supplies and financial support. In exchange, Sheng relinquished direct control over the province's economic and military affairs to Soviet administrators, effectively establishing Xinjiang as a client state of the USSR, even though it remained a province of the Chinese Nationalist government. The Soviets periodically intervened to reinforce their influence whenever they perceived it was diminishing. In 1934, they dispatched 7,000 troops across the border to assist Sheng in repelling an attempt by Nationalist warlords to oust him. This effort only partially succeeded, leading to a division of Xinjiang, with Sheng retaining authority over a segment of the province. This fragile arrangement persisted until 1937. In April of that year, Uighurs in the southern region of Sheng's control revolted, receiving unofficial support from the "New 36th Division," a semi-autonomous group within the Kuomintang. This division had been engaged in conflict against the Soviets and their puppet governor since Sheng's rise to power in 1933. The Kuomintang never officially acknowledged the division's actions to avoid straining relations with the USSR, especially since they relied heavily on Soviet military assistance following the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July. Lacking formal support, both the rebels and the New 36th Division could only resist for a few months, and by October, they had been defeated. Sheng Shicai regained complete control of Xinjiang, where he would remain until 1944, when his duplicity with both the Soviets and the Kuomintang led to his dismissal from office. That was a gross oversimplification of a region with multiple groups fighting for dominance that I can’t possibly get into in this podcast. However on the Fall and Rise of China Podcast there is a multi part series on it. Its honestly batshit insane, that one. 

Now back over in Manchuria the Japanese had been planning a seizure of Manchuria for quite some time. The invasion of Manchuria was triggered by the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931. Japanese military personnel staged a bombing near Mukden, claiming Chinese forces were responsible. This incident provided a pretext for the Kwantung Army, a faction of the Japanese military stationed in Manchuria, to launch a full-scale invasion. Ignoring orders from the civilian government in Tokyo to withdraw, the army moved quickly and occupied large portions of Manchuria. The invasion met minimal resistance from Chinese military forces, who were preoccupied with internal strife and did not effectively counter the Japanese advance. By February 1932, the Japanese had captured key cities such as Harbin and Dalian. To legitimize its control, Japan established a puppet state called Manchukuo in March 1932, placing the last Qing emperor, Puyi, on the throne as a figurehead. This puppet regime was intended to portray Japan's occupation as a civilizing mission, emphasizing economic development and stability, but was largely viewed as an illegitimate occupation by the international community. The international response to the invasion was limited. The League of Nations condemned Japan's actions, leading to Japan's withdrawal from the organization in 1933. China appealed for assistance but received little meaningful support from Western powers, who were preoccupied with their own economic problems during the Great Depression. Meanwhile, Japan continued to fortify its military presence in Manchuria and exploited its resources, establishing factories and railroads to benefit its war machine.

Moscow viewed this as a blatant power grab by the Japanese. In one swift action, the Soviets found themselves outmaneuvered. Just months earlier, they had the opportunity to seize Manchuria but opted for a strategy of soft power instead. As a result, their control over the crucial Chinese Eastern Railway became insignificant. The Japanese now held dominion over the entire region. Stalin recognized that the Red Army was ill-prepared to respond to this development. The new circumstances in Manchuria signified that merely rearming was insufficient; defensive structures were erected along the new border, and strategies were devised to defend against potential Japanese incursions while also preparing for an invasion of Manchuria. Mongolia grew increasingly aligned with the Soviet Union, and mutual assistance agreements were publicly established. Eventually, Stalin instructed a strengthening of relations with the Nationalist Chinese government, culminating in a non-aggression pact signed in 1937. While this agreement alleviated some tensions between the USSR and China, the Japanese remained unyielding. By 1938, the frequency of border clashes between the Soviets and the Japanese began to escalate.

Despite the issues in the Far East, Stalin's Great Purge was escalating simultaneously. Thousands of officers were removed from their positions, with many being executed. Among the most notable was Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had been a key figure in the Red Army's leadership for over a decade. These executions severely impacted the command-and-control capabilities of the Red Army. The military command in the Far East, known as the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army and led by the now-Marshal Vasily Blyukher, was particularly affected by these purges. General Genrikh Lyushkov, the NKVD commander under Marshal Blyukher, was the main orchestrator of this purge in the east. By June, Lyushkov feared he would soon be purged himself, prompting him to defect to the Japanese Army. He brought with him a wealth of classified documents revealing the Red Army's positioning in the east, along with insights into the vulnerabilities in the command structure following the purge. Lyushkov would be held captive in Japanese territory for the rest of the war. He eventually remarried and resigned himself to living in Japan. He disappeared from the record in 1945 during the retreat at Dalian in Manchuria. It is unclear if he was executed by his Japanese captors, killed by Soviet troops, or just lost in the mayhem of the retreating forces. The Soviet government's response to this situation remains somewhat ambiguous. However, it is known that the command of border units was reorganized and new troops were sent to the region. In the days following Lyushkov's defection, Marshal Blyukher was summoned to Moscow, presumably to receive an official reprimand from Stalin. Although he was not immediately arrested, the NKVD increased their scrutiny of him.

On July 6, 1938, the Japanese Kwantung Army intercepted a message from the Soviet commander in the Posyet region to Soviet headquarters in Khabarovsk. The message proposed that Soviet soldiers secure unoccupied high ground west of Lake Khasan, particularly the contested Changkufeng Heights, to gain a strategic advantage overlooking the Korean port of Rajin and key railways connecting Korea to Manchuria. In the following two weeks, small groups of Soviet border troops moved into the area to fortify the mountain with emplacements, observation trenches, and communication facilities. This triggered Japanese forces to begin moving into the area around Lake Khasan in July 1938, ostensibly to secure their position after a border incident and to claim territory they believed rightfully belonged to them. The Soviet command responded swiftly, deploying troops to the region to reinforce border defenses.

The Soviet forces were composed largely of the 39th Special Corps, which included infantry and mechanized units, as well as cavalry. The commander of the Soviet forces, Vasily Blyukher, was tasked with defending the region against the Japanese incursions. On the other hand, the Japanese forces, primarily consisting of troops from the Kwantung Army, were well-trained and motivated, seeking to assert their dominance in the region. Initially, the fighting involved skirmishes and artillery exchanges as both sides engaged in probing attacks. The Japanese used their superior infantry tactics and artillery to capture strategic positions. However, the Soviet forces, well entrenched and supported by artillery and tank units, mounted a considerable defense.

The major engagement occurred between August 1 and August 3, 1938, when the Japanese launched a large-scale offensive aimed at breaking through Soviet lines. The battles saw intense hand-to-hand combat, and the Soviet troops held their ground despite being outnumbered in certain sectors. Soviet counterattacks were initiated, and heavy fighting ensued around strategic points such as the heights overlooking Lake Khasan. As the battle dragged on, the Soviet side received reinforcements, allowing them to consolidate their defense. The fighting resulted in heavy casualties for both sides, with estimates of Soviet losses ranging from 500 to 1,000 troops, while Japanese casualties were reported to be higher, at around 2,000. By August 11, after several weeks of fighting, the situation began to stabilize. The Soviet command made the decision to continue holding their positions rather than pushing for further territorial gains. The battle ended with the two sides agreeing to a ceasefire. The front lines were re-established at Lake Khasan, and the status quo was maintained, but the tensions remained unresolved.

Back in 1936 the Soviet Union had entered into a Mutual Assistance Pact with Mongolia, allowing Soviet troops to be stationed in Mongolia to protect against potential Japanese aggression. In 1939, Japan had accumulated significant military forces in Manchukuo, the most notable of which was the Kwantung Army, considered one of Japan's most elite military units. On May 11, 1939, a small Mongolian cavalry unit ventured into a disputed area seeking grazing land. The Japanese responded quickly and forcefully, engaging in a series of skirmishes.The conflict began with only a few dozen cavalrymen from each side but rapidly escalated to involve several hundred soldiers, tanks, and artillery. In June, General Georgy Zhukov was appointed to lead the 57th Rifle Corps, arriving with considerable resources and additional troops. In response, the Kwantung Army fortified their positions. This led to thousands of soldiers being engaged on both sides. General Zhukov was acutely aware that his career and likely his life were at stake.

General Georgy Zhukov began to mobilize his forces, bringing in armored divisions and increasing troop numbers in the area significantly. On May 14, Lt. Colonel Yaozo Azuma led several regiments to drive the Mongols away but faced support from the Red Army. Azuma's forces suffered 63% casualties, a devastating blow. By June, the battle had significantly intensified, with Japan deploying 30,000 troops to the region. The Soviets sent Zhukov along with motorized and armored units to counter them. Lacking effective armored divisions, the Imperial Japanese Army used air forces to target the nearby Soviet airbase at Tamsakbulak. In July, the IJA confronted the Red Army with nearly 100 tanks and tankettes, while Zhukov unleashed a force of 450 tanks and armored vehicles. The Japanese had superior infantry support, but the Soviet armor managed to encircle and defeat them. The two armies skirmished for weeks, with the Japanese believing the Soviets would face logistical challenges. However, Zhukov organized a fleet of 2,600 trucks to supply his forces, an impressive feat. Both sides sustained heavy casualties, and in August, global politics began to shift, indicating an impending war in Europe. Zhukov was ordered to take decisive action, as the Soviets could not engage in a two-front war. Consequently, Zhukov mobilized a fleet of 4,000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita to the front alongside an armada of tanks and mechanized brigades. The Soviets deployed three rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and two tank brigades, nearly 500 tanks in total, along with two motorized infantry divisions and 550 fighters and bombers.

The stalemate was broken when Zhukov unleashed his forces, sending approximately 50,000 Soviets and Mongols to assault the east bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese were immediately pinned down as the Soviets executed a double envelopment maneuver. Subsequent Japanese counterattacks failed miserably, and their attempts to break out of encirclement were unsuccessful. The surrounded Japanese troops resisted surrender as the Soviets bombarded them with artillery and aerial strikes. By the end of August, the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border had been annihilated. A ceasefire was signed between the USSR and Japan on September 15.

The battle of Khalkhin Gol was catastrophic for both sides. The Japanese reported 8,440 dead, 8,766 wounded, and losses of 162 aircraft and 42 tanks, with an estimated 500-600 Japanese troops taken prisoner, who were classified as killed in action due to IJA doctrine. Some sources suggest that actual Japanese casualties could have reached as high as 30,000. The Soviets reported 9,703 deaths, 15,251 wounded, and the destruction of 253 tanks, 250 aircraft, 96 artillery pieces, and 133 armored cars. Of the tank losses, it is estimated that 75-80% were destroyed by anti-tank guns, 15-20% by field artillery, 5-10% by incendiary bombs thrown by infantry, 3% by mines, and another 3% through aircraft bombardment. The implications of this battle were pivotal. The defeat led to major reforms in the Japanese military, shifting focus toward enhancing mechanized and armored capabilities due to the lessons learned from the underperformance of their troops against the Soviets. On the Soviet side, this conflict reinforced the rising prominence of General Zhukov, who would later become a key figure during World War II.

Now we have spent all this time talking about conflict in the east, but there would also be one in the west. Britain and France had been trying to negotiate a military alliance with the Soviet Union to protect Poland before the Nazi dictator launched his attack on the nation. By August 1939, these discussions were about to fall apart. As General Zhukov oversaw the final phases of the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was secretly meeting with Stalin to persuade the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with Germany. This agreement was finalized on August 23, resulting in the division of Poland between Stalin and Hitler, while the Baltic nations, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland, fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, giving Stalin unfettered control over these countries.

Following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 23, 1939, both countries agreed to not interfere in each other's spheres of influence and to divide Eastern Europe between them. Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. The German Wehrmacht employed the Blitzkrieg strategy, which emphasized rapid attacks combining air power, armor, and infantry forces to overwhelm opponents quickly. The attack began early in the morning with bombing raids on Warsaw and other key cities, crippling Polish military communications and infrastructure. In the early hours, German forces crossed the Polish borders from multiple directions. They invaded from the west, north, and south, with considerable speed and efficiency. By using fast-moving armored units and coordinating them with air support, they achieved significant ground gains, quickly encircling and isolating Polish resistance. Poland, despite having a military force that was brave and determined, was significantly outmatched. The Polish strategy relied on static defenses and a hope for international assistance from France and Britain. However, while they declared war on Germany on September 3, support was slow to materialize, and logistical issues plagued the Polish forces. The Polish Army was not prepared for the speed of the German onslaught or the tactics employed, which led to disarray and confusion among its ranks.

On September 17, 1939, as Germany was finishing its conquest of western Poland, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east. Taking advantage of Poland's weakened state, the Red Army advanced across the border with the justification of protecting the Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities in Poland. The operation was swift and strategically planned, mirroring the German tactics of encirclement. The Polish government, caught in a pincer movement, had little recourse. The Soviet invasion further complicated their ability to resist as they were forced to fight on two fronts without adequate support. The Soviet forces captured the eastern territories, and Polish troops were taken prisoner or forced to retreat to Romania and other neighboring countries.

The swift offensives resulted in the rapid collapse of Polish resistance. By October 6, 1939, major organized Polish military resistance ceased, leading to the division of Poland as outlined in the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Germany gained control over western Poland, while the Soviets annexed the eastern regions, including parts of present-day Ukraine and Belarus. The occupation was brutal, characterized by significant repression. The Nazi regime implemented harsh policies involving the persecution of Polish Jews and the intelligentsia, deportations, and systematic annihilation in what would become the Holocaust. The Soviet occupation was also marked by political repression, including mass arrests, executions, and deportations of Polish citizens to Siberian gulags. The invasion of Poland in 1939 had profound long-term implications. It not only led to the displacement and suffering of millions but also firmly established the patterns of totalitarian rule in both occupied territories. The events served as a precursor to the extreme atrocities and war crimes that would unfold over the next six years. It also highlighted the failure of international alliances and the inadequacies of the League of Nations in deterring aggression.

Initially, the Soviets sought to leverage the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to negotiate with the Baltic states. Finland was asked to relinquish rights and territory around the Gulf of Finland and some northern islands in exchange for concessions in Karelia. However, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia received no such offers. Consequently, these smaller nations were quickly pressured into complying with Soviet demands. The Finns, however, resisted and turned down the Soviet proposals. Finland and the Soviet Union had long-standing territorial disputes, particularly regarding the border areas. The Soviet Union demanded that Finland cede territory, specifically parts of Karelia and the strategic port of Hanko, in exchange for land elsewhere. Finland, valuing its sovereignty and territorial integrity, rejected these ultimatums. This diplomatic impasse heightened tensions, setting the stage for war. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union launched a massive offensive against Finland, citing the need to protect its borders from potential threats. The Soviet military, expecting a swift victory due to its overwhelming numerical superiority and modern equipment, initiated an invasion across the border. The Soviet Union deployed around 450,000 troops against approximately 150,000 Finnish defenders. Despite being significantly outnumbered, the Finnish forces, comprised largely of regular military personnel and reservists, were well-prepared for defense. Finnish soldiers were familiar with the challenging winter terrain, utilizing knowledge of their homeland to their advantage. They employed guerilla tactics, including mobility and the element of surprise, against the larger Soviet force. The Finnish Army was also equipped with skis and snowmobiles, enabling rapid movement across the snow-covered landscape.

One of the pivotal encounters of the war was the battle of Suomussalmi, fought between December 7, 1939, and January 8, 1940. Finnish troops, though greatly outnumbered, executed a brilliantly coordinated attack, managing to encircle and defeat a larger Soviet contingent. The victory boosted Finnish morale and showcased the effectiveness of their military strategy.The battle of Raate Road took place from January 1 to 7, 1940, and involved the remnants of the Soviet 163rd Division. Finnish forces, utilizing their knowledge of the terrain, executed a surprise ambush along the Raate Road, resulting in the encirclement and destruction of a significant part of the Soviet troops. Occurring from January to March 1940,  the battle of Vuosalmi was marked by intense fighting in the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops employed defensive positions and fortified lines. Despite Soviet attempts to breach these defenses, Finnish forces held firm, demonstrating resilience against overwhelming odds.

The Soviet invasion faced numerous challenges, including harsh winter conditions, poor logistical planning, and lack of familiarity with the terrain. Troops poorly equipped for winter warfare suffered from frostbite and supply issues, leading to disarray within their ranks. Additionally, Soviet military tactics were outdated and overly reliant on massed infantry assaults, which were ineffective against the well-organized Finnish defenses. Despite fierce resistance, the tide of the conflict began to turn in favor of the Soviets by February 1940, as they gradually adjusted their tactics, employing more effective armored and aerial units. However, they faced significant attrition, and progress was slow. The war concluded on March 13, 1940, with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The treaty resulted in Finland ceding approximately 11% of its territory to the Soviet Union, including parts of Karelia and the vital city of Viipuri. However, Finland retained its independence and a large portion of its territory, marking a significant achievement against a vastly superior adversary.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In the aftermath of World War I, chaos in Germany birthed Hitler’s rise, while Stalin's purges gripped the USSR. As Hitler expanded territory and repressed dissent, the Soviets industrialized through brutal measures. Their escalating tensions foreshadowed the cataclysm of World War II, igniting conflicts across Europe and Asia.

Eastern Front Prelude #0.5 Stalin’s Purges

Last time we spoke about the Wehrmacht. In the tumultuous aftermath of World War I, Germany faced chaos and despair. The Weimar Republic, promising democracy and reform, struggled amid food shortages and inflation, leading to unrest. Amidst this turmoil, Adolf Hitler emerged, captivating those disillusioned by the republic’s failures. His initial coup attempt in 1923 failed, but through a trial transformed him into a national figure. As economic conditions deteriorated, Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers' Party gained traction, exploiting the desperate populace’s need for hope. By 1933, clever political maneuvers led to his appointment as Chancellor. Soon after, the Reichstag Fire allowed him to enact measures that suspended civil liberties and dismantled democracy. With military rearmament plans in motion, Hitler defied international treaties, expanding aggressively into territories like the Rhineland and Austria. By 1938, emboldened by perceived weaknesses from Western powers, he seized the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, setting in motion a series of conquests that would plunge Europe into World War II.

This episode is Prelude #5 Stalin’s Purges

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Over the past episodes we basically covered how World War One dramatically changed Germany and the nations that made up the Soviet Union. The Russian empire certainly underwent a dramatic amount of change in a very short period of time. But even prior to the Revolution, there were significant efforts to enhance industrial capacity within the Tsar’s Empire. These initiatives often faced challenges from established social interests and a shortage of capital. Just as conditions began to improve, World War One erupted, ultimately leading to the Empire’s collapse. Lenin aimed to transform society while boosting the production capabilities of the nascent USSR. However, this endeavor was hindered by infighting among the party elite and the ongoing civil war. Stalin, aware of the frailties in Soviet industry before he assumed power, was determined to address these issues once he solidified his leadership of the party and the nation. He initiated a series of programs inspired by an earlier proposal from Trotsky, which came to be known as the Five-Year Plans. The initiatives were to be supported by the full strength of Stalin's emerging terror regime, with the initial purges aimed at eliminating dissidents and those considered politically unreliable from the central planning committee. 

Joseph Stalin's First Five-Year Plan, launched in 1928, aimed to transform the Soviet Union from an agrarian society into an industrial superpower. The plan emphasized rapid industrialization, particularly in heavy industries such as steel, coal, and machinery, to increase production and modernize the economy. Key components of the plan included collectivization of agriculture, which sought to consolidate individual farms into large, state-controlled enterprises. This move aimed to boost agricultural output and supply food for the growing urban workforce. However, the policy faced significant resistance from peasants, leading to widespread hardship, famine, and social unrest. The plan set ambitious production targets, often unrealistic, and relied heavily on central planning. The Soviet government mobilized resources through state control, labor camps, and harsh measures to enforce compliance. The propaganda machine promoted achievements, showcasing progress through grandiose claims of output increases.

In 1929, the program was expanded to include the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. By the end of 1932, the targets of the plan were claimed to have been achieved. While the Soviet Union had undoubtedly made significant strides in industrial capacity, numerous sacrifices were made to accomplish these objectives. The subsequent famine was attributed to the plan's failures in sustaining agricultural production effectively. Millions perished during this famine, yet Stalin touted his achievements. The USSR reported increases in coal production by 84%, oil by 90%, steel by 37%, and electricity by an astonishing 168%. These enhancements laid the groundwork for the capacity the Soviet Union depended on in the approaching war, a fact that Stalin emphasized even then.

Joseph Stalin's Second Five-Year Plan, which ran from 1932 to 1937, aimed to further develop the Soviet economy through rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. Building on the foundation laid by the First Five-Year Plan, the second plan focused on modernizing various sectors, particularly heavy industry, steel production, and infrastructure. One of the plan's notable achievements was the dramatic increase in steel production, which rose by nearly 200% during this period. This was a significant improvement compared to the 37% increase achieved in the First Five-Year Plan. The plan also prioritized the production of machinery, vehicles, and consumer goods, though the latter was often neglected in favor of heavy industry. In agriculture, the collectivization efforts intensified, leading to the consolidation of individual farms into large, state-managed collectives. This shift aimed to increase efficiency and output but resulted in widespread resistance from peasants, leading to harsh reprisals and significant social disruption. Overall agricultural output grew more slowly than expected; for instance, while oil production expanded by 90% during the first plan, it only rose by about 37% in the second.

The Second Five-Year Plan was marked by ambitious goals and significant successes, but it also faced challenges such as bureaucratic inefficiencies, planning difficulties, and harsh working conditions. Despite these issues, the industrial base established during this period played a crucial role in enabling the Soviet Union to withstand the early years of World War II. Consequently, while the plan's achievements contributed to the USSR's transformation into an industrial power, the social and economic costs were significant, highlighting the complexities of Stalin's policies during this critical era in Soviet history. Without the production capacity developed during these years, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union could have endured the early phases of World War II. The country had the geographical natural defenses and manpower reserves that allowed the Red Army to sustain millions of casualties. However, it was the industrial foundation established by these plans that enabled the Soviet Union to re-equip the Red Army after the devastating losses of 1941. While we cannot rigorously speculate about an alternate history where Germany emerged victorious, it is clear that the significance of the five-year plans on the upcoming war cannot be overstated.

The driving force behind the Five-Year plans was not only political determination but also technical expertise, which needed to be sourced from abroad. Engineers and businesspeople from Germany, France, Britain, and the United States were invited to enter contracts for factory construction. They also provided the Soviet government with licenses for designs encompassing everything from tractors to lathes to diesel engines. By 1930, a total of 104 technical assistance contracts had been established, with most focusing on metallurgical and chemical technologies, vital components of a modern economy. Alongside know-how, procuring actual equipment was essential. In 1932, the Soviet Union imported about 90% of the machinery exported from the UK. A Cleveland engineering firm even designed and constructed a large steel plant in Magnitogorsk to compete with the renowned US Steel facility in Gary, Indiana. This capacity to acquire equipment, designs, and technical support from international sources was pivotal to the industrial growth outlined in the Five-Year plans.

In 1930, the Red Army was still grappling with growing pains and uncertainty among its leadership. A modernization initiative had been launched in 1928, but progress had been sluggish, partly due to the dire condition of the nation’s industry. The Five-Year Plans aimed to address this issue. As the first plan reached maturity, Adolf Hitler ascended to power in Germany, making no secret of his disdain for the Soviet Union. One has to look no further than Adolf Hitler's “Mein Kampf”, written during his imprisonment in 1924. The document basically outlined his political ideology and future plans for Germany. His views on communism, Slavs, and the Soviet Union are central themes in this work, reflecting his extremism and legitimizing his later policies. Hitler regarded communism as a significant threat to Germany and Western civilization. He associated communism with Jewish influence, portraying it as a conspiracy led by Jewish intellectuals aiming to undermine national and racial identities. He believed that communism would lead to societal decay and chaos, promoting the idea that it had already caused destruction in Russia. Hitler viewed the 1917 Russian Revolution, which established a Bolshevik regime, as a manifestation of this threat, interpreting it as both an ideological and racially motivated assault on the so-called Aryan race. He dismissed communism as a "parasitic entity" that fed on social unrest and economic instability. For Hitler, the struggle against communism was also a struggle for the survival of the Aryan race, and he stressed the need for a unified, racially pure nation to combat it.

Hitler's attitudes towards Slavs were deeply rooted in his racist ideology. In his worldview, Slavs were considered inferior races, specifically deemed subhuman compared to the Aryan ideal. He expressed contempt for Slavic culture and advocated for their subjugation, believing they were unworthy of self-determination. This notion was tied to his belief in the need for Lebensraum “living space” for the German people, which he argued could be acquired at the expense of Slavic populations. Hitler asserted that Slavic nations, particularly those in Eastern Europe, were obstacles to German expansion and should be displaced or exterminated to provide land for German settlers. His perspective was heavily influenced by a Darwinian view of racial struggle, where he saw the displacement of Slavs as a necessary step in ensuring the survival and dominance of the Aryan race.

Hitler's view of the Soviet Union was complex. On one hand, he admired the early revolutionary zeal of the Bolsheviks and their ability to fundamentally change society, but he saw their success as a threat that needed to be eradicated. He believed that the Soviet Union represented the epitome of the communist menace, being the first and most influential communist state. He advocated for aggressive expansion into Soviet territory, viewing it as both a military necessity and a means to obtain resources and land. Hitler also anticipated a future conflict with the Soviet Union, which he described as inevitable. He argued that the defeat of communism could only come through military conquest. So yeah, doesn't take a genius to see Hitler was no friend to the USSR. It became apparent to the leadership in both nations that war was looming, although neither was yet prepared for it. In response, Stalin ordered a shift in industrial focus towards armaments production. Although modernization efforts had been in motion since at least 1930, they were conducted covertly to maintain a façade during the League of Nations’ ongoing disarmament discussions. The Soviet Union actively participated in these talks, requiring them to present budgets that indicated stable armament expenditures. They created misleading public budgets that satisfied the talk's requirements while concealing actual spending that was three times greater than the figures disclosed. Following Hitler’s rise, the Red Army announced an even more extensive rearmament initiative.

The core of these budgets was allocated to the production of vast quantities of equipment. Soviet weapon production outpaced that of the Western allies by nearly three to one. A significant aspect of this production surge was the increased funding for weapon development. Between 1930 and 1939, no fewer than sixteen tank designs were introduced and adopted. In comparison, the British developed twelve designs, five of which were created in 1938. The French adopted eleven designs, while the Germans and Americans produced only five each. During this period, the Germans manufactured four designs in substantial numbers, but only two served as a foundation for further development. The Panzers III and IV continued to evolve through various improved versions, but neither could rival the T-34 or KV-1. The KV-1 tank, was a heavy tank, named after the Soviet People's Commissar Kliment Voroshilov “KV”. Development began around 1937 when Soviet military planners recognized the need for a heavily armored tank that could withstand fire from German anti-tank guns. The initial designs were led by engineer Joseph K. Kotin at the Kirov Factory in Leningrad. The KV-1 was characterized by its thick armor, particularly its 75mm frontal armor, which provided exceptional protection against the standard weaponry of the day. The tank's design was influenced by the more mobile and less heavily armored T-34, which was developed concurrently. While the T-34 focused on mobility and firepower with its 76.2 mm gun, the KV-1 was all about survivability. Its weight, approximately 42 tons, made it less maneuverable than lighter tanks, but it was considered a formidable opponent on the battlefield due to its armor and firepower.

The first KV-1 tanks were produced in 1939, with full production commencing in 1940. The initial models were known as the KV-1 Model 1940 and featured the 76.2 mm ZiS-5 gun, which allowed the tank to engage both enemy armor and fortified positions effectively. However, the KV-1's effectiveness was hampered by its relatively slow speed, up to 30 km/h and mechanical issues, which were common in early Soviet tanks. As a heavy tank, it surpassed all but the French Char B1 in terms of firepower and armor. It exhibited the distinctive features of Soviet tank design that persisted until its retirement. However, the KV-1 had several drawbacks, including poor ergonomics, good cross-country capabilities, and a range similar to that of the inferior Panzer III and IV. It was also produced at a low cost. Sharing its engine with the T-34 allowed for parts interchangeability and other benefits, but this limited its speed and range. Additionally, the tank's transmission was poorly engineered, leading to frequent mechanical failures. The KV-1 also lacked potential for upgrades compared to other key tanks of the time, resulting in its relatively early retirement. Its most significant limitation was the small number of units available; only five hundred had been acquired by the start of Operation Barbarossa, and their distribution was scattered, weakening their effectiveness against enemy tanks. The KV-1 initially surprised German forces during Operation Barbarossa due to its resilient armor, which could withstand attacks from the Panzer III and IV tanks and even some heavier anti-tank weapons. However, as the war continued, the Germans developed increasingly effective countermeasures, including the PaK 40 anti-tank gun and the larger-caliber tanks like the Panther and Tiger.

The T-34 tank, widely recognized as one of the most effective and influential tanks of World War II, was developed by the Soviet Union in response to the need for a versatile and powerful armored vehicle that could counter the advancements made by German tanks in the late 1930s. Its development began in 1937 based on the experiences and lessons learned from previous conflicts and the desire to create a tank that combined firepower, armor, and mobility. The design team, led by Mikhail Koshkin of the Kharkov Design Bureau, aimed to create a medium tank that could support infantry while having sufficient speed and maneuverability on various terrains. This led to the decision to mount a 76.2 mm gun, which was powerful enough to penetrate the armor of contemporary German tanks while remaining manageable for a medium tank.

The T-34's hull featured sloped armor, a design innovation that significantly increased its effectiveness against enemy fire by deflecting incoming rounds. Initially, it was armored with 45 mm of steel; later models saw improvements in thickness and armor design. The tank's wide tracks and robust suspension system allowed it to traverse difficult terrain, making it highly mobile compared to its contemporaries. Production of the T-34 began in 1940, and it quickly became a cornerstone of Soviet armored forces. One of the critical aspects of the T-34's development was the push for mass production. It was manufactured in massive quantities, with the USSR producing around eighty-four thousand T-34s during its lengthy production run, while Germany only produced approximately fourteen and a half thousand Panzers III and IV. 

In addition to tanks, the Red Army also explored new artillery designs. The 1930s marked a complete overhaul of the Army’s artillery, even as mechanization and motorization were still behind. By Mechanization I am referring to tracked armored fighting vehicles that move units, i.e. infantry in half-tracks, cavalry being supplanted by tanks, and artillery being replaced by assault guns or self-propelled artillery. Basically motorization is the putting of troops into trucks. A unit considered to be motorized will still generally fight in the traditional manner but be transported by trucks rather than horses or by foot. The latest howitzer model was on par with the best in the world at that time. The M1938 retained the 122-millimeter shell of earlier models but introduced several modern features: a screw breech, tires instead of traditional wheels, enhanced sights, and a split tail carriage that improved stability and facilitated transportation by trucks. This was crucial since the Red Army aimed to motorize its traditionally slowest branches: infantry and artillery.

Truck production was a persistent issue, leading to the widespread use of tractors as substitutes. This was often less than ideal due to tractors' slower speeds and their general unsuitability for long-distance transport. However, tractors were more affordable and available in larger quantities. This availability was primarily a result of the focus on licensing tractor designs for agricultural purposes under the Five-Year Plans, although they served a dual role in this context. Throughout the war, trucks remained a weak point in Soviet production. Starting in August 1941, American and British aid helped fill this gap, with approximately 400,000 trucks delivered during the conflict, while the Soviets managed to produce 265,000 on their own. The need for such aid was not anticipated in the years leading up to the war. The Red Army recognized that their doctrine's envisioned mobility would be significantly hindered if personnel and artillery were not motorized. The production shortcomings of the 1930s did affect the Red Army's campaigns during this period, but the necessary resources were never adequately allocated to resolve these shortages. While the Soviet Union was producing a significant number of trucks, competing demands from industry, the civilian economy, and the military exceeded production capabilities. One contributing factor was the manner in which trucks were distributed to the field forces. Instead of motorizing a single division or corps at a time, trucks were frequently distributed en masse to the Army. This approach allowed the massive army to absorb hundreds or even thousands of trucks at once without any substantial improvement in its capacity to transport personnel and supplies. This critical flaw was addressed during the war under Stalin’s directive, as units were methodically built up in rear areas before being deployed as fully equipped forces. While this was not a perfect solution, it proved to be an improvement over the previous practice of random truck distribution among units throughout the field force.

During this period, the air force showcased some distinctive designs, with the Polikarpov I-16 arguably being the standout among early modern fighter aircraft. The I-16 was designed by the Soviet engineer and aircraft designer Nikolai Polikarpov. The design process began in the mid-1930s, with the goal of creating a fighter that could compete with the latest aircraft of the time, particularly against the rising threat of Nazi Germany. Its development was characterized by a focus on speed, agility, and firepower. The I-16 featured a low-wing monoplane configuration, retractable landing gear, and a powerful M-62 engine, which contributed to its excellent performance. One of the aircraft's most distinctive characteristics was its round shape, often referred to as a "Rata", Spanish for "rat", which was both a result of its construction and its aerodynamic design. The aircraft first flew in December 1933, and after extensive testing and modifications, it was accepted into service by the Soviet Air Force in 1934.

The I-16 quickly gained a reputation for its speed and maneuverability. It was capable of reaching speeds of over 300 mph and had a service ceiling of around 30,000 feet, making it competitive with contemporary fighters like the British Hawker Hurricane and the German Messerschmitt Bf 109. By 1936, the I-16 was in service in significant numbers and was employed extensively in the Spanish Civil War, where it demonstrated its effectiveness in dogfights and ground support roles. In the late 1930s, more than 10,000 units were produced, making the I-16 one of the most widely produced fighters of its time. Its versatility allowed for various modifications, resulting in several variants equipped with different armaments and engines. The aircraft could be fitted with a range of weapons, including machine guns and cannons, enhancing its combat capabilities.

Despite its initial success, the I-16 began to show its age by the end of the 1930s. As newer aircraft were developed, such as the German Bf 109 and the Soviet Yakovlev Yak-1, the I-16 was gradually outclassed. The introduction of heavier armament and improved aerodynamics in these newer models made the I-16 less effective in air combat. By the time World War II began in 1939, the I-16 was still in service but had been overshadowed by its newer counterparts. However, the aircraft remained a crucial part of the Soviet air force during the early stages of the war. It was involved in significant battles, including the Battle of Moscow and the defense against the Luftwaffe, showcasing its enduring relevance despite being outmatched. The Germans had deployed the Bf 109 in considerable numbers, and the Fw-190 was on the verge of becoming operational. Meanwhile, the Soviets were working on several promising fighter designs, but by decade's end, very few modern aircraft had been put into service. The war would trigger a revitalization of fighter development within the Soviet Aero Industry, leading to the introduction of several excellent designs alongside British and American planes. None of these advancements were underway before 1940, a shortcoming that would prove detrimental for the Soviet Union in the initial stages of the German invasion.

One area where the Red Air Force excelled was in the development of attack aircraft. Today, we might refer to this as the Close Air Support role, exemplified by the Il-2 Sturmovik. Its development began in the late 1930s under the leadership of chief designer Sergei Ilyushin, responding to the need for a dedicated ground-attack aircraft capable of taking on enemy armor and fortifications. The initial concept emphasized ruggedness and firepower, leading to the decision to equip the Sturmovik with heavy armament. The design featured a low-wing monoplane configuration with a robust airframe, primarily composed of metal, which was crucial for survivability in combat. The aircraft was powered by the Shvetsov ASh-82 radial engine, offering significant performance capabilities, including a cruising speed of approximately 400 km/h, thats 250 miles per freedom units and a range of around 600 km  or 370 freedom miles.

In 1938, the prototype, designated Il-2, made its first flight. However, its initial design underwent several modifications based on feedback from the Red Air Force and field tests. By the time production began in 1941, the Il-2 had evolved into a formidable platform with improved armor and weaponry. The aircraft was typically armed with a combination of 23mm and 37mm cannons, and it could carry bombs for ground-attack missions. The Sturmovik's production ramped up significantly following the start of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, as the Soviet Union faced a critical need for effective CAS to support its infantry in the wake of German advances. Various factories, including those relocated from western regions during the German invasion, were repurposed for the Sturmovik's manufacturing. This effort led to a staggering output; by war's end, over 36,000 units had been produced, making it one of the most mass-produced aircraft in history.

One of the most notable features of the Il-2 was its armor. The aircraft was heavily fortified to withstand small arms fire and light anti-aircraft artillery, enabling it to operate effectively in contested environments. The armor plate, though adding weight, provided increased survivability for pilots, making the Sturmovik a resilient platform on the battlefield. The Il-2 was quickly proven in combat, participating in numerous key battles, including the Battle of Stalingrad and the Kursk Offensive. It provided essential support to Soviet ground forces, attacking enemy tanks, troops, and supply lines. Its effectiveness was greatly enhanced by the close coordination with ground troops, who would often designate targets for the Sturmovik. The concept behind this design was not exclusive to the Soviet Union, as the Germans also created the highly effective Ju-87 Stuka for similar purposes. It demonstrated greater versatility than the German Stuka, with superior armament and armor. This distinction was partly due to the differing roles of the two aircraft. The Stuka started as a dedicated dive bomber before being modified for anti-tank and strafing attacks, while the Sturmovik was conceived as a more general-purpose aircraft, designed to engage ground targets with a level of protection against anti-aircraft fire. 

The Soviet Navy faced a considerable challenge. The Bolshevik regime prioritized the Red Army while initially neglecting naval forces, which were seen as less critical in a land-based conflict. The 1920s were marked by doctrinal battles, particularly influenced by the Jeune Ecole movement, which valued smaller, more agile naval forces capable of commerce raiding rather than large battleships. This ideological stance led to a limited naval budget and a focus on developing submarines and smaller vessels. By the 1930s, however, the Soviet government's attitude shifted as it recognized the importance of a strong navy in asserting power and protecting its interests. The expansion of the Soviet industrial base during this time allowed for new designs and greater investments in naval construction. Despite initial low priority, Joseph Stalin's regime eventually sanctioned the creation of a formidable fleet, partly in reaction to perceived threats from Nazi Germany. In 1934, the Soviet Navy’s development gained momentum with the introduction of new projects focused on large surface ships, particularly battleships. The decision to pursue these larger vessels was likely influenced by Germany's construction of the Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes, which posed a direct challenge to Soviet naval aspirations. Although attempts were made to acquire foreign designs or ships, ultimately, the decision was made to develop indigenous designs, resulting in the Sovetsky Soyuz class of battleships, although none were completed before their scrap by 1949.

The narrative of the modernization of the Soviet Union’s military and industry in the 1930s is marked by success, but it faced a significant hurdle, Joseph Stalin himself. By 1936, an atmosphere of paranoia pervaded the halls of power. Stalin was haunted by the specter of betrayal. What became known as the Great Purge, began not with an announcement but with whispers of treason among former comrades. Stalin's grip on power felt fragile, and to safeguard the revolution, he believed he needed to eliminate anyone who dared to oppose him. The machinery of state repression, primarily the NKVD, the secret police, was primed for action. The dramatic crescendo began in August 1936 with the infamous Moscow Trials. The first show trial saw key figures of the party, men who had fought alongside Stalin, brought before the court. Grigory Zinoviev, once a close ally, stood in the dock alongside Lev Kamenev, both cloaked in fear. They were accused of plotting against Stalin, a charge resounding with absurdity. Under the harsh lights of a courtroom designed for spectacle rather than truth, they confessed to their crimes, often under extreme duress. The confessions were not just admissions of guilt; they were statements of survival, a desperate bid to escape the death sentence that lurked just outside the courtroom doors. The show trials were merely the tip of the iceberg. The NKVD launched widespread arrests, sweeping through cities and villages, casting nets of terror. Neighbors turned on each other, afraid that silence might invite suspicion. Ordinary citizens were snatched from their homes in the dead of night for crimes they could not comprehend.

Among the arrested were not only party officials but also intellectuals, artists, and even the military brass. Officers of the Red Army, once revered heroes of the revolution, now faced annihilation. They were deemed potential threats to Stalin’s regime. In just a few years, hundreds of thousands would find themselves rotting in labor camps, known as Gulags, while countless others simply vanished, their fates sealed in silence. This wave of terror didn’t only affect the political elite, it seeped into the very fabric of everyday life. Families were torn apart as loved ones disappeared, leaving children to wonder about the fate of their parents. By 1937, the purges entered a particularly brutal phase, targeting the Red Army. Stalin feared that the old guard, with their loyalty to Bolshevism, might rise against him. The NKVD executed or imprisoned a significant portion of military leaders, including the chief military commanders. One general, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a celebrated figure during the civil war, was executed after a short trial marked by his own forced confession. The Red Army, once a colossal force, crumbled under the weight of leadership decimated by Stalin’s retribution.

The purges created a culture steeped in fear. People who had once celebrated the October Revolution now tread lightly, avoiding conversations that could be misconstrued as dissent. As the purges peaked, the sheer scale of repression began to overwhelm not just the citizens but also the very institutions of the party. The tide began to turn with the fall of Nikolai Yezhov, the head of the NKVD, who became a victim of Stalin's paranoia himself. In 1938, as the purges began to ebb, Stalin turned on Yezhov, blaming him for the excesses of the terror. The once-feared Yezhov was arrested, tortured, and executed, a grim reminder that loyalty in Stalin's world was an illusion. By 1939, the purges had subsided, leaving a shattered society in their wake. Estimates of the dead, imprisoned, or exiled during this period range from 1.5 to 3 million, a high price for a regime clinging to power through fear. The Great Purge would forever mar the Soviet psyche, laying an indelible mark on the national identity. Stalin’s Soviet Union emerged from the Great Purge a different entity, albeit one weakened by loss. The fabric of trust that had once connected people dissolved. The old Bolshevik guard, with their vision of a worker's paradise, had been replaced by a climate of submission, survival hinged on unyielding loyalty to the dictator.

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In the aftermath of World War I, Germany teetered on the brink of chaos. Amidst despair, Adolf Hitler rose to power, exploiting public disillusionment. Meanwhile, Stalin's USSR pursued rapid industrialization through Five-Year Plans, implementing brutal purges to eliminate dissent. These regimes set the stage for future conflict as tensions escalated.