The Eastern Front Week by Week

Eastern Front #17 Winter is Coming

Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Typhoon. In September 1941, Leningrad faced a brutal siege. Amidst this chaos, General Zhukov rallied his troops with the grim order, “Not a step back!” While the Axis celebrated victories, soldiers at the front grew skeptical of the Nazi propaganda that inflated confidence. As the Germans prepared for Operation Typhoon, a decisive offensive aimed at seizing Moscow, logistical strains became apparent. The advance stalled, and any hope for quick victory faded. However, both sides braced for a monumental clash. Stalin and Zhukov vowed to defend the capital, with the latter asserting that they would hold Moscow at all costs. With over a million troops and abundant resources, the Germans believed victory was within reach. Yet, the Soviet defenses, fortified and resolute, stood in their way. Both the Axis and the Red Army prepared for battle, knowing the outcome would alter the course of the war. The struggle for Moscow loomed, a pivotal moment that promised a harrowing chapter in history.

This episode is Winter is Coming 

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

Massive formations of Panzers advance through the heart of the Soviet Union, sweeping aside all resistance. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers find themselves encircled, with little hope of breaking free to fight another day. The siege of Leningrad tightens as the Nazis press their advantage. In the south, the Southwestern Front still bears the scars of the devastating battle of Kyiv, where countless men now lie dead across the steppes. Meanwhile, Crimea faces a new assault, as the invaders prepare to drive towards the Don River. The conflict over Leningrad continues to devolve into a stalemate, and Army Group South grapples with the vastness of Ukraine while contending with its scarce resources. As we move into October, the weather shifts noticeably along the entire front. Snow has already begun to fall in the north, while rainstorms have caused intermittent delays. In summer, such storms typically lasted only days; now, they stretch on for weeks. Fall is firmly upon us, and winter approaches quickly. The weather was beginning to change. As Ned Stark said “Winter is coming”. 

 

During the first week of October, significant changes were implemented in the organization of the Ostheer by Hitler and the OKH. Most notably, the Panzer Groups were re-designated as Panzer Armies. This change was more than just a new title; it reflected the increasing importance of armored units within the German military strategy. Previously, these groups had been subordinated to field armies, which often resulted in friction between commanders, particularly between Guderian and Kluge during the early phases of operations. This friction created significant challenges throughout the chain of command. It began even before the war and persisted into the campaign in France. Guderian and Kluge’s personal animosity added to the strain. However, they were not alone in their frustrations; other commanders also felt the negative impact of the previous organizational structure. This hierarchy caused confusion within the chain of command and left Panzer leaders feeling constrained, desiring greater independence in their operations. Now, with the new designation as Panzer Armies, they would report directly to Army Group Commanders. This shift was aimed at enhancing the coordination of resources and expanding strategic options across the front. In theory, this new structure would streamline decision-making and improve the effectiveness of armored units in combat.

 

By October 1, the offensive capabilities of Army Group North had diminished significantly. Leeb informed Hitler that he could not launch any major offensives without additional reinforcements. Given the limited reinforcements received in late September, he had to work with what he had. Leeb still commanded 2 Panzer divisions and 2 motorized infantry divisions within General of Panzer Troops Schmidt’s 39th Corps. He intended to employ these mobile forces in a limited offensive. Leeb considered 2 options for his attack. The first was to break through the Soviet 8th Army at Oranienbaum, a promising choice. However, Leeb ultimately decided to focus on linking up with the Finns. This plan involved launching an attack northeast toward Volkhov, aiming to destroy the Soviet 54th Army in the process.

 

Hitler intervened and rejected the proposed plan. He insisted that Leeb instead attack toward Tikhvin first, then counter-march northeast to encircle the 54th Army at Volkhov. This plan likely appeared more appealing on the map tables of the dictator’s bunker than Leeb’s modest proposal. However, it overlooked crucial factors. An operation of this scale required more troops than Army Group North could muster, and it disregarded the fragile condition of the forces besieging Leningrad. Nonetheless, in a clear demonstration of Hitler’s growing disconnect from reality, and the weak resolve of the Nazi generals, Leeb accepted the plan. After some back and forth, the dictator ultimately got his way. Schmidt’s Corps was designated as the main effort toward Tikhvin, supported by 4 infantry divisions on the flanks. The 11th, 21st, 254th, and 126th Infantry Divisions were positioned south of the Shisselburg corridor and would need to redeploy to support the Panzers. Due to this requirement and the need to stockpile supplies, the attack was scheduled for October 16. Notably, the distances involved were relatively short, at less than 100 kilometers. When accounting for the delays in redeployment and logistics, the contrast with the early days of Operation Barbarossa becomes stark. The Wehrmacht remained an extremely competent and dangerous adversary, but its period of absolute dominance was clearly fading. Meanwhile, the Stavka was not resting idly. Even while addressing the potential collapse of the Western Front, they had to focus on developments in the Northwest. The Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts were instructed to prepare for another attempt to breach the vital German corridor at Shisselburg. A launch date was set for later in the month, pending the completion of preparations and a reorganization of the command structure.

 

Further south, Operation Typhoon represented far more than just another offensive; it was the culmination of months of intense fighting and hundreds of thousands of German casualties. The Nazi state had convinced itself, from top to bottom, not only of the inevitability of victory but also of its swiftness. Although the disappointment over the failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Soviet Union was palpable, it was only mentioned obliquely.  On the night of October 1, 1941, just hours before Operation Typhoon was set to begin, Adolf Hitler issued a proclamation that was to be read aloud to the troops on the eastern front “Soldiers! When I called on you to ward off the danger threatening our homeland on 22 June, you faced the greatest military power of all time. In barely three months, thanks to your bravery, my comrades, it has been possible to destroy one tank brigade after another belonging to this opponent, to eliminate countless divisions, to take uncounted prisoners, to occupy endless space … You have taken over 2,400,000 prisoners, you have destroyed or captured 17,500 tanks and over 21,000 guns, you have downed or destroyed on the ground 14,200 planes. The world has never seen anything like this!”.

While Hitler emphasized the unprecedented nature of the Ostheer’s success, his comments also hinted at Operation Barbarossa’s failure to eliminate Soviet resistance. “This time,” he confidently promised, everything would proceed “according to plan” to deliver the long-awaited “deadly blow” to the Soviet Union. With characteristic bravado, Hitler declared: “Today, the last great decisive battle of this year begins.” Yet not everyone was convinced. Wolf Dose, a soldier in the 58th Infantry Division, wrote in his diary “The Führer has told us that the decisive battle in the east is beginning, a battle that will finish off the Russians, but how and where he did not say. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will capitulate.”Others were more outspoken. “The last great decisive battle of the year, my God! And what is the decisive result supposed to be, Moscow, Kharkov, the Volga?” Throughout Germany, morale had been boosted by the recent wave of Sondermeldungen, but for those German soldiers in the forward trenches of Bock’s army group, those who had resisted fierce Soviet attacks for the past 2 months, there were far fewer illusions about the difficulties of ending the war in the east. The new drive on Moscow presented daunting challenges. In the immediate prelude to Operation Typhoon, Heinrich Haape recorded the activity observed on the Soviet side of the line “East of the Mezha, the Russians prepared a strong system of trenches, bunkers, tank-traps and barbed-wire entanglements. They laid minefields, reinforced their front-line troops, brought up supplies and gathered their strength to stand against us once more. We had to sit helplessly … and listen to stories brought back by our patrols of the rapidly developing Russian defensive system, and to read reports from our Luftwaffe spotter aircraft which saw the movement toward the front of fresh troops, guns and supply trains”. Summing up the early October period another German soldier declared “the real hardships were about to start. The experience so far was only a prelude”. Both the Wehrmacht and Hitler managed to delude themselves into believing they could still end the war with one final push. Deceiving the public was dangerous, yet it could be justified if the Communists could be crushed before the year's end. As October 1 dawned and the front lines erupted into violent clashes once again, the fate of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union hung in the balance. Taking Moscow was unlikely to end the war, but it would make victory significantly harder for the Soviet defenders.

 

At 05:30 on the morning of October 2, Bock’s offensive opened with a massed artillery bombardment followed by air and ground assaults. Heinz Otto Fausten, serving in the 1st Panzer Division, wrote of “a massive barrage of preparatory fire. At around noon, we crossed flattened enemy positions, our river of troops and vehicles flooding eastwards.” Infantryman Helmut Pabst wrote home in a letter: “06:00. I jump on top of a dugout. There are the tanks! Giants rolling slowly towards the enemy. And the planes. One squadron after the other, unloading their bombs across the way. Army Group Centre has launched its attack.” The war diary of Colonel Georg von Bismarck’s 20th Panzer Division labeled October 2 “a historic day.”

 

Panzer Group 2, however, had been in action since September 30, and by the evening of October 2, Guderian felt his forces had achieved a “full breakthrough.” In less than 3 days, his subordinate 47th Panzer Corps recorded capturing 3,800 POWs, destroying or capturing 17 Panzers, 42 guns, 77 trucks, and 300 horses. To the north, Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 advanced up to 15 kilometers into Soviet positions on the first day, and although the enemy it encountered was reported to be “surprised,” they nevertheless “resisted bitterly.” Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 drove 20 kilometers into the Soviet lines on the first day and found enemy resistance to be less than expected. The rapid advance was also attributed to the good weather, which, according to Panzer Group 3’s war diary, “benefited all movement on the bad roads and tracks.” Where the roads became problematic, the dry conditions allowed for off-road detours, avoiding serious delays. The weather report for central Russia on October 2 was “clear and sunny,” reminiscent of the conditions during the opening of Operation Barbarossa 103 days earlier. The 5th Panzer Division’s war diary simply labeled it “offensive weather.”

 

At Army Group Centre, Bock was elated. That night he wrote in his diary: “The army group went to the attack according to plan. We advanced so easily everywhere that doubts arose as to whether the enemy had not in fact decamped.” Yet intelligence gathered from captured Soviet officers soon confirmed that no order for withdrawal had been issued, and the defending armies had been ordered to hold their positions at all costs. German radio intelligence further confirmed the Red Army’s dogged determination to resist and not surrender ground. Soviet intercepts read: “Reinforcement not possible, the crossings are to be held”; “the commander is dead, I have taken over command”; “I cannot hold any longer, destroying the radio.” 

 

As Helmut Pabst observed, the German superiority at Panzer Group 3’s point of main concentration was overwhelming. “Tanks roll by, close to the gun position. A hundred have gone by already, and they’re still coming on… It looks like chaos, but it works to the minute, like clockwork. Today they want to break into the Dnieper line, tomorrow it will be Moscow. Armoured scout cars are now joining the columns.” After almost 4 hours watching the main grouping of Hoth’s Panzer Group pass by, Pabst concluded: “By now I think we’ve seen the last come by. It’s getting quieter… Any war film would pale by comparison. ‘That was really some show!’ the boys are saying.”

 

While Typhoon’s opening success seemed complete, there were still some bitterly contested positions, costing many German lives. Lieutenant-General Heinrich Meyer-Bürdorf’s 131st Infantry Division suffered very heavy losses on October 2 while trying to clear Soviet positions opposing its front. The Panzer divisions also encountered the familiar problem of inadequate bridges and, more ominously for the first day of an offensive, fuel shortages. Even before the offensive had begun, fuel reserves were recognized to be worryingly small, and plans were made to bring up more fuel using transport aircraft and towed gliders. Yet there could be no question that Army Group Centre was making significant gains across a wide section of the eastern front, and that was the message Bock relayed to Colonel Rudolf Schmundt, the Führer’s chief military adjutant at the “Wolf’s Lair” , Hitler’s secluded East Prussian headquarters.

 

The news confirmed for Hitler that the war was nearing its end, and he was in a celebratory mood. On October 3, at the annual opening of the War Winter Relief Organisation (Kriegswinterhilfswerk) in Berlin, Hitler delivered his first national address since the war began in the east. It was an auspicious occasion, allowing Hitler to recast the conflict from a failed blitzkrieg to a seamless military operation on the verge of victory. He stated: “On the morning of June 22, this greatest struggle in the history of the world began. Since then, three and a half months have passed. Today I can state everything has gone according to plan.” Yet even Hitler could not overlook the scale and cost of the fighting in the east, and he admitted that Germany had been caught unawares. “However, something did deceive us,” he told the German people; “we had no idea how gigantic the preparations of this opponent against Germany and Europe had been.” It was a surprisingly frank admission, probably inspired by his confidence in the impending defeat of the Soviet Union, which he now promised in the most direct terms. “I say this here today because I may say today that this opponent has already broken down and will never rise again!”

 

Not only was Hitler forecasting the end of the war in the east, but he also admitted he had switched industry away from army production. “Today, it is only a question of transport. Today, we have taken care in advance so that, in the midst of this war of materiel, I can order further production in many spheres to cease, because I know there is no opponent whom we would not be able to defeat with the existing amounts of ammunition.” Hitler’s speech may have reassured many of his followers, but it also reflected the depths of delusion inhibiting the German command and the credibility gap that had arisen between war propaganda and the actual situation in the east. Nevertheless, in the short term, soldiers like Wilhelm Prüller rejoiced at Hitler’s address. Writing in his diary, Prüller noted: “What a lift his words give us, as we crowd around the wireless set, not wanting to miss a single word! Is there a finer reward after a day of battle than to hear the Führer? Never!” Erich Hager noted in his diary that after the speech, “all sorts were really enthused. Many were drunk.” Other soldiers, however, were less convinced and seemed confused by the emerging dichotomy between the public representation and personal experience of the war. Hans Jürgen Hartmann expressed: “Perhaps it is only ‘talk’ that our enemy is broken and will never rise again. I cannot help myself, I am totally bewildered. Will the whole war still be over before winter?” Certainly, those with a broader perspective on events were not taken in by Hitler’s confident ruse. The Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, wrote in his diary on October 3 “Speech by Hitler in Berlin, which was unexpected, or almost so. First impressions are that he has tried to explain to the German people his reasons for the attack on Russia and to justify his delay in ending the war, about which he had made very definite commitments. There is no doubt that he has lost some of his vigour … As for us, we are given no particular attention; he lumped us with the others, and this will not produce a good impression in Italy, where the wave of anti-German feeling is growing stronger and stronger”.

 

Reality was, not everything was going perfectly smoothly. Some infantry units were suffering heavy casualties as they attempted to break the Soviet lines. There was no retreat; the Red Army was fighting for every inch of ground. This obstinacy proved to be a double-edged sword. Stiff resistance was slowing the German infantry down, ensuring they paid dearly for their gains. However, it was also setting up the Soviet field armies for encirclement by the fast-moving Panzers. There was still little the field armies could do to effectively counter the penetrating Nazi armor. At Yelna, the 9th Infantry Corps under the 4th Army was hammered by Red Army counterattacks. The Soviet 24th Army refused to sit idly by and attempted to force the Germans onto the defensive.

 

On October 2, the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions under General of Panzers Lemelsen’s 47th Corps encountered a counterattack by the 141st Tank Brigade. The Soviets were reasonably well-equipped with heavy tanks. In weeks past, they would have wreaked havoc on the advancing Panzers for hours or even days. Not anymore. The Germans had started to equip each Panzer battalion with an 88mm anti-aircraft gun and a 105mm howitzer to help counter the Soviet heavy tanks. Here, this modification proved its worth when the lead battalions quickly knocked out several KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, breaking up the counterattack almost immediately. By the morning of October 3, Guderian had a battalion of tanks more than 100 kilometers from his starting point. They seized bridges over the River Okta and began advancing on the city of Orel, which was a major population center of over 100,000 people and an important waypoint on the highway to Moscow. Furthermore, it cut Eremenko’s lines of communication with the Stavka and any real hope of reinforcements. After months of slogging across Ukraine, Guderian had finally broken out into the open. This was a real breakthrough that had not been seen since the early fighting around Smolensk.

 

In a daring move, a single company stormed the city of Orel. They lost three tanks but managed to overwhelm the confused defenders. The company was reinforced later that day, but here the advance stalled. OKH’s failure to properly stockpile supplies came back to haunt the Panzers. On the advance to Orel, some units ran out of fuel on the road. They had taken the city, wiped out two tank brigades, and inflicted over 10,000 casualties on their Red Army opponents. However, there was simply no more fuel. Guderian tried to persuade the Luftwaffe to airdrop fuel at the captured Orel Airfield, but to no avail. The VVS was still active, and there were too many Soviet fighters in the area. The Luftwaffe could not spare an escort for supply planes, and Guderian’s request was denied. This meant that his Corps had to drive their own trucks back to supply depots and gather as much as they could carry. They started out late on the fourth, but it would take four more days before they could return.

Further to the north, Hoth was determined to break the connection between the Western Front’s 19th and 30th Armies.

 

To accomplish this, he concentrated all of his Panzer Divisions at this point. The Soviets were ill-prepared to fend off the German armor here; they had no armored reserves at either the Army or Front level. There were few anti-tank guns in the rifle divisions, and unit cohesion was lacking. Additionally, many of the units making up these armies were worn down from fighting around Smolensk in August. Hoth had two infantry corps under his command for the operation: the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, which were used to launch fixing attacks against the front lines of the 19th and 30th Armies. Just as Hoth hoped, the Soviet Armies waited for Western Front commander Colonel General Konev to release armored reserves that could have been used to prevent the flanks of the field armies from being turned instantly. However, Konev did not have the numbers necessary to defeat the Panzer incursion. What he did have, he threw into the fight. First, Konev ordered three heavy artillery regiments to create a wall of fire on the advancing Panzers. This failed to stop them. Next, he sent his tank brigades to attack. In rapid succession on October 3, the 143rd, 126th, and 128th Tank Brigades were deployed. They were repulsed, losing over 100 tanks in the process. The continued poor performance of the Soviet tank formations is attributed to a complicated and interlocking series of issues. The tank brigades were more manageable than their larger tank corps counterparts had been. However, poor deployment planning and ongoing failures to coordinate operations both horizontally and vertically resulted in piecemeal attacks. These shortcomings would continue to haunt the Red Army well into the war. In the first week, Hoth faced little difficulty from the Soviet defenders. Like his counterpart Guderian, however, he struggled with resupply and fuel reserves. They reached Vyazma before the end of October 7 and managed to secure the northern flank of the city. The Western Front’s mobile reserves under Major General Dovator were forced to retreat. The 19th and 30th Armies were being cut off, leaving little hope for a successful retreat.

 

Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group was completely transformed for its role in Operation Typhoon. He now commanded three corps, compared to the two he had when the campaign in the east began. Additionally, he received a much greater share of the resources and supplies to ensure his success. His formations would smash the Reserve Front and secure the southern half of the Vyazma encirclement. On the first day, his two lead corps made it across the Desna River. The Reserve Front under Marshal Budyonny had only two tank brigades as its mobile reserve. Budyonny decided to hold these further back, choosing not to contest Hoepner’s crossing of the Desna. This proved to be a mistake, as his two field armies were quickly crushed in rapid movements. By the end of the fourth day, the 33rd and 43rd Armies had been defeated and had to retreat. To make matters worse, the Marshal had been caught in the retreat during a visit to a field headquarters, meaning he was unavailable to direct the battle during much of the critical opening phase.

 

It was at this moment that Hoepner’s increased strength proved to be decisive. He had kept his 57th Panzer Corps under General Kuntzen in reserve and committed Kuntzen on October 5. The battle quickly devolved into little more than a rout. Early on October 6, the town of Yukhnov fell to elements of the 10th Panzer Division. The Panzers were now just 200 kilometers from the center of Moscow. This was an unmitigated disaster for the Soviet defense of the capital, with the bulk of the Western Front now trapped in the Vyazma pocket. On October 5, Stalin called Zhukov from Leningrad and placed him in charge of the defense of Moscow. The Western and Reserve Fronts were subordinated to him, and Zhukov set his plans into action immediately. On October 6, he sent orders for the rebuilding of the Mozhaisk Defensive Line. This was not a new position; it had been started back in July, but the fighting around Smolensk had depleted much of the manpower reserved for its garrison. Now, it was to be the last line before Moscow itself. The defense would run through four critical towns: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, and Kaluga, forming an approximately 230-kilometer line west of Moscow that needed garrisoning. The capital was mobilized for a struggle unlike any other. Anything that could be considered a military resource was requisitioned and sent to the line. At least three regiments were formed from students of the military schools in Moscow and sent off. The situation was dire, but Zhukov remained confident in the Red Army. By this point, Zhukov had established a strong reputation as a fixer who did not yield to political pressures when he believed he was right. He had not yet lost a battle against the invaders and had proven capable of turning them back at Yelna and Leningrad. Now, he would defend the capital.

 

As the first week of Operation Typhoon ended, it looked like a repeat of the early victories of the summer. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were again encircled or in imminent danger of being encircled. The front line was collapsing once more. In Ukraine, the invaders were experiencing a mixed bag of results. The push to clear the eastern bank of the Dnieper was mostly successful, as Kleist was able to take Zaporozhye on the first. This was a boon for Manstein’s 11th Army, which had been forced to split his forces to support the collapsing Romanian 3rd Army. Fearing encirclement, the Soviet 9th and 18th Armies decided to pull back. However, this withdrawal was not entirely successful, and large numbers were caught up. This opened the path to Mariupol, and the Germans were prepared to take advantage of the space. Meanwhile, attempts to break through the Perekop Isthmus were stalling without additional support. Halder and the OKH staff had hoped that Manstein would be able to take the entire peninsula in a quick surprise attack and cut across the Kerch Strait to reach the Caucasus. It was becoming clear even now that this would not be easy. The city of Odessa was still holding out against the Romanians and their German allies. The defenders just would not break, but as the first week of October ended, the situation was looking dire. The Stavka was not ready to give up the city yet, but that time seemed to be approaching rapidly.

 

Sometime during this week, Hitler decided that Army Group South would focus its attacks on securing the Black Sea Coast, Crimea, and the Donets River basin. This meant that the drive on Kharkiv was abandoned in order to free up the forces necessary to secure the line from Mariupol to Donetsk. After this, Kleist would advance to Rostov, and the Don River would be secured. The Donets River Basin was home to many industrial centers and enormous coal reserves. At this point, Germany was suffering from shortages in coal and industrial capacity. Hitler was desperate to secure these resources before the coming winter to alleviate the effects of these shortages on the civilian economy. This plan of attack did not require any major encirclements, but it depended on Stalin being unable to rebuild the Southwestern Front. This was a significant contingency, but Halder and the OKH were convinced that the Soviets were concentrating all their resources in defense of Moscow. They also believed that the Red Army had nothing left in the tank. This was a critical mistake. No German general could claim ignorance of the demonstrated force generation capabilities of the USSR thus far. The only evidence they could muster to support their hypothesis was the number of armies they had destroyed. To their minds, it seemed illogical, if not impossible, that the Red Army would be able to raise more troops and place them in the path of the Wehrmacht. This ignorance was fundamentally rooted in the widespread belief in Nazi racial propaganda. The Soviets were perceived as barbarians, incapable of the effective governance that long-term mass conscription required. While the Nazi leadership would be disabused of this notion before the end of the war, they never relinquished their supposed racial superiority over the Soviet soldier.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

 

As Operation Typhoon began, the stakes for both the Nazis and Soviets escalated dramatically. General Zhukov urged his troops to hold their ground amidst a crippling siege in Leningrad. Meanwhile, massive German formations advanced, encircling hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers. Despite initial successes, the harsh weather and fierce Soviet resistance posed significant obstacles. With Hitler proclaiming imminent victory, doubts lingered among soldiers about the true state of the conflict. As both sides prepared for a pivotal battle, the looming clash for Moscow promised to alter the war's course.

 

Eastern Front #16 Operation Typhoon Begins

Last time we spoke about the fall of Kyiv. In September 1941, as the German forces encircled Kyiv under General Guderian's leadership, desperation loomed large for the Soviet Red Army. Despite their valiant efforts to withstand the siege, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers found themselves trapped, leading to mass surrenders. Amidst the chaos, General Zhukov took command in Leningrad, rallying his troops with the stern order: “Not a step back!”. This grim scene was compounded by the chilling decision by Nazi leaders to execute thousands of Jews at Babi Yar, demonstrating the brutal lengths to which they would go in retaliation for resistance. The battle marked a turning point; while Germany celebrated its victory, deep-rooted issues within its ranks, including dwindling supplies and morale, were beginning to surface. The horror of war had only just begun, marking a tragic chapter in history that echoed far beyond the battlefield.

This episode is the Fall of Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week, we left off with the destruction of the Southwestern Front and the capture of Kyiv. The job of defending Leningrad was tossed over to Zhukov. Meanwhile a massive reorganization was unfolding for a new operation aimed at Moscow. Yet before we jump into that I wanted to first talk about something else, how was the German propaganda machine telling the folks back home what was going on in the east? Under Hitler’s regime, there was no clear structure for producing and disseminating state propaganda. Officially, Josef Goebbels served as the Minister of Propaganda, but he lacked absolute control over the nation’s various media outlets. Instead, he competed for influence with the Wehrmacht’s Office of Propaganda Troops and other branches of the civilian government.

 

While the Wehrmacht’s office was primarily supposed to focus on internal messaging, it often released reports to the press. This was a strategic move to amplify the OKW’s preferred narrative on the frontlines and promote a military-friendly storyline. Goebbels himself was less concerned with glorifying the military or its achievements unless it directly benefited the Nazi Party or bolstered his own power. For Goebbels, serving Hitler was the ultimate priority. While many others in the government were driven solely by a hunger for power, Goebbels was a true believer in Hitler's vision, which became evident in his reporting and propagandistic efforts. Despite the growing challenges of the eastern campaign, the German command remained largely convinced that a final major offensive could bring an end to the war against the Soviet Union. Recent successes in the North and South, namely, the encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Kyiv, had revitalized enthusiasm and heightened expectations that the Soviet state was on the brink of collapse.

 

A pivotal factor in fostering this belief was Goebbels’s series of Sondermeldungen, or special news bulletins, which publicly proclaimed that the war was nearing its conclusion. However, the soldiers at the front had a different perspective on the accuracy of such claims. While some were buoyed by the optimism, many voiced skepticism. General Wilhelm Groener, who directed the German occupation of Ukraine in 1918, had warned against complacency in campaigning in the East. He stated, “Anyone who wants to grasp the strategic nature of the eastern theatre of war must not overlook historical recollections. Beside the gate of the vast lowland between the Vistula and the Urals, which is the home of one state and one people, stands the warning figure of Napoleon, whose fate should implant in anyone who attacks Russia a sense of horror and foreboding.” On September 26, soldier Heinz Rahe wrote to his wife about the anticipated offensive toward Moscow. He expressed hope that Moscow would be reached within fourteen to twenty days, but then added with a hint of doubt, “—but not by us.” Similarly, a non-commissioned officer with the 79th Infantry Division expressed his reservations on September 24. He noted, “Whether Russia can be defeated this year, I doubt very much. The Soviet military might is indeed broken, but the country is too vast, and capitulation is not an option for the Russians. Because two men can’t agree on their ideas, millions of men have to bleed.” In another poignant letter dated September 28, Alois Scheuer shared his experiences in the East, hinting at the numerous difficulties he faced. He remarked, “What I have experienced and lived through in this quarter of a year in Russia, I cannot put into words. There is so much I wish to forget and never be reminded of again. I always try not to lose hope and courage, but there are hours when the loneliness and desolation are almost unbearable.”

 

While many soldiers at the front expressed their doubts and yearned for an end to the war, Goebbels's victory propaganda continued to resonate effectively, particularly within Germany. Classified reports from the SD or “Sicherheitsdienst”gauging public opinion revealed that, as of September 25, fears of positional warfare in the East and the likelihood of a winter campaign had largely faded. A follow-up report on September 29 confirmed that more and more people were beginning to believe in a German victory before winter set in. Despite this success, Goebbels was troubled by the extent of the rising optimism. In his diary entry from September 27, he observed, “The depression is now completely gone. At times, the mood of the people goes far beyond the real possibilities. Once again, there’s hope that this winter the war will be over, and we have much to do in the next weeks to temper this extreme optimism to a more realistic level.” This palpable sense of optimism was felt even at the front, where many desperately clung to the belief that victory was near. On September 28, Hans-Albert Giese wrote to his mother, “In the next few days, we will again march somewhat further. We look forward to it because the quicker we advance, the sooner we can return home to Germany. The news from the past few days has been really great. These Bolsheviks won’t last much longer.” Another soldier, Ernst Guicking, shared similar sentiments in a letter to his wife dated September 29. He stated, “Kiev is done. Now it’s the turn of Army Group Centre. The great final chord will soon be played in the East. All our hopes are pinned on the coming four weeks.

 

As the war progressed, Goebbels struggled to balance the expectations and morale of the civilian population with the harsh realities of the situation. The Wehrmacht was experiencing victories, but things had not unfolded as planned, despite what Hitler proclaimed to the public. While official reports boasted that the Red Army was on its last legs, Goebbels was increasingly anxious about public opinion, especially as the war inevitably stretched into 1942 and beyond. Throughout the conflict, the messaging from the German state regarding the situation in the East was anything but clear. Evidence suggests that this lack of clarity impacted morale both within the armed forces and among civilians. Hitler had never been entirely secure from the threat of an internal coup, and his security situation would continue to deteriorate over the coming months and years. This decline wasn't solely due to waning morale caused by inconsistent and vague propaganda that diverged from the realities of war. Initially, Hitler’s strategic management had helped stave off coup attempts during his reign. However, his forthcoming failures would ignite discontent in the future. Propaganda had been a crucial element of the Nazi state's success in maintaining control over Germany, but the cracks were starting to show in its armor. By the end of September 1941, even ordinary soldiers were beginning to openly question the wisdom of the war. For instance, in the aftermath of the fighting around Kyiv, one soldier reflected on these sentiments in a letter home “Three months ago today the campaign against Russia began. Everybody supposed at the time that the Bolsheviks would be ripe for capitulation within no more than eight to ten weeks. That assumption, however, was based on a widespread ignorance of the Russian war materiel...Just this morning we happened to hear that, for example near Kiev, 600 guns and 150,000 men were captured. What kind of figures are those! Russia is almost inexhaustible”.

 

Things began to grind to a halt at Leningrad. The German advance, now almost entirely devoid of armored support, was stalling at the Pulkovo Heights. The suburban areas surrounding the city proved to be a tough challenge. In the North, the Finns hesitated to attack, leaving their German allies struggling to push them further. Any hope for a link-up on the eastern shores of Lake Ladoga had to come from Army Group North, but with the 4th Panzer Group reassigned to Army Group Center for the foreseeable future, this prospect was all but impossible. On September 25, the 16th Army was pushed back from the eastern bank of the Neva River. The Soviets continued their assault, but by the 27th, Luftwaffe air support began breaking up their attacks. Throughout the remainder of the month, the Red Army launched small-scale offensives from the Valdai Hills, pressing west into the German lines, yet they gained little ground. Inside Leningrad, Zhukov was not content to simply wait for the Wehrmacht to come to him. He ordered the 54th Army to attack. Although these counterattacks ultimately proved unsuccessful, they troubled General Leeb. The commander of Army Group North recognized that he was stretched too thinly and that the weight of command was eroding his remaining confidence.

 

As the offensive capabilities of the Army Group waned, Hitler sought alternative methods for the destruction of Leningrad. A notable instance of this shift occurred on September 29, when a directive was issued by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, clearly outlining the invaders' intentions. “The Fuhrer has decided to have St. Petersburg wiped off the face of the map. The further existence of this large town is of no interest once Soviet Russia is overthrown. The intention is to close in on the city and raze it to the ground by bombardments of artillery of all calibers and by continuous air attack. We have no interest in keeping even part of this great city’s population. The consequences arising from the extinction of St. Petersburg will be worked out at Supreme Command”. This directive, among others, made it clear that there was little hope for the city to surrender. In response, the resolve of both soldiers and civilians in Leningrad strengthened. Alongside Zhukov’s earlier order of “Not One Step Back,” Stalin issued his own commands, directing Zhukov to purge the city of potential fifth columnists. Defeatism could not be tolerated if the Soviet Union was to achieve victory. Though no one could foresee the horrors that awaited the city in the years to come, Stalin remained unwavering in his stance against perceived enemies of the state. He called for the eradication of both willing and unwilling collaborators with the invaders. In practice, this meant the murder of innocents and the relentless elimination of dissenters who might assist the Germans in their quest to take Leningrad.

 

Throughout the last week of September, Army Group Center was abuzz with activity. A new German offensive, codenamed Operation Typhoon, was being formed, aimed to create a massive breach in the center of the Soviet front. The objective was to eliminate the bulk of the Red Army before Moscow, seize control of the Soviet capital, and bring major operations on the Eastern Front to an end before winter set in. To achieve this, the OKH which directed operations on the Eastern Front, ordered a significant reorganization of the Ostheer or “Eastern Army” to provide the necessary forces. Army Group Centre was poised to receive the highest concentration of panzer, motorized, and infantry divisions ever assembled by Nazi Germany. In total, Bock’s army group commanded seventy-five divisions, including approximately forty-seven infantry divisions and fourteen panzer divisions. On October 2, the designated start date for Operation Typhoon, over 1,500 panzers and 1,000 aircraft were set to combine for a blitz-style offensive intended to overwhelm the Soviet front and enable rapid exploitation into the Soviet rear. Engaging more than a million Soviet troops necessitated battles of immense scale, with no guarantees of success. Even a battlefield victory would not necessarily lead to an end to hostilities. As the Germans had learned repeatedly since June 1941, there was a significant gap between operational success and strategic triumph. Operation Typhoon needed to be more than just another extension of the German front claiming more Soviet prisoners; it had to establish the conditions for a definitive victory in the East. Consequently, the OKH concentrated everything it could spare for one vast final offensive. This was a last-ditch effort to break the looming specter of a stalemate and avoid the uncertainty of a winter campaign. Capturing Moscow and ending the war in the East was always going to be a daunting task. Yet, more than at any other time in 1941, the strategic situation in mid-October convinced the German high command that victory against the Soviet Union was within reach. Even the Soviet government was preparing for the loss of Moscow, designating a new capital some 800 kilometers further east. Thus, despite the challenges facing the panzer groups, Hitler’s October offensive seemed to reinvigorate Germany’s war in the East and, in the eyes of the German command, brought the Ostheer closer than ever to outright victory.

 

Preparations for Operation Typhoon reached their peak as last-minute deliveries of fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements arrived at their jump-off points. Halder recorded in his diary on the 26th that the entire front line of Army Group Center was eerily quiet. This silence lasted until the 28th, when the Red Army began to launch probing attacks along the line. German reconnaissance reported that Soviet divisions were being transferred elsewhere. Halder noted, almost nonchalantly, that this was likely due to the Stavka attempting to organize a defense in depth, a suspicion that would prove to be more than valid in the coming weeks. The plan for the offensive was now fully outlined. In the northern part of the attack, the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group would form the line, serving as the most northern arm of the first encirclement, aimed at closing in on Vyazma. This would create a relatively small pocket, a reflection of two key factors. First, the reduced combat power of the army played a significant role. Second, and perhaps more critically, the small size of the encirclement indicated that Hitler had triumphed in the arguments of July. These discussions had focused on the large-scale operations of Army Group Center's early encirclements. Hitler advocated for scaled-back operations that targeted smaller sections of the Red Army. It was apparent that the dictator was able to impose his will on Field Marshal Bock’s planning for Operation Typhoon, at least in this respect.

 

In the center of the front, the 4th Army, led by Field Marshal Kluge, would collaborate with Hoth’s 4th Panzer Group to launch an attack on both sides of the major highway connecting Roslavl to Moscow. They would operate in two distinct groups. The northern group would form the second arm of the first encirclement, meeting the 3rd Panzer Group at Vyazma. Meanwhile, the 9th Army would screen the far northeastern flank of the advance. This significant extension of the 9th Army’s lines could have been avoided. However, it required Leeb to push his lines further east, which was unrealistic given his lack of armor since those resources were being concentrated for Operation Typhoon. Consequently, Army Group Center had to dilute their forces, covering positions that could only have been adequately defended if the panzer forces had been permitted to support Army Group North for a longer duration. This circular reasoning reflects the declining state of strategic thought within the Wehrmacht at this juncture. Additionally, it illustrated how the army in the east was being pushed to the absolute breaking point. The other leg of the center advance was tasked with holding the highway and continuing the offensive toward Moscow. This effort was crucial to pushing the front forward and securing the flank of the encircling panzers in the center.

 

The southern wing of the offensive was composed of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army under Colonel General Weichs. The infantry held the middle ground, while the panzers formed the tip of the Army Group’s front. Guderian’s objective was to break across the Desna River and then advance in a northeast direction. This maneuver would accomplish the second encirclement through a sweeping hook. Weichs would converge with the panzers around Bryansk, facilitated by the shorter distances the infantry would need to march. Field Marshal Reichenau’s 6th Army was tasked with guarding the southern flank of the entire operation. This army remained under the operational control of Army Group South. Reichenau was required to advance and attempt to keep pace with the center, even as his lines grew increasingly stretched. This risk was likely deemed acceptable due to the devastation at Kyiv, where the Red Army was in dire straits during the last week of September. However, the march alone would present a daunting challenge, just as it would for the soldiers of the 9th Army in the North.

 

Two key points underpin the entire concept of operations for the impending offensive. First, the logistics situation was dire. The Wehrmacht was attempting one of the largest offensives in military history on a shoestring budget. There simply were not enough trains arriving to fulfill the needs of the operation. Despite ongoing promises from the Army Quartermaster, shortages persisted. General Wagner served as the quartermaster of the Army, grappling with the challenge of securing enough trains to supply the forces as the invasion progressed deeper into Soviet territory. He faced severe difficulties with the Soviet Union's track system; relaying tracks to the appropriate gauge was only part of the battle. German locomotives required fuel and water more frequently than their Soviet counterparts due to their smaller size. This necessitated the allocation of significant resources toward building the necessary facilities for them. Coupled with the capacity limitations of the single-track lines, even when Wagner did manage to acquire trains, they often could not reach their intended destinations. This lack of resources critically affected the staying power of the offensive and would prove vital in the coming weeks. The second key factor in the preparations for Operation Typhoon was the absence of real reserves. It took everything the Heer could assemble just to bolster the first-line units and maintain a continuous front from Leningrad to the Dnepr. Bock was unable to establish a meaningful reserve force. This same issue had plagued the first stage of fighting in June and July, and now it had returned with renewed intensity. The Wehrmacht was not only weaker but also faced a larger front without the element of surprise. Despite these challenges, Army Group Center had been revitalized into an impressive fighting force, becoming the largest single field command in German history. Millions of men were preparing for what many believed would be the climax of the entire war.

 

To defend against the impending offensive, the Stavka had been preparing since before the Battle of Smolensk. Their defense in depth was impressive in its execution. The Red Army was far from finished. The Stavka had to dispatch significant forces south to Ukraine to reform the Southwestern Front under Timoshenko. Although Kirponos died during the breakout attempt, there was little time for grief. Command of the Western Front passed to Colonel General Konev. The Bryansk Front managed to evade encirclement at Kyiv when Guderian split its lines, with Eremenko still in command. Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyenny had taken charge of the Reserve Front. Together, they mustered around 1.25 million men in fifteen field armies. The entire defense strategy hinged on these forces performing better than they had in previous encounters. They were outnumbered and equipped with fewer tanks, artillery, and aircraft. They had to hold the line; the fall of Moscow was not an option. Stalin had already resolved that if Moscow succumbed, the war would shift further east. A second capital had been designated at Samara, located about a thousand kilometers southeast on the Volga River. From there, the Soviet Union would continue to fight. However, Zhukov remained resolute. He believed the Red Army could surpass even Alexander I in 1812 and successfully defend Moscow against foreign seizure. Zhukov told Stalin so, and it was exactly what Stalin wanted to hear. But Stalin was also visibly agitated and sought the truth in whatever form it might take. Zhukov recounted a moment of questioning from Stalin: “Are you sure that we will hold Moscow? I ask you about this with a pain in my soul. Tell me truthfully, as a communist.” Zhukov’s response was blunt and unequivocal, reflecting his uncompromising nature: “We will, without fail, hold Moscow.” Of course, Zhukov’s assurance was not infallible, and Moscow continued to face a clear and present danger. However, he had a significant advantage: he had already learned from his defense of Leningrad that to defeat the Germans, he did not need to destroy their forces or advance his front to a distant objective. In the autumn of 1941, his goal was simply to prevent the Germans from seizing their prize and thereby secure victory by default. This task was anything but straightforward. With the entire Moscow region rapidly transforming into a fortified military district, Bock was destined to face a bloody battle, and time was not on his side as autumn conditions worsened.

 

As both sides readied their forces for the impending clash in the center, Army Group South continued its advance through Ukraine. The attack on Crimea commenced on September 24th. Manstein’s 11th Army launched a bold assault across the Perekop isthmus, aiming to capture Crimea. Defending this position was the 51st Army, which had established strong fortifications along the five-kilometer-wide isthmus. However, they were quickly overwhelmed. By the 26th, the invaders had pierced the line of the Tatar Ditch. The Tatar Ditch was part of a line of fortifications that extended across the width of the Isthmus. There have been several ditches or canals dug across the Perekop, but this one was suspected to have been from the 1500’s. It had been fortified by the Red Army in preparation for the attack by the Germans. Manstein was relatively well supplied with engineering equipment and heavy artillery, especially considering the overall state of the Wehrmacht and ongoing operations elsewhere. Just as he prepared to break through into open territory, bad news arrived. Manstein had divided his forces, deploying the 54th Infantry Corps as his assault force on the Perekop. His other forces, the 49th Mountain and 30th Infantry Corps, were tasked with holding the line alongside Romanian brigades between Melitopol and the Dnepr. He was in the process of pulling the 49th Mountain Corps out of the front lines to use it as an exploitation force toward Sevastopol. As the 49th Mountain withdrew, the Soviet 18th Army probed the Romanians and discovered them weakly deployed. Hours later, they broke through the defenses, leading to the crumbling of Romanian lines. Soon, they turned to attack the 30th Infantry from two sides. A sixteen-kilometer-wide gap opened in Manstein’s lines, threatening a serious disaster. In response, he ordered the 49th Mountain Corps to turn around and patch the gap. As the month ended, this effort was still underway. The advance across the Perekop stalled as the Soviets began to strengthen their positions, while Manstein found himself distracted by crises unfolding further north.

 

On September 24, a major conference was hosted by Bock at Army Group Centre to finalize plans for the long-awaited renewal of the offensive towards Moscow. In attendance were the heads of the OKH, Halder and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, as well as the commanders of Bock’s three armies: Strauss, Kluge, and Colonel-General Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs. The three panzer group commanders, Hoth, Hoepner, and Guderian, were also present. The assembled commanders were informed of their duties according to the OKH’s plan, which had been formulated over the past month. In the north, Strauss’s Ninth Army, together with Hoth’s Panzer Group 3, was to attack from the area near Dukhovshchina, forming the northern arm of the first major encirclement, closing at Viaz’ma. While Hoth’s panzers would provide the striking power, Strauss’s infantry had to cover the northern wing of the entire offensive, as it had proved impossible to extend Leeb’s army group any further to the east.

 

Kluge’s Fourth Army and Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 were tasked with attacking on both sides of the Roslavl–Moscow highway in the center of Bock’s front, also heading for Viaz’ma to close the pocket from the south. Meanwhile, Weichs’s Second Army and Guderian’s Panzer Group 2 were positioned further south to break through the Soviet positions on the Desna River and cooperate in an advance to the northeast, focusing on an encirclement centered on Briansk. Additionally, Reichenau’s Sixth Army, attached to Army Group South, would press forward in the direction of Oboian to protect as much of Bock’s southern flank as possible. At the conclusion of the conference, it was decided that the new offensive would begin on October 2. Hoth advocated for a start date of October 3, but was overruled. However, Guderian requested and received permission for his panzer group to begin two days earlier, on September 30. He claimed his request was motivated by two factors: firstly, the absence of good roads in the area where he would operate, necessitating a full utilization of the short period remaining before the autumn rasputitsa; and secondly, his expectation of additional air support prior to the opening of the rest of Army Group Centre’s offensive. Despite Guderian’s reasoning, it was not these factors that convinced Bock to authorize the early start. He was concerned that Guderian was operating so far to the south that his offensive would have little influence on the main attack for the first four or five days.

 

On September 27, Guderian’s five panzer divisions, along with the specialized “panzer flame” detachment, fielded a total of 256 operational tanks,  a significant drop from their combined strength of 904 tanks on June 22, 1941. At the same time, estimates suggested that Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 had diminished to approximately 280 tanks, down from a starting total of 707, while Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 numbered roughly 250 tanks, a reduction from 626. Even these remaining tanks were often in a highly provisional state of repair. Halder later reflected on this after the war, noting, “When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which first required that strong elements be pulled back out of Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength.” Although his troops were exhausted, they followed the lead of their commander. This was the peak of Guderian’s legend. He had defied orders numerous times and remained undefeated, earning the admiration of the Panzer force as a whole. However, this reputation also garnered him scorn from many of his fellow officers. Guderian’s trademark impetuosity was beginning to prove dangerous for the men under his command. Many tanks, men, and trucks would have benefited from an additional two days of rest, but Guderian was not inclined to grant them that necessary reprieve. The attack commenced before Guderian could fully position his right wing. As the day progressed, he managed to make some advances, but there was nothing to indicate a significant breakout. Halder noted in his diary that reports indicated the initial attack had caught at least some Soviet units by surprise.

 

On the front lines, the 4th Panzer Division was the lead element of the attack. They broke through the 283rd Rifle Division with ease but soon encountered a company of tanks. Colonel Bakharov’s 150th Tank Brigade was equipped with new production T-50 light tanks, a mix of older models, and a few T-34s. When the lead elements of the 35th Panzer Regiment made contact in the town of Essman, they faced two of these T-34s. The Soviet medium tanks were well positioned, providing excellent coverage of the road. Dug in, they halted the advance of the entire German division for several hours. The Germans attempted a flanking maneuver but were caught in the open, resulting in the loss of a Panzer III. Following this setback, they called in air support, prompting the T-34s to retreat rather than risk being targeted by the Luftwaffe. Once the air support arrived, the first town fell, allowing Guderian to get his division back on schedule. Meanwhile, Eremenko was misled by his field commanders about the size of the attack, and his intelligence picture remained weak. As a result, he concluded that the 4th Panzer Division's assault was merely a diversion. The Bryansk Front failed to act to counter this penetration, a decision that would ultimately prove to be a significant mistake.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Amidst the chaos of September 1941, the German forces encircled Kyiv, trapping countless Soviet soldiers, leading to mass surrenders. Meanwhile, the Nazi propaganda exaggerated victories, claiming impending German domination. Soldiers, however, expressed doubts and despair in their letters, questioning Russia's capacity for defeat. As logistics strained the German advance and Soviet defenses strengthened, preparations for a new offensive, Operation Typhoon, were unveiled. With a fate hanging in balance, both the Germans and Soviets braced themselves for a brutal struggle over Moscow.

Eastern Front #15 The Fall of Kyiv

Last time we spoke about the Panzer’s Greatest Victory. Amidst the chaotic landscape of late August 1941, the siege of Kyiv escalated under General Guderian's command against the resilient Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Timoshenko. September brought relentless rain, complicating the push toward Leningrad, while Finnish forces threatened Soviet defenses. The German army, once poised for a swift victory, grappled with critical supply shortages as they aimed for a massive offensive on Moscow, codenamed Operation Typhoon. Hitler's altered directives and a deteriorating situation on the ground forced the Wehrmacht to cope with dwindling resources. Meanwhile, the Soviets, despite significant losses, began to regroup, bolstered by non-active reserves. They only needed to endure, allowing Germany's offensive strength to exhaust itself as winter approached. As the campaign wore on, deepening battles of attrition transformed the initially swift Blitzkrieg into a grueling war of attrition, marking a significant shift in the conflict. Both sides braced for a war that would last far longer than anyone anticipated.

This episode is the Fall of Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

So it's September 17th, and the Commander of the Southwestern Front has finally received permission from Stalin to order a retreat. But it's too late. His armies now find themselves completely surrounded by the German forces. As Kyiv falls, General Zhukov is making preparations in Leningrad, readying for a desperate battle to the last man. Meanwhile, in the center, Field Marshal Bock is poised to launch an offensive aimed at bringing an end to the war once and for all. Now last week we covered the dramatic closing of the Kyiv pocket. The capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, along with a significant portion of the Southwestern Front, has become a giant trap. Generals Guderian and Kleist have fought vehemently for weeks, successfully linking their forces southeast of the city. Many of Stalin's generals fervently urged him to allow a retreat, yet he refused to grant them this option. Now, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are encircled.

 

The battle for Leningrad was reaching a critical juncture. General Zhukov had been appointed to take command in the second week of fierce fighting. With his usual energy and determination, he set about overhauling the city's entire defensive strategy. Prior to his arrival, the defenses were on the brink of collapse, and Zhukov was not willing to let morale deteriorate further. He made the tough decision to dismiss several officers who had lost their fighting spirit, replacing them with trusted subordinates. This was not merely a matter of favoritism; the men he replaced were demoralized, and Zhukov needed leaders who still had the will to win. This aspect of command is often overlooked: the ability to maintain composure and inspire resilience after weeks of setbacks is crucial in any army. For the Red Army, it was vital to continue fighting after experiencing some of the most significant defeats in military history. On September 17th, Zhukov issued an order to all his subordinate commands "Not a Step Back! Do not give up a single verst of land on the approaches to Leningrad!"

 

On September 16th, the 8th Army found itself completely surrounded and cutoff from Leningrad. This grim encirclement would come to be known as the Oranienbaum Pocket. The fighting around the city had grown increasingly desperate. During early September, Hitler made the pivotal decision not to directly assault Leningrad. Instead, a strategy was devised to encircle the city and starve its defenders into submission. To achieve this, Army Group North needed to connect with Finnish forces to the east of Lake Ladoga. However, merely cutting off land connections would not suffice. Everyone knew that the Soviets were already supplying Leningrad across the lake. The only way to prevent this was to expel the last remaining Red Army units from the eastern shore, a task that seemed nearly impossible. Leeb's Army Group was on the brink of exhaustion, and the expected transfer of Hoepner's Panzers to Army Group Center proved to be the final straw. By the end of the third week of September, Army Group North was left with little to no offensive power.

 

Zhukov ordered counterattacks to push back the German forces, but by the 20th, it became clear that these efforts wouldn't yield significant results. Nonetheless, there were three key benefits from Zhukov's initial counterattack. First, it bolstered the morale of the Leningrad Front. Zhukov proved that he would fight to the last man, and his decision to remove incompetent and broken leaders from command was crucial. Second, the counterattack took the German command by surprise. Generals Leeb and Halder had assumed that the Soviets were on the verge of collapse. This misjudgment would not be the first, or the last, time they underestimated the fighting spirit of the Red Army. This unexpected resistance, combined with Hitler's relentless order to transfer panzer units to Army Group Center for a renewed offensive towards Moscow, sent shockwaves through German command. In response, Halder arranged to transfer several infantry units to Leeb’s command to compensate for the loss of the Panzers. Finally, the fierce combat had dulled the strength of Army Group North. Since July, they had suffered losses of around sixty thousand men, with replacements failing to match the quality of those who had fallen. The Heer, as of June 1941, was staffed with experienced non-commissioned officers and junior leaders who served as force multipliers. Non-commissioned officers, along with platoon and company leaders, form the backbone of a any modern industrialized army. They play a crucial role in maintaining discipline and possess vital institutional knowledge about tactics and weapons handling. The losses sustained in the early months of the campaign drained their ranks of many of these capable men, making their absence felt far beyond mere numbers. The battle for Leningrad was far from over; it remained a grueling fight rather than a static siege. The casualties suffered in the latter half of September pushed the conflict towards a siege mentality, with both sides paying dearly for every inch of territory. As the month drew to a close, both the Soviets and Germans focused on reorganizing and redeploying for one last major attempt to seize the city before winter set in.

 

The commander of Army Group Center finalized his plan for the decisive offensive. After weeks of heated discussion, Field Marshal Bock had secured his objective: Moscow would again be the focal point of the German campaign, and he was to spearhead the effort. As the third week of September began, the plan had been named, Operation Typhoon. Hitler had designated Army Group Center to receive the bulk of the panzer units, even permitting some enhancements to their capabilities. Yet, Bock often voiced his frustrations, claiming he was expected to achieve great things with inadequate resources. While Hitler refused to allocate everything at his disposal, he believed Bock was equipped with everything necessary for success. The reality, however, lay somewhere in between. Army Group Center was far from receiving the full support one would anticipate for such a crucial offensive. Hitler had declined to release sufficient spare parts to fully repair the panzer units, let alone provide additional tanks. Although the panzer divisions received some replacements, it was nowhere near enough to restore them to full strength. August’s losses had been too great, and the limitations of Germany's supply capabilities in September 1941 were evident. As we discussed last week, Hitler released only a small portion of the reserve production of new tanks. 

 

The logistical buildup was also lackluster. The harsh Russian winter, notorious for decimating Napoleon’s army, loomed on the horizon. Every soldier in the German army understood the challenges winter would bring. Yet, supplies of winter uniforms were grossly insufficient. Even before the end of the third week, some units were informed they could only expect to receive 25% of their required winter clothing. To make matters worse, the 19th Panzer Division was notified they would no longer receive replacement boots due to leather shortages. Leather production had long been a persistent challenge in prewar Germany. The country was never self-sufficient in the textiles industry, with leather particularly dependent on imports. In 1934, as Germany began to recover from the Great Depression, leather and textile goods accounted for 26% of total imports. The demands of the greatly expanded army, combined with intense campaigning in the east, placed significant strain on the German economy.  It wasn't solely production issues that hampered the buildup for Operation Typhoon. The rail supply lines were wholly inadequate. By mid-August, the 9th and 2nd Armies were surviving hand to mouth, unable to allocate any ammunition for future operations. The supply of fuel, oil, and lubricants was equally insufficient, failing to account for the poor condition of the engines, which significantly increased consumption. As they struggled to maintain even these inadequate supply levels, the trucks of the Grosstransportraum were being ruined on long journeys that should have been supported by the railroads. Hopes of a renewed offensive hinged on improvements to the railway system, but General Wagner, in charge of the military rail system, continuously made false assurances. In August, Army Group Center required at least 24 trains per day to meet daily consumption. However, in the first half of the month, barely half that number arrived. Subsequently, Wagner promised to increase the number to 30 and then 35 trains daily to establish adequate stockpiles for the next stage of the advance, but in practice, only about 18 trains a day managed to come through. In early September, it became clear that Army Group Center needed 27 trainloads of supplies each day just to maintain its current supply levels and build a stockpile for the offensive. This level of support would need to continue for at least 19 days. Wagner, assured Halder he could deliver these supplies for at least 13 days. However, by the end of the third week, it was evident that Wagner could not meet this commitment. On many days, less than half of the promised supplies made it through. Trains often arrived half-loaded, incorrectly loaded, or not at all.

 

Some of these hardships were self-inflicted, while others were unavoidable results of the state of the Wehrmacht and Nazi governance. Nevertheless, they existed and provided support for Bock’s complaints about priorities. However, there is substantial evidence indicating that Army Group Center was receiving the best the Wehrmacht could manage. By the end of the third week of September, Bock commanded the largest field command in military history, with three field armies and three complete panzer groups at his disposal. He oversaw 47 infantry divisions, 14 panzer divisions, 1 cavalry division, 5 security divisions, and 8 motorized divisions. In total, this amounted to around two million men, 1,500 tanks, and over 1,000 artillery batteries. This represented a significant increase in manpower and artillery compared to the Army Group’s starting strength in June. However, there were actually fewer tanks than had been present in just two panzer groups at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. This decline highlighted how far the panzer force had fallen after just twelve weeks of combat. These losses were not entirely unforeseen; the problem was two-fold. First, the panzer divisions lacked the level of spare parts and maintenance necessary to address relatively minor mechanical issues or battle damage. Second, Hitler was actively withholding replacement vehicles. Hitler clung to fantastical dreams of rebuilding the panzer divisions from scratch after defeating the USSR, envisioning a nearly instantaneous revival. He was unwilling to see his limited production trickle away in small numbers as replacements, only to be consumed by the ongoing war in the Soviet Union. A core aspect of Nazi ideology is the belief that anything can be achieved through sheer willpower. Therefore, Hitler convinced himself that although the Heer might be uncomfortable with the temporarily reduced number of panzer divisions, victory was assured by the superior willpower of the Nazi war machine. He envisioned that after the war, he would be able to ramp up production sufficiently to fully restore the divisions with modern equipment for future campaigns. This proved to be a mistake, one that would cost dearly when Army Group Center launched their attack. The kick-off day for Operation Typhoon was set for October 1st.

 

Guderian’s Panzer group had only just completed the encirclement behind Kyiv when they received orders to march north at the earliest opportunity. Although he had a well-stocked supply depot at Romny, his transport truck fleet was nearly nonfunctional. The Panzers had been stationary for almost a week, and fuel, along with rations, was becoming increasingly scarce. At one point, they were forced to rely on air drops from the Luftwaffe. The diary of the 47th Panzer Corps recorded on September 18th “As a result of the heavy demands over the last weeks on outrageously bad roads the state of the trucks has worsened. Owing to the failure to deliver spare parts innumerable instances of damage, often only relatively minor, cannot be repaired. This in part, therefore, explains the high percentage of … non-serviceable trucks”. Assigned to a Panzer Division Alexander Cohrs wrote in his diary “Some [vehicles] tipped over. Luckily none in our company. After 18 kilometres of marching on foot I sat on an armoured vehicle. It tipped so much that it balanced on two wheels, while the other two temporarily stood in the air; still it did not tip over. Along the way was a moor where the vehicles had to make a big detour . . . one by one vehicles got stuck or even turned over, resulting in breaks and a slow tempo”. They were in urgent need of a rest and refit period, but it was becoming increasingly clear that such a break would not be forthcoming. Instead, Guderian’s men braced themselves for the inevitable breakout attempts, as the Luftwaffe and infantry coordinated efforts to reduce the encirclement. Once that was accomplished, they would have to move north and prepare for Operation Typhoon.

 

The 5th Air Corps was determined to destroy as much of the Southwestern Front as possible. One officer claimed that the Luftwaffe would do “half the work of the Army.” In just the third week of September, the 5th Air Corps dropped hundreds of thousands of pounds of bombs on the region, conducting sortie levels unprecedented in the war. Simultaneously, the 2nd Air Corps was working tirelessly to hammer the Red Army in the Kyiv pocket. Together, these forces destroyed thousands of vehicles, ranging from trucks and trains to tanks and enemy planes. During this time, the Luftwaffe maintained essentially complete air superiority over the pocket. The VVS, the Soviet Air Force, rarely attempted to strike at the Germans; when they did, they were often easily brushed aside by the Luftwaffe's air cover. The few times they managed to breach it and attack the Panzers on the ground, their efforts proved largely ineffectual. Nonetheless, the losses for the Luftwaffe were mounting. Each plane lost was essentially irreplaceable. When the campaign began on June 22nd, the Luftwaffe had started with 2,995 airframes of all types. By the time the pocket was closed around the Southwestern Front, that number had dwindled to less than 1,000 operable airframes. The Luftwaffe was also suffering because hundreds of serviceable airframes were scattered across the Eastern Front. However, similar to the Panzer units, the repair process was hampered by a lack of spare parts, mechanics, and adequate facilities. Some damage resulted from poor maintenance, while other issues stemmed from battle damage that could not be repaired on site. The commander of the 2nd Air Fleet reported to higher headquarters in September that the Luftwaffe was simply overtaxed and nearing the end of its limits.

 

Reducing the pocket fell on the shoulders of the German infantry, as it had in every major battle before. The 6th Army, under Field Marshal Reichenau, was ordered to assault Kyiv. While the city was encircled, it remained well defended, housing the highest concentration of Red Army soldiers within the pocket. Reichenau’s 51st Infantry Corps advanced southward to the east of the city. Finally, Kirponos received permission to retreat from his superiors in Moscow and issued a withdrawal order on the seventeenth. This decision quickly devolved into a rout. On September 18th, the 51st Corps successfully linked up with the 34th Infantry Corps, effectively splitting the pocket into two distinct sections. Despite the potential for a strong defense of the city, it was not to be. The fighting concluded on the nineteenth, with the Red Army surrendering in droves after weeks of relentless bombardment. Leadership failures and a lack of resolve contributed to their poor performance. As the Red Army began to collapse within the now-divided pocket, it became inevitable that chaos and carnage would follow. Mixed orders, confused leaders, and a complete breakdown of discipline all added to the turmoil.

 

As the German infantry moved into the heart of the city, they encountered a horrifying new reality. The NKVD had rigged the city to explode, secretly installing radio-controlled mines in hundreds of buildings. On September 20th, the first detonation occurred, with explosives strategically placed in locations where Germans were likely to take up residence. To complicate matters further, mass looting erupted among the remaining civilians and even some Germans. The city was without power or running water, and food was becoming increasingly scarce. The NKVD had detonated the power plant, a cannery, one of the city's water towers, and all the bridges spanning the Dnieper River. Looting was particularly focused on a large flour warehouse. Additionally, the NKVD ensured that as much food as possible was dumped into the river. By September 24th, the bombs began to detonate regularly. NKVD saboteurs worked to ignite fires caused by these explosions, with a clear intent to destroy the city center. The fires quickly spiraled out of control, and the lack of running water exacerbated the situation as more bombs went off. These explosions resulted in approximately 200 casualties among the soldiers. While this might be considered relatively light, the impact on morale was significant. Furthermore, many of the dead and wounded were staff officers, which adversely affected unit cohesion and amplified the chaos throughout the city.

 

As a result of the Soviet boobytraps and sabotage efforts, on September 26, Major General Kurt Eberhard, the military governor, and SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, the SS and Police Leader, convened at the Rear Headquarters. It was there that they made the horrific decision to exterminate the Jewish population of Kyiv, claiming “it was a retaliatory measure for the recent explosions”. Also in attendance were SS-Standartenführer Paul Blobel, commander of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, along with his superior, SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Otto Rasch, commander of Einsatzgruppe C. The execution of this order fell to Sonderkommando 4a, led by Blobel, under the overall command of Friedrich Jeckeln. This unit comprised members of the Sicherheitsdienst or “SD”, the Sicherheitspolizei or “SiPo”, the third company of a Special Duties Waffen-SS battalion, and a platoon from the 9th Police Battalion. The massacre was carried out by Sonderkommando 4a, along with Police Battalion 45 under Major Besser, and was supported by members of a Waffen-SS battalion.

 

In stark contrast to the "myth of the clean Wehrmacht," the Sixth Army, led by Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, collaborated with the SS and SD to plan and execute the mass murder of Kyiv’s Jewish community. On 26 September 1941, the following order was posted “All Yids of the city of Kiev and its vicinity must appear on Monday, 29 September, by 8 o'clock in the morning at the corner of Mel'nikova and Dokterivskaya streets. Bring documents, money and valuables, and also warm clothing, linen, etc. Any Yids who do not follow this order and are found elsewhere will be shot. Any civilians who enter the dwellings left by Yids and appropriate the things in them will be shot”. On September 29 and 30, 1941, the Nazis and their collaborators murdered approximately 33,771 Jewish civilians at Babi Yar. Babi Yar is a ravine just outside Kyiv. It was first mentioned in historical records in 1401, in relation to its sale by an old woman referred to as "baba," who served as the cantiniere at the Dominican Monastery. The word "yar" is of Turkic origin and translates to "gully" or "ravine."

 

These units were further reinforced by Police Battalions Nos. 45 and 303, along with units of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, all supported by local collaborators. Sonderkommando 4a and the 45th Battalion of the German Order Police carried out the shootings, while servicemen from the 303rd Battalion of the German Order Police guarded the outer perimeter of the execution site. Two days later, the commander of the Einsatzkommando reported “The difficulties resulting from such a large scale action—in particular concerning the seizure—were overcome in Kiev by requesting the Jewish population through wall posters to move. Although only a participation of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 Jews had been expected at first, more than 30,000 Jews arrived who, until the very moment of their execution, still believed in their resettlement, thanks to an extremely clever organization”. 

 

According to the testimony of a truck driver named Hofer, victims were ordered to undress and were beaten if they resisted “I watched what happened when the Jews—men, women and children—arrived. The Ukrainians[c] led them past a number of different places where one after the other they had to give up their luggage, then their coats, shoes and over-garments and also underwear. They also had to leave their valuables in a designated place. There was a special pile for each article of clothing. It all happened very quickly and anyone who hesitated was kicked or pushed by the Ukrainians  to keep them moving”. The crowd was so large that most of the victims likely had no idea what was happening until it was too late. By the time they heard the sound of machine gun fire, escape was no longer an option. They were herded down a corridor formed by soldiers, in groups of ten, and then shot. Hofer continued “Once undressed, they were led into the ravine which was about 150 metres long and 30 metres wide and a good 15 metres deep ... When they reached the bottom of the ravine they were seized by members of the Schutzpolizei and made to lie down on top of Jews who had already been shot ... The corpses were literally in layers. A police marksman came along and shot each Jew in the neck with a submachine gun ... I saw these marksmen stand on layers of corpses and shoot one after the other ... The marksman would walk across the bodies of the executed Jews to the next Jew, who had meanwhile lain down, and shoot him”.  In the following months, thousands more individuals were seized and taken to Babi Yar, where they were executed. It is estimated that over 100,000 residents of Kyiv from various ethnic backgrounds, mostly civilians, were murdered by the Nazis at this site until their evacuation of Kyiv. On January 10, 1942, about 100 captured Soviet sailors were executed there after being forced to disinter and cremate the remains of previous victims. Furthermore, Babi Yar became a site of execution for residents of five Gypsy camps. Patients from the Ivan Pavlov Psychiatric Hospital were gassed and then disposed of in the ravine.  

 

The Wehrmacht tightened its grip around the now-divided pocket from all sides. Despite mass surrenders, there were still determined efforts to break free. The aerial blockade in the region was far from complete, allowing several senior Soviet commanders, including Budyonny, Timoshenko, and Khrushchev, to escape by aircraft. By the evening of September 20, Colonel General Kirponos, along with the forces of the Soviet 5th Army, managed to reach Driukovshchyna, located just 15 kilometers southwest of Lukhovitsa. However, the Red Army column soon came under attack from the 3rd Panzer Division in that area. The Germans successfully captured General Sotensky, the artillery commander of the Soviet 5th Army, pushing the remaining enemy forces into the Shumikovo forests. Kirponos, along with Potapov, commander of the Soviet 5th Army, staff officers, and approximately 2,000 Soviet troops continued to resist for several more hours. While leading his men near the front line, Kirponos was seriously wounded in the left leg and taken deeper into the forest. Shortly thereafter, a mortar shell exploded nearby, claiming his life. With Kirponos killed, the remaining Soviet forces were left with no choice but to surrender. Among those lost in this battle was Mykhailo Burmystenko, the commissar of the Soviet Southwestern Front and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. His death marked him as the highest-ranking Soviet communist leader killed during World War II.

 

The Battle of Kyiv was a catastrophic defeat for the Red Army, inflicting greater damage than the earlier battles of Minsk and Smolensk. The Soviet Bryansk Front launched counter-attacks to prevent such a setback but faced failure, leading to the loss of around 100,000 soldiers and 140 tanks out of an initial force of 260,000 soldiers and 260 tanks. Following these defeats, the Bryansk Front was thrown into chaos. Less than three weeks later, as the Wehrmacht's concentrated offensive toward Moscow began, it could muster only 200,000 troops to resist. With the Southwestern Front completely shattered, the Soviets had no choice but to rebuild it from the ground up, transferring forces from the central sector to fill the gaps created in the southern front line.

 

Victory at Kyiv was a crucial step for the advancement of Army Group Center. Now the OKH and OKW could shift their focus back to the central front and resume their push toward Moscow. German commanders found renewed hope in the success at Kyiv, as the destruction of the Soviet Southwestern Front allowed Army Group South to advance east through Ukraine without encountering much resistance. Additionally, the vast amounts of captured equipment in the Kyiv area enabled the Wehrmacht to continue their advance without waiting for resupply. Over the eight weeks of the Battle of Kyiv, Army Group Center had the opportunity to recover, strengthen its exhausted forces, and improve their supply situation. Their infantry divisions joined the motorized forces on the front lines in a methodical march eastward.

 

However, the Battle of Kyiv also yielded some positive outcomes for the Soviet Union. The southward advance of Panzer Group 2, aimed at encircling the Soviet Southwestern Front, delayed the German advance toward Moscow by a month. This ultimately extended the Wehrmacht's operations into the winter, which proved costly for them. Nevertheless, the Red Army suffered significant losses that could have been pivotal in defending Moscow. In dominating the vital economic regions of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht also secured the southern flank of Army Group Center, delivering a heavy blow to the Soviet Bryansk Axis forces and smoothing their path toward Moscow. Zhukov remarked on this situation “We can imagine that without operation [in the direction of Ukraine], the situation of the German Army Group Center could have been even worse than it was found to be. Reserve forces of the [Soviet] High Command, which had been used in September to fill the gaps in the southwestern sector, could have been used in an attack on the flank and rear of the central group of the German armies advancing on Moscow”.

 

While the fighting raged on, plans for the next phase of the campaign were already underway. Guderian initiated a strategic redeployment, positioning forces where they could be supported by infantry. Meanwhile, Kleist prepared to lead his limited forces in a bold maneuver across Ukraine, aiming for Donetsk and beyond. The Lower Dnieper remained unsecured, and the 1st Panzer Group was tasked with this critical mission alongside their advance toward Donetsk. The 11th Army received orders to prepare for an assault on the Perekop Isthmus, a crucial step toward capturing the entire Crimea and advancing into the Caucasus. The 11th Army was now under the command of Colonel General Manstein, following the tragic death of its previous leader, Colonel General Schobert. During combat operations in the southern Soviet Union, Schobert was killed when his Fieseler Storch observation aircraft crashed in a Soviet minefield. As the 6th and 17th Armies continued their eastern push, they would cover the Panzer advance from the north, ensuring a steady progression in the campaign.

 

The disaster at the Southwestern Front became painfully clear to Stalin as the hours ticked away. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were poised to be captured by the invaders, as the nation braced for what could be its final offensive of the war. Timoshenko was dispatched south to assemble yet another line of defenses, but the situation was dire. The encirclement at Kyiv threatened to result in at least two hundred thousand prisoners, along with hundreds of vehicles and tanks lost. The two armies not trapped in the encirclement were retreating with no end in sight. Only the 21st and 17th Armies remained intact. The 6th Army had been devastated by the breakthrough of Kleist’s Panzers at Kremenchug, and the 38th Army had been split into two fragments. The Bryansk front was nearly wiped out as well. Despite calls for reinforcements and the formation of new units, these soldiers were far from combat-ready. As the week drew to a close, Timoshenko struggled to find a viable position for a proper defensive line. It seemed that Ukraine was on the verge of falling to the invaders.

 

Some German officers even speculated that they could end the year on the banks of the Don River. While Rostov lay over five hundred kilometers to the east, the prevailing mood made that goal feel reachable in the wake of such victories. This was the greatest triumph in the Wehrmacht’s history and seemed to mark the beginning of the end for the campaign in the East. Yet, as we will see, it was actually the onset of a prolonged decline. Though it wasn’t the last victory for the Wehrmacht in the East, it certainly represented the high water mark of German military prowess. From this point on, unconditional victories would become a thing of the past. Even as generals celebrated their achievements, challenges loomed on the horizon. Halder noted privately, if not publicly, that there was little chance of the Soviets capitulating that year. Moreover, serious issues persisted with production and the availability of replacement soldiers, as the war in the East continued to deplete resources and manpower at an unprecedented rate.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In September 1941, the German forces, led by General Guderian, surrounded Kyiv prompting mass surrender of Soviet forces as others desperately tried to escape. In the aftermath, as the German troops entered the city, they encountered sabotage and desperation among the civilians. Soon after, in a chilling response to resistance, the Nazis executed thousands of Jews at Babi Yar. The horrors of the eastern front were only just beginning.

Eastern Front #14 Panzer’s Greatest Victory

Last time we spoke about the Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues. In late August 1941, the German siege of Kyiv intensified, led by General Guderian amidst a fierce defense from the Soviet Red Army under Marshal Timoshenko. As the Nazis pushed forward, their initial confidence waned under severe logistical strain and significant casualties, while the Soviets showcased resilience and tactical evolution. The month ended in bloodshed, with both sides suffering staggering losses. As September arrived, rain soaked the battlefields, further complicating efforts toward Leningrad, where Finnish troops advanced, threatening Soviet hold on the city. The Germans faced a critical moment as they lost vital supply routes. Fierce combat ensued, with the Soviets and Finnish forces engaged in relentless skirmishes that emphasized the human cost of war. Then in a enormous reversal, Hitler issued directive no. 35 altering the course for Moscow. After fighting tooth and nail against it, Hitler ultimately succumbed to the alure of taking the capital of the USSR.

This episode is the Panzer’s Greatest Victory

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Leningrad is now encircled. Guderian and Kleist, are on the brink of merging their forces just outside the ancient city of Kyiv. As the war rages on, the Red Army unleashes a relentless assault on German positions in the center. We find ourselves in the 11th week of Operation Barbarossa. The weary German Army is eyeing what could be their greatest achievement yet, but meanwhile, the Red Army plunges to new depths. Supply trucks are mired in mud as the Panzers struggle to complete the encirclement against the Southwestern Front. Last week, we witnessed the Southwestern Front and the Bryansk Front fiercely fighting to retain control over Ukraine and its capital, Kyiv. We also observed the renewed momentum of the advance on Leningrad as the Stavka reorganized the city's defenses. In a challenging turn, Army Group Center had to retreat from the Yelna salient, suffering significant casualties in the process. 

The Wehrmacht now faced two daunting logistical issues involving men and machines. Neither was in massive supply by the end of the summer of 1941. By late September, an official report would put German casualties above 500,000. 14 divisions were more than 4,000 men short, 40 divisions were over 3,000 men short, and 30 divisions were more than 2,000 men short. Meanwhile, the Heer had lost nearly 1,500 tanks and artillery pieces. This accounted for about one-third of the starting force. Only 47% of the tanks across all four Panzer Groups were operational, according to a report from September 4, with many tanks requiring spare parts for repairs. Hitler had ordered that all new tank production be held in a strategic reserve in Germany, aiming to form new Panzer divisions. It would take until mid-September for Halder to convince Hitler that the plans for capturing Moscow, Operation Typhoon, required some replacements to be released. Only 96 tanks had been sent forward, just over 10% of the new production from June to the end of August. When Hitler finally allowed the strategic reserve of vehicles to be allocated for replacements, the Panzer arm was in desperate straits. On September 15, he authorized the release of 60 Czech 38(t)s, 150 Panzer IIIs, and 96 Panzer IVs along with an additional 310 replacement engines for the Panzer III. These numbers were completely inadequate. His only other concession was the transfer of two more complete Panzer divisions to the 4th Panzer Group under Hoepner. The 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions had been unable to participate in the initial invasion due to their poor state of readiness following the Yugoslavia campaign in April. They had since been rebuilt and brought along about 450 new tanks.

However, even the entire stock of production could not have rebuilt the Panzer arm to its original numbers. Most of the new production was of modern designs, which would replace some of the obsolete models they began the invasion with. Yet, that statement doesn't capture the whole truth. Seventy-one of the approximately 800 tanks produced by German factories from June to the end of August were Panzer IIs. These vehicles had proven inadequate in France in 1940 and were certifiably obsolete by the end of the summer of 1941. Nevertheless, production did not cease that year. Remarkably, production of the Panzer II as a mainline tank continued until 1942 with production of derivatives and specialised variants continuing until 1944. As it stood, the Panzer arm was significantly reduced from its June starting point. A complete rebuilding of the force was out of the question, as there simply weren't enough available tanks. Additionally, Hitler forbade any attempts to fully restore the Panzer divisions. Instead, they were forced to amalgamate and make do with what they had. The Heer would have to undertake Operation Typhoon with their diminished resources. There was no other option.

Highlighting the logistical issues facing the Germans, might lead you to believe that the situation was much worse on the Soviets. The summer of 1941 indeed represented a Soviet debacle of grand proportions, marked by mass confusion and enormous waste of men and material. However, it remains a fact that these losses, while dreadfully costly to the Soviet war effort, were bearable. In fact, far from crumbling, the Red Army was growing in size, fueled by a vast pool of non-active reserves. Moreover, unlike the German Army, the Red Army didn't have to win the war in 1941; it only needed to survive long enough for Germany’s offensive strength to exhaust itself. The winter granted the Soviet Union a reprieve, further sweetened by the entry of the United States into the war. Thus, despite the Red Army's weaknesses in the summer of 1941, it succeeded fundamentally in one key respect,it confounded the German leadership’s plan to conquer the Soviet Union in a Blitzkrieg-style campaign during the early weeks of the war. As Historian Jacob Kipp concluded in his study on the Battle of Smolensk “At a horrible cost in losses, Russia gave up her sons and her land to bleed the Wehrmacht white, even if the losses were 10 to 1 in favour of the German invader. Nazi ideology and occupation policies in the end made such sacrifices seem justified and legitimized Soviet totalitarianism . . . After Smolensk it was clear that this would be a long war, not a Blitzkrieg. The Soviet state and society, which Lenin and Stalin had cast as a vast mechanism for mobilization and militarization, had begun that process in earnest”. 

By the time German armies were able to reassemble for their renewed drive on Moscow designated Operation Typhoon, it would already be September 30. The available combat strength and logistical support had fallen far below what would be required to seize the Soviet capital. Following the pattern of earlier offensives, the attack began well and again took advantage of the dreadful Soviet strategic direction to capture another huge haul of Soviet prisoners in two enormous pockets. As Halder recorded on October 4: ‘Operation Typhoon is following an altogether classic course... The enemy is standing fast on all parts of the front not under attack, which gives hope for the creation of pockets.’

However, as in past German offensives, the pace could not be sustained. Over vast distances, the spearheads weakened as their flanks grew, and their supply lines became impossibly long. Soviet counterattacks became relentless. Road conditions worsened along with the weather, and soon German troops everywhere found themselves in freezing temperatures with little more than their worn-out summer uniforms. Deprived of the chance to win the war, or even to escape the slogging battles of attrition, Germany's stalled eastern front underwent rapid de-modernization. This intensified the bitter deprivations of life at the front, especially as winter took hold. As one German soldier wrote in December 1941: ‘Technology no longer plays a role... The elemental power of nature broke the operations of our engines. What do we do?’

Summarizing the first two years of the war, Michael Geyer observed: ‘However successful the first two years of the war, the Third Reich never came close to escaping the dilemma posed by the fact that the political and military-strategic costs of expansion continuously outran the benefits of a newly gained hegemonic position.’ When the hoped-for lightning victory against the Soviet Union proved beyond the Wehrmacht’s capacity, a longer-term, war-winning solution was all that remained open to Germany. However, the prospects of success for this option can be immediately dismissed. As Historian Omer Bartov has written “Once blitzkrieg failed, production, industrial capacity, material and manpower resources, organisation and technical skill, all became more important than tactics, training, and courage. Of course blitzkrieg itself depended on technology, indeed, it made a fetish of modern fighting machines. But now technological innovation had to be paralleled by quantities produced, while the initial psychological impact of mass (but spatially and temporally limited) use of modern weaponry lost much of its force. In this area Germany had no chance of competing successfully with its enemies.”

Raw statistics make this clear. In 1941, German industry managed to produce a total of 5,200 tanks, 11,776 aircraft, and 7,000 artillery pieces over 37mm. In the first half of 1941, the Soviet Union produced 1,800 modern tanks, 3,950 aircraft, and 15,600 artillery pieces and mortars. What is extraordinary is that these figures rose considerably in the second half of 1941, despite the loss of important production centers and the massive industrial relocation to the east. In the midst of the war on its doorstep, Soviet factories turned out another 4,740 tanks, 8,000 aircraft, and 55,500 artillery pieces and mortars. Thus, the Soviet Union outperformed Germany in all major armaments even in the first year of the war, and thereafter, production almost always exceeded losses in the main categories.

Now back to the frontline. Army Group North completed cutting off Leningrad by the end of the first week of September. September 8 is marked as the first day of the formal siege of the city. The Germans intended to completely blockade the Soviets, preventing anyone and anything from escaping. Leeb planned to reach the eastern shores of Lake Ladoga with his armor, thereby stopping the Soviets from supplying the city across the lake. Due to Hitler’s order on September 6, Leeb was forced to transfer the 41st, 56th, 57th Motorized divisions, and 8th Air Corps to Army Group Centre by September 15. He would be left with only two motorized divisions and one Panzer division. Later, as a concession, Leeb would be allowed to keep hold of a second Panzer division. Realizing he needed everything he could to accomplish his mission, he moved up his timetables. The city was still strongly defended, as the Soviets had been preparing their defenses for weeks. Three armies, with a total of 452,000 men, held the perimeter. The various divisions and smaller units that comprised these armies were in varying states of readiness. To supplement these forces, three divisions of People's Militia had been raised from the city’s population. The People’s Militia divisions, also known as the DNO or Division of Narodnoe Opolcheniye, were raised from the civilian population and received little formal training. Equipped with whatever was available, these units were theoretically considered irregular forces. However, many of them fought in Leningrad as regular infantry divisions. Over time, some of these divisions were formally designated as regular units, with a few even being recognized as Guards units. The Baltic Fleet was also present in the harbor, consisting of two battleships and several smaller ships. They provided significant gunfire support to the defenders during the siege, firing 358 barrages that delivered 9,368 shells in September alone.

East of the encircled city, the Northwestern Front was rebuilding, attempting to break the siege and maintain the supply connection across Lake Ladoga. The 85,000-strong 54th Army was assembling at Volkhov while the remnants of the 48th Army held the frontline. The Soviet defenses formed a rough triangle around Leningrad, bounded by Krasnogvardeysky in the south, Lake Ladoga and the Neva River in the east, and the Baltic in the west.Leningrad was already beginning to feel the effects of the encirclement as Leeb had brought up his large siege guns in the first week of September. The siege guns of Army Group North included the 240mm K-3, manufactured by Krupp. Approximately six of these guns were present at Leningrad, deployed under the second battalion of the 84th Artillery Regiment. Later in the siege, at least one of the massive 280mm Bruno guns was brought to bear on the city as well. Additionally, the 18th Army possessed a battalion of 210mm Mörser 18 guns, further enhancing the artillery capabilities aimed at the besieged city.

As the second week began, the bombardment intensified, with the massive artillery pieces complemented by large-scale Luftwaffe bomber raids. One such raid ignited a fire at the Badaev warehouse, which stored the majority of Leningrad’s food supplies. The Germans commenced their assault on September 9. The 4th Panzer Group held the western lines around the city, with Reinhardt’s 41st Corps serving as the main effort in this push. Their objective was to take Krasnogvardeysky and push through Krasnoe Selo to punch a hole in the Soviet defenses west and south of the city. The attack was successfully spearheaded by the 36th Motorized Infantry for 10 kilometers before being halted by concentrated land and naval artillery fire. The next day, they faced a counterattack from the 42nd Army following a significant preparatory artillery barrage. A stalemate developed in the area between Krasnoe Selo and Krasnogvardeysky. Later that day, the 1st Panzer was committed, achieving some initial success, but more reinforcements were needed to break through the Soviet defenses. Reinhardt then deployed his last reserve formation, a single Panzer battalion from the 8th Division, but this did not decisively shift the battle in favor of the Germans. By September 12, it was Voroshilov’s turn to send his last reserves into the fight, including a Naval Infantry Brigade and the newly formed 5th People's Militia Division. Despite these efforts, Krasnoe Selo fell, and Krasnogvardeysky was being outflanked, while Pulkovo held firm. Although there was a small opportunity to capitalize on their success, additional reinforcements were necessary, but none were available, as the 8th Panzer was still reorganizing after its heavy losses in August.

Leeb received explicit orders that the 41st Corps had to be transferred “in good condition,” despite its role as the offensive spearhead. He was also informed that the Soviet 54th Army had begun to attack his flanks, forcing him to desperately reorganize his line to cover the gap created by the imminent departure of the majority of his Panzer Group. Leeb needed to concentrate enough force for another attempt at capturing the city while keeping the outer lines of the blockade secure from Soviet attacks. Reinhardt was instructed to make one final assault before being allowed to redeploy. During this week, Zhukov replaced Voroshilov, who was ordered to return to Moscow and report directly to Stalin.

Voroshilov was having quite a rough few…years to say the least. He had commanded Soviet troops during the Winter War from November 1939 to January 1940. However, mostly due to poor Soviet planning and Voroshilov's incompetence as a general, the Red Army suffered approximately 320,000 casualties compared to 70,000 Finnish casualties. When the leadership gathered at Stalin's dacha in Kuntsevo, Stalin apparently shouted at Voroshilov for the losses, to which Voroshilov screamed back blaming the failure on Stalin for eliminating the Red Army's best generals during the purges. This heated exchange culminated in Voroshilov smashing a platter of food on the table, as told to us through Nikita Khrushchev who went on to say it was the only time he ever witnessed such behavior towards Stalin. Voroshilov was made the scapegoat for the initial failures in Finland and was later replaced as Defense Commissar by Semyon Timoshenko. Subsequently, he was appointed Deputy Premier responsible for cultural matters.

Then between 1941 and 1944, he served as a member of the State Defense Committee. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Voroshilov became the commander of the Northwestern Direction from July to August 1941, overseeing several fronts. In September 1941, he commanded the Leningrad Front, where he worked alongside military commander Andrei Zhdanov as German advances threatened to encircle the city. Voroshilov displayed considerable personal bravery amidst heavy shelling at Ivanovskoye, even rallying retreating troops and leading a counterattack against German tanks armed only with a pistol. However, the style of counterattack he employed had long been abandoned by military strategists and earned him contempt from his colleagues. He ultimately failed to prevent the Germans from surrounding Leningrad that got him dismissed from his post. Despite all of this he survived until 1969, lived to be 88. Now after he was canned, his plan to demolish Leningrad’s military facilities was canceled, and a no-step-back order was issued with a penalty of death for any violations. Zhukov was becoming Stavka's fixer, and he focused on preparing Leningrad for a prolonged conflict. He organized further call-ups of local civilians into the militia divisions to bolster defenses.

Zhukov knew he wouldn't have long before Reinhardt's hammer blow struck, resulting in German gains despite frantic counterattacks, aerial bombardment, and artillery fire. All his attempts at a planned counteroffensive were preemptively foiled by the Germans, who attacked first. Zhukov could only feed reserves into local counterattacks while trying to establish a fresh second echelon defensive line, formed by the 16th Army and stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the Neva River. Commanders were strictly forbidden by both Stalin and Zhukov from removing any troops from this line. The Germans reached the Gulf of Finland after capturing Uritsk on the 16th, isolating a Soviet Army in the Oranienbaum bridgehead. Although German assaults eventually captured Krasnogvardeysky, they became bogged down shortly after against a fortified region.

Army Group Centre experienced a relatively quiet week as preparations for the upcoming Operation Typhoon continued. Field Marshal Bock spent much of the month advocating to the OKH for more resources and requesting that formations be kept from being pulled south. Despite the quietness, there was ongoing small-scale attritional fighting along the frontline, particularly affecting the 4th and 9th Armies. This continued even though the Western and Reserve Fronts had switched to a defensive posture. Assaults on the German lines were preceded by hours of continuous artillery barrages, reflecting a supply situation that seemed untenable to the invaders. German artillery had been rationing ammunition for weeks, leading many Wehrmacht soldiers to express disbelief that the Soviets could sustain their forces with such an abundance of ammunition. While this fighting gradually depleted the strength of both sides, there was no imminent risk of a major breakthrough by the Soviets. With the center appearing stable, the focus of both STAVKA and OKH had shifted southward.

Stalin's obstinacy regarding Kyiv, despite all advice from his military advisors, makes little sense from a purely military perspective. However, the city was the third largest in the USSR and held significant historical importance. Abandoning it would have been politically devastating, potentially undermining the morale of the defenders in Leningrad and Odessa. Furthermore, Stalin was eager to demonstrate to the USA and the UK that the USSR was worthy of receiving aid. If it appeared that the USSR was on the verge of capitulation, support would likely diminish. Therefore, Kyiv could not be abandoned without a fight. Stalin had requested that Churchill establish a second front against Germany or, failing that, deploy twenty to thirty British divisions into the USSR as an expeditionary force. This request was refused as impossible. Although Stalin recognized the danger posed by Guderian’s advance southward, he severely overestimated the capabilities of the Red Army while underestimating the strength of the German divisions. He believed Guderian was likely positioning himself for a future flanking offensive against Moscow, rather than attempting to encircle the forces at Kyiv. Even if Guderian continued south, Stalin maintained confidence that Eremenko could contain the unfolding disaster.

Eremenko was struggling to hold back Guderian's advances, despite being promoted and receiving reinforcements. On the 7th, Marshal Shaposhnikov and his deputy Vasilevsky approached the Soviet dictator, seeking permission for the South Western Front to withdraw. Random factoid, over on the Pacific War week by week podcast, I am covering the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria in 1945, and mr Vasilevsky basically ran the show. Their request was initially denied. After much pleading, they were granted permission for localized withdrawals for the 5th and 37th Armies, but no further measures were allowed. Vasilevsky: “In other words, this was a half-way measure. The mere mention of the urgent need to abandon Kiev threw Stalin into a rage and he momentarily lost his self-control. We evidently did not have sufficient will-power to withstand these outbursts of uncontrollable rage or a proper appreciation of our responsibility for the impending catastrophe on the Southwestern direction.” Budyonny and Zhukov were just two of the officers demoted for challenging Stalin over Kyiv.

As for Guderian, the rain continued to turn the landscape into impenetrable mud throughout the second week. The mud had not only slowed the advance but disabled a lot of combat and logistical vehicles. To operate the vehicles had to operate in lower gear which spiked their fuel consumptions further. One estimate was that instead of the normal 300 litres of fuel per 100km fuel consumption was now 15,000 liters per 100km with that increasing again by 100 to 200% cross country. His movements in the first week had not impressed Bock, and their already tenuous relationship was strained further by the slow pace of the advance. However, Guderian and Weichs' 2nd Army offensives began to exploit some cracks in Eremenko’s crumbling front. On the 10th, Model’s 3rd Panzer Division broke through one of these gaps and raced to Romny, which was intended to be the meeting point between Guderian and Kleist. However, there was no sign of Kleist; in fact, he had yet to initiate his offensive. Fortunately, Romny had been a major staging area for the Red Army, and Model’s breakthrough was so sudden and rapid that he managed to capture significant stockpiles of supplies there, alleviating some of their logistical issues. This is just one example among hundreds from the first few months of Operation Barbarossa, illustrating how fate afforded the Germans opportunities that they could not have relied upon. However, sooner or later, they would find that luck would begin to turn against them. Model’s fuel stocks were nearly depleted, and there had not been enough to send his supply trucks back. It was uncertain whether Schweppenburg even had the necessary supplies for replenishment, even if the trucks arrived. If not for the supply dump captured at Romny, September could have turned out much worse for the 3rd Panzer Division and, consequently, for Guderian’s entire offensive. However, Model found himself in a precarious situation, as the small forward elements he had stationed in Romny were completely isolated.

Elsewhere, more of Guderian’s divisions began to experience sudden success, but this expansion also significantly increased the length of the frontline that needed to be defended. The 47th Panzer Corps found itself tasked with holding a 150 km stretch of the frontline; by the 13th, it had lost its last reconnaissance plane, with no replacements available. Overstretched and effectively blind, the Corps’s best hope was that the enemy would not be in a position to mount a strong attack against them. Fortunately, the 40th Army’s line was in disarray, and confusion reigned among their ranks as they struggled to grasp the situation. Communication was ineffective, forcing them to pull back to reorganize their lines. However, three large Soviet columns were spotted marching towards Romny and two other towns bridging the Sula River. On the morning of the 11th, Model dispatched a forward detachment to advance south to Lukhovitsy. If Kleist was not going to reach Model, then Model would push on to reach Kleist with the remnants of Guderian’s spearhead. Lukhovitsy and its bridge were captured on the 13th, and the Kampfgruppe quickly dug in to repel any Soviet attempts to escape, while also hoping for reinforcements and air support. With Guderian’s offensive now spent, it fell to Army Group South to complete the encirclement.

When Dnipropetrovsk was captured on August 26th, it was accomplished by Kleist’s motorized infantry in conjunction with the Panzers. However, when the infantry struggled to expand the bridgehead across the river, relocating the tanks became pointless until a secure foothold was established, either at Dnipropetrovsk or elsewhere. Even after the bridgehead at Kremenchuk was secured and expanded, preparations for the breakthrough offensive took significant time. It wasn't until September 10th that three Infantry Corps of the 17th Army finished deploying across the river, which meant Kleist could not initiate his crossing until the 11th. This delay provided an opportunity for Kleist’s Panzer divisions to restore their strength, achieving up to 100 operational tanks in three of the four divisions, while the fourth managed to regain only 79 tanks. Estimates indicated that the pre-refit Panzer Group had been degraded to approximately one-third of its initial pre-invasion strength but was eventually restored to about 50% effectiveness. Several Panzer divisions underwent their refit near Dnipropetrovsk, which may have misled Kirponos regarding German intentions. This deception resulted in the German bridgehead at Dnipropetrovsk facing significant Red Army attacks, as more Soviet reinforcements were funneled into the heavy fighting there. Despite this, the 38th Army at Kremenchuk suffered severe losses, with 40,000 casualties and 279 tanks lost due to repeated failed assaults against the German infantry holding the bridgehead.

Zeitzler was finally permitted to withdraw from the Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead on the 10th. Thirteen artillery detachments had been transported across in an attempt to expand the bridgehead, and withdrawing them alone would take nearly six days. Given the upcoming offensive at Kremenchuk, it seemed futile to withdraw, so Zeitzler requested to be relieved by the infantry of the 17th Army instead, a request that was approved. Fighting in Dnipropetrovsk continued well after Kleist broke out at Kremenchug. It was not until September 15th that the 14th Motorized Corps launched an attack in the rear of the 6th Army, relieving some of the pressure on the Germans at Dnipropetrovsk. Notably, the Italian Expeditionary Corps also found success in this assault, marking one of their first major operations in the Eastern Theater. Ultimately, the CSIR would consist of just 62,000 men, intended to be among the best Italy had to offer, so as not to create a poor impression alongside the other Axis allies. When Keitel laid eyes on them upon their arrival on the eastern front at the end of August, he scornfully described the force as "a boundless disappointment," noting that the officers were far too old and that the troops amounted to "half-soldiers" incapable of standing up to the Red Army. Even Hitler disparagingly referred to the Italians as nothing more than "harvest hands." In any case, the Italians were too few in number and arrived too late on the eastern front to have any significant impact on the fortunes of Germany’s 1941 campaign.

Kleist’s offensive finally commenced on the morning of the 12th. Hube’s 16th Panzer, supported by artillery and air force, shattered two Soviet rifle divisions and raced to Semenovka by the afternoon. However, Hube’s advance was halted 15 km short of Khorol due to running completely out of fuel. This situation was worsened by the mud, which slowed the following 9th Division, still in the process of crossing the river. Had there been any Red Army forces with sufficient strength or mobility, Hube’s isolated division would have faced a serious risk of counterattack and potential destruction. After refueling overnight, the 16th Panzer pushed to Lubny, moving 40 km from Model’s advanced Kampfgruppe. There, the Panzers were stopped until the next day by fierce resistance from the NKVD, local worker militias, and an anti-aircraft battery. Subsequent attacks by the 17th Army and the rest of Kleist’s divisions led to the near disintegration of Feklenko’s 38th Army. Over the following two days, Kleist managed to get three Panzer divisions across the river, supported by the 48th Motorized Infantry Corps. The Soviet 47th Tank Division attempted a flank attack against Kempf’s Motorized Corps, but its remaining few dozen light tanks made little impact. With several Panzer divisions now positioned behind their lines, panic began to spread across the entire Southwestern Front, causing both its southern and northern positions to crumble under the weight of the German infantry offensives.

By the end of the 13th, it was clear that Kirponos was doomed. Only the 38th and 40th Armies remained operational. The 38th was nearly shattered from the fighting at Kremenchug, while the 40th was poorly positioned to offer assistance. There were no reserve armies available to break the encirclement, and Kirponos was constrained to unfavorable defensive positions due to Stalin's directives. With more than 200 km between them and safety at the Eastern frontlines, each day's delay condemned thousands to their fate. The initial breakout attempts were carried out by rear-area supply troops who lacked heavy weapons and a cohesive command structure. Despite being extremely outnumbered, Model’s forces managed to hold onto the river crossings. Although the main bridges were secured by the Germans, the encirclement was not completely sealed. Along Guderian’s line, breakout attempts led to several unexpected battles. One notable instance involved Schweppenburg’s 24th Panzer Corps command post being abruptly attacked by a Soviet column and nearly overrun. Ultimately, the 9th Panzer broke through to Model’s position at Lukhovitsy, officially closing the encirclement on the 15th. The convergence of small units from opposing sides during an encirclement is often regarded as the defining moment marking the end of the encirclement. At this stage, the battle is typically considered resolved. However, the reality on the ground is often quite different. Breakout attempts occurred in every major encirclement on the Eastern Front, and the Battle of Kyiv was no exception. Additionally, the mere meeting of the two halves does not ensure that the pocket has been effectively closed. For days, or even weeks, a pocket could remain unsealed, despite what operational maps at headquarters might indicate.

Out of 261,696 men and 259 tanks committed to combat in an attempt to stop Guderian, the Bryansk Front suffered approximately 100,000 casualties and lost 140 tanks. Fewer than 200,000 men remained available for combat across the entire Bryansk front. Stalin had placed too much faith in Eremenko, despite repeated requests for a change from other officers. Eremenko’s offensives had drained the Red Army’s offensive capabilities, although the Germans remained unaware of this depletion. Concern rippled through the chain of command regarding the exposed position of the 2nd Panzer Group. Some of its divisions were tasked with covering frontages of over ninety kilometers—a challenging prospect even under optimal conditions. However, the unfamiliar terrain and poor supply lines meant the already weakened divisions were being stretched to their limits. It was the frailty of Eremenko’s front and the Stavka’s inability to orchestrate a strong offensive anywhere along the line that saved the 2nd Panzer Group from being encircled. While German soldiers were exhausted, the decisive blow never landed. The Red Army was in an even worse state. The war began to resemble a matchup between two punch-drunk boxers, swaying back and forth, exchanging blows without the strength to finish the fight. Stalin’s refusal to permit a retreat had facilitated the encirclement of the Southwestern Front, leaving only one question: How severe would the impending disaster be? Would the Red Army endure?

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As the German siege of Kyiv intensified, General Guderian led an aggressive push against the resilient Soviet Red Army. Despite initial successes, the Nazis faced severe logistical challenges and heavy casualties as rain turned battlefields into mud. Meanwhile, Hitler's changing directives hampered operations, leading to a stalled advance on Moscow. By September, the brutal realities of war shifted tactics, and both sides prepared for a long, grueling conflict. The fight was far from over.

Eastern Front #13 Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany marched toward Kyiv, their confidence began to falter. General Fedor von Bock’s forces, fresh from capturing Smolensk, faced a fierce defensive from the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko.  The grim reality of warfare set in as soldiers from both sides endured harrowing conditions. German units struggled with their dwindling resources, suffering immense casualties that shattered morale. Conversely, the Soviets demonstrated remarkable resilience, with commanders like Georgy Zhukov evolving their tactics to counteract German advances. By month's end, both armies faced staggering losses, with the Soviets suffering catastrophic casualties. This fierce battle would become a pivotal moment, illustrating the fierce determination of the Red Army and altering the course of history on the Eastern Front.

This episode is the Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

September has arrived on the Eastern Front, bringing with it the late summer rains. General Guderian is pushing his tanks southward, aiming to cut off the defenders of Kyiv. Behind him, Field Marshal von Bock is tasked with holding the line at Yelna, while the Soviet High Command is prepared to sacrifice tens of thousands of brave soldiers to reclaim it. Last week we talked about how the Bryansk Front struggled to fend off Guderian as his armored divisions advanced, threatening to encircle Kyiv. In the area of Army Group North, the push towards Leningrad is recovering from earlier setbacks. General Vatutin’s offensive was swiftly repelled by Manstein’s Panzers, and the 18th Army successfully cleared Estonia. The rapid advances of Leeb's offensive have devastated the Soviet forces. To address the dire situation, the Stavka has deployed three armies: the 54th, 52nd, and 4th Armies, arriving in early September to bolster defenses in front of Leningrad. Their focus is on the eastern side of Volkhov, aiming to prevent a connection between the Finnish and German forces.

In August, the Germans captured Mga, but an NKVD division briefly retook it for a day before being driven out by the 20th Motorized Division. A see-saw battle unfolded throughout the first week of September, but by the end of the week, the Germans had gained firm control. The 48th Army was struggling to maintain its position, and on September 7th, the combined might of the 20th Motorized and 12th Panzer Divisions captured Sinaivino, with Shisselburg next on their list. These towns were the last land connections to the rest of the Soviet Union. Losing Mga, the last rail connection, was a significant blow to the defense of Leningrad. With the fall of Shisselburg and Sinaivino, the options for leaving the city without traversing Axis lines grew grim. The only escape route left was across Lake Ladoga. Army Group North had originally advanced an average of 5 kilometers a day in July, which slowed to 2.2 kilometers in August, and dropped to just 1.5 kilometers a day in September. Lengthening supply lines, growing fatigue among soldiers, and fierce Soviet resistance have begun to take their toll. Now, with Leningrad isolated, many soldiers of Army Group North believe their mission is nearly complete. All that remains is to wait for Leningrad to starve, surrender, and for Army Group Center and South to achieve their objectives. The OKH announced  "the Iron Ring around Leningrad has been closed”. 

The Finnish forces had advanced across the Karelian Isthmus, posing a significant threat to Leningrad. Back on August 22, the Finnish 4th Corps entered Soviet territory north of Vyborg, swiftly advancing toward the Vuoksi River in the early stages of their offensive. By the 24th, the Finnish 8th Division successfully crossed Viipuri Bay, landing south of Vyborg and severing the coastal road leading to the city. In an attempt to re-establish this vital road link, the Soviet 43rd, 115th, and 123rd Rifle Divisions initiated a counter-offensive against the 8th Division. Despite being heavily outnumbered, the Finnish Light Brigade T managed to delay the Soviet advance for several crucial hours while 4th Corps continued its southward march on August 25.

In the ensuing days, both sides regrouped their forces and prepared for a clash in the heavily forested area surrounding Porlampi, located between the coastal and central Karelian highways. The battle began on August 30, when advanced elements of the Soviet 43rd Rifle Division encountered the Finnish 8th Division in the Porlampi forests. Both armies called in reinforcements, with the Soviets largely unaware that the Finnish troops they were engaging had crossed Viipuri Bay, mistakenly believing the 8th Division was part of the main body of the 4th Corps. In reality, 4th Corps was advancing uncontested to the north and east, posing a threat to encircle the Soviet forces. Over the next several days of intense combat in the Porlampi region, the Finns effectively employed motti skirmishing tactics to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviets. Finnish artillery proved particularly effective, disabling many Soviet vehicles, obstructing roads, and creating significant bottlenecks. By the late afternoon of August 30, the 43rd Rifle Division succeeded in pushing the 8th Division out of Porlampi and into the nearby village of Somme, located several miles northwest. Fighting continued fiercely throughout the night.

On the morning of August 31, the main body of the IV Corps arrived, launching attacks on the 123rd Rifle Division at Porlampi and the 115th Rifle Division at Ylasomme. This assault effectively collapsed the northern flank of the Soviet army, forcing a retreat. However, the 8th Division remained engaged in heavy combat with the 43rd Rifle Division northwest of Porlampi and was unable to complete the encirclement. Utilizing the dense forest terrain, the Soviet 123rd and 115th Rifle Divisions withdrew southwest toward Koivisto. Vyborg fell on August 31, allowing more Finnish forces to focus on the remaining troops of the 23rd Army. The 43rd Rifle Division, which had advanced the farthest west, was nearly annihilated by Finnish forces on September 1. A handful of survivors retreated south and were evacuated by the Soviet Navy from the Baltic coast in November. The Red Army incurred heavy losses during the engagement, with 7,000 soldiers killed, 1,000 wounded, and 9,000 captured, primarily from the decimated 43rd Rifle Division. In comparison, the Finnish 4th Corps suffered 700 fatalities and 2,700 injuries. The Finns also seized a substantial amount of Soviet equipment, including 164 artillery pieces of various calibers. Notably, they captured Major General Vladimir Kirpichnikov, marking him as the highest-ranking Soviet prisoner of war taken during both the Winter War and the Continuation War.

On September 2, Finnish forces marched to the village and port of Koivisto but did not pursue the remnants of the Soviet divisions that had fled into the surrounding archipelago; these units were later evacuated by the Soviets in November. While fighting near Viipuri continued, the Finnish advance toward Leningrad persisted. The Finnish IV Corps spearheaded the advance along the western shore, the II Corps operated in the center, and the recently arrived I Corps moved along the eastern side of the Isthmus. Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Mannerheim ordered the forces to hold their position short of the Soviet fortifications. The Finnish troops reached the old border on August 31 and halted their advance shortly thereafter at the Soviet fortifications.

Back on August 20, General W. Erfurth informed Mannerheim that Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel would send a letter outlining where Finland would be requested to attack Leningrad. Mannerheim, articulating the practical challenges of this proposal, highlighted the opposition from both political and military leadership regarding any assault on the city. The government had previously decided against attacking Leningrad, and only after pressure from military leaders did they agree to make a limited advance across the old border to secure better defensive positions. The Social Democrats were particularly opposed to crossing the border. When Keitel's letter arrived, President Risto Ryti and Mannerheim prepared a negative response.

On August 31, Erfurth contacted Mannerheim again and suggested canceling the attack on East Karelia in favor of an attack on Leningrad, but both Ryti and Mannerheim refused. On the same day, Mannerheim ordered that the offensive be halted at a line stretching from the mouth of the Rajajoki River to Ohta. The exact boundary between Ohta and Lake Ladoga would be determined later when the Finns had reached the old border in that area. This strategy aimed to shorten the front line without having to assault the Soviet fortifications north of Leningrad. In this last phase, the Soviets had six infantry divisions along with various separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north, but all were operating at half strength due to the recent heavy fighting with Finnish forces.

The Finnish 12th Division reached its target on September 1, while attacks elsewhere commenced on September 2. The 18th Division captured Mainila on the same day and took Valkeasaari the following day. By September 7, both the 18th and the 2nd Divisions had reached their objectives between the Rajajoki and Ohta. The commander of I Corps, Colonel Mäkinen, instructed his troops to advance to the Ohta-Lake Lempaalanjärvi-old border line at Lake Ladoga, adding that if they encountered strong defenses, the offensive could be halted. The attack began on September 4, and on September 6, the 10th Division encircled and destroyed the Soviet 941st Rifle Regiment at Kirjasalo. By September 9, the objective line was secured across the board, and Finnish forces transitioned to a defensive posture. Soviet military leadership quickly recognized the diminished Finnish pressure, and by September 5, two divisions were redeployed from the Karelian Isthmus to bolster defenses south of the city against the Germans. Although Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus did not directly partake in the Siege of Leningrad, their mere presence contributed to the siege by disrupting supply lines to the city around and across Lake Ladoga.

While they had no intention of launching an assault on the city, Soviet intelligence was unaware of this crucial detail. In response to the situation, Lieutenant General M. Popov was ordered to push the Finns back to relieve pressure on Leningrad. Unfortunately, he had limited forces available for this challenging task. In late August, the Northern Front was reorganized into two subfronts, officially becoming the Leningrad and Karelian fronts by September 1st. This restructuring did not replace the Northwestern Front; rather, it underscored how the Stavka viewed the evolving threat to Leningrad. Effectively, the Northwestern Front had been detached from the city’s defense. General Vatutin’s recent offensive had been a desperate attempt to reform those defensive lines, but it ultimately failed. Now, the front faced a difficult reality, trapped in both the figurative and literal wilderness east of Lake Ilmen.

As September began, Field Marshal Bock faced immense challenges. Timoshenko and the revamped Western Front were relentlessly striking along his lines east of Smolensk. Meanwhile, General Guderian was pressuring the Army Group Center’s staff and commanders for reinforcements and additional support as the situation in the Yelna salient approached a crisis point. On September 6th, Hitler issued a crucial directive for the campaign, War Directive 35.  “Combined with the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, the initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between the flanks of Army Groups South and Center have provided favorable conditions for a decisive operation against the Timoshenko Army Group which is attacking on the Central front. This Army Group must be defeated and annihilated in the limited time which remains before the onset of winter weather. For this purpose it is necessary to concentrate all the forces of the Army and Air force which can be spared on the flanks and which can be brought up in time. On the basis of the report of Commander In Chief Army, I issue the following orders for the preparation and execution of these operations….”.

Hitler had completely reversed his earlier stance and reaffirmed the intention to capture Moscow. It was becoming increasingly evident to all involved that the war would not conclude by the year's end. While Hitler's directive did not explicitly acknowledge this reality, it hinted at it indirectly. His goal was to finish the year on a victorious note. If his armies could capture both Moscow and Kyiv while maintaining the siege of Leningrad, he could convincingly declare to the German people that the war was nearly won. The directive laid out the campaign's objectives, yet the specifics of the operation would fall to Bock’s staff for planning and approval. Hitler established strict limits on the forces available and outlined the key objectives. Once Guderian completed his task of dismantling the Southwestern Front, he would rejoin the efforts at the center.

Field Marshal Bock was set to receive Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group and Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group. Meanwhile, the 1st Panzer Group would remain with Army Group South to continue its offensive operations in Ukraine, reaching as far south as Crimea. The plan detailed in Hitler’s directive called for a dual envelopment strategy aimed at crushing Timoshenko’s forces. Notably, it mandated that the destruction of the Western Front be achieved through close encirclement. This emphasis on proximity was not lost on Bock or his chief of staff, Halder. Earlier in the year, following the initial battles for Minsk, this had been a point of contention. The choice between a tighter operational encirclement and a more extensive strategic encirclement had sparked disagreements between Hitler and his field commanders since the invasion of France. Nevertheless, Bock had secured what he desired: the advance towards Moscow would resume, and his command would once again serve as the central focus of the entire campaign.

Meanwhile, Army Group Center was under relentless pressure from Timoshenko and Zhukov. Yelna remained the focal point for the Red Army, and the Wehrmacht was holding on by a thread. Zhukov temporarily paused his operations to regroup and receive reinforcements from Stavka reserves. Once these forces were in place, he renewed his assaults. On September 1st, every segment of Army Group Center’s front lines came under attack. The Soviet 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies of the Western Front launched an offensive from Iartsevo to Dukhovshchin. In the salient itself, the main effort came from the 24th Army, with support from the 43rd Army. Defending this strategic position were only four German infantry divisions: the 268th, 292nd, 78th, and 137th. These units had been hastily assembled from various infantry corps of the 4th and 9th Armies, sent in to relieve the encircled Panzers. As the attacks intensified, it became increasingly impossible for the defenders to withstand the overwhelming numbers arrayed against them. Officers expressed their frustration to superiors, noting that the fighting had devolved into desperate trench defenses, with artillery supplies being rationed and no armor support available along the line. Each assault created opportunities for local penetrations, and every penetration posed a risk of becoming a breakthrough that could ultimately spell the end for the salient.

Army Group Center was fully aware of the precarious situation surrounding Yelna, yet they had no resources to spare for a counter-offensive. Timoshenko’s Western Front push left Bock without any reserves. Both the staff of Army Group Center and the 20th Infantry Corps felt powerless, knowing a retreat was necessary. Time was pressing; if they delayed much longer, the Red Army could exploit their successes and break through across the Desna River, leading to open space beyond, a situation that was simply unacceptable. The situation along Army Group Center’s front was dire. At one point, Field Marshal Bock called Halder, inquiring what he should do if the front line were to collapse. This dramatic plea was not from a nervous subordinate but from a seasoned officer. Bock had earned his rank the traditional way, having been awarded Imperial Germany’s highest honor for military valor in 1916. He had faced some of the toughest fighting on the Eastern Front during World War I. While he may have been considered a Nazi accomplice, he was neither a coward nor someone prone to exaggerating his circumstances. On September 4th, Bock issued orders for a withdrawal back across the river, effectively saving his infantrymen from certain annihilation at the hands of Zhukov’s forces. 

As Franz Frisch, who fought in those battles, later wrote: “Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ “Wehrmachtsbericht” about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”. 

The retreat was executed orderly, with the infantry divisions moving to new positions on the western side of the Desna, reestablishing the line along the Ustrom and Striana rivers. Yelna was liberated on September 5th. Zhukov had achieved the seemingly impossible: he forced back significant German forces from their prepared positions. It came at a steep cost, however, with the Red Army suffering nearly thirty-two thousand casualties and losing two strong tank divisions, but the objective was accomplished. The Germans, for their part, paid a heavy price to hold the salient as long as they did, with the fighting around Yelna from July to September resulting in close to ten thousand casualties for the Wehrmacht. Despite this notable success, the stavka was frustrated that German forces had managed to escape intact, rather than achieving the intended encirclement and destruction of the defenders in the salient.

Guderian’s drive south faced significant challenges in the last week of August. The Bryansk Front successfully blocked Schweppenburg’s Panzer Corps from advancing across the Desna River in force. On Guderian’s flank, the 2nd Army struggled to keep pace, prompting complaints about vulnerabilities to counterattacks. In light of these emerging threats, Guderian requested additional mobile formations from Army Group Center. However, he received only the SS Das Reich division and the Grossdeutschland regiment, as Army Group Center needed to retain the remaining Panzers to counter potential breakthroughs by the Western and Reserve Fronts. As Timoshenko and Zhukov intensified their assaults on the front lines, Bock’s forces were pushed to their breaking point. On September 1st, Schweppenburg managed to push the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions across the river, although serious challenges plagued his advance. Between the two divisions, he could muster only 86 operational tanks. Nevertheless, they continued to push forward. From September 1st onward, both divisions faced Soviet counterattacks. The 21st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Gerasimenko, launched an assault against the 4th Panzer near Korop, which was led by Major General Erlencamp. In a confusing attack, Erlencamp’s men managed to capture over twelve hundred prisoners from the 21st Army. The 4th Panzer, under Model’s command, did not perform as well. Meanwhile, the 10th Tank Division, now a shadow of its former self, managed to hold off Model’s advances for several days. The disparities in outcomes from these minor battles are difficult to assess. However, factors such as terrain, logistics, and tactical leadership on both sides played crucial roles in determining the results.

Late in August, Eremenko received a direct order from Stalin to “smash Guderian and his group to smithereens.” Determined not to disappoint the dictator, he quickly devised a plan. Guderian’s northern flank was alarmingly long, extending over one hundred kilometers. To defend this vulnerable flank, Guderian had assigned General of Panzers Lemelsen and his 47th Corps. Eremenko opted to exploit Lemelsen’s exposed position by assembling a mobile exploitation force comprising the 4th Cavalry Division, the 108th Tank Division, and the 141st Tank Brigade. The primary target was the 7th Panzer Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Arnim. However, Arnim had only 50 operational tanks to cover more than sixty kilometers. To complicate matters, only half of these were Panzer IIIs; the remainder were outdated light models. In stark contrast, the Soviets had more T-34s than the Germans had tanks, alongside KV-1s and some BT light tanks, significantly enhancing their offensive capabilities. Eremenko initiated a reconnaissance in force before August came to a close, but his efforts were swiftly thwarted by the Germans. German small units effectively leveraged their superior organization and combined arms coordination to repel the limited initial attacks over the first few days. After successfully pushing back the uncoordinated probes from Eremenko’s forces, the Germans quickly shifted to the offensive. 

By September 1st, the 108th Tank Division found itself surrounded in the woods. Eremenko, reluctant to disrupt his timeline, chose not to intervene to save the division. On the morning of September 2nd, he launched his own offensive. However, the attack faltered due to inadequate reconnaissance and the Soviet standard failure to coordinate their efforts effectively. On the night of September 4th, the 108th Tank Division managed to break out of its encirclement, bringing along only eleven tanks and twelve hundred men. The 141st Tank Brigade fared similarly poorly, dwindling from an authorized strength of ninety-four tanks to just thirty-eight. This was a significant disaster. Despite the setback, Eremenko continued his assault, but it had devolved into localized attacks at the small unit level. The Red Army's ongoing inability to coordinate its subordinate units enabled Lemelsen to repel Eremenko’s assaults with relative ease. 

By the end of the first week, the true scale of the disaster became evident. On September 5th, Eremenko requested and received permission to deploy blocking detachments to prevent unauthorized retreats in a desperate attempt to stabilize his faltering command. This botched offensive resulted in a staggering one hundred thousand casualties with little to show for it. Although the 47th Panzer Corps had been stretched, it remained unbroken. Lemelsen had managed the battle effectively, keeping his forces balanced enough to secure the flank of Guderian’s advance. However, had Stalin not consistently forbidden the withdrawal of the Soviet Southwestern Front, it’s plausible that Eremenko’s offensive might have provided enough time for Kirponos to safely withdraw the majority of his forces.

Around Kyiv, a combination of difficult terrain, escalating logistical issues, and determined enemy resistance was causing Rundstedt to worry that Red Army forces ahead of him could escape the encirclement promised by Guderian’s advance south. To counter this, he ordered the 1st Panzer Group, along with the 6th and 17th Armies, to cross the Dnipro River across as many sectors as possible, regardless of the condition of these formations. The goal was to establish a bridgehead of sufficient depth at Kremenchug, providing the Germans a starting point for an offensive towards Kyiv. This maneuver occurred despite vigorous counterattacks from the overstretched 38th Army. One of the largest counterattacks consisted of eighty Soviet tanks, which was ultimately repulsed, resulting in the destruction of sixty tanks. Constant air interdiction by the Luftwaffe, coupled with the diversion of all Soviet reserves in the local theater towards Guderian’s drive south, helped prevent any larger offensives against the bridgehead. By September 7th, the infantry of the 17th Army had successfully expanded the bridgehead enough to facilitate further large-scale operations.

Initially, the plan called for the 1st Panzer to secure the flanks of the offensive by capturing Poltava, while the 17th Army was tasked with advancing towards Mirgorod and Lubny. The goal was to link up with Guderian and create a large pocket centered on Kyiv. However, increasing Soviet resistance and the realization that the river line was being strongly defended led Rundstedt to conclude that any breakout needed to be executed rapidly to avoid becoming bogged down, which would give the Red Army more time to escape. As a result, the orders for the 1st Panzer and 17th Army were swapped. Despite the urgent need to initiate the operation, the offensive faced delays due to challenges in building sufficient supplies and reinforcing the bridges to accommodate the vehicles of the Panzer divisions. This included the construction of two 16-ton bridges.

Further south at Dnepropetrovsk, the 3rd Motorised Corps attempted once again to expand their bridgehead. Initially captured in late August, the Corps had failed to sufficiently broaden it to facilitate the crossing of additional formations. This limitation was partly due to the entire Corps relying on just a single footbridge and a captured floating bridge, which severely restricted logistics, exacerbating the usual challenges in transporting supplies to such an eastern position. Additionally, Dnepropetrovsk was regarded as secondary to the priorities of the 1st Panzer and 17th Army. Another significant factor was the relentless assaults from Red Army forces, who did not view this sector as a mere sideshow. A German army meeting with senior leaders from Army Group South, held on the 8th, highlighted the intensity of the fighting in this area. Reports indicated that the floating bridge was destroyed ten times by artillery, three times by bombers, once by the crash of a shot-down plane, and finally by a storm. Heavy tank-led assaults were frequent; one managed to overrun the forward positions of the 198th Infantry Division, leading to heavy German casualties, including one company of the 308th Regiment, which was reduced to just 20 men.

VVs’ activity was on the rise, with other units in the Area of Army Group South reporting similar numbers of air attacks each day. However, this activity paled in comparison to the VVS's main focus, which involved flying 4,000 sorties against Guderian's Panzer Group 2 between August 29th and September 4th. The fierce fighting at Dnepropetrovsk resulted in an average of more than 300 German casualties every single day throughout the battle. These heavy losses prompted the Corps’ commander, Zeitzler, to repeatedly request permission to withdraw to the German-controlled side of the river. However, Rundstedt consistently denied these requests, as he was under orders from Halder to hold the bridgehead. It remains unclear whether the bridgehead was intended as a potential second breakout position or merely as a distraction for the Soviet forces.

At the end of the first week of September, the double envelopment of the Southwestern Front was progressing poorly. Guderian experienced limited success as he pushed southward. His long flanks were extending, he received little support from Army Group Center, and Eremenko’s unsuccessful but persistent attacks served as a constant distraction. In the south, Stülpnagel’s 17th Army had breached the first layer of containment at Kremenchug. However, the 38th Army was strengthening its resistance and proving to be less than easy prey for the worn-out infantry. To complicate matters further, the rain had begun to fall. Curzio Malaparte was an Italian writer and filmmaker who spent approximately two years as a correspondent for Italian newspapers on the Eastern Front. Many of his articles were suppressed by Mussolini’s censorship due to their candid portrayal of the war. He had this to say during this time period. “All of a sudden, it starts to rain. At first, it is a gentle shower, silent and almost furtive. But soon it develops into a regular hurricane, a veritable cloudburst... The German soldiers look up at the sky shouting and cursing. The artillery-trains come to an abrupt halt, the horses slither about in the mud that has formed as if by magic, the lorries skid on the slippery surface”. Unlike the summer rains, which would vanish in a day, the rains of September persisted nearly nonstop for the first two weeks in Ukraine. Movement became almost impossible; in some areas along Guderian’s advance, it was reported that it took ten hours to cover just twenty kilometers. This situation was intolerable, yet it had to be endured. The advance continued throughout the first week of September, with the rain adversely affecting both sides as they attempted to maneuver and supply their forward elements.

At this point, thousands of small, nameless battles were raging across the front. These skirmishes consistently proved costly for the Red Army. However, the sheer attrition was beginning to impact German forces as well. Some divisions started to dissolve battalions in order to bolster the strength of their remaining battalions. The lightning-fast mobile warfare that characterized earlier phases of the conflict was being replaced by slow positional warfare or even static trench fighting reminiscent of the First World War. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of Infantry Karl Weisenberger, noted on September 3rd, “We are fighting the war of the poor man. We must manage on less so that other positions can advance rapidly.” Already, German soldiers in these more static areas began to complain about enduring large artillery barrages. If this trend continued, the technical superiority and mobility of the German forces might diminish in significance compared to the demographic and industrial advantages of the Soviet Union.

It is rather ironic, Hitler and the top German commanders were facing a problem that 129 years prior plagued Napoleon Bonaparte. The most obvious example is Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812. The German High Command’s inability to recognize the essential hallmarks of this military calamity highlights their flawed conceptualization and planning in anticipation of Operation Barbarossa. Much like Hitler, Napoleon was a conqueror of Europe, believing that his war on Russia was key to compelling England to negotiate. He invaded with the intention of concluding the war swiftly, aiming for a decisive battle in western Russia. However, as the Russians withdrew, Napoleon's supply lines lengthened and his strength dwindled week by week. The poor roads and harsh environment took a deadly toll on both horses and men, while politically, Russia’s oppressed serfs remained, for the most part, loyal to the aristocracy.

Even after defeating the Russian army at Smolensk and Borodino, Napoleon did not achieve a decisive result, leaving him with the dilemma of either retreating or pushing deeper into Russia. Neither option was truly acceptable, the retreat was politically untenable, while the advance was militarily unwise. Yet, in each instance, Napoleon chose to advance. In doing so, the French emperor outdid even Hitler, successfully capturing the Russian capital in September 1812. However, this victory counted for little when the Russians simply refused to acknowledge defeat and prepared to continue fighting through the winter. By the time Napoleon left Moscow to begin his infamous retreat, the Russian campaign was doomed. As Clausewitz said “The Russia campaign of 1812 demonstrated in the first place that a country of such size could not be conquered (which might well have been foreseen), and in the second that the prospect of eventual success does not always decrease in proportion to lost battles, captured capitals, and occupied provinces, which is something that diplomats used to regard as dogma, and made them always ready to conclude a peace however bad. On the contrary, the Russians showed us that one often attains one’s greatest strength in the heart of one’s own country, when the enemy’s offensive power is exhausted, and the defensive can then switch with enormous energy to the offensive”. 

Despite the intervening 129 years, the parallels between Hitler’s advance into the Soviet Union and earlier campaigns are unmistakable, a point almost entirely lost on the German generals. Despite reading accounts of the 1812 campaign and other Russian wars, they preferred to trust in their technological advancements and “natural” German superiority. The war of 1812 was certainly not the only invasion from which German generals could have drawn instructive lessons. The German army’s failure to successfully implement the famous Schlieffen Plan in 1914 also merits significant comparisons with Operation Barbarossa. Just as the defeat of France in 1940 had inflated the myth of superiority to dangerous levels within the German army, so too did the memories of 1870 influence planning and expectations on the eve of World War I.

As the powerful right flank of the German western front wheeled through Belgium in the initial stages of World War I, serious problems soon undermined the success of Schlieffen’s planned strategic envelopment. The German railways proved magnificent for mobilizing and concentrating the massive force of the army, but once there, the field armies had to march to war, leaving supply railheads further behind each day. Efforts to extend the railways suffered from poor planning and inadequate resources. Trucks were scarce and too slow over congested roads to effectively bridge the gap. The constant demands on transportation led to a high vehicle fallout rate, and by early September 1914, during the critical battle of the Marne, only 40 percent of the fleet remained serviceable.

Horses were, of course, the primary means of transportation for the army, but they were poorly cared for, and almost no provisions had been made for fodder during the march. This resulted in a large number of sick and weakened horses, many of which succumbed in high numbers. Allied resistance also took a toll on German offensive strength, with casualties throughout the German field armies reaching about 265,000 men by September 6, 1914. The expansion of the front further exacerbated this weakness, while French forces managed to replenish their ranks without committing too many reserves at the outset, allowing them to fall back toward the country’s interior. These factors, while not exhaustive, contributed to the German failure in 1914 and reflect essential problems later encountered, to varying degrees, in Operation Barbarossa. Summing up the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, historian Hew Strachan's judgment could just as easily apply to 1941 as it did to 1914. Strachan wrote “Moltke’s [the Chief of the German General Staff] lines of communication were lengthening by the day; his front broadened as the movement through France developed . . . The combination of the detached corps, the heavy losses . . . and exhaustion through the march and its attendant supply problems meant that a stage would be reached when the Germans had too few men. Thus, in almost every key index of military strength – in command, in communications, in manpower . . .  the balance was swinging from Germany to France. Much of the swing was inherent in the advance itself and the plan which had given rise to it”. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced toward Kyiv, General Guderian led a fierce battle against the resilient Soviet Red Army. Despite initial confidence, German forces faced enormous casualties and dwindling supplies. As September rains fell, the arduous struggle continued towards Leningrad, where Finnish forces joined the conflict. The battles, marked by immense suffering, determined the course of history on the Eastern Front, showcasing the relentless human spirit and the grim realities of war, ultimately foreshadowing a turning point in the larger conflict.

 

Eastern Front #12 Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced towards Kyiv, their confidence in a swift victory began to wane. General Fedor von Bock's forces had captured Smolensk, yet the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted an unexpected and resilient defense. The Soviets, despite their heavy losses, rallied and mobilized millions, initiating counteroffensives that demonstrated their vast potential. Amidst the chaos, logistical troubles plagued the German troops, stretching their resources thin and leading to growing unrest among soldiers grappling with devastating casualties. As the battle for Kyiv intensified, the realization dawned on German commanders that their aggressive strategy was failing, with victory slipping from their grasp. 

This episode is Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Tension stretches from Berlin, the capital of Germany, to Moscow, the heart of Russia, as military commanders and powerful leaders strategize their next moves. One side contemplates a decisive action, while the other fears that too much territory has already been surrendered. The Red Army must now prepare to confront the Wehrmacht, in a critical battle just outside Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Last week marked a turning point as fighting in the sector of Army Group Center came to a standstill, largely due to exhaustion among the troops. In response, Adolf Hitler commanded General Guderian to redirect his forces south toward Ukraine, while General Hermann Hoth provided support for Army Group North, advancing from the north.

On August 20, a report from the 2nd Army's 267th Infantry Division noted that over the preceding six days, the division had suffered around 1,000 casualties, bringing its total losses since the war began in the east to approximately 2,700 men. Within the LIII Army Corps, which included the 267th Infantry Division, overall losses reached 192 officers and 5,500 soldiers by August 22. At the war's outset, the average German infantry division consisted of about 17,000 troops. By the end of August 1941, the impact of casualties on these divisions was significant. In 14 of the divisions, losses had exceeded 4,000 men; in 40 divisions, over 3,000; in 30 divisions, over 2,000; and 58 divisions recorded losses of fewer than 2,000. On August 21, fighting around the Yel’nya salient, a bulge in the front line near the Smolensk region, began to ease as the Soviet 24th Army regrouped and received reinforcements in preparation for a major offensive expected by the end of the month. Even during this period of relative calm, the German IX Army Corps, tasked with defending the northern flank of the salient, was so severely understrength that engineers, desperately needed to build roads behind the front, were forced to fight as infantry for weeks.

The term “quiet” seems almost ironic considering the continuous losses being inflicted. The 137th Infantry Division was reportedly losing over 50 men daily in localized skirmishes between August 20 and 30, while the neighboring 263rd Infantry Division lost around 1,200 men from August 20 to 27, averaging about 150 losses per day. Following an inspection of the Yel’nya frontline, Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was told, “Troops are very strained. Enemy artillery activity is unpleasant, and our munitions are limited. Mines and wire are absent.” As August came to a close, the anticipated Soviet offensive finally commenced, featuring eight rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and one motorized infantry division, all supported by 800 artillery guns, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The Soviet forces, under General Georgy Zhukov's Reserve Front, were organized into two shock groups positioned north and south of the salient. For the first time, this offensive was coordinated with simultaneous attacks by the Western Front in the north at Dukhovshchina and the Bryansk Front in the south at Roslavl and Novozybkov. On the offensive’s first day, August 30, the Soviets penetrated ten kilometers into the southern flank of General Günther von Kluge’s forces, prompting Field Marshal Fedor von Bock to dispatch two divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division, to stabilize the situation. Heavy fighting ensued until September 2, when Bock decided to abandon the Yel’nya salient, deeming it purposeless and noting that the divisions there were being "bled white" over time. Thus, after six weeks of fierce combat and staggering losses, the Yel’nya salient ultimately proved ineffective, an appalling illustration of the aimless strategic direction of Army Group Centre. As soldier Franz Frisch, who fought in these battles, later reflected…

“Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ (Wehrmachtsbericht) about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”.

Franz Frisch was not the only German soldier to be taken aback by the stark contrast between the glorified wartime propaganda and the harsh reality faced at the front lines. Georg Grossjohann, an officer who had been stationed in France during the early weeks of Operation Barbarossa, later recounted his experiences after the war: “When I was moved to the east [in the late summer of 1941] I was actually convinced that I would be too late to see action. Reichspressechef [German press chief] Dr Dietrich declared on the radio that all that was needed in Russia from that point in the late summer would be ‘police actions’. Well, I was taught differently when I arrived there . . . There was tremendous bitterness amongst the infantry soldiers at the front over the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the realities of their situation”.

In the late summer of 1941, images of victorious advances into enemy territory had become relics of past wars, often propagandized in news reels. For the average German soldier, or Landser, the grim reality of life on the Eastern Front began to mirror the harrowing experiences of trench warfare. Corporal W.F. expressed his despair on August 22, stating, “We have suffered greatly under the Russian artillery fire, and we must live day and night in our foxholes for protection from shrapnel. The holes are filled with water, and lice and other vermin have already made their way in.” Another soldier, Erich Mende, observed how digging deeper was nearly impossible, as ground water would appear after just 50 centimeters. Meanwhile, fellow soldier Harald Henry wrote in a letter home on August 18, “It would be no overstatement to say that ‘a dog wouldn’t want to go on living like this,’ as no creature could endure such primitive conditions. All day long, we huddle in the ground, twisted in narrow holes, facing the sun and rain without respite, desperately trying to sleep.” If the living conditions were harsh, they were only compounded by the constant terrors of combat that dominated life on the front. Just days later, on August 22, Henry expressed his mental anguish in another letter, capturing the toll of war on his psyche. “Yesterday was a day so immersed in blood, so full of dead and wounded, so blasted by crackling salvoes, shrapnel from shells and groans and shrieks of the wounded, that I can not yet write about it . . . As if by a wonder I was drawn from the heaviest fighting in the afternoon and remain until now unhurt . . . At any rate my old non-commissioned officer Grabke and many other comrades are dead.”

In contrast to the chaotic early weeks of the war, when Soviet armies struggled with command and control, the stabilization of the front alleviated much of the pressure on the Soviet forces, enabling them to improve the coordination of their operations. This shift was evident in German assessments of Soviet combat performance. On August 6, Strauss reported that the Red Army had become a "well-led, tough, powerful enemy with a great deal of artillery and a strong air force." Three days later, a command conference at Panzer Group 3 described the enemy as a "[g]reat mass" still capable of fighting. Their armaments were characterized as “good,” and their artillery was reported to be "much more proficient than in the early days" of the conflict. This analysis reflected a radical shift from the dismissive evaluations made just three weeks earlier.

A crucial question arose: "How much longer until the Russian fighting strength is broken?" The answer was uncertain, with a statement declaring, "We must stand behind the Fuhrer in this, the hardest struggle in our history." Given Germany’s high military standards, the numerous mentions in war diaries of the bravery and resilience of the average Red Army soldier are particularly revealing. Leeb noted in his diary on August 5 the challenges of battle and the tenacity of the Russians, remarking on the daily report from the 18th Army that cited "40 prisoners and 500 dead Russians at Muru." Another German general reflected after the war, "The Russian civilian was tough, and the Russian soldier even tougher. He seemed to have an illimitable capacity for obedience and endurance." While the German invaders begrudgingly accepted the fanatical commitment of fighting to the last man, many aspects of the war in the East shocked and revolted them, highlighting the totality of the Soviet approach to warfare.

Many German soldiers reacted with indignation upon encountering Soviet women serving as combatants. Karl Fuchs, a soldier in the 7th Panzer Division, wrote home to his wife: “When I get home, I will tell you endless horror stories about Russia. Yesterday, for instance, we saw our first women soldiers, Russian women, their hair shorn, in uniform! And these pigs fired on our decent German soldiers from ambush positions.” Hans von Luck, also in the 7th Panzer Division, recounted an encounter with a dog in an abandoned village that ran up to meet them, only to disappear under one of their armored vehicles. This triggered an explosion that damaged the vehicle. Luck explained incredulously, “We ran to it and discovered that the dead dog had an explosive charge concealed in the fur on its back, with a movable pin as a detonator. When the dog crawled, the detonator tipped over and triggered the explosion. The dog had been trained to find meat under armored vehicles.”

The "Molotov cocktail" emerged as another sign of Soviet desperation in the face of inadequate anti-tank defenses. This improvised explosive device, filled with gasoline or kerosene, was ignited on impact through a burning wick. Originally used by Franco's troops in the Spanish Civil War, it was later employed more effectively by the Finnish army during the Winter War, where it gained its name, an unflattering reference to Soviet Foreign Minister Vjacheslav Molotov. During the early days of Operation Barbarossa, even Molotov cocktails were in short supply, but their success later prompted factories to produce them at a rate of 120,000 per day. The fanaticism of Soviet resistance was evident not only in their novel use of improvised weaponry but also in their combat tactics. Accounts describe Soviet soldiers pretending to surrender only to open fire or stab their captors at close range. Numerous reports attest to "dead" Soviet soldiers suddenly springing back to life and ambushing unsuspecting Germans. In his memoir, Manstein recounted that "there were more than enough cases where Soviet soldiers, after throwing up their hands as if to surrender, reached for their arms as soon as our infantry came close, or where Soviet wounded feigned death and then fired on our troops when our backs were turned." Warfare on the Eastern Front was as ferocious as it was brutal, with combatants on both sides often unwilling to give quarter or observe the usual conventions of war. The Germans had initiated a war of annihilation in the east, intent on starving millions and enslaving those who remained. Yet, unlike their previous campaigns, this time they faced a determined opposition employing every possible means of resistance.

Theodor Mogge, a non-commissioned artillery officer serving with the 2nd Army, poignantly remarked, “Every day brought new victims.” By the end of August, after just nine weeks of conflict against the Soviet Union, German losses had amounted to 14,457 officers and nearly 400,000 soldiers. Statistically, this meant that slightly more than one in every ten men was now a casualty. Reserves from the Replacement Army were already marching eastward to help fill some of these vacancies, but the supply of manpower was dwindling rapidly, and the war had only just begun. The prolonged, bloody battles and the staggering death toll profoundly affected the soldiers, who were repeatedly reminded of how expendable life was on the Eastern Front. Having witnessed so much death during the march to Smolensk, Siegfried Knappe came to terms with the likelihood that his own fate would also be sealed by the war. “I had to become fatalistic about it and assume that eventually it would happen to me and there was nothing I could do to prevent it . . . I knew that I was going to be killed or badly wounded sooner or later. The odds against my escaping unscathed were impossibly high, and I accepted my eventual death or maiming as part of my fate. Once I forced myself to accept that, I could put it out of my mind and go on about my duties”.

By the end of August 1941, German sources estimated that they had taken around 872,000 prisoners of war. This staggering figure represents a devastating blow to the Red Army, which had fielded nearly 2.7 million troops along the western front on June 22. In just nine weeks of relentless fighting, this means that about 33% of the Western Red Army became prisoners of war. When taking into account the estimated dead and wounded, the situation appears even bleaker. Although various reports present differing figures, the lowest credible estimate indicates that approximately 1.4 million Red Army soldiers perished in combat or from injuries sustained during this time frame, from June 22 to August 31. Additionally, around 680,000 soldiers were wounded but survived. When we calculate total casualties as a percentage of the Red Army's initial strength at the start of Operation Barbarossa, it reveals a staggering 109%. Few military campaigns in history can match the scale of this defeat and devastation. For comparison, during World War I, the Imperial Russian Army mobilized about 16 million soldiers over four years, resulting in approximately 9 million casualties, including prisoners of war. However, in just over two months during Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army experienced nearly one-third of that total number of casualties. This cannot be viewed as anything less than a catastrophic disaster for the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union. In these western territories of the USSR, the reality of war unfolded as a hellish experience unlike any seen before.

The prisoners of war faced a gruesome fate. Reports from the Nazi bureaucracy revealed that some Red Army prisoners were receiving a daily ration of just around 100 grams of bread. This absurdly low ration was intentionally designed to kill many prisoners without the use of bullets. The Nazis understood the importance of keeping their civilian population well-fed, especially as Germany was grappling with a minor food crisis. To maintain adequate calorie levels for German citizens, food had to be imported from the conquered territories in the east. Unfortunately, there was very little left for the prisoners of war. Nazi leaders even questioned the necessity of providing this meager amount to the captives. It has been estimated that fewer than one in three of these prisoners would survive a year in German captivity.

The new forces mobilized thus far had elevated the operational strength of the Red Army across all fronts to approximately 6.7 million men. While the initial quality of these forces was lacking, they improved with each encounter. This enhancement was largely attributed to the growing experience at the tactical unit leader level. Additionally, there were likely surviving non-commissioned and junior officers who contributed their understanding to the lowest tiers of combat. As in all wars, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting and casualties. However, the armor and artillery branches of the Red Army suffered significant losses in proportion to their infantry counterparts. Every single mechanized corps had been rendered ineffective as a fighting force, even before the Stavka, the Soviet High Command, could carry out the planned disbandment of those units.

The Wehrmacht was certainly in better shape compared to their opponents. They had suffered far fewer casualties in every battle throughout the war. However, this did not mean there were no manpower issues at the front. The Heer, or German Army, had never been sufficiently large to achieve the ambitious objectives set by its leaders. Aware of this limitation, they nonetheless managed to convince themselves that decisive action could lead to the defeat of the Red Army in the western regions of the Soviet Union. Accomplishing this would allow them to avoid the need for a continuous advance across the entire expanse of the country. Yet by the end of August, this ambition was beginning to resemble a fool's errand. General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, acknowledged early in the month that the Nazi war machine had significantly underestimated both the size of the Red Army and the resilience of the Soviet state.

The last week of August was relatively calm across the central front. Generals Georgy Zhukov and Semyon Timoshenko had to pause their relentless assault on Army Group Center near Smolensk to reorganize and rehabilitate their forces for another push. Meanwhile, Army Group Center found itself in no position to launch an attack, having had the panzers of Generals Guderian and Hoth reassigned to support the other two Army Groups struggling with their own faltering offensives. Zhukov, demonstrating remarkable boldness, requested additional forces from the strategic reserve, and somewhat surprisingly, he was granted them. Joseph Stalin was not typically one to reinforce failure, but perhaps he recognized that Zhukov was his best field commander at that moment. It was crucial to give Zhukov a better chance of breaking through Army Group Center. The specifics of any promises made remain unclear, but Zhukov was confident he could seize Yelna. He may have persuaded Stalin that capturing this small town could lead to a strategic breakthrough in the center. Regardless, he received the extra troops he requested. Zhukov would not resume his offensive until August 30, and during the preceding week, he concentrated on positioning his forces.

At Velikye Luki, the Germans had encircled the garrison by August 24. After two days of defending against the encroaching forces, the Red Army commanders decided to attempt a breakout. Ershakov’s 22nd Army and Colonel Yakovlev’s 48th Tank Division had been significantly weakened by weeks of fierce fighting for the city, but they resolved to fight their way out. On August 26, the breakout began. After intense combat, Yakovlev managed to escape with only two tanks and 2,400 men; the rest of the 22nd Army was captured. General Stumme, leading the German assault, took 25,000 soldiers prisoner along with his panzers. When Timoshenko learned that Yakovlev had abandoned the city, he ordered him to turn back and retake it. This order underscored the troubling disconnect between the Red Army’s highest leaders and the realities faced by forces on the ground. Yakovlev’s unit was a ragtag band of survivors, far from a ready military force for an offensive operation. Demonstrating remarkable personal bravery, Yakovlev refused Timoshenko’s commands. Unfortunately, he was arrested and executed. Nevertheless, Yakovlev had illustrated that effective tactical leadership could transform the Red Army into a formidable weapon against the Germans. He led an understrength tank division, armed with no more than the equivalent of a regiment’s vehicles, to recapture a city defended by strong infantry forces. It took two panzer divisions and the full attention of the Wehrmacht to finally root him out, yet he was rewarded for his skill only with the grim fate of an assassin’s thanks.

In the north, Manstein had decisively crushed Vatutin’s attack at Lake Ilmen, inflicting severe losses on the Red Army by the start of this week. Along the Luga line, the Red Army was beginning to crumble. While the approaches to Leningrad exerted significant pressure on the advancing Germans, they continued to push forward. Despite suffering losses when Manstein's forces faced a counterattack at Lake Ilmen, the advance toward Leningrad persisted. On August 24, the city of Luga fell to German control. It seemed that the pause before resuming the offensive had benefited Army Group North while afflicting the Soviets. Although some resistance remained in front of the city, Army Group North was expected to encounter roadblocks as they crossed the Luga River.

The Red Army’s last remaining armor in the area was under the command of Major General Baranov. His 1st Tank Division represented the last, best hope for defending the city. Unfortunately, he was becoming increasingly worn down. In the last week, he decided to avoid major engagements and conserve his resources through smaller delaying actions. These platoon-sized attacks proved effective, enabling savvy small unit leaders to choose situations that provided advantages in numbers, positioning, and preparation. Meanwhile, the 8th Panzer Division had finally recovered from its drubbing at Soltsy and was reintegrated into the fighting. Once again, however, it faced significant challenges. Lieutenant Kolobanov, leading a small platoon of KV-1 tanks in the defense of Krasnogvardeysk, achieved remarkable success by destroying approximately 40 German tanks. The defense of the city continued to hold firm through the end of the month.

To the east, the battle to encircle Leningrad continued as General Schmidt’s 39th Panzer Corps advanced from the south. After cutting the main Leningrad-Moscow rail line, they pushed towards Mga, the center of the last operational rail junction serving Leningrad. On August 30, the town fell to the men of the 12th Panzer Division. Leningrad was now isolated, a status that would persist until 1944. Although the siege of the city had not yet begun, it was effectively cut off from the outside world. Notably, just before the 12th Panzer Division arrived at Mga, workers and machinery from the Kirov tank plant successfully evacuated via rail to Chelyabinsk. Once there, they were able to rebuild the factory and resume production of KV-1 tanks. This sort of initiative was critical to the long-term war effort. Remarkably, the Germans remained largely oblivious to this and other industrial relocation efforts that were underway. With this accomplishment, Generals Leeb and Hoepner began to consider whether a direct assault on the city was feasible. This decision sparked debate; it was argued that the Panzers had successfully captured Minsk, Smolensk, and other smaller towns with relative ease. If they moved quickly and in force, they might overwhelm the defenders of Leningrad in a similar fashion. Ultimately, it was agreed that an attempt would be made to take the city. However, this effort would be postponed until mid-September, as the ongoing fighting at Krasnogvardeysk still held back the primary thrust of Army Group North.

Stalin and Hitler were captivated by the unfolding drama of Guderian’s drive south. It was evident that stopping him would signify the end of the war of maneuver. An attrition war was already taking shape east of Smolensk, and it would soon become a slogging match of equal proportions between Army Group North and the Northwestern Front. All hopes of the Stavka rested on Lieutenant General Eremenko. Eremenko was a cavalryman with a reputation as an up-and-comer in the Red Army. He was part of the same circle of officers who had followed in the footsteps of Timoshenko and Budenny, a path that emphasized personal loyalty to Stalin above all else. Despite this political aspect, Eremenko was a reasonably competent officer, having proven himself during the Civil War and at Smolensk. This was his opportunity to secure a place among the elite officers of the Red Army.

He took command of the Bryansk Front and devised a plan to halt the ambitious panzer general. Guderian's assault began on August 25, led by Schweppenburg's 24th Panzer Corps, which was operating at reduced strength due to the 4th Panzer and 10th Infantry divisions still assembling in their starting areas. Despite this, Guderian and Schweppenburg decided to proceed with the 3rd Panzer Division under Lieutenant General Model. On the morning of August 26, the forward battle group of Model’s division seized a massive bridge over the Desna River at Novogrod Severisky. Model was leading from the front and arrived on site just hours after the bridge's capture. However, the Red Army responded swiftly, targeting the bridge with artillery fire. While they failed to destroy the structure, they killed one of the regimental commanders and wounded Model.

Weather conditions further delayed Schweppenburg as he attempted to bring up his late reinforcements. Model’s division lacked the strength to break out across the river alone. Guderian had carefully planned the attack to exploit the gap between the 13th and 21st Armies, but the Soviets reacted quickly, repositioning their forces effectively under the circumstances. The Stavka assigned the 40th Army to Eremenko, who sought to position its troops in front of the crossing before Schweppenburg could reinforce Model. The 40th Army was one of many reserve armies, consisting of little more than several thousand infantry gathered into ad-hoc divisions with minimal organic support elements. In August 1941, the 40th Army had around 25,000 soldiers but virtually no radios below the division staff level and very few artillery and anti-tank guns available.

The 10th Infantry Division was next to attempt crossing the river. The fighting was fierce, and the outnumbered Germans were forced back. Lieutenant General Loeper could not hold his positions against the Soviet counterattacks and had to pull his men back across the bridge. It seemed that Eremenko was managing his task effectively. He requested and received support from the VVS. Large numbers of DB-3 tactical bombers were sent into the area for interdiction raids over the last three nights of the month. Unfortunately, they failed to inflict significant damage on Schweppenburg's men as he tried to consolidate them for a breakout across the river. The VVS continued to struggle with poor coordination and inadequate pilot training, along with many other issues stemming from the chaos of the invasion's early months. As the week progressed, Schweppenburg was able to gather his forces and prepare for a coordinated push across the Desna. By August 30, he was in position. Guderian wanted him to move faster, but, as demonstrated by the assault from the 10th Infantry, Schweppenburg needed more time. Guderian persistently pressed Bock for additional troops. However, Bock was still occupied with holding the line against Timoshenko’s assaults.

Although the Yelna salient had quieted, Bock was not blind to Zhukov’s plans for it. Army Group Center was being pushed to its breaking point, and its commander had little patience for Guderian’s demands. Nevertheless, Bock recognized that the sooner Guderian accomplished his mission, the sooner Hitler would agree to reinforce Army Group Center. Only then could Bock resume the drive on Moscow. Relenting to Guderian, Bock promised on August 30 that the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment would be dispatched to his command. He also permitted the SS Division Reich to be transferred to Guderian, though Bock attempted to delay the transfer of the last unit to maintain some defensive capability on his lines.

Army Group South was not allowed to remain idle while Guderian advanced south. The plan called for Kleist to cross the Dnipro and maneuver around Kyiv from the south. While the exact meeting point of the two panzer groups was not firmly established, the intention was to encircle the bulk of the Southwestern Front behind Kyiv to the east. The 17th Army would support Kleist as he advanced across the river. In the last week of the month, they launched an assault, managing to gain reasonable bridgeheads. Meanwhile, the Stavka attempted to replicate the 40th Army's success further north by forming the 38th Army, which was set in similar blocking positions across the Wehrmacht's Dnipro bridgeheads. Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe was more active in this area, and close air support relentlessly pounded the raw recruits of the 38th Army. Nevertheless, by the end of the month, the resistance to Kleist’s breakout was sufficient to convince Rundstedt to pull the 58th Panzer Corps from its developing positions. Instead, they would pass through the 17th Army's lines and break out from the more northern crossings.

North of Kyiv, the 6th Army under Reichenau was struggling. On August 25, the 111th Infantry Division was compelled to abandon its bridgehead across the Desna. The Soviet 5th Army was maintaining a strong defense, but as Guderian and Weichs advanced from the north, the Soviets were forced to extend their positions. Halder was uncertain how firmly the Southwestern Front would hold. He assumed that the Stavka was aware of the unfolding situation as Guderian continued his advance. It seemed only a matter of time before the pincers would close, trapping the entire Southwestern Front. The logical course of action would have been to avoid a massive encirclement. Kirponos needed authorization to abandon Kyiv and reform his lines behind the Dnieper River, but this was out of the question for Stalin. He insisted that Kirponos remain in position and defend the city.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced toward Kyiv, confidence waned amid fierce Soviet resistance led by Marshal Timoshenko. Despite heavy losses, the Red Army regrouped and initiated counteroffensives, outmatching the weary German troops struggling with logistics. Remarkably, both sides demonstrated unyielding fighting spirit, with the Soviet tactics evolving rapidly. As the battle raged, the grim reality of war unfolded, revealing the deep toll of combat and the determination of soldiers on both fronts, altering the course of history.

Eastern Front #11 The Battle for Kyiv Begins

Last time we spoke about how the Germans had underestimated the Soviets. General Fedor von Bock’s forces captured Smolensk, yet the Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, fiercely defended their territory, demonstrating an unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. Struggles for control intensified around Kyiv, as logistical issues plagued the Germans. Their supply lines grew thinner, causing unrest among troops facing devastating casualties. Amidst desperate counteroffensives, the Soviets mobilized millions, revealing the vastness of their manpower and determination. By mid-August, German command recognized a grim truth: they had underestimated the "Russian colossus." What started as a confident assault evolved into a prolonged struggle where victory was no longer assured. The Germans were stretched thin, while the Soviets regrouped, heralding a change in the tides of war that would resonate through the Eastern Front.

This episode is The Battle for Kyiv Begins

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Red army was exhausted as she entered her third week of being invaded by Nazi Germany. However she was striking back where she could, and little by little it seemed like she was chipping at the armor of the allegedly invincible Wehrmacht. We left off last week with Army Group North advancing towards Leningrad while also attacking Vatutin. Meanwhile Guderian began a turn southwards as the Red Army frantically tried to fill gaps in their lines north of Kyiv. In June, the Soviet Air Force, known as the VVS, suffered a devastating setback. Throughout July, their operations were able to continue, but only due to their reserve aircraft and the Luftwaffe's challenge in covering such a vast front. Although the vast majority of this reserve was made up of old planes, sheer numbers allowed the Soviet Airforce to continue the fight and cover most of the front. On August 7th, they launched a long-range bombing mission targeting the heart of Nazi Germany, Berlin, the political center of the Third Reich. In a desperate bid to halt Army Group North's advance, the Soviet military committed all available resources. The Soviet Naval Staff devised a daring strategy, determining that their best chance of success lay in launching Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from a small island off the coast of Estonia, nestled in the Baltic Sea.

Strategists calculated that if the twin-engine bombers were loaded with approximately 3,000 kilograms of fuel and no more than 750 kilograms of bombs, they could undertake an 1,800-kilometer round trip to Berlin with 10-15% of reserve fuel remaining. However, this approach meant the pilots would lack the extra fuel necessary for evasive maneuvers when facing German defenses, including anti-aircraft fire and intercepting fighters. The only viable option was to fly at high altitudes in a straight line both to and from their targets, which significantly compromised the accuracy of their bombardments. Tactical precision was, however, not the primary goal of the Berlin raid.

On August 2nd, fully loaded Soviet DB-3T bombers set off from the makeshift airfield to test the feasibility of using such an airstrip. The test revealed that skilled pilots could indeed take off under such challenging conditions. Then, on the night of August 4th, five Soviet aircraft embarked on a reconnaissance flight over Berlin, departing from the island airstrip. The Germans had established a formidable anti-aircraft perimeter that extended 100 kilometers around their capital, complete with powerful spotlights capable of illuminating an area of 6,000 cubic meters. Remarkably, the Soviet planes successfully traversed Berlin without detection. The pilots were now ready for an audacious bombing raid.

On the evening of August 7th, 1941, fifteen Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from the Baltic Fleet ascended into the sky, heading straight for the German capital. With Soviet fighters lacking the range to escort them, altitude became their sole defense. Surprisingly, the German military did not anticipate such a mission originating from the Soviet Union. In fact, despite previous small-scale bombing raids by the British, Nazi propaganda perpetuated the belief among German citizens that there was no threat from the East, insisting that the Soviet Air Force had been decimated following Operation Barbarossa. The idea of a Soviet bombing raid on Berlin in the summer of 1941 seemed almost unfathomable to the German military leaders and Nazi officials.

At that time, Berlin's streets were illuminated by the warm glow of apartment windows and streetlights, as blackouts were not enforced. The clear night of August 7th allowed the Soviet bombers to navigate directly toward the heart of the city. Approaching their targets from an altitude of 7,000 meters, the bombers encountered no anti-aircraft fire, and the searchlights remained dormant. As the bomb bay doors swung open, over 11,000 kilograms of bombs cascaded through the night sky, raining down upon central Berlin. With their loads released, the aircraft, now significantly lighter, turned to return to Estonia. The stillness of the night at 7,000 meters was suddenly shattered by the explosion of anti-aircraft shells. Miraculously, the Soviet bombers returned unscathed, accomplishing their mission. Initially, the German propaganda machine claimed that British RAF planes had conducted the raid, reporting six downed aircraft. This narrative was quickly refuted by newspapers in the UK, forcing the German government to reluctantly concede that it was, in fact, Soviet aircraft that had struck Berlin.

While the bombing raid caused no notable damage to the German capital, the Kremlin celebrated it as a major victory over the enemy, mirroring the triumphant spirit witnessed the following year when the U.S. executed the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. In both instances, such bold strikes represented a crucial morale boost for populations that had only experienced defeat at the hands of Axis powers up to that point. The Soviet Union continued its bombing missions against Berlin, but the German defenses thereafter became ever more vigilant in preparation for the VVS bombers. The second raid, executed on August 10th, echoed a similar fate. This time, twenty-six bombers took off with a mission to strike Berlin. Of those, only six made it to the city, and tragically, just two returned to base. Nevertheless, this series of operations highlighted the VVS's resilience and growing power, a testament to their ability to conduct missions deep into enemy territory, even amidst adversity.

Throughout the early weeks of the war, the Luftwaffe struggled to recover from even the relatively mild losses it had sustained. As the conflict expanded, new aircraft production was being stretched thin across three theaters of operation. In the Mediterranean and Africa, the demand for air support grew increasingly critical as Italian forces began to falter, while British forces intensified their assaults on Axis shipping routes. If you want to hear a 10 podcast rundown of the entire Africa Campaign, might I interest you over at the Pacific War Channel for the video version or Echoes of War for the audio only version. Me and my co-host Gaurav go through the entire campaign with a lot of detail on the issue of logistics, honestly it was a fun and great series!

Now Back in Germany, the British Bomber Command initiated a campaign targeting industrial sites since the summer of 1940, during the height of the Battle of Britain. Initially, these bombing raids inflicted only minimal damage on German infrastructure and morale. It wasn’t until 1942, with the launch of the combined bomber offensive, that British attacks began to seriously threaten German capabilities. However, even at this early stage, the presence of Bomber Command’s operations required the Luftwaffe to divert fighters and anti-aircraft installations that could have been deployed elsewhere. This constant need for defensive resources added pressure on the Luftwaffe, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a balanced and effective response across all fronts.

On the Eastern Front, the conflict was intensifying as the Soviet Air Force began to recover from the initial shock of invasion. The Red Army demanded more air support across broader fronts than ever before, pushing the limits of their already strained resources. As the front lines advanced, the Air Corps found themselves moving squadrons further away from their well-equipped bases. The forward airfields they established were often little more than dirt strips, making supply logistics a daunting challenge for the Luftwaffe, just as it was for the army. In the vast, undeveloped areas where they were forced to operate, spare parts, fuel, and even medical attention for pilots and crew members became increasingly scarce. By the third week of August, as the assault on Leningrad intensified, the 1st and 8th Air Corps had been conducting nonstop missions for weeks. They targeted VVS airfields and rail lines leading into the city, provided crucial close air support, and attempted to disrupt concentrations of the Red Army. However, with too few planes and personnel available, the effectiveness of these missions suffered.

Amidst these challenges, the VVS struggled to capitalize on their opportunities. In Army Group Center, Luftwaffe activity was limited, as most of the 1st Air Fleet had been redeployed north and south to support Hitler’s key objectives in Kyiv and Leningrad. However, the VVS did not stand idle. In the south, the 5th Air Corps worked diligently to defend General Kleist’s panzer divisions from the increasing threat of Soviet air assaults. Despite the odds stacked against them, VVS pilots displayed remarkable bravery and determination to inflict damage on German forces. Meanwhile, Wehrmacht anti-aircraft artillery units were activated to defend critical crossing points over rivers. These bridges served as vital arteries for sustaining the Heer’s combat power, facilitating the movement of troops and supplies. Likewise, bridges positioned behind the Red Army provided essential routes for retreats and allowed for the steady influx of reinforcements to the front lines. Both sides dedicated significant resources to denying the other access to these crucial bridges, making air power a primary means of achieving their objectives.

Facing numerous uncertainties in the ongoing operations, Hitler’s customary decisiveness had temporarily eluded him. Day after day, he stood at military conferences, grappling to find a way to close the Pandora’s Box he had opened in the east. Caught between his instinctive strategic judgment and the fervent opposition of his commanders, Hitler anxiously sought a solution that would accommodate all options. On August 10th, Jodl submitted a proposal to Hitler that echoed much of what Halder had suggested in their meeting on August 7th. This endorsement was infused with Halder’s characteristic optimism. Central to Jodl’s argument was the ongoing push toward Moscow by Bock’s armored forces. He portrayed the two flanking army groups as robust enough to fulfill Hitler's objectives, providing a semblance of reassurance to the Führer amidst the strategic stalemate. Not surprisingly, Hitler found some solace in this proposal, as it seemed to propose a joint solution to the contentious debate over the campaign's strategic direction. While not fully accepted in its original form, Jodl's submission was persuasive enough for Hitler to initiate changes in an amendment to Directive 34, which would be known as Directive 34a. Dated August 12th, this new directive marked a significant shift toward the Moscow alternative, albeit with Hitler’s stringent conditions attached. Directive 34a clearly stated that Rundstedt’s army group was expected to achieve its objectives in Ukraine without assistance from Bock. Likewise, Leeb’s army group was tasked with encircling Leningrad and forming a connection with Finnish forces. In this scenario, Bock was instructed to extend his front further north, allowing for a greater concentration of forces to support Leeb’s offensive. Additionally, the directive reiterated Hitler’s long-standing demand that Bock decisively address the Soviet forces on his southern flank before he could renew his advance eastward. Regarding Moscow, the directive stated:

“Only after these threats to our ranks have been entirely overcome and armoured formations have been rehabilitated will it be possible to continue the offensive, on a wide front and with echeloning of both flanks, against the strong enemy forces which have been concentrated for the defence of Moscow. The object of operations must then be to deprive the enemy, before the coming of winter, of his government, armament, and traffic centre around Moscow, and thus prevent the rebuilding of his defeated forces and the orderly working of government control”. 

The new directives sent panic into the top ranking commanders. As noted in the war diaries describing some back and forth between Halder and Bock:

BOCK : In this case I don’t know any more how I can move the army group forward. Today is the beginning of positional warfare! The units to be given up can only be moved in a partly finished condition [owing to their incomplete refitting]. I must make you aware, that after the loss of this corps an attack by Strauss’s army, except for the special action towards Velikie Luki, is no longer possible. The offensive intention of 9th Army is dead. 

HALDER: In my opinion this goes for 2nd Army too. 

BOCK : Please inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [Brauchitsch], that with this order any thought of an offensive posture by the 9th Army, and as a result probably by the whole army group, ceases to exist. It is also to be borne in mind, that going over to a defensive position is not possible given the current position. The existing line is not adequate for a lengthy defence. I have the intention to inform the Fuhrer’s chief adjutant [Schmundt] of the ¨ same thing. 

HALDER: I don’t know myself what I should do. I am utterly desperate and will try to save what there is to save.

Even before the order arrived instructing Hoth to allocate forces to assist Army Group North, a report from Schmidt’s Panzer Corps cautioned that the planned operation to recapture Velikiye Luki would necessitate an entire panzer corps. This was due to the diminished strength of the existing panzer divisions. Sent on August 14th, Schmidt’s report indicated that even if the operation was delayed for six more days, until August 20th, it would still have to be executed with limited numbers of trucks and without any replacement manpower. A critical issue highlighted in the report was the acute shortage of replacement tank engines, which had become a significant source of frustration for the command. Hoth, having already awaited reinforcements since early August, noted on August 15th that the long-awaited motors and spare parts were only expected to arrive on August 16th or 17th. 

Despite the immense pressure facing the 9th Army and the disappointing outcomes of the refitting period, Hoth remained resolute in his decision to proceed with the offensive against Velikiye Luki. He preferred an aggressive approach to regain the initiative and push the Soviets onto the defensive. Originally set for August 21st, the offensive was postponed by one day due to inclement weather. The operation was to be executed by Kuntzen’s LVII Panzer Corps, led by the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, and supported by the 40th Army Corps. The attack achieved immediate success, and by August 26th, the Germans had captured Velikiye Luki, taking 34,000 prisoners and seizing more than 300 artillery pieces. However, Bock was acutely aware that limited offensives like this one would not lead to the destruction of the Red Army, nor did they sufficiently relieve the pressure on his front. In his diary on August 24th, he reflected on the situation, expressing his concerns about the campaign's direction and effectiveness:

“This is the seventh or eight time in this campaign that the army group has succeeded in encircling the enemy. But I’m not really happy about it, because the objective to which I have devoted all my thought, the destruction of the enemy armies, has been dropped. Perhaps we will overrun the Russians in front of my northern wing and thus get things going to the point that at least the pressure on my eastern front is relieved. It can’t hold much longer the way things look now. I am being forced to spread the reserves which I so laboriously scraped together for the hoped for attack behind my front just to have some degree of security that it will not be breached. If, after all the successes, the campaign in the east now trickles away in dismal defensive fighting for my army group, it is not my fault”.

Further north, the fighting around Lake Ilmen continued. On August 16th, the Germans retreated from Staraia Russia and Gorki. Vatutin’s offensive was making progress, but signs indicated that the situation was not likely to remain in the Red Army's favor. As discussed last week, the challenging terrain had hindered the Soviet advance, and communication issues were prevalent throughout the ranks. In response, Leeb directed Manstein to relieve the beleaguered 10th Infantry Corps. By August 19th, Manstein was in position and launched a counter-attack. He achieved complete surprise as the 3rd Motorized Infantry struck on the left flank, while the SS-Totenkopf division attacked on the right. The Soviets struggled to respond effectively; Vatutin failed to coordinate a proper reaction and watched helplessly as Manstein's counterattack forced his men back. By the end of the week, it became clear that Vatutin could not maintain his territorial gains, and he found himself back at his original starting point. The offensive had significantly weakened his positions, costing him several thousand men.

However, from a theater-level perspective, it cannot be declared a total failure. While Vatutin did not significantly disrupt the Wehrmacht's advance or reclaim substantial territory, his offensive succeeded in distracting Army Group North from its primary objective. Leeb had been drawn into diverting resources away from the main effort, violating the command doctrine that emphasized the importance of the Schwerpunkt, or main effort. In German military doctrine, the success of the schwerpunkt was paramount, and Leningrad was the strategic objective of Army Group North. Capturing and holding the city was one of the two main goals upon which the entire campaign hinged during this phase of operations. Unfortunately, Leeb compromised these principles to protect his weakened southern flank. Forces under Manstein were withdrawn from the main effort and sent south to defend what, at that moment, was a strategically insignificant line. It became evident that Vatutin lacked the necessary forces to achieve a real breakout. Leeb’s failure in command at this critical moment dealt a serious blow to the Wehrmacht’s chances of fulfilling Hitler's order to capture Leningrad. As the assault began to stall, the absence of Manstein's forces might have been the crucial factor needed to sustain the momentum of their advance.

In addition to Leeb's strategic missteps, Army Group Center was embroiled in its own battles of attrition that could shape the campaign's strategic outlook in the region. The situation at the Yelna Salient continued to unfold dramatically. Zhukov had the advantage of numbers, positioning, and strong political backing for his impending attack. Bock had never endorsed Guderian’s advance across the river in the first place. Army Group Center had been weakened due to the diversion of its panzer forces to neighboring Army Groups. As the commander of Army Group Center, Bock felt slighted by this shift and raised his concerns with the OKH and OKW. Moscow had been his objective from the outset of the campaign, and he consistently requested more troops. However, following two of the largest encirclement battles in history and a remarkable string of successes during the advance to Smolensk, his Army Group had been significantly curtailed.

Germany’s offensive strength had weakened, but it had by no means entirely diminished. Zhukov, the Chief of the General Staff, recognized impending dangers for the Central Front, particularly facing Guderian’s 24th Panzer Corps and Weichs’s 2nd Army. Back on July 29th, Zhukov was summoned to a meeting with Stalin to provide a comprehensive report on the situation. During this meeting, he articulated his concerns clearly and decisively, laying out the challenges that lay ahead:

“On the strategic axis of Moscow the Germans are unable to mount a major offensive operation in the near future owing to their heavy losses and they lack appreciable reserves to secure the right and left wings of Army Group Centre. On the Leningrad axis it is impossible for the Germans to begin an operation to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns without additional forces”.

The situation in Ukraine remained complex, with the Uman encirclement still unfolding. According to the Soviet Chief of Staff, the real danger was that Bock might temporarily abandon his thrust toward Moscow and redirect his focus southward. This shift could resolve the threat to his overstretched southern flank and aid Army Group South by penetrating the rear of Kirponos’s South-Western Front. This scenario was especially perilous because, as Zhukov highlighted, the Central Front covering this section of the line was "the weakest sector of our line," and its armies were "badly equipped." To address this vulnerability, Zhukov recommended reinforcing the Central Front with three armies: one from the Stavka Reserve, one from the Western Front, and another from the South-Western Front. He proposed that the movement of these forces could later be supplemented by reinforcements arriving from the Far East. Zhukov also advocated for Kirponos to withdraw his front behind the Dnepr River, a strategy that would necessitate abandoning Kyiv. He laid out a solid military rationale for this difficult decision. However, Stalin was incensed by the mere suggestion of giving up Kyiv, accusing Zhukov of “talking nonsense.” Zhukov, one of the few Marshals willing to speak candidly to Stalin, insisted, "If you think the Chief of the General Staff talks nonsense, then I request you relieve me of my post and send me to the front."

And Stalin did just that, dismissing Zhukov from his position and assigning him to command the newly formed Reserve Front, replacing him with the more agreeable Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov. Stalin’s hasty dismissal of the threat to the southern flank would have dire consequences in the future. The Soviet dictator remained convinced that Army Group Center would continue its advance toward Moscow after a brief pause for reorganization and repair. To preempt this potential course of action, Stalin ordered Timoshenko to prepare for large-scale offensives across the front. The aim was to disrupt the next phase of German operations before they could begin. Furthermore, Stalin directed all Front commanders to organize new counter-offensives to commence from mid-August. This coordinated effort would stretch from Staraia Russa in the north to the approaches of Kyiv, with the most significant concentration of force aimed against Bock’s Army Group.

At this point in the war, several generals had been executed for incompetence or even the appearance of disobeying Stalin’s orders. Zhukov demonstrated not just a strength of character to not bow to the dictator but also bravery. For this he had been rewarded with dismissal from the Stavka but also the retention of his life. It is unclear why Stalin did this, but it was to pay off for the Soviet Union as the war progressed as Zhukov was to prove perhaps the Red Army’s most capable commander.  Now was his opportunity to save both his reputation and his life. Zhukov had been relentlessly pounding the salient for days, and as the third week of August commenced, the Germans were starting to feel the cumulative effects of the unrelenting Soviet attacks. On August 18th, Zhukov found himself compelled to pause his offensive at Yelna. He had exhausted his resources and required time to position reinforcements effectively. Simultaneously, Timoshenko was orchestrating a large counteroffensive aimed for the end of August. Together, the renewed forces from the Red Army’s Western and Reserve fronts would strike against the weakened Army Group Center. The remainder of the month would essentially be an operational pause for both sides, as they had been battering each other nonstop for nearly eight weeks.

Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group had become the focal point for the high commands on both sides of the conflict. With his advancing panzers now rested, Hitler aimed to crush the Red Army in the south and seize the abundant resources of the Ukrainian Steppe. Stalin, on the other hand, was desperately funneling men and materials into Guderian’s path, but to little effect. Last week, the Bryansk Front was established specifically to stop Guderian's advance. Meanwhile, the already nearly destroyed Central Front was dissolved, and its remaining forces were transferred to Eremenko’s command. On August 19th, Gomel fell to the Germans. In the aftermath of this capture, Army Group Center’s southern flank was in significantly better shape than it had been just a week earlier. Another Soviet Front had been effectively dismantled, and the German lines had been straightened.

Hitler’s prolonged indecision regarding strategy in the east had significant repercussions for front-line commanders. The lack of a clear strategic directive created hesitancy and confusion about where specific forces should be deployed along the front and the expected timetable for the initiation of operations. Major strategic questions loomed, such as the fate of the Yel’nya salient, which was being defended not based on sound military logic but rather on an assumption about the next phase of the campaign. This uncertainty was particularly troubling for Guderian, who found himself uncertain about how much strength to allocate to his offensive in the south. On August 18th, he expressed his frustrations in a letter to his wife: “This situation has a bad effect upon on the troops, for everyone is aware of the absence of harmony. That is the product of unclear orders and counterorders, absence of instructions sometimes for weeks . . . we are missing so many opportunities. But it is annoying when no one knows the reasons. These most probably cannot be put right in this war which we will win despite it all. That is human nature in great moments and with great men”.

Guderian’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein, also observed the lack of clarity and the outright contradictions in the issuing of orders, leading him to conclude, “The troops must think we are crazy.” While Guderian's forces were continually being pushed south by Hitler’s desire to secure the southern flank and exploit successes, Army Group Headquarters, under Bock’s determined leadership, attempted to resolve the ambiguity by prioritizing Moscow. On August 17, Greiffenburg met with Weckmann to clarify the upcoming offensive operations. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center instructed his counterpart at the 9th Army, stating, “The enemy in front of the army group is to be destroyed. The armies will break through in the general direction of Moscow.” Similarly, on August 19, Bock firmly set his sights on Moscow, urging Weichs to expedite operations in the south. He believed that a successful advance toward Velikie Luki would enable the entire army group to shift its focus eastward.

However, the joint proposals prepared by Warlimont and Heusinger on August 18 had yet to receive a direct response from Hitler by August 20. Consequently, Heusinger was sent to meet with Jodl to gauge the mood at the Wolf’s Lair. While Jodl had previously favored Halder’s plans, his conversation with Heusinger revealed significant doubts. Jodl, familiar with Hitler’s moods, sensed the dictator’s renewed determination and stubborn unwillingness to consider any further deliberation on his chosen strategic path. He was also cautious about challenging Hitler now that his mind was made up, influenced partly by raw pragmatism and partly by the enduring Fuhrer myth of which Jodl was a compliant disciple. According to Heusinger’s account, Jodl was increasingly reluctant to engage with the OKH’s plans. Undeterred, Heusinger pressed the importance of focusing on Moscow and defeating the “life strength” of the Red Army, asserting that “everything else will fall into our lap.” To this, Jodl reportedly replied, “That’s what you say. Now let me tell you what the Fuhrer’s answer will be: There is at the moment a much better possibility of beating the Russian forces. Their main grouping is now east of Kyiv.”

 

Heusinger, however, remained steadfast and raised concerns about the impending winter, reminding Jodl that it would arrive earlier in the northern and central sectors than in the south. Ultimately, Jodl agreed to do what he could to support the OKH’s plans, although his resolve was clearly weakening. He cautioned Heusinger, “You must admit that the Fuhrer’s reasons are well thought out and cannot be pushed aside just like that... One must not try to compel him to do something that goes against his inner convictions. His intuition has generally been right; you can’t deny that!” The diminishing support from Halder at the OKW directly stemmed from Hitler’s newfound sense of purpose and the emphatic tone with which he now dictated the campaign's strategic goals. On the same day that Heusinger was appealing to Jodl for continued support (August 20), Hitler unequivocally rejected the OKH’s memorandum. With clear directives for the future course of the war, the subservient OKW quickly abandoned any independent ideas and sought to rein in the wayward OKH.

On August 21, the head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, visited Halder’s headquarters with the task, according to Warlimont, of winning Halder over to Hitler’s viewpoint or at least weakening his opposition to Bock’s panzer diversion. Keitel likely knew that Hitler’s mind was already made up; he was, however, careful not to dash all of Halder’s hopes, leaving him with the impression that Hitler’s final decision was still pending. Instead, Keitel conveyed that Hitler insisted on proceeding with the northern operation towards Leningrad and aimed to eliminate the Soviet 5th Army in the south. If Keitel attempted to persuade Halder of Hitler’s strategic wisdom, it was probably nothing more than what Halder expected from someone so blindly obedient to the Fuhrer. In any case, Halder neither hoped for nor counted on support from Keitel. Whatever transpired during their meeting that day, Halder seemed to remain unaware of how far events had turned against him. On the same day (August 21), Hitler instructed Jodl to draft new orders for the OKH detailing the direction of future operations. These orders would reach Halder’s office late that evening and strike, according to Heusinger, “like a bomb.” Hitler’s army adjutant, Major Engel, simply described it as “a black day for the army.” Upon reading Hitler’s new directives, Halder realized that all his plans and hopes had come to nothing. The order proved to be a devastating blow, leaving Halder uncertain about how the war could be won. In his diary, he ominously noted, “It is decisive for the outcome of the campaign.” Hitler's directive began:

“The proposal by the army for the continuation of the operations in the east, dated 18.8, do not meet with my approval. I order the following: The principal objective that must be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but rather in the south the occupation of the Crimea and the industrial and coal region of the Donets, together with the isolation of the Russian oil regions in the Caucasus. In the north, the encirclement of Leningrad and the union with the Finns”.

Many leading commanders of the Wehrmacht opposed this plan, with Bock and Halder being the most vocal. Both had long been staunch advocates for maintaining a focus on Moscow since the early days of the campaign. Their egos played as significant a role in this opposition as did the war's strategic considerations. They were reluctant to acknowledge that the path they had staked their reputations on, that capturing Moscow was the only way to win the war, might not be the best approach moving forward. Bock, in particular, was unwilling to see his command diminished in order to facilitate the campaign's success. He feared that Guderian would take all the glory for himself, a prospect that did not sit well with anyone in the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, Hitler remained resolute in his decision, dismissing the objections he perceived as mere whining from the generals. He believed that, left to their own devices, none of his achievements would have materialized. He envisioned Germany still mired in depression, too fearful to conquer its enemies. In Hitler's mind, he alone had willed the war into existence. He had driven the Wehrmacht into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Low Countries, France, and now into the heart of the Soviet Union. While his egomania had not yet reached its zenith, he was not going to be swayed by the generals. He considered himself a chosen man, a genius destined to lead Germany to victory; the generals were merely instruments to fulfill that vision.

On August 19, the same day Gomel fell, Eremenko managed to penetrate the rear areas of Schweppenburg’s 24th Panzer Corps. Units from the Central Front’s 45th Rifle Corps were wreaking havoc on the limited supply lines of the Panzers. In a call to Guderian’s headquarters, Eremenko had to report an extraordinary admission of weakness: he would be unable to seize the town of Novozybkov on the Gomel line. This was a remarkable acknowledgment for a Panzer commander in 1941, and it may have been unprecedented. Schweppenburg was not known for timidity, but his men and vehicles were simply worn out. The next day, Guderian ordered him to resume the advance, but Schweppenburg clarified the dire situation at the front. The 3rd Panzer Division had essentially no fuel, the 10th Motorized Infantry had lost more trucks than they could count, and the 4th Panzer was out of position. The 4th Panzer reported that they were running on fumes, with only forty-four operational tanks remaining. The relentless campaigning was not merely dulling the edge of the Wehrmacht’s sword; it was destroying it. The 4th Panzer had begun the campaign on June 22 with one hundred seventy-six tanks, but the past seven weeks had reduced the division to just twenty-five percent of that number. Clearly, the victories of the initial weeks had come at a significant cost. Despite these challenges, Hitler felt the time was ripe to strike south and envelop Kyiv. On August 23, he ordered Guderian to lead Schweppenburg’s 24th Panzer and the 47th Panzer Corps under Lemelsen to link up with Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group, which was advancing north from Kremenchug.

The 1st Panzer Group had been struggling to make significant progress, which partially motivated the decision to deploy part of Guderian’s forces to assist in encircling Kyiv. By late July, it had become evident that Army Group South was incapable of capturing the city without substantial support. On August 16, Stalin finally authorized the 5th Army to withdraw behind the Dnieper River. The 5th Army had fought valiantly, giving the Germans a formidable fight under the circumstances. However, the Southwestern Front was on the verge of collapse. On the opening day of Operation Barbarossa, Kirponos commanded what was arguably the strongest armored force in the world, consisting of eight mechanized corps and four thousand four hundred tanks in his Front's order of battle. Now, just eight weeks later, he had been reduced to a single weak division. The 32nd Tank Division remained the only reserve force in the entire region with any substantial mobility. The entire front was worn out, yet the Southwestern Front still maintained reasonably strong defensive lines, effectively forcing the infantry of Army Group South to pay for every inch of ground they gained. The threat to the front did not stem from an imminent collapse of the defensive lines; by now, even the weakest Red Army units were no longer susceptible to the kind of dissolution that could have been expected in the early days of the conflict. The soldiers were becoming veterans, and the prospects of winning battles were increasingly tangible. Every Front had witnessed the Germans' vulnerabilities firsthand: the invaders could indeed be defeated, man-to-man.

However, the key factor in every battle so far had been the mobile forces. If the armor and mounted infantry could remain nimble, victory was within reach. Herein lies the challenge: despite becoming overstretched, the Germans were still able to deploy multiple corps-sized combined arms teams that exhibited strong mobility. In contrast, the Red Army struggled to match this capability. While the Soviet inventory contained more tanks than the Germans, the challenge lay in effectively fielding them in cohesive units, led by experienced commanders, and guided by strong strategic direction. Until these deficiencies could be addressed, the situation for the Soviets would remain dire. Only time would reveal whether they could overcome these obstacles.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In August 1941, the Soviets began to rally against the seemingly unstoppable German advance toward Kyiv. General Fedor von Bock's forces faced unexpected resilience from the Red Army, commanded by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. Despite heavy casualties, the Soviets adopted counteroffensive strategies, mobilizing millions and revealing their vast manpower. But while the battle for Kyiv raged, tension grew within the German command as they grappled with logistical issues and the realization that their initial plans for a quick victory had spiraled into a protracted struggle.

Eastern Front #10 “We Have Underestimated the Russian Colossus”

Last time we spoke about Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht aimed to capture Moscow, bolstered by early victories under General Fedor von Bock. However, the Red Army, under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted a fierce defense, demonstrating unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. The Germans encircled Smolensk, celebrating its capture on July 16, yet their supply lines grew perilously thin. As battles intensified, Soviet forces reorganized, relocating factories to ramp up production of tanks and aircraft. In August, the Germans found their advance stymied by a revitalized Soviet spirit, which mobilized millions to replenish its ranks, even amid staggering losses. The Uman encirclement concluded, forcing the Soviets into a desperate fight, but German victories came at an alarming cost. Encountering manpower shortages, the Wehrmacht faced a critical juncture as the harsh realities of war set in. 

This episode is “We Have Underestimated the Russian Colossus”

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As the fierce battles of Smolensk and Uman reached their climactic moments, the Wehrmachtwas gearing up for a critical third offensive movement. The Panzers of Army Group Center, which had previously borne the brunt of the assault against the Soviet Union, were now poised to transition into a supporting role. Their mission was no longer directly targeting the heart of Soviet defenses but instead to bolster the ongoing attacks on Leningrad in the north, renowned for its strategic importance as a major port city and Kyiv in the south, the capital of Ukraine and a vital economic center. Before embarking on their new assignments, the Panzers were tasked with securing the flanks of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's forces. This maneuver was essential to ensure the stability of their front lines as they prepared to assist their comrades engaged in combat in both the northern and southern sectors.

Last week, we concluded our discussion with a deep dive into the strategic plans for the impending renewal of the offensive, focusing particularly on the precarious situation surrounding Smolensk. At that juncture, Soviet General Semyon Timoshenko was desperately trying to batter his way back into the city, a vital stronghold that had seen fierce fighting. This week, we will explore how this dramatic saga unfolds during the second week of August, specifically from the eighth to the sixteenth. As the fighting intensified, the other two army groups were left anxiously awaiting the support of the panzer divisions led by Generals Hermann Hoth and Heinz Guderian. These armored units were crucial to the German strategy, their mobility and firepower essential for breaking through Soviet defenses. In our previous discussion, we delved into the manpower reserves of both the Axis and Soviet forces, examining how these reserves were being translated into replacements on the battlefield. This week, however, we'll shift our focus slightly to investigate the status of military aid being dispatched from the United States and the United Kingdom, a critical yet often misunderstood aspect of the War in the East. To set the stage for this discussion, let’s begin with a brief overview of how military and economic assistance was organized and handled in America, an essential factor influencing the overall dynamics of the conflict.

The 1930s began with the Great Depression and experienced a minor recession in 1937-1938. In response to the aftermath of World War I and ongoing war debts, the U.S. Congress enacted several Neutrality Acts aimed at maintaining non-interventionism by prohibiting Americans from selling arms to warring nations. However, as the situation escalated in Europe and Asia, President Roosevelt sought to amend these acts to allow cash sales of military goods to Britain and France, leading to the Neutrality Act of 1939, which marked a shift from isolationism toward interventionism. After the Fall of France in June 1940, the British Commonwealth became the primary force against Axis powers, but Britain faced dwindling resources. In response, Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease program, allowing the U.S. to provide military support to Allied nations. Public opinion began to shift favorably towards this aid as Americans recognized the need to support Britain against Nazi Germany, despite initial isolationist sentiments.

The United States had specific legal limitations regarding the aid it could provide, which the United Kingdom did not face during World War II. These limitations are often referred to as Lend-Lease, but it’s important to understand that Lend-Lease was not so much about what aid could be delivered, but rather how it should be funded. This program evolved from the Neutrality Act, which had initially imposed an arms embargo on the nations engaged in conflict. The Neutrality Act was eventually amended to permit military equipment purchases on what was known as a cash and carry basis, an essential framework that allowed belligerent nations to acquire supplies as long as they could pay for them upfront. Cash and Carry was shorthand to mean that purchases had to be made with gold or US dollars and the goods had to be carried on non-American ships with no insurance from the US. This was to limit exposure of the American maritime industry to risk of serious loss by naval action. By 1941, the United Kingdom desperately needed to continue acquiring military equipment and economic supplies to sustain its war effort against Nazi Germany, but its gold reserves were dwindling alarmingly.

The Lend-Lease bill was passed in March 1941, permitting Roosevelt to supply defense materials to any nation deemed vital to U.S. security. Over time, significant aid was extended to the Soviet Union, China, and others, with a total expenditure of about 51 billion. In May of that year, the Act was further modified, allowing the transfer or sale of military equipment to certain governments at the President’s discretion. Crucially, this amendment meant that payment was not necessarily required for the goods transferred, which was a lifeline for the British war machine. Notably, the Soviet Union was not initially included under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. As a result, they could still place orders for equipment, but these orders had to be paid for in gold or U.S. dollars. Thus, during June and early July, the Soviets began placing massive orders with American industrial suppliers. The first of these orders alone totaled nearly $1.8 billion, an enormous sum at the time. The requests included thousands of aircraft, artillery pieces, trucks, and additional military supplies. Moreover, they sought essential raw materials such as rubber, steel, aluminum, and oil, resources critical for sustaining their wartime industry.

As the desperate situation on the Eastern Front deepened, Joseph Stalin took the extraordinary step of reaching out to American Envoy Harry Hopkins with a bold request: he asked that President Franklin D. Roosevelt consider sending American troops to fight against Hitler's forces. Stalin proposed that these American soldiers could be deployed anywhere along the Eastern Front, operating under the command of American leaders, a significant step that highlighted the urgency of the Soviet plight. This offer mirrored a similar one Stalin had made to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill around the same time, illustrating the level of desperation and anxiety the Soviet dictator felt as he witnessed the Red Army retreat from a series of catastrophic defeats throughout June and July. However, both of these offers were ultimately declined by the democratic leaders of the West, who were cautious about directly engaging in the Eastern Front conflict.

Even as United States forces in Europe and the Pacific reached full operational strength during the critical years of 1943 and 1944, the Lend-Lease program continued to play a vital role in the Allied war effort. By this time, most remaining Allies, particularly those in Europe, had become largely self-sufficient in frontline military equipment such as tanks and fighter aircraft, although arms shipments persisted. However, Lend-Lease logistical supplies, including essential motor vehicles and railroad equipment, remained indispensable for sustaining military operations. World War II marked the first major conflict where entire formations of troops were routinely motorized. Soldiers were not only supported with vehicles specifically designed for combat, but also with a diverse array of transportation and logistical vehicles, enabling rapid movement and supply distribution across vast distances. Despite this, the warring powers significantly reduced the production of non-lethal materials to concentrate on munitions, leading to severe shortages of products necessary for industrial and logistical purposes, particularly unarmored vehicles. Consequently, the Allies became almost entirely dependent on American industrial production for unarmored vehicles, including those specially designed for military purposes.

A prime example of this reliance is found in the Soviet Union, which was heavily dependent on rail transportation. Beginning in the latter half of the 1920s, and accelerating through the 1930s, numerous foreign industrial giants, including Ford, were commissioned to establish modern dual-purpose factories in the USSR, 16 of which were built within just one week, starting on May 31, 1929. However, with the onset of war, these factories transitioned from producing civilian goods to manufacturing military equipment, resulting in a dramatic decline in locomotive production. During the war, only 446 locomotives were produced, with merely 92 built between 1942 and 1945. Remarkably, about 92.7% of the Soviet Union's wartime procurement of railroad equipment came from Lend-Lease, providing a crucial 1,911 locomotives and 11,225 railcars.

Additionally, trucks were essential to the Soviet war effort. By 1945, nearly one-third of the trucks operating within the Red Army were American-built. Vehicles such as the Dodge 3/4-ton and Studebaker 2.5-ton trucks emerged as some of the best in their category on either side of the Eastern Front. Beyond vehicles, American shipments of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations, and clothing were equally critical for the Soviet military's logistics and supply chain. Lend-Lease also delivered significant quantities of weapons and ammunition to support the war effort. The Soviet Air Force received approximately 18,200 aircraft through this program, which accounted for nearly 30% of the total Soviet fighter and bomber production during the conflict. While most tank units were equipped with Soviet-built models, around 7,000 tanks acquired through Lend-Lease (in addition to more than 5,000 British tanks) were utilized by the Red Army, making up about 8% of the wartime tank production.

A particularly crucial aspect of the Lend-Lease program was the provision of food supplies. The invasion of the Soviet Union had devastating consequences for its agricultural foundation; during the initial Axis offensive from 1941 to 1942, the total area under cultivation in the USSR plummeted by 41.9%, while the number of collective and state farms decreased by 40%. The Soviets suffered a catastrophic loss of draft and farm animals, as many could not be relocated before their territories were captured. In those regions occupied by Axis forces, the USSR lost an estimated 7 million out of 11.6 million horses, 17 million out of 31 million cows, 20 million of 23.6 million pigs, and 27 million out of 43 million sheep and goats. Additionally, thousands of essential agricultural machines, including tractors and threshers, were either destroyed or seized. The war also took a heavy toll on the agricultural workforce; between 1941 and 1945, 19.5 million working-age men were compelled to leave their farms to serve in the military or work in industry. This agricultural crisis was especially pronounced during Soviet offensives, as liberated areas had been left in ruins, with millions of displaced individuals requiring sustenance. Consequently, Lend-Lease emerged as a lifeline, providing a substantial quantity of foodstuffs and agricultural products that were critical to supporting both the military and the civilian population in the USSR.

Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs: “I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so”.

Now turning back to the war in the east. In Ukraine, Army Group South was preparing for its offensive into the pivotal bend of the Dnieper River, a strategic location crucial for controlling the region. However, the logistics situation was beginning to appear increasingly grim. Many of Field Marshal Erich von Rundstedt’s divisions at the forefront were reporting alarmingly low ammunition stocks, with some units dwindling to just 15% of their necessary supplies. The strain was starting to fray discipline within the ranks, as small units found themselves at odds over the limited supplies and who should be prioritized for resupply. By the end of July, General Hermann Kleist’s war diary painted a bleak picture of the supply situation. His quartermaster reported with frustration that in the event of poor weather, the supply convoys struggled to move, even at reduced speeds, often consuming as much fuel as they were able to deliver to the Panzer units. Of the weather and condition of the roads, an Italian journalist said in late summer 1941: “The road, if this species of cattle-track may be so described, is covered with a thick layer of dust, which with every breath of wind rises in dense red clouds. But in places, where the clayey soil has failed to absorb the rain-water, where a stream crosses the track, the sticky, tenacious mud grips the wheels of the lorries and the tracks of the tanks, which sink slowly into the Buna as into quicksand” Rail deliveries were described as inadequate at best, exacerbating the supply crisis. After another week of waiting for necessary provisions, the situation had not improved. The casualty toll was enormous and severely impacting the tactical efficiency of Army Group South. Of the nearly 200,000 losses sustained by the Wehrmacht by early August, more than 63,000 came from Rundstedt’s forces alone. To address this devastating loss, the OKH had dispatched a mere 10,000 reinforcements, a shortage of 50,000 men that was an absurd handicap for an already overextended Army Group. In the first week of July, Halder had confidently boasted about the impending Soviet defeat, celebrating the successes of the Heer. Yet, by mid-August, he had adopted an entirely different tone. The vast expanses of the Soviet Union, combined with its seemingly limitless reserves of manpower and political will, had effectively crushed any hopes of a swift and easy victory for the Germans. The realization of the true scale of the Soviet resistance began to dawn on the German command, marking a pivotal shift in the course of the war. As noted in Halder’s diary entry for August 11th: “Regarding the general situation, it stands out more and more clearly that we underestimated the Russian colossus, which prepared itself consciously for war with the complete unscrupulousness that is typical of totalitarian states [sic]. This statement refers just as much to organizational as to economic strengths, to traffic management, above all to pure military potential. At the start of the war we reckoned with 200 enemy divisions. Now we already count 360. These divisions are not armed and equipped in our sense, and tactically they are inadequately led in many ways. But they are there and when we destroy a dozen of them, then the Russians put another dozen in their place. The time factor favours them, as they are near to their own centres of power, while we are always moving further away from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over an immense front line, without any depth, are subject to the incessant attacks of the enemy. These are sometimes successful, because in these enormous spaces far too many gaps must be left open”

The dispersal of German units across a vast front line significantly weakened the army's overall strength and exposed a critical shortage of resources. This fragmentation undermined every attempt at effective concentration, which was essential for launching successful offensives. The realization of this dire situation had a sobering impact on General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, who candidly articulated the challenges facing the German military. He understood that the army's ability to wage war effectively was being severely compromised, as logistics and supplies were stretched thin, making it increasingly difficult to coordinate movements and sustain their operations in the face of a resilient Soviet resistance. “What we are now doing is the last desperate attempt to avoid positional warfare. The High Command is very limited in its means. The army groups are separated by natural boundaries (marshes). Our last reserves have been committed. Any new grouping now is a movement on the baseline within the army groups. This takes time and consumes the power of men and machines.”

On August 8, Army Group South had successfully advanced to the Dnieper River, just south of Kyiv, a city of great strategic importance in Ukraine. However, the situation took a dramatic turn when the Southwestern Front managed to exploit a weakness in the lines between Kleist’s Panzer Group and the 4th Infantry Corps. The limited reserves within Army Group South triggered a sense of panic as elements of the Soviet 26th Army launched a bold counteroffensive, advancing an astonishing sixty kilometers towards the town of Bohuslav. As the situation grew increasingly desperate, construction battalions, typically engaged in building infrastructure, were hastily sent into battle to help stem the tide of the advancing Soviet forces. To the north of Kyiv, in Korosten, the Red Army was also in a precarious position, retreating but not being encircled and annihilated like their comrades had been during the disastrous encirclement at Uman. The 5th Army had successfully fulfilled its mission of delaying the German advance, buying crucial time for the Red Army to regroup. It became increasingly evident that Army Group South lacked the resources necessary to encircle Kyiv independently. This shortfall cast a shadow over their operational capabilities and highlighted the challenges they faced in maintaining control over occupied territories in the face of mounting Soviet resistance.

At the far southern flank of Army Group South, the advance was proceeding at a much slower pace than anticipated. The Red Army was stiffening its resistance, determined to hold the line against the German onslaught. Contributing to the agonizingly slow progress were the exhaustion and fatigue felt by the troops, compounded by increasingly poor supply lines. Soldiers found themselves struggling not only against the enemy but also against the relentless toll of war. One soldier serving in the 11th Army documented his thoughts on the drawn-out advance in his memoirs, capturing the grim realities faced by his fellow troops. His reflections offer a poignant glimpse into the mindset of those fighting on the front lines, illustrating both their physical hardships and the psychological strain that accompanied the prolonged conflict. “Our lines of supply became more strained with each day’s advance, and as our momentum slowed to a crawl we continued to experience everincreasing sporadic shelling...In this sector we found ourselves facing an enemy who held superiority in heavy weapons, and our own artillery units were now compelled to ration ammunition because of our strained supply lines. The depth of our penetration into the Soviet Union began to take its toll”. 

By late July 1941, the degree of German overextension on the southern flank had prompted urgent calls for independent Romanian action against Odessa. Unlike the Finns, who were hesitant, the Romanian Head of State and self-appointed field commander, General Ion Antonescu, readily responded to the call for a renewed offensive. He launched a series of successive, but ultimately failed, assaults in an effort to capture the city by force. Despite his determination, the situation in Odessa became increasingly dire for the Romanian forces. The Southern Front's 9th Independent Army found itself effectively boxed into the confines of the city, a critical port on the Black Sea. To capture this strategic location, several separate German battalions were deployed alongside the 72nd Infantry Division to support the Romanian 4th Army in its assault. However, the Romanian forces were poorly equipped for an urban battle, yet they were tasked with the daunting challenge of breaching the city’s defenses. The fighting for Odessa was ferocious and quickly devolved into brutal hand-to-hand combat and artillery duels, transforming the city into a battlefield of devastation. What started as an assault turned into a prolonged siege, resembling a meat grinder that inflicted heavy casualties on both sides. The battle raged on for a staggering 73 days, a testament to the tenacity of the defenders and the determination of the attackers. In this grueling conflict, the Romanian Army suffered significant losses, with around 90,000 soldiers falling in the fight for Odessa. The Red Army, for its part, would ultimately report approximately 60,000 casualties among its ranks during the fierce engagements in the city in 1941.

The city was eventually evacuated by the Soviets and subsequently awarded the distinguished title of "Hero City" of the Soviet Union for its courageous defense. Antonescu attempted to claim some semblance of victory; however, the staggering losses incurred during the campaign were undeniable. The Romanian forces suffered catastrophic casualties, with approximately 80% of the 12 divisions involved experiencing heavy losses, amounting to around 98,000 casualties in less than two months of brutal fighting. Though Antonescu was willing to accept such high casualties and insisted on continuing his campaign, losses of this magnitude severely undermined the effectiveness of his military forces. Ultimately, the entire Romanian army was forced to reorganize and undergo further training to address the devastating impact of the conflict. In the grander strategic picture, while Hitler faced setbacks in Finland due to the growing threats of war on the Eastern Front, he effectively lost Romania as a frontline ally, further complicating his military objectives in the region. 

The Stavka, the Soviet high command, understood that it was only a matter of time before Army Group North resumed its offensive operations toward Leningrad. In response, they hoped to catch the Germans off guard by launching a counter-offensive aimed at the 16th Army, commanded by Colonel General Busch. General Nikolai Vatutin, riding high on the prestige gained from his successful attack at Soltsy, was entrusted with the responsibility for planning this more extensive counter-offensive. He was given essentially complete freedom and granted access to the entire resources of the Northwestern Front. However, his initial draft plan was met with immediate rejection from both Joseph Stalin and General Aleksandr Shaposhnikov. They deemed it far too ambitious for their strategic tastes. Vatutin was ordered to scale back his plans significantly, facing serious restrictions on aspects such as the speed of his advance. This caution was likely wise, rooted in a newly acquired understanding of Wehrmacht tactics. The Stavka had legitimate reasons to fear that Vatutin's forces might overreach, risking encirclement and annihilation, a fate that had befallen many earlier in the war. In previous campaigns, the Stavka had been overly ambitious, leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of men due to reckless assaults characterized by inadequate reconnaissance and insufficient preparation. Now, they were striving to temper the aggressive inclinations of their commanders, a prudent shift given the challenging circumstances faced by the Red Army by mid-August. Although they could mobilize replacements for the lost soldiers, the Soviet Union was rapidly running out of space to absorb further losses. They urgently needed to secure victories, and soon. Vatutin was seen as the right leader for this critical task, believing he had devised a competent strategy to reclaim lost territory and begin reversing Army Group North’s fortunes. Unfortunately for him, on August 10, he was preempted by the onset of a planned German offensive, which would significantly complicate his ambitions.

The initial plan was for the 48th Army to launch an attack at Utogorsh, situated west of Lake Ilmen, while the 11th, 34th, and 27th Armies positioned themselves south of the lake to launch a broad offensive aimed at recapturing the line at Soltsy. The objective was to encircle and cut off the 10th Infantry Corps, commanded by General of Artillery Hansen, with the intention of pushing back the remainder of the 16th Army. This counter-offensive was set to begin on August 12. However, when the Germans initiated their planned offensive on August 10, it disrupted the preparations of both the 48th and 11th Armies. Consequently, the Soviet response became disjointed, with some units engaged in defensive actions while others were still preparing for the assault. Despite these challenges, Vatutin made the bold decision to send the remaining units forward as originally planned on the morning of August 12. Initially, this choice appeared prescient, as the 10th Infantry Corps, moving northeast, was inadvertently advancing deeper into the expected encirclement. Remarkably, the 34th Army managed to push all the way to the Staraia Novgorod-Dno rail line in less than two days of intense fighting. This level of success was almost unexpected, marking a gain of over forty kilometers that outpaced the movements of other Red Army forces in the area. Within hours of reaching the rail line, the 34th Army successfully cut off the 10th Infantry Corps, making it seem as though Vatutin had orchestrated another triumph akin to his success at Soltsy.

However, this situation mirrored previous experiences in more ways than one. Upon learning of the encirclement, Army Group North reacted with remarkable speed and efficiency. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb redirected the 3rd Motorized Division and the SS-Totenkopf Division to relieve the isolated 10th Infantry Corps, placing General Erich von Manstein in charge of the operation and providing him with resources from the 8th Air Corps for the counterattack. He was to initiate the assault immediately, but it took several days to redeploy these forces from the Luga-Leningrad axis to the southern area near Lake Ilmen. By the third week of August, Manstein would finally be in position to aid the encircled 10th Infantry Corps. For the time being, however, those troops were essentially on their own. Despite being well-equipped, the 10th Infantry Corps managed to fend off the weakening assault from Vatutin’s forces. Vatutin found himself in a similar position to that at Soltsy: he had a large enemy unit cut off, numerical superiority, and the initiative. Yet, the challenging terrain proved indifferent to the allegiance of the armies traversing it. The harsh landscape was as unforgiving to Soviet trucks and tanks as it was to German ones. The offensive became literally bogged down in the swampy, roadless terrain, complicating logistics and operations. Communication faltered, preventing Vatutin from effectively coordinating his forces. Command and control broke down at the small unit level, a recurring issue that had plagued the Red Army since the earliest hours of the war.

Late in the first week of August, General Heinz Guderian was relieved of his command at Yelna, a transition carried out by the 20th Infantry Corps. Seizing this opportunity, Guderian swiftly moved south across the Sozh River on August 8, launching a direct assault into the 13th Army’s defenses, which were now part of the newly formed Soviet Central Front. His objective was to capture Gomel, thereby securing the flank of Army Group Center to the north of the Pripyat Marshes. Guderian recognized this as another chance to demonstrate his capacity for independent command. Within days, he successfully pushed aside the 13th Army and began to roll up the right flank of the 21st Army. By August 12, Colonel General Maximilian Weichs and his 2nd Army joined Guderian in the push for Gomel. The collaboration between their forces resulted in several small tactical encirclement battles, effectively destroying the Soviet units in their path. By the end of the week, the 13th Army was rendered combat ineffective, having lost nearly half its units to the relentless assaults by Guderian and Weichs. Despite their successes, the pair would continue their advance towards Gomel throughout the week, not reaching the city until later in August. The Stavka, recognizing the impending threat, could see that the Central Front was in danger of being encircled and potentially destroyed. This scenario would inevitably open the path to Kyiv from the north. In an effort to rectify the situation, on August 14, Soviet high command deployed General Aleksei Krieger’s 3rd Army and Major General Mikhail Petrov’s 50th Army to reinforce this critical front. Together, they formed the Bryansk Front under the command of Lieutenant General Andrei Eremenko. Eremenko was tasked with defending the approaches to Kyiv from the north and securing the line between the Southwestern and Western Fronts, aiming to stabilize the deteriorating situation and prevent a complete collapse on the Soviet side.

As Guderian and Weichs advanced through the Central Front’s defenses, Soviet Generals Georgy Zhukov and Vasily Timoshenko were still hammering away at the German positions around Yelna. Throughout the first week of August, Zhukov requested and received substantial resources from the Stavka reserve for his planned assault. While the Red Army continued to struggle with the challenges of bringing modern equipment and well-organized units to the front, Zhukov was determined to maximize the best that the Stavka could spare. As he built up his forces, he managed to secure two tank divisions, the 102nd and 105th, along with two motorized divisions and an independent company of T-34 tanks. This allowed him to assemble a formidable core of about three hundred tanks for his offensive. Zhukov made the tactical decision to attack from a single direction, a choice that drew criticism from some historians who felt he should have orchestrated a more ambitious plan, perhaps utilizing a double pincer maneuver against the German salient. However, these critics often overlook the realities of Zhukov’s situation.

He faced a significant shortage in manpower and materiel, and time was not on his side. Timoshenko's offensive to the north was faltering, and it would not be long before the Germans could reinforce their positions in the encircled zone. Delaying his attack could lead to the risk of being outflanked, as the Wehrmacht might successfully break out of the pocket if given the luxury of time and the opportunity to choose where to strike. Zhukov was acutely aware of the limitations of his command and control capabilities, something any general on the Eastern Front, be they German or Soviet, would recognize. While he was not a master of maneuver warfare, he had proven himself capable of adapting to the circumstances at hand. He understood well the shortcomings of the Red Army at this stage, particularly as he dealt with a mix of raw recruits and a sprinkling of veterans. His forces lacked many seasoned non-commissioned officers, and numerous officers were occupying roles two or even three grades above their actual rank and experience. Yet, despite these challenges, this was the army he had to work with. Zhukov chose an imperfect plan filled with compromises, tailored to the realities of his situation. From the outset, he recognized that his attack on Yelna could not replicate the circumstances at Khalkhin Gol; the two situations were fundamentally different, and Zhukov was fully aware of this disparity.

On August 8, General Zhukov initiated his onslaught against the German positions. A shock group was formed around the 102nd Tank Division, designated to attack the northern sector of the salient. Shock groups were ad-hoc formations intended to be the main strike force of an attack. Their role was to break the enemies line open. In theory, this would then be followed up by reserves to exploit the gap. These were the primitive predecessors of the later Shock Armies that would be used later in the war. This was only one part of the Red Army’s ideal concept of the breakthrough operation, but we will cover that in more detail in a later podcast. Zhukov skillfully targeted his strike at the critical juncture between the 15th Infantry Division and the SS-Division Das Reich. However, despite the careful planning, the combination of shortcomings in tactical leadership and the Germans' well-prepared defensive positions meant that little progress was achieved. After just two days of fighting, this initial attack was called off. Yet, Zhukov was undeterred. He remained steadfast in his determination to evict the Wehrmacht from this side of the Desna River. To this end, he continued to organize and plan a much larger and more sustained operation aimed at recapturing Yelna. Fortunately for him, Army Group Center had been forced to halt its own offensive operations to the east, creating an opportunity that Zhukov was determined to exploit for as long as possible. The first serious counterattack at Yelna marked the beginning of a battle that would rage for several weeks. Although the Heer managed to hold its lines, it paid a heavy price for this defense. The two divisions facing Zhukov’s shock group suffered approximately two thousand casualties within just two days of combat. The pace of the Soviet assault was relentless, and there would be no respite for the invaders. Zhukov's resolve and the pressure his forces applied promised to make the defense of Yelna a costly endeavor for the German troops.

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Despite capturing Smolensk, German supply lines faltered, and Soviet forces reorganized production to restore their ranks. The Germans underestimated the Soviet spirit, leading to heavy casualties. As they advanced toward Kyiv, logistical issues and low morale plagued German troops. Counteroffensives struck with force, revealing the vast Soviet manpower reserves. By mid-August, the Germans recognized their underestimation of the Soviet Union's capacity for war, which shifted the tides of the Eastern Front.