The Eastern Front Week by Week

Last time we spoke about Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa. On the campaign's second day, Army Group North, led by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, aimed to seize Leningrad and prevent Soviet retreats. Initial assaults caught Soviet troops off guard, leading to devastating German victories. However, logistical challenges in harsh terrain began to hamper their advance. As Germany celebrated these wins, Soviet forces regrouped and mounted fierce counterattacks, demonstrating unexpected resilience amid chaos. In Finland, leveraging the situation, local activists orchestrated a rebellion in Kaunas, declaring independence and collaborating with German troops, marking a brief surge of hope among the populace. Yet, the brutality of war soon took center stage as Nazi units began committing horrific atrocities against Jewish communities. Amid these grim realities, soldiers faced not only daunting battles but also the moral implications of their actions. The tide of war began to reveal the brutal consequences of conflict, foreshadowing a dark period in history as both sides grappled with the unfolding horror of human suffering on the Eastern Front. 

This episode is: Day 3 Operation Barbarossa: The First Encirclement 

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello again, we are now on day 3 of Operation Barbarossa. Over the past two episodes we covered Army Group Center and Army Group North as they made their initial thrusts into the USSR. As the conflict unfolded, Army Group Center burst into the Soviet Union, fueled by an unstoppable momentum. The thrust was bolstered by the most formidable deployment of Luftwaffe assets ever seen on the Eastern Front. Imagine nearly 1,500 aircraft from the 2nd Air Fleet soaring through the skies, unleashing a relentless barrage on Soviet airfields, critical supply lines, and concentrations of troops. At first glance, the initial air superiority seemed like a foregone conclusion. However, this early success of the Luftwaffe belied deeper challenges lurking beneath the surface. Reconnaissance gaps and a glaring lack of close air support were quietly starting to impede the operational effectiveness of the German forces on the ground. As the campaign roared into action, German troops, led by Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group and Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, initiated a swift, coordinated advance. Their goal? To encircle entire Soviet armies. Key locations like Alytus and Grodno became battlegrounds where fierce tank clashes unfolded. Here, the Germans encountered the formidable T-34s of the Red Army, a new and powerful adversary. Despite their bravery, disorganization and a failure to integrate combined-arms tactics ultimately doomed the Soviet counterattacks. Today we are going to continue the story and this will set the stage for one of the most significant encirclements in modern military history at the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket.

We are now venturing back to the campaign led by Army Group Center, who are currently being supported by two air corps, 2nd Air Corps, under General of Aviation Loerzer, the 8th Air Corps under Colonel General Richthofen both of which were part of the 2nd Air Fleet, under Field Marshal Kesserling. The 8th Air Corps was tasked with supporting the 9th Army, especially Armoured Group 3, while the 2nd Air Corps  coordinated with the 4th Army, focusing primarily on Armoured Group 2. The previous successes of the Wehrmacht's land campaigns had showcased the enormous advantage Germany gained through effective combined-arms operations. Recognizing this critical synergy, Kesselring made it clear to his generals that the desires and strategies of the army were to be regarded as his own commands. This instruction underscored the necessity of collaboration, an essential element in the execution of their military plans. The commitment of air units to this campaign underscored the importance of Army Group Center as the spearhead of Operation Barbarossa. Around 1,500 planes took to the skies under the banner of the 2nd Air Fleet, boasting a formidable mix of modern light bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. In that crucial first week, these aircraft unleashed a series of raids on Soviet airfields and supply dumps, all in an effort to disrupt the Red Army’s ability to respond effectively to the invasion. By the end of this initial phase, it was clear: the Luftwaffe had overwhelmingly triumphed in the opening shots of the air war. Yet, even in this promising start, serious challenges began to emerge. 

Despite the impressive number of aircraft, there was never enough close air support available to adequately assist the frontline troops. Gaps in air reconnaissance quickly became an issue. This lack of information allowed Soviet troop concentrations to go unnoticed, resulting in missed opportunities and surprise counter-attacks. This failure to gather intelligence left the Corps and Army commanders with an incomplete tactical picture. However, amid these challenges, there were also significant successes for the close air support units of the air fleet. Throughout this tumultuous beginning, the sky remained a battleground of innovation and conflict, where both sides wrestled for dominance as the war unfolded. Some of the reasons for this was because the 8th Air Corps had been heavily involved in the capture of Crete, and with the battle concluding in early June, there was barely any time to prepare for Barbarossa. By June 21, the 8th Air Corps was critically short on resources: approximately 600 motor vehicles, 40 percent of its aircraft, and essential communication equipment were all lacking. This significant shortfall loomed large just days before the invasion. On that same day, Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen, the commander of the 8th Air Corps expressed deep concern, stating, “We are greatly concerned that our units are as yet unready.” Maintaining hundreds of aircraft at peak operational readiness proved to be a constant technical challenge, obscuring the stark difference between the total number of aircraft and those truly combat-ready. For instance, out of 425 dive-bombers, only 323 were actually fit for combat, and of the 98 'destroyers', merely 60 were operational. Among the 384 fighters, just 284 were combat-ready, while the total bomber force of 299 aircraft saw only 222 remain serviceable. Overall, while Air Fleet 2 boasted a total of 1,367 aircraft across all types, but only 994 were capable of executing combat operations. This issue wasn't limited to Air Fleet 2; throughout the whole Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe faced an average 25 percent fallout rate among its aircraft. Consequently, a combined strength of 2,995 aircraft translated into just 2,255 that were truly combat-ready. By the summer of 1941, it became increasingly evident that the Luftwaffe would only be able to fulfill its commitments if the war in the east could be won swiftly and with minimal losses. Practical concerns, such as oil availability, and strategic considerations regarding Britain, made a prolonged campaign simply untenable. The Luftwaffe was already stretched thin across multiple fronts, with approximately 1,566 aircraft tied down in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and within Germany itself. This significant dispersion of strength across less critical theaters hindered their ability to concentrate on the most vital front, the one with the narrowest window for success.

The left flank of Army Group Center was firmly anchored by the 6th Corps within the Suwalki salient. These determined troops advanced in a northwestern direction toward Vilnius, aiming to seize control of the critical bridges at Alytus on the Neman River. In their path lay several divisions of the Red Army. However, the Soviet 11th Army, led by Lieutenant General Morozov stretched thin across a wide front of 170 kilometers, offered little resistance to the relentless march of the German Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Group. It was no surprise, then, that in the early hours of the 3rd Panzer Group’s surge eastward, forward units reported encountering “only very weak or no enemy contact.” Luftwaffe reconnaissance confirmed this, identifying just one enemy artillery battery in their path. By the end of the day, Hoth’s panzer group had reached the Neman River, seizing captured bridges at Olita and Merkine. The penetration of the Soviet front was significant; Halder remarked that the panzer group had already gained the freedom of operational maneuver, but also noted in their war diary “Where the enemy appears, he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. As a result, the struggle will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign.” The strategic importance of Alytus was clear: it needed to be secured to maintain the momentum of the offensive. On June 22, the Germans achieved a crucial victory with the capture of Alytus. Under the command of Colonel General Hoth, the 3rd Panzer Group pushed forward with incredible speed, covering a distance of 65 kilometers from their starting point to the bridges at Alytus in less than ten hours.  After quickly brushing aside a small NKVD border guard post on the outskirts of the town, the Panzers began to cross the Neman River almost immediately. This rapid advance not only secured the vital crossing but also set the stage for further operations deeper into Soviet territory.

On the Soviet side, the invasion triggered nothing short of utter chaos, most strikingly evident in the Western Military District, which faced Army Group Center. Here, the command structure collapsed almost immediately due to a near-total loss of communication at most levels of the chain of command. This complete disarray made it impossible to gather coherent information about the current situation, severely hampering the development and execution of a coordinated Soviet response. As internal confusion mounted alongside external pressure from the German advance, the Western Military District descended into disintegration. This slide toward chaos was exacerbated by the Soviet High Command's misguided adherence to pre-war plans, which called for immediate counterattacks. However, due to the lack of proper preparation and direction for these efforts, they resulted in piecemeal assaults that proved ineffective while inflicting heavy casualties on Soviet forces.

To give an example, the 11th Army, operating under the command of the Soviet Northwestern Front, had begun to organize a counterattack against the 4th Panzer Group around Raseiniai. However, the situation was precarious; the 11th Army had only the 5th Tank Division available to respond to the German crossing at Alytus. To complicate matters further, the Soviet tanks faced a 30-kilometer road march to reach their positions, causing a crucial delay that allowed the German Panzers time to concentrate their forces. By the time the Soviet tanks were nearly in position, the Panzers had managed to deploy an entire regiment ready to cross the Neman River. Unfortunately for the Soviets, some of their tanks suffered mechanical issues and fell behind on the way. Nonetheless, they arrived in force with 44 T-34s, a mark of their formidable capabilities. In this first encounter, the German troops were taken by surprise by the T-34s. The Soviet tanks swiftly targeted the northern of the two bridges, effectively shutting it down, and destroyed a Pz. 38(t) on the site. However, the Soviet tanks faced a limitation of their own; they were short on armor-piercing ammunition. To minimize their exposure while still covering the bridge, they pulled back to a defilade position, continuing to keep the Panzers in check.

On the scene, Colonel Rothenburg, the German commander, quickly called in Luftwaffe support. The air force arrived shortly, unleashing high-explosive bombs on and around the Soviet positions in the northern sector. Just prior to this, the T-34s had received reinforcements in the form of additional T-28 medium tanks. Together, they formed a defensive line that kept the Germans just out of range of the Panzers’ light armament. While this confrontation unfolded at the northern bridge, more Panzers began crossing the southern bridge, only to encounter BT-7 tanks waiting to engage them. A minor stalemate developed in both sectors, but the Soviets quickly began to show signs of weakening. Unlike their German counterparts, they lacked the staying power needed to hold their ground under pressure. As evening fell, it became evident that the Soviets’ failure to provide adequate support for their tanks was detrimental. They struggled without sufficient infantry, artillery, and air support to bolster their defenses. Finally, the Germans managed to break through, regaining momentum and resuming their drive forward.

The next morning, the Soviet 5th Tank Division withdrew, having suffered substantial losses, approximately 70 tanks in total. This included at least 27 of the modern T-34s, which were in short supply during the early days of the war. Tragically, many of these tanks were lost due to operator error; two of them accidentally drove into the river, resulting in complete losses. The Germans, on the other hand, incurred losses of around 30 tanks, though only 11 of these were total losses. Significantly, all of the Soviet losses were irrecoverable, a stark contrast to the German experience. Several factors contributed to this discrepancy, but the most apparent was the chaotic nature of the Soviet retreat. The Soviets often fell back in disarray, which hindered their ability to recover and salvage their equipment. Even if they had been more organized, it remains questionable how well-equipped the Soviet Tank Divisions were with recovery equipment. The tables of organization of the Soviet Tank Division in 1941 authorized one crane truck and twenty recovery tractors. Most sources do not cover the status of this type of auxiliary equipment but considering what we know about the poor state of the authorized tank strengths, it is unlikely that any division had the proper recovery vehicles in place during the first days and weeks of the war. In the early weeks of the war, the Germans clearly excelled in this critical aspect of military operations, allowing them to maintain their momentum while the Soviets struggled to regroup.

Whatever delays and casualties these early Soviet counterattacks caused the German forces, the horrendous losses on the Soviet side have often led literature to portray a one-sided conflict that favors the narrative of an unrelenting German blitzkrieg. This focus tends to obscure an important reality: from the earliest stages of the war, German losses were far from negligible. Typically, German casualties did not stem from large-scale battles in conventional engagements with the Red Army. Instead, they were primarily the result of the disintegration of organized Soviet fighting formations. The breakdown in command and control led to numerous smaller skirmishes that, while not significant on their own, collectively inflicted a substantial toll on the invading forces. On only the third day of conflict, Halder noted that casualties were “bearable,” but he added, “Remarkably high losses among officers.” During this period, Soviet tactics, though crude, proved effective. Engagements were often initiated by small groups of Soviet soldiers, who would ambush unsuspecting German forces from carefully selected positions. This approach leveled the playing field against the German superiority in heavy weapons, mobility, and air power. The dense Belarusian forests and high summer cornfields provided excellent cover for these Soviet troops, allowing them to prepare ambushes along the roads essential to the German advance. As German columns stretched longer across the countryside, gaps inevitably opened between the fast-moving Panzers and the slower-trudging infantry. This left poorly defended supply columns exposed to attacks, even from small groups of soldiers without heavy weaponry. This situation sparked an immediate and effective form of guerrilla resistance, executed by soldiers armed with military-issued equipment rather than untrained peasants.

By June 24, the 3rd Panzer Group reported that the forests were teeming with fugitive Soviet soldiers who were “attacking from the flank and rear,” causing unrest and “slowing the advance.” Therefore, a request was made for reserves from Colonel-General Adolf Strauss’s 9th Army to be dispatched to “clean out the woods.” However, the vast area in question made this an impossible task, especially given the limited German reserves. In fact, at no point in the war did German security forces succeed in eliminating partisan resistance in Belarus. On the contrary, these forces only grew in number and effectiveness. A similar pattern of attacks plagued the 2nd Panzer Group’s rear area from the outset of the war. A former officer from the 3rd Panzer Division observed: “During the first two days of combat, unarmored troops and rear echelons suffered considerable losses inflicted by hostile enemy troops cut off from their main bodies. They hid beside the march routes, opened fire by surprise, and could only be defeated in intense hand-to-hand combat. German troops had not previously experienced this type of war.”

Now to the south of the Alytus area lay the Bialystok Salient, a broad protrusion of Soviet lines extending into German-controlled Poland. This salient was flanked by German forces on both its northern and southern sides, stretching approximately 250 kilometers at its widest point. The fortress of Brest anchored the southern end of the front along the Bug River. The dividing line between the Soviet Northwestern and Western Fronts ran just south of Alytus, creating a distinct advantage for Hoth’s Panzers as they operated along this divided area of responsibility. The bulk of the opposing Western Front forces remained concentrated within the Bialystok Salient. Although the utter disarray engulfing the Soviet Western Front positioned most of their counter-moves for failure, the impact of the Red Army’s new tanks was evident even in the most one-sided encounters. In an attempt to cut off the German penetration and seal the dangerous breach in the Soviet front, Lieutenant-General Dmitri Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, launched frantic counterattacks on June 24 and 25 against the left wing of Army Group Centre using his 11th and 6th Mechanized Corps. The 11th Mechanized Corps was comparatively weak, equipped with only 60 T-34s and KV-1s, supported by 200 older T-26s and BT series tanks. In contrast, the 6th Mechanized Corps fielded 960 tanks, with approximately half being the newer medium and heavy T-34 and KV-1 designs.

Unfortunately, plagued by communication issues and a lack of precise intelligence, the Soviet offensive was hopelessly ill-coordinated. As a result, it missed its intended target, Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group, and instead collided with the 20th and 8th Army Corps of the advancing 9th Army. Even before making contact, the counterattack, directed by Pavlov’s skilled operations officer, Lieutenant-General Ivan Boldin, was severely hindered by the relentless aerial assaults of Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen’s 8th Air Corps. Boldin’s scattered forces endured heavy losses even trying to reach their designated assembly areas in the Lunna–Indura–Sokolka region south of Grodno. His long, armored convoys became easy targets for the formidable Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers, which in some cases were equipped with phosphorus bombs. Complicating matters further, the T-34s and KV-1s had only recently been introduced to the two Mechanized Corps, arriving in April and May 1941. Many KV-1s still lacked ammunition, and crews for the new models were assigned only in late May and early June, leaving training rudimentary at best.

As a result, Boldin’s counter-stroke was merely a shadow of its intended strength. Nevertheless, the sight of massed Soviet tanks, particularly the newly seen T-34s and KV-1s, instilled panic among the German Panzerjäger anti-tank units as they watched round after round bounce off the Soviet armor. Urgent requests for more armor-piercing shells were sent out, while Richthofen’s squadrons provided critical close-air support. The near-total absence of aerial cover cost the Soviets dearly, and the offensive soon devolved into another catastrophic defeat with heavy losses. However, two significant factors emerged from this engagement. First, the battle delayed the advance of the 9th Army’s right wing and widened the gap between the 3rd Panzer Group and its infantry support. More importantly, this confrontation exposed the vulnerability of German units to attacks by the latest Soviet tank models, which, with Soviet factories now working at a furious pace, posed a dire threat for the Germans if the war dragged on beyond its expected timeframe.

A report about a junior Soviet officer, Lieutenant Pavel Gudz, commanding five KV-1s and two T-34s on the southern front during the war’s first day captures the scene vividly: “The Germans started bombing the column... A shell from a German anti-tank gun bounced off the tank’s heavy armor... Gudz, who was both the tank’s gunner and commander, fired a single shot in return, destroying the enemy gun. He and his platoon went on to knock out five German tanks, three armored personnel carriers, and several cars. After lunch, the Germans attacked again, and Gudz disabled three more tanks. His driver, Galkin, rammed another German tank, dislodging its track and forcing it into a ditch. The fields were covered with burned-out tanks and dead Germans.”

On June 25, elements of the 57th Panzer Corps, under General of Panzers Kuntzen captured Vilnius, while the 39th Panzer Corps, under General of Panzers Schmidt began advancing toward Minsk. They executed a wide flanking maneuver behind the Soviet 3rd Army, effectively trapping them in the early stages of what would evolve into the Bialystok-Minsk encirclement. Despite his firm belief that Army Group Centre's top priority should be the closure of the encirclement at Minsk, Halder favored sending elements of both Panzer groups toward the Dvina and Dnepr rivers to secure bridgeheads for the next stage of the advance. On June 29, Halder recorded in his diary for the first time his objective for Army Group Centre: the attack on Moscow. He expressed hope for the seizure of Rogachev and Mogilev along the Dnepr, stating that this would "open the road to Smolensk and, from there, the course to Moscow."

Meanwhile, at Hitler's headquarters, a very different picture was emerging. Hitler was also considering the continuation of the campaign following the elimination of the pocket. The critical question was whether the main thrust of operations should be directed toward Moscow or Leningrad. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch of the OKH was known to be in attendance at the Wolf's Lair on June 29, and while the records do not specify, he likely recommended the Moscow option to Hitler. Even if he did not, he certainly would have supported it. However, Hitler was more inclined to focus on cutting the Soviets off from the Baltic Sea, thereby denying them access to the North Sea. This strategy would secure Germany’s ore transports from Scandinavia and allow for the concentration of Finland’s strength for their attack in the east. Regarding an eventual thrust on Moscow, Hitler argued that an advance on Leningrad would secure the left flank of the later operation, and that, for the time being, the Soviet capital should simply be subjected to bombing. The following day, June 30, Hitler expanded on these sentiments, asserting that the addition of Panzer forces from Army Group Centre would facilitate the rapid seizure of Leningrad’s industrial area and that only after this should the attack on Moscow be launched.

In more immediate concerns, Brauchitsch reported that Hitler was once again expressing nervous anxiety about the depth of Schweppenburg’s 24TH Panzer Corps, which had reached Bobruisk and was building a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Beresina River on June 29. Brauchitsch reassured Hitler that this was simply flank protection for the main operation at Minsk. However, Halder, who was not present but later received a report from Brauchitsch, recognized that Guderian would settle for nothing less than the quickest possible crossing of the Dnepr. Halder personally supported Guderian in this endeavor. Yet, Hitler remained concerned that the 24th Panzer Corps had over-extended itself. He forbade army command from issuing any further orders for the eastward advance of the Panzer Corps, effectively tying Halder's hands.

Halder regarded this as a grave mistake but was unwilling to concede command of the campaign to Hitler. In his diary, Halder defiantly stated: “Let us hope that the middle levels of command will do the right thing on their own and without express orders, which we cannot issue because of the Führer’s orders to Brauchitsch.” A strict interpretation of his orders prohibited him from issuing a command to advance, but it did not explicitly require him to forbid action if it was undertaken independently by the generals themselves, which he assumed it would be. Using this tenuous reasoning, Halder convinced himself that he could still achieve his objectives without disobeying orders. While Germany’s leading generals clashed among themselves and with Hitler’s headquarters over direction for the eastern campaign, infighting among Germany’s political institutions was even more intense. Headed by some of the most unscrupulous personalities in the Third Reich, notably Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler, each man vied for the largest slice of the lucrative Soviet prize, seeking to expand their respective empires within the internal authorities of the Nazi state. Observing this chaotic scene, Goebbels, who himself was embroiled in a dispute with the OKW and the designated minister for the new eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg, over the dissemination of propaganda complained in his diary: “Always the same thing: spheres of authority.” He astutely added: “If we go down, it will be as a result of these disputes.”

Earlier, during the afternoon of June 22, German assault guns from the 8th Infantry Division took Grodno. As they advanced, they encountered the 29th Tank Division. Unfortunately for the Red Army, the local commander, Colonel Studnev, was not among the most competent leaders. Mistaking the assault guns for Panzers, he decided to engage from a distance. His poorly trained gunners wasted their ammunition with ineffective shots. Recognizing that their assault guns were unlikely to achieve significant results, the Germans took cover and called in close air support. Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers swiftly arrived and began attacking the stationary Soviet tanks. Meanwhile, the 8th Infantry Division engaged with their artillery, proving effective in destroying several light tanks. After enduring four hours of this combined arms assault, Studnev's men retreated, having lost 33 tanks while inflicting only a couple dozen casualties on the invaders. Importantly, this delay did not significantly hinder the Germans; in fact, the Panzers were never present in the area. They were busy pushing east and north at breakneck speed, seeking to envelop the very units that were so eagerly rushing to the border within the growing pocket.

On the southern half of the developing encirclement was the 2nd Panzer Group under Colonel General Guderian. His group represented the largest concentration of armored forces ever assembled in the short history of the Wehrmacht. Guderian was a prima donna by reputation even at this early stage of the war. However, he was a daring commander who never hesitated to argue with his higher command. He schemed to increase his responsibility and resources. In the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, Guderian's Panzer Group faced one of the longest marches to its objective: Minsk, situated over 400 kilometers from their starting point. For comparison, the march of the 3rd Panzer Group was notably shorter at only 300 kilometers. It was also anticipated that Guderian’s route would encounter some of the stiffest enemy resistance. The first week yielded mixed results. The Brest Fortress could not be overwhelmed and needed to be bypassed; infantry units from Field Marshal Kluge’s 4th Army were assigned to reduce it instead. Guderian’s tanks faced Red Army units immediately upon crossing the Bug River on the morning of June 22. The 14th Mechanized Corps launched a counterattack en masse, deploying over 200 tanks. However, nearly all of these were outdated light tanks from the previous decade. The newer and more advanced models, which were causing other German Panzer units significant trouble elsewhere along the front, were conspicuously absent from Guderian's opposition. Several factors combined to give the Panzers a decisive edge in this engagement. The T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 were still in limited production runs and would not make up the bulk of the Red Army’s armor forces until later in the war. Exact dates are disputed but it is likely that by late 1943 this generation of designs dominated the front-line armor units. Of course, on no side during the war was tank development static and many sub-models and evolutions of designs were admitted into service; some were better than others. They enjoyed tactical surprise, demonstrated superior organization, and had ready access to close air support, among other advantages. As a result, the Soviet counterattack was halted in its tracks, leading to severe losses bialfor the Red Army. While the Germans did suffer some tank losses, the counterattack had not significantly hindered their progress.

In the following days, Marshal Timoshenko, as the commander of the entire field army, sought to galvanize the Western Front into utilizing its armor to counter the invading forces. He directed several armored units to retake Grodno, still unaware that no Panzer units were present in the city. The 6th Mechanized Corps was ordered to march on Grodno and expel the Germans. The Luftwaffe’s extensive commitment to Army Group Center once again proved effective, as aerial reconnaissance detected the approaching tank columns on June 23. This intelligence was promptly relayed to 8th Flying Corps Headquarters, which dispatched aircraft to attack the advancing columns. Under the command of Colonel General Richthofen, the Luftwaffe destroyed 63 tanks, causing significant disruption to the Soviet march. Richthofen was a cousin of the infamous Red Baron of World War One fame, Captain Manfred von Richthofen. He was an ace in his own right and would go on to the highest levels of command in World War Two. He was an ardent supporter of Hitler and accepted bribes and other extra-legal benefits in the dictator’s service. He spent the last months of his life as an American POW before succumbing to a brain tumor in July 1945. 

When the 6th Mechanized Corps arrived in the Grodno area, it was a formidable force, on paper, the strongest collection of armor in the Red Army. Under Major General Khatskilevich, the corps boasted at least 100 KV tanks, nearly 200 T-34s, and hundreds of light tanks. However, there were significant logistical challenges. The light tanks required gasoline, while the medium and heavy tanks operated on diesel. This discrepancy meant that logistics would need to provide two types of fuel, with stocks depleting at uneven rates. Unfortunately for Khatskilevich, the closest major supply depot in Bialystok had been destroyed, forcing him to rely on his next supply source in Vawkavysk, located 75 kilometers to his rear. Recognizing the urgency, he sent whatever resources he could back to retrieve more fuel supplies. For the moment, the 6th Mechanized Corps found itself hindered by this fuel shortage. Additionally, the lack of radios and other communication equipment made it impossible to coordinate any action with the 11th Mechanized Corps. As a result, while the previously mentioned 29th Tank Division was enduring a devastating assault, Khatskilevich was unable to provide any assistance.

Only on June 24 did Major General Khatskilevich order an assault. Due to the ongoing diesel shortage, he could only deploy his light tanks, which were poorly positioned and ran directly into prepared anti-tank defenses. The attack was repulsed. On June 25, he attempted again, this time incorporating his medium and heavy tanks. However, success remained elusive. There was essentially little to no effective combination of artillery, infantry, and air support with the tanks, unlike the coordinated assaults the Germans had consistently demonstrated in the early days of the campaign. Consequently, any localized moments of success were swiftly crushed by the Wehrmacht’s combined arms approach, as the beleaguered Soviet tanks attacked in waves of increasing desperation. While the Soviet heavy tanks proved daunting for the Germans to handle, they, too, suffered from inept crews and poor coordination. Eventually, these tanks were either abandoned or destroyed by close-range heavy anti-tank fire. It wasn't until late in the afternoon that Western Front Headquarters realized they were squandering their armor. The Wehrmacht had not concentrated its armor at Grodno but had instead positioned it on the flanks of the salient. In horror, Pavlov recognized this too late and ordered the remnants of the 6th and 11th Mechanized Corps to pull back and cover Slonim to prevent Guderian from cutting off their main line of retreat. Unfortunately, this retreat did not go well; it effectively broke the units, leaving them as little more than a disorganized mob. The 17th Panzer Division arrived at Slonim late on the 24th, only to find the bridge blown. They quickly deployed pioneers to build a new bridge across the Schara River that night. 

Meanwhile, the rest of the 47th Panzer Corps caught up and pushed through to Baranavichy. The Bialystok pocket was now all but closed. Although Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group and Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group still needed to reach Minsk, there was now little standing in their way. The 12th and 20th Panzer Divisions reached the outskirts of Minsk on June 26. 

Contact finally established between Hoth and Guderian at Minsk, ostensibly closing the outer ring of the encirclement. However, in practice, the southeast side was far from being hermetically sealed. At Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Friedrich Fedor von Bock was anxious to advance toward the great rivers but was dismayed by the lost opportunities caused by higher command’s insistence on focusing on the Bialystok-Minsk pocket. Venting his frustration, Bock wrote: “That is the curse of the evil deed! If we turn near Minsk, there will inevitably be a stop there until the entire Bialystok-Minsk pocket has largely been cleared. I wanted to take possession of the Dnepr or at least the Beresina bridges quickly, so as not to have to fight for them later which, unfortunately, will now be the case!”

They began their assault the following day. The city was encircled by a ring of bunkers and fortifications, but these defenses were not manned with the full strength necessary for a proper hold. Minsk marked the easternmost point of an encirclement that had trapped the better part of three Soviet armies: the 3rd, 10th, and 13th Armies. These forces were loosely arranged in an oval stretching from Navahrudak in the west to Minsk in the east. The last major independent unit of the Western Front was the 4th Army, commanded by Major General Korobkov. He narrowly escaped encirclement along with his comrades near Minsk, primarily because Guderian’s Panzers had split him from the rest south of Baranovichi. While the 4th Army lived to fight another day, it suffered significant losses inside the pocket.

As Hoth’s Panzers assaulted Minsk, the fortifications continued to hold them back, resulting in casualties. The recent rainfall had turned the ground to mud, severely limiting their maneuverability as they fought through and around the city’s outskirts. Meanwhile, Guderian’s leading elements remained far from being able to seal the southern flank of the encirclement. The Luftwaffe relentlessly bombarded the city, causing widespread fires upon detonation. At one point, nearly half of Minsk was engulfed in flames, which made the defense of the city even more challenging. Finally, on June 28, the heart of Minsk was occupied by elements of the 12th Panzer Division. However, Guderian was still unable to close his end of the encirclement. It wasn’t until well after the fall of Minsk that his forces linked up with Hoth’s. By June 29, the encirclement was officially sealed, but there was just enough time for several units of the 13th Army to slip through the gap. 

However, Guderian was blind to such problems, and his post-war memoir glossed over the incomplete nature of the encirclement, seeking instead to celebrate his achievements at Minsk as an outstanding success. Reflecting on the final days of June, Guderian wrote: “The Russian forces, which had been in the Bialystok area and had been attempting in vain to break through our encircling pincers, were now completely surrounded. The foundations had been laid for the first great victory of the campaign.” The confident tone of these reflections hid a more genuine picture of the fighting that Guderian had conveyed in a letter to his wife on June 27. After describing the initial days as "strenuous," he mentioned the loss of several officers who had been close to him and the sadness it caused. When discussing the Red Army, he noted with a hint of grim resignation: “The enemy resists bravely and bitterly. The fighting, therefore, is very hard. One just has to put up with it.” By nature, Guderian was not a pessimist; indeed, he had previously been accused of viewing events through an overly optimistic lens. His letter simply conveyed the character of the new war in the east, which was marked by fervent hostility and fanaticism, unlike anything he had encountered before.

By the end of June, a begrudging acknowledgment of the Red Army's unexpectedly zealous resistance was growing among upper circles of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party. This reflected the stark contrast between the reality of war and the elevated confidence that had consumed the German leadership prior to the launch of operations. For many, this realization was just beginning to take hold. While it would be too much to suggest that anyone doubted Germany's ultimate triumph, the shock of facing genuine resistance was palpable. On June 29, Goebbels noted in his diary: “The Russians are fighting bravely. Their command is functioning better than during the first few days.” The following day, he remarked: “In foreign countries, our military situation is, if anything, being judged rather too optimistically, even by our enemies. They think our Wehrmacht capable of the most amazing achievements.” By July 1, despite general satisfaction with developments, Goebbels conveyed a clear sense of unease: “The Russians are putting up more of a fight than one would have expected. Our losses in men and equipment are not completely insignificant.”

Similarly, Bock described the ongoing challenge of defeating the sizable Soviet armies, noting that the swift breakthroughs to Minsk had not fully achieved this goal. Unlike previous campaigns, where surrounded enemy units acknowledged their defeat and surrendered willingly, the Red Army was far more resistant. The implications for Operation Barbarossa were profound. Reviewing events in his rear area on June 28, Bock observed: “Our losses are not inconsiderable. Thousands of Russian soldiers are hiding in the forests, far behind the front, some in civilian clothes… catching them all is impossible given the tremendous size of the area. One hundred kilometers behind the front, at Siemiatycze, the 293rd Division is still fighting for a row of strongly fortified bunkers, which have to be taken one at a time. In spite of the heaviest fire and the employment of every means, the crews refuse to give up. Each one has to be killed one at a time.”

Meanwhile the infantry armies of Army Group Center advanced and began the process of reducing the pocket, but this was no easy task. Even when Red Army units surrendered, the sheer size of the encirclement made it difficult to manage. Many soldiers continued to fight and die long after the Wehrmacht’s generals had deemed the situation resolved. It would be several days before the pocket was officially declared liquidated. Fighting remained intense until the very end. This battle became known as the Bialystok-Minsk pocket. It marked the first major operational success of Operation Barbarossa and was one of the largest encirclements in modern military history, rivaled only by the Dunkirk pocket. The vast majority of the Western Front was either destroyed, encircled, or disintegrating as they retreated from the advancing Germans.

In the aftermath of sealing the encirclement, Hitler intervened in the chain of command and ordered the Panzers to halt their advance. This move echoed his earlier decisions during the lead-up to Dunkirk, driven by a similar fear: he was concerned that the Panzers would leave the infantry behind, exposing their long and fragile logistical lines to a counterattack. Colonel General Halder, in his role as chief of staff of the OKH, argued against this decision. He was nominally the man responsible for such strategic choices, and in previous wars, he would have had the authority to proceed as he saw fit. However, Halder underestimated Hitler’s resolve regarding this matter, a miscalculation he would continue to make throughout his tenure. Halder, at least externally, was a man of complex motivations. He was bribed by Hitler throughout his tenure. He was certainly aware of the racial motivations of the Nazi regime and was comfortable exercising command in an Army engaged in a war of genocide as a matter of course. At the same time, he was sympathetic to the July 20 plotters and their attempted assassination of Hitler. Acquitted of war crimes, after the war he would go on to lay the groundwork behind the myth of the “Clean Wehrmacht.”

Ultimately, the Panzers were halted despite Halder's objections. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership was distraught but determined to continue the fight. Much of the Nazi leadership believed that the Soviet Union could not withstand such a severe blow as they had delivered at Minsk. They thought they had kicked in the door and expected the entire structure to crumble. They were mistaken. Stalin would not permit the Soviet Union to fall so easily. Timoshenko was appointed to lead the Western Front in Pavlov’s stead, and he immediately set about organizing defenses in front of Smolensk. The enemy's objective was now clear: the Panzers aimed to continue their advance along the Brest-Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow route. It was Timoshenko’s task to halt their progress.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Army Group Center advanced relentlessly, supported by a powerful Luftwaffe. Initial successes against poorly prepared Soviet troops gave rise to confidence, but logistical issues soon hampered German operations. As Soviet forces regrouped, fierce counterattacks emerged, revealing their resilience. The chaotic response from Soviet command only deepened their losses. Within days, the Germans encircled vast Soviet armies at Bialystok-Minsk, marking a significant operational victory.

Last time we spoke about Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa. On June 22, 1941, Operation Barbarossa commenced, marking the beginning of one of history's largest military campaigns. German soldiers received the shocking news just hours before the assault, rallying under Nazi ideology with grim determination. At dawn, artillery and air raids erupted, catching Soviet forces unprepared. The Wehrmacht launched a surprise attack, swiftly advancing deep into enemy territory, achieving significant early victories against a disorganized Soviet defense. As the first day wore on, German forces encountered fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers demonstrating unexpected resolve. Despite initial success, logistical challenges soon became evident, as the harsh terrain of the Eastern Front complicated the advance. Roads were poor, forcing troops to abandon vehicles and rely on manpower to pull them free. While high-ranking German leaders celebrated their swift progress, the reality for individual soldiers was increasingly sobering; they faced a determined Soviet army far from the feeble force they had anticipated. 

This episode is: Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa: The North Army Attacks

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello there. In the last episode we opened up the can of worms that was Operation Barbarossa, only for day one. In this podcast we are going to continue that story, but for cohesive sack we decided to tackle this by army group. So for the remainder of the week each episode will cover the different groups and today we are talking about Army Group North.

Prior to the invasion, Adolr Hitler emphasized that the most important objective was to prevent the Red Army from retreating in an orderly fashion. He stated that the blows against the Red Army must be sufficiently powerful to eliminate any chance of recovery. To achieve this, he asserted the necessity of deploying tank forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy's strongest units. Commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Army Group North was stationed in East Prussia. Its strategic objective was Leningrad, with operational goals that included capturing the territories of the Baltic republics and securing the northern flank of Army Group Centre in Northern Russia, specifically between the Western Dvina River and the Daugavpils-Kholm Army Group boundary.

Each of the German Army Groups was supported at the operational level by an Air Corps, except for Army Group Centre, which was supported by two Air Corps. A German Air Corps in 1941 was of variable strength but usually included at least 3 Air Wings of various types, including but not limited to Medium Bombers, Ground Attack and Fighter wings. There was a small Reconnaissance element in the Air Corps, but this was usually limited to a single flight of planes. Army Group North received support from the 1st Air Corps, led by Lt. General Förster, part of the 1st Air Fleet, led by Colonel General Keller. While this Corps lacked the dedicated ground attack Ju-87 Stuka wings found in other Air Corps, it compensated with a heavy concentration of Ju-88 medium bombers. In addition to the forces of the 1st Air Corps, there was also an ad-hoc organization led by Lieutenant Colonel von Wild, which was established to secure the coastline and ensure that the Soviet Navy could not disrupt the movement of the Heer along the coast.

As was the case along the entire front, the 1st Air Corps launched surprise attacks on Soviet air bases in its sector with brutal effectiveness. The Soviet response was minimal, hindered by a significant lack of modern equipment, poor command and control, and the shock of being attacked without any warning. The few Soviet fighters that managed to take to the air were completely outclassed by their German counterparts. Soviet losses in the initial days of the war were so staggering that even the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe found them hard to believe. It is estimated that 1,800 Soviet planes were destroyed on the first day, with hundreds more lost throughout the week. In the far north, the war opened with a massive Soviet bomber raid on June 25, targeting cities across Finland with approximately 500 medium bombers. This attack was a critical demonstration of the Red Air Force’s continuing strength. The Luftwaffe could not intercept them all, and the Finnish Air Force was in a similarly precarious position. Ultimately, this situation led to Finland officially joining the war, providing a short-term boost to the Nazi war effort.

So you might be asking yourself, how did Finland get sucked up into this? Let’s just summarize the bitter experience Finland had over the past couple of years. The 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact enabled the Soviet Union to exert pressure on the small Baltic republics and Finland, likely to improve its strategic position in Eastern Europe in the event of a broader conflict. The Baltic republics quickly acquiesced to Soviet demands for military bases and troop transfer rights, while Finland resolutely refused. When diplomatic efforts failed, military action was initiated, and on November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Finland, marking the beginning of the Winter War.

The Winter War served as a rude awakening for the Finns regarding the realities of international politics. Condemnation from the League of Nations and global outrage seemed to have little impact on Soviet policy. Although Sweden permitted volunteers to join the Finnish army, it refrained from sending military support or allowing passage to French or British troops, who were also mobilized in fewer numbers than initially promised. Even right-wing extremists were disillusioned to find that Nazi Germany provided no assistance and actively blocked material support from other nations. The Moscow Peace Treaty, which concluded the Winter War, was viewed as a significant injustice. The losses at the negotiation table, including Viipuri, Finland's second-largest city were perceived to be greater than those suffered on the battlefield. Finland lost one-fifth of its industrial capacity and 9% of its territory. Of the 12% of Finland's population living in these lost territories, only a few hundred remained; the remaining 420,000 relocated to the Finnish side of the new border.

Public opinion in Finland longed for the re-acquisition of the homes left behind by the 12% of the population who had been forced to flee Finnish Karelia in haste. Many placed their hopes in the peace conference that was generally expected to follow the war. Consequently, the term Välirauha "Interim Peace" gained popularity after the harsh terms of the peace treaty were announced. Although the peace treaty was signed, the state of war was not officially revoked due to the ongoing global conflict, the challenging food supply situation, and the poor condition of the Finnish military. Censorship remained in place and was utilized to suppress criticism of the Moscow Peace Treaty and blatant anti-Soviet sentiments. The continued state of war allowed President Kyösti Kallio to ask Field Marshal Mannerheim to remain as commander-in-chief, responsible for overseeing the reorganization of Finland's Armed Forces and fortifying the new border, a crucial task during these tumultuous times. Within a week after the peace treaty was signed, fortification work commenced along the 1,200 km long Salpalinja or "the Bolt Line", with a primary focus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Saimaa. Throughout the summer and autumn, Finland received military supplies purchased and donated during and immediately after the Winter War. However, it took several months before Mannerheim could provide a somewhat positive assessment of the army's condition. Military expenditures in 1940 rose to 45% of Finland's state budget, with military purchases prioritized over civilian needs. Mannerheim's position and the ongoing state of war allowed for effective military management, but this also created a troubling parallel government that occasionally clashed with civilian government structures. On March 13, the same day the Moscow Peace Treaty came into effect, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare requested the Foreign Office to initiate negotiations with Finland as soon as possible to foster positive relations. The under-secretary of MEW, Charles Hambro, was authorized to form a war trade treaty with Finland and traveled to Helsinki on April 7. He had previously exchanged letters with Ryti, and they quickly reached a basic understanding of the treaty's contents. The Finns were eager to commence trade; from their first meeting, a preliminary treaty was drafted and accepted immediately. However, Hambro needed approval from his superiors and emphasized that the treaty would not be considered official until a final version was negotiated. Under the treaty, Finland agreed to give control of its strategic material exports to Britain in exchange for armaments and other essential supplies. However, the following day, Germany invaded Norway, rendering the treaty unworkable due to the absence of safe trade routes between the two countries.

Germany has historically served as a counterbalance to Russia in the Baltic region. Even though Hitler's Third Reich had colluded with the Soviet invaders, Finland saw some value in pursuing warmer relations with Germany. Following the German occupation of Norway and particularly after the Allied evacuation from northern Norway, the relative importance of improving ties with Germany increased. On May 9, Finland inquired about the possibility of purchasing arms from Germany, but Germany refused to even entertain the discussion. Beginning in May 1940, Finland initiated a campaign to restore the amicable relations with Germany that had deteriorated during the last year of the 1930s. Finland hoped to capitalize on the fragile Nazi–Soviet relationship and the numerous personal connections between Finnish and German athletes, scientists, industrialists, and military officers. After the fall of France, in late June, the Finnish ambassador in Stockholm received diplomatic reports suggesting that Britain might soon be compelled to negotiate peace with Germany. The experiences of World War I highlighted the importance of maintaining close and friendly relations with the victors, prompting Finland to intensify its efforts to court Nazi Germany. A notable shift in the German attitude toward Finland was observed in late July when Ludwig Weissauer, a secret representative of the German Foreign Minister, visited Finland to inquire with Mannerheim and Ryti about Finland's willingness to defend itself against the Soviet Union. Mannerheim assessed that the Finnish army could withstand a few weeks of conflict without additional arms. Weissauer departed without securing any promises.

Unbeknownst to Finland, Adolf Hitler had begun planningOperation Barbarossa following the collapse of France. He had previously shown little interest in Finland before the Winter War, but he now recognized its potential as an operational base and the military value of the Finnish army. In the first weeks of August, German fears of a potential Soviet attack on Finland led Hitler to lift the arms embargo. Thus, arms deliveries that had been halted during the Winter War were resumed. The next German visitor was Joseph Veltjens, a representative of Hermann Göring, who arrived on August 18 to negotiate with Ryti and Mannerheim regarding German troop transfer rights between Finnmark in Northern Norway and the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia in exchange for arms and other materials. Initially, these arms shipments were transported via Sweden, but later they began arriving directly in Finland. This arrangement constituted a breach of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on Germany’s part and represented a material breach of the Moscow Peace Treaty for Finland, which had primarily aimed to restrict cooperation between Germany and Finland. There is some debate about whether the ailing President Kallio was informed of these developments; it is possible that his health deteriorated before he could be briefed confidentially. As part of the campaign to warm relations with the Third Reich, it seemed a natural progression to seek closer cooperation, especially since the much-disliked Moscow Peace Treaty had explicitly discouraged such partnerships. Censored propaganda in the Finnish press contributed to the country’s reorientation while employing measured means. Soviet negotiators had insisted that the troop transfer agreement to Hanko should not be published for parliamentary discussion or voting. This precedent made it easier for the Finnish government to keep the troop transfer agreement with the Germans secret until the first German troops arrived at the port of Vaasa on September 21. 

The arrival of German troops alleviated the insecurity felt by many Finns and was largely welcomed. Most opposition stemmed from concerns about the negotiation process rather than the transfer itself, as the Finnish populace was largely unaware of the specific details of the agreements with the Third Reich. The presence of German troops was seen as a deterrent against further Soviet threats and a counterbalance to the Soviet troop transfer rights. On November 21, the German troop transfer agreement was expanded to allow the movement of wounded soldiers and those on leave via Turku. German troops arrived and established quarters, depots, and bases along the rail lines from Vaasa and Oulu to Ylitornio and Rovaniemi, extending to roadways via Karesuvanto and Kilpisjärvi or Ivalo and Petsamo to Skibotn and Kirkenes in northern Norway. Roadwork to improve the winter road between Karesuvanto and Skibotn, as well as the construction of entirely new roads from Ivalo to Karasjok, was discussed and later funded by the Germans. On October 23, Ryti, Mannerheim, Minister of Defence Walden, and Chief of Staff Heinrichs decided to share information regarding Finland's defense plans for Lappland with the Wehrmacht to foster goodwill, despite the risk that this information could be passed on to the Soviet Union. When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov visited Berlin on November 12, he demanded that Germany cease its support for Finland and treat Finland similarly to the Baltic states. However, Hitler insisted that no new military actions should occur in Northern Europe before summer. Through unofficial channels, Finnish representatives were informed that "Finnish leaders can sleep peacefully; Hitler has opened his umbrella over Finland."

On May 24, 1941, a group of staff officers led by General Heinrichs left Finland to participate in discussions with the German High Command in Salzburg on May 25. During these meetings, the Germans outlined their plans for the northern part of Operation Barbarossa, expressing interest in using Finnish territory to launch attacks from Petsamo to Murmansk and from Salla to Kandalaksha. Heinrichs conveyed Finnish interest in Eastern Karelia, but the Germans recommended a passive stance. Negotiations continued the following day in Berlin with the Army High Command , where, in contrast to the previous day’s discussions, Germany requested that Finland form a strong attack formation ready to strike on either the eastern or western side of Lake Ladoga. The Finns promised to consider the proposal but informed the Germans that they could only arrange supplies along the Olonets-Petrozavodsk line. The issue of mobilization was also discussed, and it was decided that the Germans would send signal officers to facilitate confidential communication with Mannerheim’s headquarters in Mikkeli. Naval issues were addressed, primarily focused on securing sea lines over the Baltic Sea and the potential use of the Finnish navy in the upcoming conflict. During these negotiations, the Finns submitted various material requests, ranging from grain and fuel to aircraft and radio equipment.

Heinrichs' group returned to Finland on May 28 and reported their discussions to Mannerheim, Walden, and Ryti. On May 30, Ryti, Witting, Walden, Kivimäki, Mannerheim, Heinrichs, Talvela, and Aaro Pakaslahti from the Foreign Ministry met and accepted the results of the negotiations, establishing a list of key prerequisites: a guarantee of Finnish independence, restoration of pre-Winter War borders (or better), continued grain deliveries, and that Finnish troops would not cross the border before a Soviet incursion. The next round of negotiations took place in Helsinki from June 3 to 6, focusing on practical details. It was agreed that Germany would control the area north of Oulu, a region sparsely populated and not critical to the defense of southern provinces. The Finns also consented to provide two divisions, 30,000 men to the Germans in northern Finland and to allow the use of airfields in Helsinki and Kemijärvi for German operations with additional airfields at Kemi and Rovaniemi added later. 

Finland warned Germany that any attempts to establish a Quisling government would terminate cooperation, emphasizing the importance of Finland not being viewed as the aggressor and that no invasion should be launched from Finnish territory. Subsequent negotiations regarding naval operations continued on June 6 in Kiel, where it was agreed that the Kriegsmarine would mine the Gulf of Finland as soon as the war commenced. The arrival of German troops participating in Operation Barbarossa began on June 7 in Petsamo, where the SS Division Nord moved southwards, and on June 8 in the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia, where the German 169th Infantry Division was transported by rail to Rovaniemi, both divisions turning eastward on June 18. In response to these developments, Britain canceled all naval traffic to Petsamo starting June 14. From June 14 onward, several German minelayers and supporting motor torpedo boats arrived in Finland, some on official naval visits and others hidden in the southern archipelago. The Finnish parliament was informed for the first time on June 9 when the first mobilization orders were issued for troops required to safeguard the subsequent mobilization phases, including anti-air and border guard units. On June 16, two Finnish divisions were transferred to the German army in Lapland. On June 18, an airfield in Utti was evacuated by Finnish planes, and the Germans were permitted to use it for refueling starting June 19. German reconnaissance planes were stationed at Tikkakoski, near Jyväskylä, on June 20. On June 20, the Finnish government ordered the evacuation of 45,000 people from the Soviet border. The following day, June 21, Finland's Chief of the General Staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally informed by his German counterpart that the attack was set to begin.

Operation Barbarossa had commenced in the northern Baltic by the late hours of June 21, when German minelayers, previously hiding in the Finnish archipelago, laid two large minefields across the Gulf of Finland, one at the mouth of the Gulf and another in its central part. These minefields effectively confined the Soviet Baltic Fleet to the easternmost part of the Gulf of Finland until the end of the Continuation War. Additionally, three Finnish submarines participated in the mining operation, laying nine smaller fields between Suursaari Island and the Estonian coast, with the first mines being deployed by the Finnish submarine Vetehinen at 07:38 on June 22, 1941. Later that night, German bombers flying from East Prussian airfields flew over the Gulf of Finland toward Leningrad, mining the harbor and the Neva River. Finnish air defense observed that one group of bombers, likely responsible for the mining of the Neva, flew over southern Finland. On their return trip, these bombers refueled at Utti airfield before heading back to East Prussia. Finland feared that the Soviet Union would quickly occupy Åland and use it to block naval routes from Finland to Sweden and Germany, particularly in conjunction with the Hanko base. 

In response, Operation Kilpapurjehdus or "Sail Race" was launched in the early hours of June 22 to deliver Finnish troops to Åland. Soviet bombers attacked Finnish ships during the operation at 06:05 on June 22, before the Finnish forces could land on Åland, but fortunately, no damage was inflicted during the air assault. Individual Soviet artillery batteries began firing at Finnish positions from Hanko early in the morning, prompting the Finnish commander to seek permission to return fire; however, before this permission could be granted, the Soviet artillery ceased. On the morning of June 22, the German Gebirgskorps Norwegen initiated Operation Rentier, advancing from Northern Norway to Petsamo. The German ambassador began urgent negotiations with Sweden to facilitate the transfer of the German 163rd Infantry Division from Norway to Finland using Swedish railways, a request that Sweden granted on June 24. On June 22, both the Soviet Union and Finland declared their respective neutrality in the ongoing conflict, creating unease among Nazi leadership. Germany attempted to provoke a response from the Soviet Union through the use of the Finnish archipelago as a base and Finnish airfields for refueling. 

On the morning of June 22, Hitler proclaimed: "Together with their Finnish comrades in arms, the heroes from Narvik stand at the edge of the Arctic Ocean. German troops under the command of the conqueror of Norway and the Finnish freedom fighters under their Marshal’s command are protecting Finnish territory." Following the launch of Operation Barbarossa at approximately 3:15 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union sent seven bombers on a retaliatory airstrike into Finland, striking targets at 6:06 a.m. Helsinki time, as reported by the Finnish coastal defense ship Väinämöinen. On the morning of June 25, the Soviet Union launched another air offensive, deploying 460 fighters and bombers targeting 19 airfields in Finland. However, due to inaccurate intelligence and poor bombing accuracy, many raids struck Finnish cities and municipalities, causing significant damage. The Soviet forces lost 23 bombers during this operation, while Finnish forces reported no aircraft losses. Although the USSR claimed that the airstrikes were aimed at German targets, particularly airfields in Finland, the Finnish Parliament used these attacks as justification for approving a "defensive war." 

Finland did not permit direct German attacks from its territory against the Soviet Union, requiring German forces in Petsamo and Salla to hold their fire. Air attacks were also prohibited, and inclement weather in northern Finland hindered German flying capabilities. Only one attack from southern Finland against the White Sea Canal was approved but had to be canceled due to poor weather conditions. Occasional small arms fire occurred between Soviet and Finnish border guards, but overall, the front remained quiet. Both parties, along with the Germans, conducted active air reconnaissance over the border, yet no air battles ensued. The worst damage occurred in Turku, where the airfield became inoperable for a week, and the medieval Turku Castle was struck. Heavy damage also affected civilian targets in Kotka and Heinola, though casualties from the attacks were relatively limited. The Soviet Union justified the offensive as directed against German targets in Finland; however, even the British embassy acknowledged that the majority of the damage was inflicted on southern Finland, including airfields without any German forces present. Rovaniemi and Petsamo were the only locations with German troops at the time of the attack. Consequently, Foreign Minister Eden admitted to parliament on June 26 that the Soviet Union had initiated the war. A parliament meeting was scheduled for June 25, during which Prime Minister Rangell was set to announce Finland's neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict. However, due to the Soviet bombings, he instead declared that Finland was once again at war with the Soviet Union. Thus, the Continuation War commenced. 

Down in the mud, the Heer was advancing steadily northward despite stiff resistance from the Red Army. Along the coast, the 291st Infantry Division made a near-miraculous advance into Latvia. However, they were soon ordered to moderate their pace due to growing resistance in the center and the slower progress of the rest of the 18th Army on their right flank.The corps of the 18th Army were making decent progress overall. The 26th Infantry Corps was pushing through light resistance as they attempted to secure the crossroads at Siauliai. The swampy terrain complicated their march, but the 10th Rifle Division's efforts to hold them back were ultimately futile. The Soviets were caught by surprise, outnumbered, outflanked, and outmaneuvered. The 30th Infantry Corps on the right encountered even rougher terrain than their counterparts in the 26th Corps. Despite the challenging conditions, resistance was also light, as only the 90th Rifle Division stood in their way on the approach to Siauliai.

Hoepner’s two panzer corps encountered remarkably different levels of opposition from the Red Army forces in the area. By June 26th, General Erich von Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps had established a bridgehead at Dvinsk on the Dvina River. However, Manstein became a victim of his own success, having to pause operations for six days to await the arrival of General Ernst Busch’s 16th Army, which was threatened on its right flank due to the 9th Army's southern turn to begin encirclement east of Białystok. Manstein was also far ahead of the Fourth Panzer Group’s second panzer corps, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps, which had been delayed largely because of the aforementioned Soviet counterattacks at Rossienie. Lacking support, Manstein's halt was a prudent measure; however, as Halder’s diary notes, it allowed the Soviets the opportunity to fall back over the Dvina River. Halder also observed that in the Army Group’s rear area, "strong wedged-in enemy elements are causing the infantry a lot of trouble even far behind the front." The activities in the northern and southern army groups illustrated the interdependence of each sector on the overall progress of the war. Yet, even in this early phase, the armies' inability to maintain contact between neighboring units, pacify rear areas, and provide infantry support to the panzer spearheads highlighted the army's overextension, which was already becoming apparent. Securing the crossings of the Dvina River was critical for the future advance of the Army Group. Manstein reached the city on June 26. His advance of over three hundred kilometers was an impressive achievement, but it also isolated his corps from neighboring units on both sides. For the next three days, his men held onto the bridgehead despite serious counterattacks from the Soviet 27th Army. On June 29, infantry support from the 16th Army began to arrive. This should have signaled Manstein to launch another offensive, but orders came from Hoepner stating that Army Group North had halted the Panzers on the Dvina until the infantry could catch up along the entire front.

Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps made several small tactical blunders on the first day, resulting in a loss of initiative to the Soviet 8th Army and its parent Northwestern Front. While Manstein raced toward the Dvina, the 41st Panzer Corps faced the brunt of the Red Army’s counterattacks in the region. The Soviet 8th Army had positioned its reserves over a hundred kilometers from the border, a decision that had significant consequences. On one hand, the Army headquarters could not move its reserves up to support the frontline divisions, effectively dooming the 10th and 90th Rifle Divisions to a hopeless retreat without armor support. On the other hand, this distance prevented the bulk of the army from being encircled in the early days of fighting. This breathing space allowed for a counterattack to be organized.

As the commander of the Northwestern Front, Kuznetsov ordered a counterattack. He dispatched orders to the 27th and 8th Armies to begin preparations within hours of the opening hostilities. However, his ability to communicate orders was severely hindered due to the destruction of command bunkers, non-operative phone and power lines, and many officers losing control of their units. To complicate matters further, the speed of the Wehrmacht’s advance in some sectors rendered orders obsolete before they even arrived. Kuznetsov directed the 8th Army to mobilize its armor. Lieutenant General Sobeniknov organized his mechanized corps for the assault. The 12th Mechanized Corps would push from the north, attacking the 41st Panzer Corps at Tytuvenai. In the south, the Soviet 11th Army’s 3rd Mechanized Corps attacked from north of Kaunas in the direction of Raseiniai. Together, the two corps mustered around three hundred fifty tanks, while the two Panzer divisions of the 41st Corps possessed approximately three hundred ninety tanks.

Finally, after long delays, during the night of June 22, the tanks concentrated and prepared for their counterattack against Reinhardt’s panzer corps. However, this concentration was compromised by orders from the Soviet 8th Army, which diverted one of the tank divisions to mount a counterattack at the border. This unauthorized diversion highlighted the tenuous lines of communication within the Red Army's hierarchy. This situation also highlighted a division in tactical concepts. Kuznetsov aimed to concentrate his armor to counter the enemy's concentration, while his subordinate Sobeniknov preferred to use the tanks piecemeal to support his infantry. The inherent tension between these opposing strategies had played out in France just a year earlier, with predictable results. The Panzers had successfully outmaneuvered their opponents, who were reliant on infantry support, and they were doing so once again in the Soviet Union. Notably, General Charles De Gaulle was one of the few French commanders who advocated for the mass deployment of French tanks but had been consistently overruled. Confusion abounded, and the counterattack became a messy, ill-coordinated affair from the outset.

Besides the command-and-control issues, logistics were also problematic. The 12th Mechanized Corps lacked sufficient fuel for the road march to the assembly area, approximately sixty kilometers away. Major General Shestopalov attempted to coordinate supply convoys to fetch fuel during the night of June 22-23, but this proved to be nearly impossible. The roads were overcrowded, and ongoing confusion about unit locations aggravated the situation. On the morning of the 23rd, German Luftwaffe attacks further disrupted the corps' road march and supply efforts. It wasn’t until the following afternoon that one of Shestopalov's divisions reached the jumping-off point for the counterattack. This was the 28th Tank Division, which was equipped solely with light tanks. Although the division had two hundred and thirty tanks, it could have been a powerful attacking force if properly supported. Unfortunately, this was not to be. Colonel Chernyahovksy, the division commander, ordered an assault by the first regiment that arrived. The 55th Tank Regiment attacked with only forty light tanks. They advanced against the 21st Infantry Division, which successfully repulsed them with anti-tank and artillery fire. This piecemeal assault began at 2100 hours, but after only three hours, Chernyahovksy called off the attack, having lost seventeen of his forty tanks with nothing of consequence gained.

Near Raseiniai, things were calm for the moment as the 6th Panzer Division was in the process of refueling and rearming. Luftwaffe reconnaissance had located a column of Soviet armor on the road from Kedainiai; however, this report was lost somewhere along the way. On the morning of June 24, the division was unexpectedly struck by the 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps. This morning brought two new realities for the men of the 6th Panzer. They were caught off guard by the Soviet counterattack, and the 2nd Tank Division was primarily manned by the best medium and heavy tanks in the Red Army. Hitherto unknown to the Wehrmacht, T-34s, KV-1s, and the monstrous KV-2 roared into battle. The Wehrmacht had little intelligence indicating the existence of such tanks, let alone the number that the Red Army possessed. This is a notable example of the failures of the Wehrmacht’s and the Nazi regime’s intelligence services. Throughout the war, tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence consistently failed to provide meaningful warnings to the officers and soldiers on the ground. This issue was not isolated to the Eastern Front but was especially egregious in the campaigns in the east.

The shock of encountering these formidable tanks was compounded by the complete ineffectiveness of the division’s anti-tank weapons against them. Round after round bounced off the thick armor of the Soviet tanks. The Pak 36 was worse than useless; its thirty-seven-millimeter shell had become essentially obsolete by 1941, replaced by the larger and more capable fifty-millimeter Pak 38. The obsolescence of the Pak 36 should not be overstated to imply that it was completely useless. Instead, it was ineffective against the most modern tanks it encountered. This issue had already been apparent in 1940 in the west, where it was proven ineffective against the British Matilda Mk. II and the French B1 and S35. The Heer was aware of the weapon's shortcomings, which led to the development and deployment of the Pak 38 in 50mm. However, even the Pak 38 struggled against the T-34 and was ineffective against the Soviet heavy tanks. The Pak 40 in 75mm was already in development, but the first units would not be delivered until February 1942.

However, even the larger Pak 38 could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Soviet tanks. Eventually, three KV-2s broke through the division's front, overrunning the infantry. This marked the first time German infantry experienced the terrifying ordeal of being overrun by tanks, a scenario that the French and British had faced multiple times in the Western theater. The breakthrough shocked German commanders. It was only the third day of the war, and they were supposed to be crushing a surprised Red Army with obsolete equipment and poorly organized leadership. Instead, they found themselves confronted with the inadequacy of their own equipment and a failure in reconnaissance that prevented them from anticipating the attack. Leaders were stunned by the course of events a wake-up call for many soldiers and officers. As the KV-2s advanced, they attacked the division’s reserve while crossing the Dubya River. Intense fighting ensued, and the tanks began to overrun a field howitzer battery. Quick-thinking soldiers directed fire from the one-hundred-fifty-millimeter guns at point-blank range against the incoming KV-2s. Nevertheless, the heavy tanks shrugged off these attacks. It was only when howitzer fire physically destroyed the tracks of the tanks that they were put out of action. Although immobilized, the threat would persist until German infantry dealt with the tanks the hard way by hand. Sources do not provide a precise account of how these tanks were put out of action, but inferring from other actions allows some insight into how it was likely accomplished. Infantry would have had to physically mount the tanks, open the hatches, and drop grenades inside. Alternatively, they would need to wait for the Red Tankers to voluntarily exit their vehicles to either gun them down or take them prisoner.

This singular breakthrough did not change the outcome of the battle. The Soviet tanks remained too disorganized, manned by poorly trained crews who, in some cases, did not know how to operate their vehicles fully or work together in small-unit tactics. The 2nd Tank Division’s attack sputtered out as piecemeal assaults ran out of fuel and ammunition. The fighting was not over yet. Reinhardt was maneuvering his 1st Panzer Division and elements of the 36th Infantry Division around the open flank of the 2nd Tank Division, while Manstein’s Panzers advanced toward Kedainiai behind the Soviet lines. By the night of the 24th, General Solyankin had been surrounded but refused to surrender. On the morning of the 25th, he attempted a breakout with his remaining tanks. This effort was quashed, but not without drama, as the KV tanks attacked and nearly broke through the German lines. The soldiers on the ground were beginning to appreciate the value of their anti-aircraft guns in combating the heavy tanks. The 88 mm anti-aircraft gun would eventually become legendary in this new role, though these were the earliest days of its employment. This application was not without its failures, stemming from desperation as everything else had been tried, and aside from isolated instances like howitzers destroying tracks, all other methods had failed. The 88mm Flak gun, in various mountings at this point in the war, was a Corps-level asset intended for use as a stationary emplacement to defend local supply and command centers against air attacks. It was effective in this role. Its success as an anti-tank gun stemmed from its high velocity and substantial shell weight. The Germans were not the only ones to discover that anti-aircraft guns could be effectively repurposed for anti-tank work. Eventually, the Soviets adopted a modified version of their M1939 85mm gun for tank use, as did the Americans with their M3 90mm gun. The British utilized their QF 3.7-inch gun in anti-tank and field artillery roles, but they never officially adopted it or a modified version for those purposes. The 2nd Tank Division would hold out until sometime on the 26th when Solyankin was killed. Shortly thereafter, Reinhardt’s Corps was able to advance, though sporadic fighting likely continued in isolated pockets even after the Heer declared the battle over.

By June 26, both of the Northwestern Front’s counter-strokes had failed. The northern sector of the front was shattered, and Army Group North was taking full advantage of the situation. The Red Army retreated in complete disorder. Any division that had not been broken or surrounded in the first days was rendered combat ineffective due to exhaustion. Kuznetsov received orders from the Stavka in Moscow to continue counterattacking and to drive northwest from Kaunas to cut off the advancing Panzers. This was impossible, especially since Kaunas had fallen on the 24th, where the Soviet 11th Army struggled to hold the line against the assault by the 2nd Infantry Corps. To address the situation, the other tank division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps was sent to the front around Kaunas in an attempt to repair the holes in the lines. This approach was fundamentally flawed, as had already been demonstrated in the north by the 12th Mechanized Corps. Piecemeal assaults by isolated tanks proved ineffective in making meaningful progress against the German army. Nonetheless, the division was deployed to the front, where they were promptly overrun and forced to retreat toward Vilnius. This retreat opened a dangerous gap in the front, cleaving the Northwestern Front in two as Manstein advanced and the other elements of Army Group North continued their relentless pursuit.

Kaunas had been taken so easily because of a local uprising. In June 1940, the Lithuanian government submitted to a Soviet ultimatum, leading to Lithuania's occupation, transformation into the Lithuanian SSR, and incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Soviets began implementing various Sovietization policies, including the nationalization of private property and mass arrests of political activists and others deemed "enemies of the people." These arrests targeted many prominent politicians, such as Aleksandras Stulginskis, Juozas Urbšys, Leonas Bistras, Antanas Merkys, Pranas Dovydaitis, Petras Klimas, government officials, military officers, and members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union. The Lithuanian Army was reorganized as the 29th Rifle Corps of the Red Army. Additionally, all non-communist cultural, religious, and political organizations were closed. The economic situation steadily worsened, and the standard of living declined. A year later, just a week before the uprising, approximately 17,000 Lithuanians, mainly from the intelligentsia were deported to Siberia with their families, where many perished due to inhumane living conditions. This deportation became the most significant precipitating event that incited popular support for the uprising and fostered a positive predisposition toward the German invasion. Those who escaped the deportations or arrests spontaneously organized into armed groups hidden in the forests, awaiting a broader uprising.

The Lithuanian Activist Front  or “LAF”, formed in the fall of 1940, seeking to re-establish Lithuanian independence. Founded by Kazys Škirpa in Berlin, the LAF sought to unify the Lithuanian resistance, organizing and conserving resources for the planned uprising against the Soviets. It acted as an umbrella organization, with many groups adopting the LAF name even if they were not directly connected to the LAF in Berlin. The LAF established its military-political headquarters in Vilnius and its organizational headquarters in Kaunas. However, communication and coordination between the centers in Berlin, Kaunas, and Vilnius were poor. The Vilnius headquarters suffered significantly from Soviet arrests, especially in early June 1941, and became largely defunct. Many arrested activists were executed in December 1941 in the Soviet Union.

In March 1941, the LAF in Berlin published a memorandum titled “Dear Enslaved Brothers”, providing instructions for preparing for the impending war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Insurgents were instructed to secure strategic locations such as prisons, railroads, bridges, communication hubs, and factories, protecting them against potential sabotage by the retreating Red Army. Meanwhile, the Central Headquarters was to organize a provisional government and declare independence. In April, a list of provisional government members was compiled, reserving the prime minister's post for Škirpa, with four ministers from Vilnius, six from Kaunas, and one from Berlin. The members were to represent a wide spectrum of pre-war political parties and claimed to represent the majority of the Lithuanian people. However, some have suggested that not all designated ministers were aware of their proposed appointments to the provisional government. On June 14, Nazi authorities in Berlin insisted that Škirpa and his activists refrain from forming any government or making public declarations without their prior approval. Škirpa agreed to this but had little control over the activists in Lithuania itself.

The uprising began in the early morning of the 22nd coinciding with the first day of the war. The LAF concentrated its main forces in Kaunas.  The LAF decided that its primary goal was not to engage the Soviets directly but to secure the city and declare independence. By the evening of the 22nd, the Lithuanians had taken control of the Presidential Palace, post office, telephone and telegraph stations, and radio stations. Control of the telephone systems allowed them to disconnect all known communist numbers, enabling communication without the need for passwords or codes. The Soviets had sabotaged the radio station, and repairs were done overnight from June 22 to 23, with medical students delivering spare parts in an ambulance. Despite concerns that not enough Lithuanian forces were guarding the radio tower, on the morning of June 23, Leonas Prapuolenis announced the declaration of Lithuanian independence and the list of members of the provisional government. The broadcast was repeated several times in Lithuanian, German, and French. On the morning of June 23, insurgents raided Soviet armories in Šančiai, Panemunė, and Vilijampolė. Now armed, the Lithuanians spread throughout the city, with special attention given to the Vilijampolė Bridge across the Neris River, as they expected the Germans to enter the city via this route. However, when the Lithuanians arrived, they found the bridge wired with explosives. Forty Soviet troops and three armored vehicles guarded the bridge, waiting for the right moment to detonate it. 

The retreating Soviets prematurely destroyed the bridges over the Nemunas River, forcing Red Army units in Suvalkija to bypass Kaunas, which likely saved the insurgents in that city. The Metalas factory became the headquarters for insurgents in Šančiai, who attempted to prevent Soviet soldiers from crossing the Neman River by boat or from constructing a pontoon bridge. In this fighting, about 100 insurgents were killed, and 100 Soviets were taken prisoner, along with a large cache of equipment, including three tanks that no one knew how to operate. Other groups secured police stations, shops, and warehouses, and attempted to re-establish order in the city. The insurgents hastily organized their own police and freed approximately 2,000 political prisoners. Colonel Piotr Ivanov, commander of the Red Army's 188th Rifle Division, reported to the 11th Army staff that during the retreat of his division through Kaunas, "local counterrevolutionaries from the shelters purposefully and severely fired upon the Red Army, causing heavy losses of soldiers and military equipment."

By June 24, 1941, the Red Army's tank units in Jonava were ordered to retake Kaunas. The insurgents radioed the Germans for assistance, and the Luftwaffe bombed the tank units, preventing them from reaching the city. This marked the first coordinated action between Lithuanian and German forces. Lieutenant Flohret and four privates, the first German scouts to enter Kaunas on June 24, found the city in friendly hands. The next day, the main German forces marched into the city without impediment, almost in a parade. On June 26, the German military command ordered the disbandment and disarmament of the rebel groups. Two days later, Lithuanian guards and patrols were relieved of their duties. 

After defeating the simultaneous attacks at Raseiniai and Tytuvenai, Reinhardt’s Corps pushed past the flank of the retreating 8th Army and positioned itself alongside the 56th Panzer Corps. They reached the Dvina River at Jekabpils, approximately ninety kilometers north of Daugavpils. It is unclear exactly when they arrived in force, but it was on or before June 30. Army Group North’s orders to halt at the Dvina also applied to Reinhardt’s Panzers. The Panzer commanders fiercely protested this frustrating halt, but Field Marshal Reinhardt stood his ground. He believed that the strategic situation was not as clear-cut as he desired and felt that his lengthening right flank was a vulnerability that needed to be addressed. After all, the Soviet forces in the area had not been encircled; they had merely retreated, still posing a threat from Vilnius, even in their weakened state. Busch’s 16th Army was still engaged in combat and making its way to the Dvina, facing the longest and most arduous route of Army Group North, which was evident in their slow advance. In contrast, the 18th Army was advancing rapidly through Latvia and was only a few kilometers from Riga.

The Soviet situation was grim. The Northwestern Front was now divided into two unequal halves, with few prepared defenses available for the remaining forces. The tank divisions had been decimated, and the logistics of the armies had been ravaged by the Luftwaffe and the rapidly changing character of the front lines. Kuznetsov faced serious pressure from Stavka to repair the situation. Partially due to their poor understanding of the conditions on the ground, they continued to order massive counter-attacks that were impossible to execute. They were unaware that some of the units they were ordering had ceased to exist. The first week of the war had started with disaster, and the situation did not improve. Despite many examples of personal bravery, determined resistance, and the battle-tested capabilities of the Red Army’s superior tanks, the Northwestern Front had been pushed back from its prepared defenses, was in open retreat, and was unable to maintain a coherent line of defense. Einsatzgruppen men marched into Kaunas alongside the German Army on June 24. Almost immediately, a pogrom was initiated by the Einsatzgruppen. Most of the killings in the first days were carried out by locals who were sanctioned by the Nazis. The organized murder began within days of the occupation and would not cease for years.

Starting on June 25, Nazi-organized units attacked Jewish civilians in Slobodka, Vilijampolė, a Jewish suburb of Kaunas that was home to the world-famous Slabodka yeshiva. According to Rabbi Ephraim Oshry, while Germans were present on the bridge to Slobodka, it was Lithuanian volunteers who perpetrated the murders of the Jews. The rabbi of Slobodka, Rav Zalman Osovsky, was bound to a chair; "his head was laid upon an open volume of gemora a volume of the Talmud, and they sawed his head off." Following this, both his wife and son were also murdered. His head was displayed in a window of their residence, bearing a sign that read: "This is what we'll do to all the Jews." As of June 28, 1941, Nazi official Walter Stahlecker reported that 3,800 people had been killed in Kaunas and a further 1,200 in surrounding towns. Karl Jaeger, the Nazi commander of the mobile killing squad Einsatzkommando 3, wrote on December 1, 1941, that Nazis and Lithuanian partisans had killed 7,800 Jews in Kovno between June 24 and July 6, 1941. Jaeger recorded that 4,000 of those killed were victims of Lithuanian partisans alone.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Wehrmacht, driven by Nazi ideology, achieved early victories but soon faced fierce resistance and logistical challenges in harsh terrain. As optimism waned, the Soviet army began mounting counterattacks, demonstrating surprising resilience. Amid global tensions, Finland leveraged the chaos, seizing control in Kaunas alongside advancing German troops. However, the brutality escalated with atrocities against Jews, marking the grim realities of war.

Last time we spoke about the myth of the German Blitzkrieg. As summer approached in 1941, Hitler readied his forces for Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union aimed at securing rapid victory. Despite Stalin's restructured Red Army, both sides faced logistical challenges. Hitler's goal was to annihilate the Red Army, while his generals prioritized capturing Moscow, leading to debates and miscommunication. The Wehrmacht’s initial successes relied more on luck and enemy blunders than revolutionary tactics like Blitzkrieg, a concept popularized after the war by German generals seeking to explain their swift victories in France. However, these tactics were not as groundbreaking as portrayed; they stemmed from long-standing principles of maneuverability. As the campaign progressed, the reality of a harsh Eastern Front began to set in, casting doubt among German leaders about their ability to sustain their rapid advances amidst logistical nightmares, foreshadowing the monumental struggles that lay ahead.

This episode is: Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Its finally time to begin the Eastern Front. For the last few weeks we went through 11 prelude episodes and 1 special, but the time has come for Germany to unleash Operation Barbarossa. But before we begin I have to mention a few things going forward. We are now embarking on an incredible journey through the vast and complex campaigns of the Eastern Front, a scale that is truly monumental. While the distances involved might remind some of our Pacific War series, the nature of these land campaigns means that they engaged far more troops. Millions of soldiers from both sides were mobilized, organized into hundreds of divisions and thousands of regiments, creating a colossal theatre of war. Given the immense scale, it's important to note that we cannot possibly cover every movement of every unit within the confines of the youtube episode format, let alone this humble podcast. I am going to do my best to give you the macro and micro picture of this colossal event. Ironically the scope of it begins on a huge scale as I am sure most of you know, Barbarossa is simply insane. 

The soldiers of the Heer remained largely unaware of Operation Barbarossa until the late afternoon of June 21st. Only then did they receive the shocking news through a proclamation from Adolf Hitler, announcing that the long-anticipated conflict would soon begin. For many of these soldiers, this revelation was breathtaking, yet it was met with a surprising sense of confidence rather than fear. Most soldiers had anticipated that such a day might eventually come, and their response was characterized by a grim determination. They firmly believed in the ideological righteousness of their impending invasion, convinced that their mission was justified and necessary. With the start time for the operation looming just a few hours away, sometimes as little as six hours after they had received Hitler's message, they swiftly set to work preparing themselves for the challenge ahead. In this charged atmosphere, there was little room for doubt. The soldiers focused on their tasks, their minds geared towards executing the orders that would soon propel them into one of history's largest military engagements. With the weight of their convictions behind them, they were ready to embark on a campaign that would forever alter the course of the war.

Adolf Hitler was convinced that a series of decisive defeats would lead to the collapse of Joseph Stalin's government. He expressed this belief to General Alfred Jodl, stating, "We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down." This mindset reflected a broader expectation among many high-ranking officials within the German military, who shared the belief that a swift and overwhelming victory was imminent. Field Marshal Paul von Kleist later reminisced about this prevailing sentiment in a conversation with Basil Liddell Hart after the war. He remarked, "Our hopes of victory were largely predicated on the assumption that the invasion would trigger a political upheaval in Russia. There was an excessive expectation that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suffered significant defeats." This optimism was further nurtured by Hitler's political advisers, who painted an overly simplistic picture of the political landscape in the Soviet Union. Von Kleist acknowledged that, as soldiers, they lacked sufficient understanding of the intricate political dynamics at play to challenge these assumptions. This misplaced confidence in a quick resolution would ultimately prove to be a critical misjudgment as the campaign unfolded and the realities of the Eastern Front became starkly evident.

Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was notably opposed to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. He articulated his stance with striking clarity, stating, "I can summarize my opinion on a German-Russian conflict in one sentence: if every burned-out Russian city were as valuable to us as a sunk English battleship, I would support a German-Russian war this summer. However, I believe we can only defeat Russia militarily, but such a conflict would ultimately be detrimental to us economically." Ribbentrop acknowledged the allure of delivering a decisive blow to the Communist system, suggesting that there was a certain logic in allowing the continent of Europe and Asia to unite against the Anglo-Saxon powers and their allies. Yet, he emphasized one critical point: "The decisive factor is whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England." He expressed concern that a German attack on Russia would actually bolster English morale, framing it as an indication of German doubt in the success of the war against England. According to Ribbentrop, this military venture would not only signal that the conflict would persist for a longer duration but could also inadvertently prolong it. By diverting attention and resources toward the Eastern Front, Germany risked undermining its campaign against Britain, thereby complicating an already challenging war effort.

General Walter Warlimont issued a chilling order to all military commanders in the German Army regarding the planned occupation of the Soviet Union. The directive outlined several ruthless measures aimed at eradicating any political opposition. The key points included: Liquidation of Political Officials: The order explicitly stated that all political officials and leaders were to be eliminated. This directive underscored the Nazi regime’s determination to dismantle any structures of Soviet authority and suppress potential resistance. Disciplinary Authority: In cases where political officials were captured by German troops, an officer with the authority to impose disciplinary punishment would decide whether the individual should be liquidated. The mere fact that a person was identified as a political official was sufficient justification for this deadly decision. Treatment of Political Leaders: The order also specified that political leaders within the Soviet armed forces (Red Army) would not be recognized as prisoners of war. Rather, they were to be executed at the earliest opportunity, specifically stating that such actions should occur in prisoner-of-war transit camps at the latest. This directive revealed the brutal approach taken by the German military against perceived enemies, reflecting a broader strategy of annihilation aimed at consolidating control over the occupied territories and eliminating any political influence that could challenge Nazi authority.

The attack commenced with the thunderous roar of artillery fire just after 0300 hours. As dawn began to break in the northern regions of the Soviet Union, the sound of the opening salvos shattered the early morning calm. Above, Luftwaffe bombers streaked across the sky, their engines shrieking as they flew toward crucial targets, including ammunition depots, military headquarters, and other strategic installations. At the tactical level, the Soviet military was caught entirely off guard. A crucial lack of communication meant that no alert had been issued to front-line troops, leaving them unprepared for the onslaught. Key infrastructure was left defenseless; bridges remained unguarded, and artillery positions were unmanned, creating a significant vulnerability that the German forces were poised to exploit. In addition, many Soviet aircraft stood idle on tarmacs, completely unprepared for action as the attack unfolded. This lack of readiness would have dire consequences for the Soviet response, as the Wehrmacht took swift advantage of the element of surprise, launching a fierce assault that would set the tone for the devastating campaign that lay ahead.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Leeb's Army Group North was tasked with a crucial mission, with its area of operations extending from the Baltic port city of Memel in the northwest to the vicinity of Suwalki in the south. The left flank of this vast formation was commanded by Colonel General Georg Kuechler, who oversaw the 18th Army. As the divisions of the 18th Army advanced across the border, they did so with a surprising lack of fanfare. This muted initiation was a direct consequence of the German high command's strategy, which centered heavy artillery preparations primarily in areas opposite the advancing Panzer groups, diverting attention from Kuechler's forces. Kuechler's command comprised six infantry divisions, stretched across a front of approximately one hundred kilometers, with an additional division held in reserve for contingency operations. In stark contrast, the opposing Red Army mustered only three Rifle divisions organized into two corps. Notably, the 10th Rifle Division bore the brunt of the assault, holding a significant stretch of nearly eighty kilometers of the front that the 18th Army was targeting. By midday on the first day of the offensive, Kuechler was pleased to report that his troops had achieved advances ranging from eight to ten kilometers along the entire front. This progress was particularly noteworthy given that many forward Soviet units appeared to be out of position, contrary to the expectations set by the OKH. Although the fighting was fierce in several border towns, overall resistance was assessed as light, a fact that deviated from the German command’s anticipations of a more robust Soviet defense. 

Despite this relative ease, substantial victories remained elusive across most sectors. Nevertheless, one unit stood out amid the prevailing conditions: the independent 291st Infantry Division, which was rapidly advancing through disarrayed Soviet positions. By the end of the first day, this division had surged nearly 65 kilometers into enemy territory, effectively traversing the vast Lithuanian countryside before securing a strategic bridgehead into Latvia. The remaining five divisions of the 18th Army, the 1st, 11th, 21st, 61st, and 217th Infantry, also made commendable progress as the day drew to a close. While they encountered sporadic resistance and engaged in tough fighting in certain locations, the overall lack of determined opposition allowed them to maintain momentum. This initial success set the stage for further operations in the coming days, as Kuechler’s forces aimed to exploit the disarray within the Soviet ranks.

On the right flank of the 18th Army was the 4th Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Ernst von Hoepner. Hoepner played a critical role in the campaign to come. His personal resistance to Hitler’s orders would end his career however and eventually his life later in the war. He orchestrated the operations of 602 tanks distributed among 3 panzer divisions, which were organized under the command of two Corps leaders: General Erich von Manstein, at the helm of the 56th Panzer Corps, and General Reinhardt, who directed the 41st Panzer Corps. These men both would go on to much higher commands later in the war. Manstein's singular objective was to drive his forces toward the critical bridge over the Dubyssa River at Ariogala, a strategic point essential for the continued advance into Soviet territory. If this bridge was destroyed before it could be secured, Army Group North would be delayed by weeks, if not months. The terrain was especially hard to traverse, and this bridge was one of the only passages fit for tanks over the Dubyssa river and its gorges.

The lead element of Manstein’s offensive was Major General Brandenberger’s 8th Panzer Division. As they approached the town of Girdziai, positioned a mere 13 kilometers from the border, they encountered fierce resistance from the Soviet 125th Rifle Division. The defenses around Girdziai were formidable, prompting German commanders to attempt a tactical bypass of the town. However, despite the opposition, the relentless advance of the German Panzers continued. By late evening, the 56th Panzer Corps came to a halt for the day after an impressive advance. The Corps had successfully mobilized troops and tanks over a distance of 92 kilometers from its starting point, achieving all of its primary objectives. Girdziai, though it had temporarily thwarted the advance of major elements, ultimately succumbed in the late afternoon, allowing Manstein’s forces to press onward. Meanwhile, the 41st Panzer Corps operated on the left flank of the Panzer Group, engaged in its own fierce battles. As they pressed forward, German troops encountered staunch resistance from the Red Army, which fought tenaciously in the densely wooded areas lining the attack route. Despite their efforts, Reinhardt’s Corps could not secure all of its planned objectives for the day, falling short of the essential crossings at Raseinai. The challenges faced in these wooded terrains highlighted the determined resistance of the Soviet forces and the obstacles that lay ahead for the advancing Panzers.

On the southern flank of Army Group North was the 16th Army, commanded by Colonel General Busch. Busch was an ardent supporter of Hitler, using this connection to get himself out of trouble and into higher positions throughout the war. Tasked with securing a front measuring 100 kilometers, the 16th Army played a pivotal role in repelling the Soviet 16th Rifle Corps to safeguard the left flank of the advancing Panzers. At the outset of the offensive, the Soviets began to retreat in a state of disarray, reflecting the initial effectiveness of the German strategy. However, as the day wore on, communication became increasingly unreliable, with reports indicating that contact was lost with some subordinate units of the 16th Rifle Corps. As the day progressed, German forces found that resistance from the Soviet troops was stiffening. Small unit commanders within the Wehrmacht reported being engaged by Soviet forces emerging from areas that had been bypassed during the advance. This situation created a sense of uncertainty, as secure positions were elusive, and the Heer soon discovered that this reality was pervasive throughout the Soviet Union. If you were to look at a map of operation barbarossa it would fill you mind with overwhelmed German avances, but this does not necessarily reflect the reality. The Germans struggled for the entirety of their occupation of the Soviet Union to properly secure and make safe any rear area. Organized Partisans ensured that nowhere was safe for the invaders. This compared with the relatively docile occupied France and the Low Countries, where serious resistance would not become a problem until much later in the war. 

Particularly in this sector, small bands of Red Army soldiers demonstrated remarkable resolve and combat skill, often catching their German adversaries off guard with sudden counterattacks. It was evident to all involved that this campaign would not unfold as smoothly as the blitzkrieg in France had just a year prior. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the 16th Army had achieved tangible success. Its divisions made better-than-expected progress in several areas, and despite the challenges faced, they had not encountered significant delays in their advance. The day’s outcomes bolstered the morale of the German troops, setting a hopeful tone for the ongoing operations, even as the specter of a determined enemy loomed ever larger. Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was designated as the primary effort of the entire campaign. As such, it commanded the widest front and the most extensive resources. Bock’s lines stretched from Suwalki in the north to the notorious Pripyat Marshes in the south. The left flank of this formidable advance was anchored by General Hermann Hoth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group. As the advance commenced, Bock’s forces were preceded by a considerable artillery barrage, complemented by Luftwaffe close air support that relentlessly bombarded positions held by the Soviet 11th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kirill Morozov. Notably, Morozov had strategically positioned his forces slightly behind the border, allowing for some protection against being completely overrun during this initial onslaught. Even so, parts of the 57th Panzer Corps managed a remarkable advance of up to 70 kilometers on that first day. Hoth’s command also included two infantry corps: the 5th and 6th Corps. These formations, moving at a slower pace than their armored counterparts, did not cross the border until 04:00 hours. Nevertheless, they managed to foot march an impressive 40 kilometers before halting for the day, enduring some level of combat during their progress. Another of Hoth’s Panzer Corps, the 39th, advanced on the left flank, closest to the dividing line of the Army Group. With a front only 20 kilometers wide, this corps was densely packed and faced little opposition, encountering only fierce house-to-house fighting in a small village near the border. As pertaining to General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer group’s war diary after completing the first day of Operation Barbarossa, “Where the enemy appears he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. The struggle, as a result, will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign”. By 09:40 hours, aerial reconnaissance reported significant numbers of unidentified Red Army soldiers withdrawing toward the Neman River, seemingly attempting to regroup and fortify their defensive lines.

Capitalizing on this retreat, the 7th Panzer Division raced toward the crossings at the town of Alytus. The 7th Panzer Division already had some standing as one of the best divisions in the Heer. It had been commanded in France by then Major General Rommel, who built his reputation first in the daring assaults after the breakout of the Panzers near Sedan. By 12:45 hours, the German forces had secured the bridges, providing a vital foothold. However, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, the commander of the Soviet Northwestern Front, had other plans. He dispatched his 5th Tank Division to disrupt the German advance and push the Panzers back over the Neman River. The first elements to arrive were 44 T-34 tanks, which, facing only 20 German tanks, seemed poised to turn the tide. This should have spelled doom for the German advance; however, the ineptitude of the inexperienced Soviet tank crews, combined with timely Luftwaffe air support, meant that the T-34s were effectively neutralized in place. This encounter was a total victory for the Wehrmacht. The presence of the superior Soviet tanks was barely noticed at the highest levels of the Heer’s command, but soldiers who had encountered them first hand were shaken. One soldier recounted how a T-34 had absorbed dozens of anti-tank rounds without effect. This was a portent of things to come, though it would be weeks before the highest levels of the Heer took notice of the superior Soviet tanks. While this engagement delayed the advance by several hours, it cost the 7th Panzer Division a not insignificant portion of its combat strength. Ultimately, by the end of the day, the 39th Panzer Corps had successfully secured its bridgehead across the Neman River and began to drive a wedge between the Soviet Northwestern and Western Front commands. This advancement set the stage for the anticipated encirclement of the Western Front. Commanders on both sides recognized the significance of the growing gap and directed their best efforts toward sealing it, knowing that the outcome of this maneuver might determine the success of the campaign.

Next in line was the 9th Army, commanded by Colonel General Strauss. His forces were deployed along a formidable front spanning 200 kilometers. At 03:00 hours, Strauss’s troops crossed the line in conjunction with the rest of the front. His primary focus was on the left flank, where 3 of his divisions advanced from Suwalki toward Grodno. They soon found themselves engaged in fierce combat against the Soviet 29th Tank Division of the 3rd Army, which mounted a determined resistance. This sector proved to be no easy battleground. Elements of the 9th Army would become some of the first German troops to encounter the Soviet heavy KV-1 and medium T-34 tanks, although only 2 KV-1s and 26 T-34s were present during this initial engagement. The KV-1 and T-34 tanks had not been produced in nearly the same numbers as the lighter tanks of the Red Army, and those that had been produced had not been concentrated. It was not uncommon to have 1 T-34 for every ten lighter tanks, like the T-37 or T-26.

Details about the confrontation remain scarce, but it appears that these Soviet tanks were largely ineffective in their debut against the well-trained Heer. However, this would not hold true in future encounters, as the Soviets would quickly adapt to the challenges presented by the German forces. Despite the fierce opposition, the 9th Army made significant progress, fighting their way to the outskirts of Grodno. However, the city itself would not fall until the following day. At that time, Lieutenant General Vasily Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet 3rd Army, which was headquartered in Grodno. By the close of the day, Kuznetsov found himself in a perilous situation, facing the real threat of encirclement. As the day unfolded, his superiors struggled to grasp the true extent of his predicament, a situation that was not uncommon on this day or in the days that followed. German special forces operating in the region had successfully disrupted communication lines, further complicating the command and coordination of Soviet forces. This disruption would continue to plague the Stavka (the Soviet high command) throughout the campaign, as it sought to counter the rapid and aggressive maneuvers of the Wehrmacht. By the end of the day, the 9th Army had not only advanced along their entire front but also achieved the majority of their first-day objectives. This success enhanced the overall momentum of the German offensive and underscored the effectiveness of their strategic planning in the early stages of the campaign.

On the right flank of Strauss’s army was Field Marshal Heinz Guderian’s 4th Army, commanding a front that measured 100 kilometers. Despite having a significant area of responsibility, this was still only half the size of the 9th Army’s front. Unlike many of the other infantry armies engaged in the offensive, Kluge’s assault was preceded by a substantial artillery and aerial bombardment, designed to soften enemy defenses and pave the way for the main offensive. The Army’s assault engineers had to push across the Bug River in order to clear the border area and build bridges for the oncoming main body of troops. This went off without a hitch. By 12:30 hours. However, once across the river, the 9th Army began to encounter more serious resistance from the Soviet forces. This unexpected opposition slowed the German operations somewhat, as troops learned, just like their comrades in other sectors on this day, that the bypassed Soviet forces were not surrendering without a fight. The Red Army soldiers displayed remarkable tenacity, often engaging in fierce resistance even when cut off, a contrast to the experiences of the Heer during their previous campaigns in the West. This determined defense by the Soviets took the German soldiers by surprise, challenging their expectations and underscoring the resilience of the Red Army in this early phase of the Eastern Front conflict. As the day progressed, the 4th Army, although facing delays, continued to adapt to the evolving situation. The initial advantage of surprise began to erode as the fierce fighting tested the mettle and resolve of Kluge's troops, indicating that the campaign in the East would demand more from them than the swift victories of their past engagements in Western Europe.

Despite the intense fighting, the Soviet Western Front, commanded by General of the Army Pavlov, was disintegrating under the relentless pressure of the German advance. The most pressing issue facing Pavlov was the command and control of his armies. He struggled to establish communication with the headquarters of several divisions, leaving them unable to effectively command their subordinate units. The day before Operation Barbarossa commenced, Pavlov had personally petitioned Joseph Stalin for permission to mobilize his forces, but his request was summarily denied. This denial would prove catastrophic for the Red Army, severely impacting their ability to mount a cohesive defense. Nowhere was this lack of preparedness more evident than in the sectors facing Army Group Center. As the first day of battle drew to a close, Soviet divisions found themselves scattered and ill-equipped. Many units possessed little more than rudimentary plans to resist the impending German assault, demonstrating a severe lack of coordination and resources. In this chaotic environment, the 4th Army made only limited progress, advancing an average of 10 to 30 kilometers along the front. Among the Soviet formations, it was the 263rd Infantry Division that achieved the greatest success on this day, managing to secure the town of Bryansk. However, this modest gain was overshadowed by the overall disarray of the Soviet forces, highlighting the dire situation that Pavlov faced as the campaign unfolded. The inadequate response to the German offensive illustrated the broader challenges that the Red Army would need to overcome in the days to come, as they grappled with both internal disorganization and external aggression.

Anchoring the right flank of Army Group Center was Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, which operated along a front of 100 kilometers. Guderian is another of the various Generals who would go on to play an outsized role in the outcome of the war. His habit of disobeying direct orders from even the highest of authorities would get him in trouble as the war progressed, but he managed to get himself in and out of trouble due to his willingness to play coy with Hitler. The OKH and Army Group Center ensured that Guderian's Panzers were among the most heavily supported forces in the entire theater, receiving the highest priority for Luftwaffe assets and being assigned the bulk of the Army Group’s dedicated formations. These dedicated formations included assault guns battalions, artillery batteries, anti-tank and flamethrower support among others. As the assault commenced on the morning of June 22, 1941, the 12th Infantry Corps launched an attack to encircle the fortress at Brest. The Brest fortress was exceptionally unprepared for the assault and many of the defenders fled in the earliest hours. However, those that stayed behind put up a heroic defense of the citadel that lasted until at least June 30, 1941. In 1965 it was memorialized as a “Hero Fortress” , a unique decoration in Soviet History. Its individual equivalent is the “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Twelve cities were eventually decorated as “Hero City” as well for various roles in the war. The fortifications were manned by approximately 9,000 soldiers from various Soviet units who fought tenaciously and refused to surrender. 

The 2nd Panzer Group, operating 190 kilometers to the south of Hoth, encountered a considerably more challenging advance. While some bridges across the Bug River, acting as the German-Soviet border, were successfully seized during the initial German assault, it would require the German Army’s assault engineer teams to figure out how to cross the Bug River for not just infantry but also heavy vehicles and Panzers. Compounding the difficulties, General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen, commander of the 47th Panzer Corps, which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized Division, and the 167th Infantry Division, reported significant challenges in crossing the captured bridges. The approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic, severely hindering the movement of troops and equipment. This necessitated the construction of pontoon bridges, causing delays in their penetration. However, by midday, at least nine bridges were operational. To expedite the crossing, the 18th Panzer Division utilized 80 specially outfitted Panzer III and IV tanks to ford the Bug. These were known as Teuchpanzers. They had originally been designed for the abandoned Operation Sealion. These special amphibious conversions were viewed with some suspicion by the men that used them. However, they worked perfectly on this day. They were equipped much like modern fording capable tanks. The tanks were sealed against any water inflow and set up with a large air breather tube. These tanks were instrumental in defending the expanding bridgehead as engineers continued their work on the pontoon bridges.

Before noon, the 47th Panzer Corps successfully crossed the Lesna River, approximately 10 kilometers beyond the city of Brest-Litovsk, moving further into Soviet territory. To the right of the 12th Infantry Corps was the 24th Panzer Corps, whose main effort was aimed at advancing as far as possible toward Minsk, located more than 300 kilometers away. Although it was not anticipated that they would reach the city before the end of the first week, it was vital to push toward Minsk quickly to achieve the grand encirclement intended by Adolf Hitler. Standing in their way was Lieutenant General Korobkov’s 4th Army. Late in the day, the 22nd Tank Division was committed to the fight. However, German air superiority sealed the fate of the Soviet tank columns, with the Wehrmacht’s coordination in the field proving overwhelming for the inexperienced and unprepared Red Army troops. By the end of the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the 47th and 24th Panzer Corps had advanced approximately 20 kilometers. While this was not as spectacular as the gains achieved in other areas of the front, it was notable given the stiff resistance they encountered and the serious terrain obstacles they had to overcome. This initial movement set the stage for further advances in the coming days as the German forces continued to push into Soviet territory. 

Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, was divided into two halves by the Carpathian Mountains. The southern sector, situated along the Prut River in Romania, would not initiate offensive operations until July 2. Therefore, the forces stationed there, including the German 11th Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, remained passive during the first week of Operation Barbarossa and will not be covered this week. In contrast, the northern sector held the majority of the Army Group’s combat power. On its northern flank was the 6th Army, led by Field Marshal Friedrich Reichenau. Half of the divisions within the army were designated to support the 1st Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Hermann Kleist. These armored forces moved across the border in coordination with the rest of the front and engaged in fierce combat against Soviet positions fortified by the 15th Rifle Corps.

The northernmost units, particularly the 44th Infantry Corps, faced exceptionally stiff resistance from well-prepared Soviet defenders. As the day progressed, they endured hundreds of casualties and managed only an average advance of 15 kilometers under heavy enemy fire. In the southern portion of the front, the 17th Infantry Corps engaged in combat as well, but initially encountered far less resistance compared to the 44th Infantry Corps. However, this relative calm changed dramatically before midday as soldiers from the 15th Rifle Corps fought desperately to defend their bunkers. Even after German forces believed many of the bunkers had been cleared, Soviet defenders continued to mount tenacious resistance, demonstrating their determination to hold their positions. This fierce fighting persisted until the day's end. Despite the challenges, elements of the 6th Army were able to advance approximately 15 kilometers beyond the border in some sectors. This progress, while limited in comparison to the advances in other sections of the front, showcased the tenacity of both sides and set the stage for the ensuing battles as the campaign unfolded.

The supporting infantry of the 1st Panzer Group relentlessly battered the Soviet bunkers along the Bug River. By midday, a small gap had been opened, allowing Colonel General Hermann Kleist’s Panzers to spring into action and begin their assault. However, the advance was soon hampered by bunkers that had been accidentally bypassed by the infantry in front of them, leading to fierce fighting and mounting casualties. As a result of these challenges, only one of the five Panzer divisions within the 1st Panzer Group managed to cross the border on the first day: the 11th Panzer Division, commanded by Major General Crüwell. This division advanced a relatively modest distance of 25 kilometers, but given the circumstances, it represented a significant gain for the German southern front on the first day of Operation Barbarossa. While the Red Army was unprepared for the vast offensive along the entire front, the defenses along the Bug River had one advantage: Soviet forces were able to resist from prepared defensive positions. The armies defending this region possessed more tanks than anywhere else on the Eastern Front. Although these tanks were employed with a level of incompetence, they still managed to score some hits against the advancing German forces. Despite the initial setbacks, it became clear that the Soviet defenders would continue to provide resistance in the days to come, using their fortifications and remaining armored assets to contest the German advance along the Bug. The fighting in this sector would prove to be a harbinger of the challenges that awaited both sides as the campaign unfolded. Theories emerged that the Soviet Union was seeking to preemptively attack Romania or Romania and Germany together are unfounded in reality. The Red Army was in the middle of a massive reorganization that rendered it incapable of offensive action. Colonel Glantz, considered by many to be the foremost expert on the subject of the Eastern Front, has definitely put the topic to bed in his 1998 book, Stumbling Colossus. 

The first day of Operation Barbarossa was a definitive success, with many of the objectives for the initial assault not only met but exceeded. Prior to the launch of the offensive that morning, numerous leaders within the Wehrmacht had expressed concerns that while strategic surprise was achievable, tactical surprise would be unlikely. However, by the end of the day, these apprehensions had proven completely unfounded. The Germans had achieved an unprecedented level of tactical and strategic surprise, an accomplishment that seemed fantastical just weeks prior. This successful outcome marked the latest in a series of remarkable victories that contributed to the growing legend of the Wehrmacht. Following their swift conquests in Poland, France, and the Low Countries, the rapid gains in the Soviet Union further solidified their reputation as an unstoppable military machine. The intoxicating success of the first day fueled unbridled optimism among many of the highest-ranking leaders, particularly Adolf Hitler. This victory allowed them to indulge in their expectations for the coming days of Operation Barbarossa, as it seemed that another of Hitler’s audacious gambles had paid off. The mood was buoyant, with visions of further rapid advancements and ultimate victory overshadowing any lingering doubts about the challenges that lay ahead.

However, there was a darker side to the first day of Operation Barbarossa. Beneath the surface of the victories celebrated in the opening hours, the average German soldier was quickly learning that the Red Army was not composed of mere conscripts deemed as "Untermensch" with no will to fight. Instead, they encountered determined and cunning professional soldiers who displayed remarkable courage and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. Complicating the narrative of victory, logistics soon proved to be a significant issue for the Wehrmacht. Some of Hoth’s Panzers had run out of fuel during the fighting, and Kluge’s men discovered that the roads of the Soviet Union were a far cry from those of France. Throughout Army Group Center, units found that what had been marked as proper roads on their maps were, in reality, little more than sandy trails carved through dense forests. This lack of reliable infrastructure meant that trucks often became mired in the terrain, necessitating the use of manpower and horses to pull them free. The inefficiency of these tracks posed further challenges, as tanks consumed significantly more fuel when traversing such rough terrain. Additionally, the roads were seldom wide enough to accommodate two-way traffic, complicating the routing of troops and supplies. For many of the junior officers and soldiers engaged in the combat, it became increasingly evident that there would be no easy days on the Eastern Front. The initial successes had come at a high cost, and the harsh reality of the campaign loomed large, hinting at the grueling challenges that lay ahead.

Stalin and his command staff were taken aback by the swiftness and brutality of the German invasion. For days, if not weeks, rumors had been swirling in the capital regarding a potential attack. Just hours before the Germans launched their offensive, Stalin had personally ordered his men not to mobilize, fearing that such a move might provoke Hitler. Perhaps, reminiscing about the events of September 1939, he hoped that a last-minute diplomatic deal could be struck to avert war. He was gravely mistaken.

 

Hitler was resolute in his plans for invasion, driven by a necessity rooted in his ideological beliefs. This madness propelled him to commence the largest military campaign in history, one that would ultimately be doomed to fail. As the first few hours of the invasion unfolded, Stalin’s high command began to reassess their strategy and resolve to resist the onslaught. They were determined not to allow the Red Army to collapse without a fight. Under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Soviet Generals swiftly issued orders for immediate counter-attacks while simultaneously planning larger counter-offensives for the days ahead. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Thus on June 22 of 1941, Hitler has unleashed Operation Barbarossa, one of the largest military operations of all time. German soldiers, fueled by Nazi ideology, prepared with grim determination as they received orders just hours before the assault. The attack began with artillery and air raids at dawn, catching the Soviets off guard. Initial successes marked the first day, with German forces advancing deep into enemy territory, despite facing unexpected resistance. However, the harsh realities of the Eastern Front, including logistical challenges and resilient Soviet defenders, foreshadowed a grueling campaign ahead, one that would test the Wehrmacht's might like never before.

Last time we spoke about the Hitler’s decision to go to war. As June 1941 approached, Hitler prepared for Operation Barbarossa, an audacious plan to invade the Soviet Union before decisively defeating Britain. Stalin, sensing danger after the Winter War, had restructured the Red Army, but both sides were plagued by logistical woes. Hitler's directive emphasized destroying the Red Army, while his generals, led by Halder, argued for capturing Moscow first. Ignoring Soviet warnings, the Wehrmacht faced weakened armored divisions and critical supply shortages, stemming from a lack of standardized equipment and logistical planning. As the campaign unfolded, divisions became diluted, and the vastness of the front posed significant challenges. War games conducted by Paulus revealed critical insights about Soviet reinforcement capacities, indicating that rapid mobilization could counter German advances. The audacity of the invasion clashed with the grim reality of Nazi genocide plans, shaping a conflict that would become one of history's darkest chapters. Would this confrontation lead to Hitler's ruin, or could he outmaneuver his greatest rival?

This Special episode is: the Development of Blitzkrieg

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Yes, this week we actually have a special episode, just before we dive into Operation Barbarossa! What a horrible way to tease you all I know. 

Now for today we are delving into a concept that has shaped our understanding of World War II, Blitzkrieg. When we hear the term, vivid images may come to mind: daring Panzer commanders leading their troops from the turrets of their tanks, crashing through unsuspecting Allied soldiers, with the ominous screech of Stukas overhead and infantry riding behind in half-tracks. However, these depictions are more myth than reality, largely crafted through decades of propaganda. Much of this narrative was constructed after the war by none other than the Panzer generals themselves. Figures like Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian played pivotal roles in this movement, striving to cultivate an image of a glorious Wehrmacht, one that was supposedly only thwarted by the stubbornness of the mad dictator, Adolf Hitler. This self-serving imagery not only enhanced their own reputations but also cast a shadow over the complex realities of the war.

Let’s take a closer look at what people actually mean when they use the term Blitzkrieg. Generally, it refers to German military operations conducted from 1939 to 1941. At its core, Blitzkrieg is often characterized by the speed and efficiency with which these operations were executed, hence, the term translates to “lightning war.” A prime example of this concept can be seen in the Battle for France in 1940. In that campaign, German forces dealt a staggering blow to the French and British armies in a matter of days, nearly knocking them out of the war. The initial phase of the Battle of France was nothing short of catastrophic, as the British Expeditionary Force or “BEF” and the French Army were on the verge of annihilation. However, it’s crucial to note that this rapid offensive did not mark the end of hostilities in France. In fact, serious fighting continued for another three weeks following the evacuation at Dunkirk. While the Battle of France concluded relatively quickly, around six weeks total, the German tactics were not as decisive as they were often portrayed. For comparison, let’s look back at the Schlieffen Plan from 1914, which reached its climax in front of Paris within four weeks. The Schlieffen Plan was Germany’s military strategy in the early 20th century, designed to avoid a two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. Conceived by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905, the plan aimed for a rapid German victory over France by invading through neutral Belgium and encircling Paris from the north. Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take longer to mobilize its vast army, giving Germany time to defeat France quickly and then redirect forces to the Eastern Front. The plan relied heavily on speed, coordination, and violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war when Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. In execution, the plan faltered. The right wing of the German army, intended to sweep through Belgium and northern France, was weakened to reinforce the left, slowing momentum. Belgium’s resistance, logistical problems, and the unexpectedly fast Russian mobilization forced Germany to divert troops eastward earlier than planned. By September 1914, German forces were halted at the First Battle of the Marne. 

The Germans were bogged down at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical issues, and effective Allied resistance. The German army, following the Schlieffen Plan, had advanced rapidly through Belgium and northern France, aiming to encircle Paris and force a quick French surrender. However, the rapid advance stretched their supply lines thin, leaving troops exhausted and short on food, ammunition, and reinforcements. Crucially, German command weakened the right flank, the part of the army responsible for encircling Paris, to reinforce other sectors, undermining the original plan. As German armies moved south of the Marne River, a significant gap opened between the First and Second Armies. Allied forces, particularly the French under General Joffre and the British Expeditionary Force, identified and exploited this vulnerability. The French famously used Parisian taxis to rush reinforcements to the front, helping launch a strong counterattack. Fearing encirclement and unable to maintain their offensive, German commanders ordered a retreat to more defensible positions. This retreat marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the end of mobile warfare on the Western Front. The armies dug in, and what followed was a prolonged, grinding stalemate marked by trench warfare.

In 1940, however, there was no such miracle for the French. This so-called Blitzkrieg had not achieved a swift and definitive victory; instead, it revealed multiple underlying issues that contributed to France's downfall. There were numerous reasons behind the collapse of the French forces, and their performance was shockingly poor. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, very few in the Allied world were willing to confront the uncomfortable truth that the failures of France and Britain played a significant role in this unexpected outcome. It was far easier to believe that the Germans had created something revolutionary, a unique approach to warfare, that had caught the French and British armies off guard.

 

The reality was that the Germans had never anticipated the war would unfold as successfully as it did. Even the operational plan for the Battle of France emerged from a recognition that the overall strategic situation was grim. Invading France through the Low Countries was the only viable option for bringing substantial German forces across the Rhine. Interestingly, the early drafts of the 1940 plan resembled something directly from the desk of Helmuth von Moltke back in 1908, offering little innovation or new strategy. The German General Staff had spent years analyzing the failures of the 1914 campaign and concluded that there was little hope for a fresh or groundbreaking approach. They believed that only time, luck, and superior organization could allow them to overcome the Allied forces. In May 1940, the actual plan put into action was a reaction to unexpected circumstances. The Allies accidentally acquired a copy of the German plans, prompting the General Staff and Hitler to realize their operational blueprint had been compromised. 

Known as the Mechelen Incident, d on January 10, 1940, during the Phoney War phase a German aircraft, carrying the plans for the German invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, codenamed Fall Gelb or Case Yellow, crash-landed in Belgium near Vucht, now part of Maasmechelen. It was certainl a case of oopsy daisies. The pilot, Major Erich Hoenmanns, was flying a Messerschmitt Bf 108 when low fog caused him to lose his bearings. While trying to reorient himself by heading toward the River Rhine, he inadvertently crossed into Belgian airspace after mistakenly flying over the frozen Rhine. He then encountered mechanical failure after inadvertently cutting off the fuel supply to the engine, forcing him to land in a nearby field. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, both he and his passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, survived. Reinberger was carrying key documents related to the planned invasion, a fact that alarmed both men upon realizing the implications of their crash and their accidental entry into Belgium. In a frenzied attempt to destroy these documents, Reinberger tried, but failed initially, to set them on fire. He eventually managed to burn some, but Belgian border guards discovered the scene, leading to the capture of Hoenmanns and Reinberger.

The reaction in Berlin was one of shock and anger upon learning that their plans had fallen into enemy hands. Adolf Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of senior Luftwaffe commanders and debated the potential compromise of their military strategy. Despite the initial panic, it was determined that the attack would proceed as planned. Following much deliberation, they decided to develop a new strategy, partly crafted by General Erich von Manstein. This innovative plan called for a rapid thrust through the Ardennes, with the goal of driving to the coast to encircle and cut off the primary Allied field armies positioned in the Low Countries. While this plan was bold, it wasn't entirely original to Manstein; elements of it had been discussed in earlier planning stages but had been dismissed. It was only the urgent need for a fresh strategy to meet Hitler’s timeline for an invasion of France that led to the adoption of Manstein’s ideas. Moreover, this approach conveniently placed Manstein in a key position at the heart of the Wehrmacht’s main offensive. As chief of staff to Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Army Group responsible for this area, Manstein's influence and strategic vision became critical to the operation's success.

Now we don’t need to delve into the intricate details of the planning or execution of the Battle of France. Instead, it's important to clarify one crucial point: those involved in German military planning did not initially view the battle as a “Blitzkrieg.” While the term "lightning war" has become iconic, it was perceived by the German high command primarily as a strategic concept, rather than the operational doctrine that contemporary audiences often associate it with. Historically, German and Prussian military theorists had grappled with their nation's strategic challenges, particularly following their defeat by Napoleon. This pivotal moment shaped their military thinking for decades. One of the central dilemmas they faced was the fear that any conflict could escalate into a prolonged struggle, a scenario that the resources and political stability of Germany could ill afford. From prior to World War I, military planning had emphasized the importance of avoiding a two-front war, allowing the nation to concentrate its resources and efforts on a single front. This strategy was vital for Germany's aim of achieving a swift resolution to conflicts. It’s crucial to note that Germany was not unique in its desire for short wars; the prevailing sentiment across many nations at the time was a general reluctance to engage in lengthy conflicts. The concept of a short war was a common thread in strategic planning, and it would be misleading to suggest that Germany’s approach was radically different from that of its contemporaries. Understanding this context, we can see that Blitzkrieg was not strictly a doctrine of operations nor a specific set of tactical maneuvers. For the Wehrmacht in 1940, it represented more of an abstract idea, loosely connected to the long-standing principles of German strategic thought that had been evolving since 1870. This concept would later manifest in a unique combination of speed, surprise, and coordinated assaults, but its origins lay in a broader strategic mindset that prioritized quick and decisive victories over drawn-out warfare.

If Blitzkrieg wasn’t the driving force behind Germany’s remarkable victory over France and Britain in 1940, what accounted for this stunning achievement? One significant factor was sheer luck. Reflecting on the campaign, General Heinz Guderian mused that their success felt “almost a miracle.” A combination of fortunate circumstances and a series of critical missteps by the Allies played a fundamental role in the outcome. The Allies’ mistakes were compounded by poor communication between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army, which ultimately allowed the Germans the crucial time they needed to execute their decisive maneuvers. This became especially evident following the breakthrough across the Meuse River, where the Germans seized the initiative. As the situation unfolded, the Allies consistently faltered in their response. In France, the political landscape was rapidly deteriorating, leading to significant confusion. The day the Germans launched their invasion, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, which added another layer of instability during a critical moment. Meanwhile, the French military command experienced turbulence as well, with changes in Army leadership occurring at the height of the campaign. Debates over British support in the field intensified, and inadequate reserves were deployed in a piecemeal fashion. Incompetent military leadership, poor coordination, and muddled political directives all significantly contributed to the success of the German campaign. Yet, despite these advantages, the level of success the Wehrmacht achieved was unexpected, even for their own generals. Hitler and his advisors expressed concerns that their forces were becoming overextended and could be vulnerable to a counterattack from the Allies. Ultimately, it was a combination of fortunate circumstances and these various factors that shielded the Germans from facing the consequences of potentially overreaching their capabilities.

The tactics employed in World War II were fundamentally shaped by the experiences and lessons learned during World War I. This was true for every army around the globe at that time. Each nation emerged from the First World War with a unique understanding of warfare, shaped by their specific experiences and challenges. However, a few key insights were universally recognized. Firstly, it became evident that armor, infantry, artillery, and reconnaissance units needed to operate in harmony. The concept of "combined arms" was not merely a theoretical idea; it was increasingly understood as a vital necessity for effective military operations. Effective coordination among these branches was crucial for overcoming the complexities of modern warfare. Secondly, by 1939, there was widespread consensus that aerial power would play a critical role on the battlefield. The question was no longer whether to incorporate air support into military strategies, but rather how to best integrate these elements to maximize their effectiveness. Military planners and political leaders debated strategies for employing combined arms, seeking the most effective methods for coordination and execution. This evolving understanding led to innovative doctrines that emphasized speed, flexibility, and the importance of communication among different branches of the military. Countries began experimenting with various formations and tactics, ultimately paving the way for revolutionary approaches to warfare that would be realized during the conflict.

The French military recognized that their overarching strategy needed to emphasize the use of combined arms in continuous defensive lines. To achieve this, they implemented infantry-tank teams that operated at the pace of infantry, prioritizing reliability over speed. While this approach limited the rapid mobility of their forces, it was designed to ensure that the coordination and effectiveness of armored units were maintained alongside their infantry counterparts. In 1940, French tanks were among the best in the world, significantly outclassing their German counterparts in terms of armor and armaments. However, substantial flaws were embedded within their tactical framework concerning these continuous defensive lines. French military leaders had not been trained to deploy their units in aggressive, independent assaults, as such maneuvers might disturb the carefully controlled lines determined by higher command. This rigidity hindered their operational flexibility and responsiveness. Moreover, difficulties in equipment acquisition left many French tanks without radios, severely impacting their communication capabilities on the battlefield. This lack of effective communication further complicated coordination among combined arms teams, limiting their effectiveness in rapidly evolving combat situations. On the other hand, the British government believed that supporting the French on the continent necessitated a strong naval and air presence, with limited ground forces. Consequently, the British field army was relatively small, consisting of troops that were better trained in colonial policing than in executing large-scale combined arms maneuvers alongside their French allies. Although the British fielded notable tanks, such as the Matilda, their focus was not on large maneuver elements. The insufficient scale and coordination on the French side meant that the British also did not prioritize the development of such capabilities. This strategic divide between the French and British forces contributed to the challenges both nations faced during the early stages of World War II, as they struggled to adapt their tactical approaches to the realities of modern warfare.

The primary lesson the Germans gleaned from the brutal trench warfare of World War I was that maneuverability was paramount in modern combat. They recognized that the stagnation of movement had transformed the conflict into a horrific slugging match, resulting in millions of casualties. This static warfare, devoid of maneuver, had become an industrial exercise in destruction, one that Germany, due to its limited manpower and resources, could not sustain in the long run. The sheer weight of the combined British and French forces matched their own, and with the arrival of American troops, the prospect of victory slipped further out of reach. Throughout the war, the Germans had consistently outmaneuvered their Russian opponents, a strategy that allowed them to effectively manage their limited resources while achieving tactical successes on the Eastern Front. However, in the West, opportunities for these maneuvers had been severely curtailed, leading to stalemate and attrition. To counter this, Germany dedicated the interwar period to mastering the principles of combined arms warfare, focusing on how to create formations that could execute swift maneuvers and independent actions. This effort culminated in the development of the Panzer division, an innovative military structure that emphasized speed, maneuverability, and operational flexibility. The Panzer divisions were meticulously designed to facilitate rapid movement and to empower local commanders to make decisions on the battlefield without waiting for orders from higher-ups. This decentralized command structure allowed for greater responsiveness and adaptability during combat operations. Over time, these divisions would evolve into Panzer Corps and Panzer Armies, further enhancing the German military's ability to perform combined arms operations effectively. This focus on maneuverable warfare not only defined German tactics but also set a new standard for military strategy in the years leading up to World War II.

However, this strategic vision was far from perfect. Germany faced significant challenges in building a robust industrial base capable of mass-equipping its armies with the advanced mechanized units envisioned in their plans. Germany took a very long time to initiate a full wartime economy during World War II due to a mix of ideological, political, and strategic factors, all of which severely impacted production efficiency in the early years of the war. When the war began in 1939, Adolf Hitler deliberately avoided transitioning Germany into a total war economy. He wanted to maintain civilian morale and avoid the harsh sacrifices Germans had experienced during World War I, especially food shortages and labor conscription. Consumer goods production continued, cinemas stayed open, and rationing was minimal in the early years. Hitler believed that a Blitzkrieg strategy would lead to quick victories and negate the need for total mobilization. This mindset was supported by Nazi ideology and bureaucracy. Hitler's government was fragmented, with various competing agencies, like the Wehrmacht, the SS, and different ministries, all vying for control. Economic planning was disorganized, with no centralized authority to oversee efficient industrial production. Industry leaders were left to make decisions based on profit and political loyalty, rather than wartime necessity. Germany also did not fully utilize its available labor force. For ideological reasons, the Nazis were reluctant to employ women in heavy industry as extensively as the Allies or the Soviet Union. Instead, they increasingly relied on forced labor from occupied countries, which was inefficient, underpaid, and poorly managed. By 1942, Germany had suffered major setbacks, especially on the Eastern Front, and Hitler realized that a more serious mobilization was needed. This is when Albert Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments and War Production. Speer introduced rationalization measures, streamlined production, reduced duplication, and centralized control of industry. Under his leadership, German armaments output significantly increased, even amid intensified Allied bombing. However, these improvements came late. The delays in shifting to a war economy meant that Germany missed its chance to build overwhelming material superiority early in the conflict. Allied powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, vastly outproduced Germany by the mid-war years. US industry operated at full capacity, and the USSR, despite massive losses, reorganized its economy behind the Urals for war-focused production. This all resulted in unstable production lines, making it difficult to develop standardized equipment and maintain a long-term acquisitions pipeline. Consequently, the German military resorted to a mixed approach. They developed a small number of elite mechanized divisions, equipped to the highest standards with the latest technology. In contrast, additional infantry divisions were motorized to a degree, utilizing truck-drawn artillery to enhance their mobility, while the majority of the army remained largely traditional in structure. These standard infantry units, reminiscent of their historical counterparts, carried their supplies on their backs, with horse-drawn wagons following behind to transport heavier equipment.

As a result, the infantry of the Heer could only move at a pace consistent with historical infantry tactics: approximately five kilometers per hour, neither faster nor slower. This limitation proved to be a significant shortcoming, particularly on the Eastern Front. The infantry struggled to keep pace with the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions, leading to logistical challenges. Frequently, the panzers and motorized infantry found themselves forced to pause their advances, waiting for the slower-moving infantry to catch up and take their positions. This situation undermined the very advantages in speed and maneuverability that the Germans had sought to create, disrupting the flow of the campaign and hindering effective combat operations. In essence, while the innovative structures like the Panzer divisions were designed to revolutionize warfare, the failure to fully mechanize and equip their entire army would ultimately constrain Germany's tactical flexibility and responsiveness, especially in the vast theaters of the East.

The doctrine governing the employment of panzer divisions in the German army is notably difficult to define. In a post-war interview, General Heinz Guderian’s deputy, General Hermann Schweppenburg, asserted that there was no cohesive doctrine for employing panzer divisions throughout the conflict. This assertion has sparked endless debates across forums, academic papers, and casual discussions in cafes since the war concluded. However, taking Schweppenburg’s claim at face value requires us to traverse generational and cultural divides in a manner that may prove unattainable. There is no universally accepted benchmark to ensure that we share a common understanding of what he meant by the absence of doctrine. Unfortunately, no one could ask him for clarification now, given that he has been deceased for over half a century. Therefore, we must base our analysis on common sense and the evidence available to us. It is essential to consider the context in which these panzer divisions operated. While Schweppenburg may have perceived a lack of formal doctrine, various operational principles and methodologies were indeed developed and employed throughout the war. The German military did prioritize speed, flexibility, and combined arms operations, reflecting the lessons learned from both World Wars. The effective use of panzer divisions often relied on the initiative and adaptability of local commanders, who were empowered to make real-time decisions in response to the fluid nature of battle. This decentralized command structure, although not a formal doctrine in the traditional sense, created a framework for coordination that was essential to the success of their armored units. Ultimately, while it may be tempting to view the absence of a formal doctrine as a weakness, it can also be interpreted as a strength, one that allowed for a responsiveness to the dynamic conditions of warfare. We must critically assess the available evidence and acknowledge the complexities therein, recognizing that the execution of panzer operations was shaped as much by opportunistic innovation as by any rigidly defined doctrine.

 

First, what is doctrine? While there are many interpretations of the term, a concise definition from the United States Marine Corps encapsulates its essence: “Doctrine is the fundamental principles, including tactics, techniques, and procedures, by which forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.” Importantly, this definition does not necessitate the existence of a formal written document. In this context, General Schweppenburg's assertion may hold validity if he was referring specifically to the absence of a documented doctrine outlining the principles of armored force employment. However, it is crucial to recognize that there existed common understandings among panzer commanders regarding their roles and responsibilities within the German army. Without these shared insights and precepts, chaos would have likely ensued, rendering cooperative actions among units nearly impossible. The absence of a formal document does not imply a lack of coherence in operational strategies. On the contrary, the effectiveness of panzer divisions was predicated on a foundational commonality of purpose and approach. Commanders across the board shared an understanding of the strategic objectives and the methods necessary to achieve them, which facilitated coordination and unity of effort in combat situations. This implicit doctrine, built upon shared experiences and lessons learned, allowed the German military to execute complex maneuvers effectively and adapt to the dynamic conditions of warfare.

What we know about actual panzer doctrine can be corroborated through operational histories. The Panzer divisions were regarded as self-contained mobile forces specifically tasked with breaking through enemy lines. After achieving this breakthrough, they were assigned various missions, the most common of which included cutting enemy lines of communication, disrupting retreats, and targeting logistics. During Operation Barbarossa, this doctrine was vividly illustrated in the battles of Minsk, Smolensk, and Kyiv. Large independent panzer units were directed to penetrate Soviet lines and establish connections behind the enemy's main body. In this operational framework, infantry units were to advance behind the panzers, securing the lines of communication essential for sustaining the panzer forces. Once encirclement was achieved, efforts would shift to reducing the encircled pocket, a tactic known as the Kesselacht, or cauldron battle. This concept was historically rooted in the strategies of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke and later adapted by his successors, including those influenced by Schlieffen's principles. These encirclement battles involved infantry forces advancing from all sides into the pocket to reduce its size. Ultimately, the destruction of the encircled enemy forces would be achieved either through a decisive assault or the enemy's surrender. However, the aforementioned slow pace of infantry movement often led to situations where panzer units found themselves bogged down in heavy fighting unsuited to their capabilities while waiting for infantry to relieve them. Once the pocket was fully encircled and secured, or once relief was achieved, the Panzers would continue their advance. These encirclement strategies were designed to operate on a massive scale, often targeting entire field armies and, in the cases of Minsk and Kyiv, large Soviet army groups. Yet, the scale of these operations was not always consistent. Tensions frequently arose between Hitler and his generals regarding the aggressiveness of the panzer advances. Hitler often expressed concern that field commanders were overextending themselves, advocating for more manageable encirclement operations. This was notably evident in France in 1940, when he ordered a pause in the panzer advance to allow the infantry time to catch up and secure the communication lines for Kleist’s panzer group. Similar disagreements occurred after the battle of Minsk in 1941, when Hitler and Army Group Center's commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, clashed over the size of future encirclement attempts. Surprisingly, in this instance, Hitler was unable to impose his strategy on the seasoned Field Marshal. Army Group Center proceeded with large-scale encirclements, culminating in the significant encirclement operation at Smolensk in July 1941.

The emphasis on encirclement battles was not solely beneficial to the Panzers and motorized units; all branches of the German military were encouraged to seek encirclement whenever possible. The 1933 Heer Field Service Regulations called for artillery, infantry, armor, and air support to work together down to the company level. This cooperation was primarily to be facilitated through direct communication among the respective commanders. The regulations stipulated that artillery commanders should position their command posts as close as possible to those of infantry commanders. If personal communication was not feasible, liaison officers were to be assigned to link the respective units. Additionally, the use of radios and telephones was recommended wherever possible. The inclusion of radio and telephone communication at the end of this hierarchy may seem counterintuitive. However, the Germans were acutely aware of how easily telephone lines could be severed by enemy artillery fire, while radios were susceptible to jamming and interception. Electronic warfare was absolutely utilized by both sides on the Eastern front, but it does not get as much attention in secondary accounts of the war. Perhaps the most noteworthy example was at Kursk where the Red Army and the Wehrmacht battled it out over the radio waves, jamming, intercepting and triangulation of the other sides observers and command posts. 

During the North Africa Campaign of World War II, radio communications were essential for both Axis and Allied forces operating across the vast, open desert. The terrain demanded mobile, long-range radio systems, but this also made transmissions highly vulnerable to interception, jamming, and triangulation, tools that became critical in the evolving landscape of electronic warfare. Interception played a particularly important role. British intelligence units, especially the Y Service and those linked to Ultra at Bletchley Park, routinely intercepted German and Italian radio traffic. German forces often used open channels or weak encryption, allowing the British to gain valuable insights into Axis troop movements, supply lines, and battle plans. This intelligence edge was a major factor in key victories, such as the Second Battle of El Alamein, where Allied forces were able to preempt German strategies. Jamming techniques were also employed, though they were less refined than in later stages of the war. Both the British and Germans attempted to disrupt enemy communications by broadcasting on similar frequencies, particularly during major offensives or air-ground coordination efforts. However, the technology was still developing, and jamming sometimes interfered with friendly transmissions as well. Triangulation became a highly effective method for locating enemy radio operators. British forces used mobile direction-finding units mounted on vehicles to track the origin of German transmissions across the desert. When combined with intercepted messages, this allowed commanders to accurately identify the positions of enemy headquarters and convoys, enabling more precise attacks. Altogether, the effective use of radio interception, jamming, and triangulation gave the Allies a significant advantage in the North African theater, demonstrating the growing power of signals intelligence in modern warfare. By the way, if you haven't checked it out yet, me and my Co-host Garauv over on Echoes of War podcast did a 10 episode series on the entire North Africa Campaign, I highly recommend it. 

Needless to say the Nazi regime utilized a lot of propaganda that contributed to the myths perpetuated by generals long after the war concluded, take for example the idealization of the "clean Wehrmacht." This romantic notion of advancing panzers emerged not only at the war's conclusion but also started soon after the Germans captured Paris, which they viewed as a stepping stone towards imminent victory. The propaganda machinery of the Third Reich rapidly began producing films, news stories, and radio broadcasts that framed the Wehrmacht's success in the West as an inevitable result of German superiority. These narratives circulated widely within the army and across the conquered territories of Europe. The impact of this propaganda was immediate, with German officers, who should have recognized the realities of warfare, beginning to believe their own rhetoric. Many perceived their operational success in the so-called Blitzkrieg as evidence of unparalleled military brilliance. The swift collapses of the Low Countries, France, Poland, and the British Expeditionary Force reinforced their belief that they had created something unique in military history.

However, this belief was fundamentally flawed. The Wehrmacht of 1939-1940 capitalized on the unpreparedness of their enemies for a war of maneuver, leveraging superior training and communication capabilities to outflank the bewildered Allies. This was not a unique ability, nor was it one that could not be replicated by other nations. As the Wehrmacht geared up for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1940-1941, the professionalism that had characterized German planning for decades began to erode. Generals increasingly assumed best-case scenarios for their maneuvers while neglecting the significant obstacles they would face. These critical missteps would soon become apparent within weeks of the start of Operation Barbarossa. Before long, many high-ranking officers in the Wehrmacht would begin to doubt the war's outcome, with some losing all hope of victory long before the onset of winter.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As blitzkrieg tactics, asserting speed and coordination, manifested in the rapid defeat of France, they obscured deeper issues. While the myths surrounding Germany's military prowess grew, luck played a crucial role in their early victories. As blunders unfolded in the east, doubts about the war's outcome began to gnaw at German high command, foreshadowing the inevitable struggle ahead.

Last time we spoke about the planning for Operation Barbarossa. In 1940, as Europe faced the aftermath of the swift German Blitzkrieg, Stalin realized the imminent threat to the Soviet Union. Following the Winter War with Finland, he restructured the Red Army, appointing General Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov's remarkable military background shaped his strategies for upcoming conflicts. However, despite receiving numerous warnings about a German invasion, Stalin hesitated, believing the alarms to be fabrications. As tensions escalated, the Soviet military was still underprepared, facing critical shortages of equipment and personnel. On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their attack, exploiting the Red Army's disorganization and lack of readiness. Stalin, desperate to fortify defenses, rushed military production but was starkly unprepared for the rapid devastation that ensued. This catastrophic failure would haunt the Soviet Union as they struggled to adapt and respond to the unexpected German onslaught in the early days of Operation Barbarossa.

This episode is Prelude #11 Hitler’s decision to go to War

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

In the last episode we examined how Hitler began WW2 against western europe and the planning behind Operation Barbarossa. Today we are going to dive into Hitler’s ultimate decision for war against the Soviet Union.

In December of 1940, a pivotal moment in World War II unfolded when Adolf Hitler signed War Directive Twenty-One. Hitler’s war directives were a sort of executive order that he signed and published as a means of putting his priorities into action by the regime’s various mechanisms. Throughout the war, he would sign 74 of them, the last ones devolving to little more than his ideological rants and attempts to intervene in the smallest tactical decisions. You know Hitler sandbagging his own generals and such. This critical order called for the German Army and Air Force to begin preparations for a bold and aggressive invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler recognized that this operation would likely need to occur before Germany could conclusively defeat Britain, underscoring the urgency and precariousness of the Nazi strategy. War Directive Twenty-One provided a rough outline for the invasion, revealing Hitler’s expansive ambitions. The planned advance was to stretch from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, encapsulating a massive swath of territory. The directive's strategic vision targeted the annihilation of the majority of the Red Army, alongside a crucial goal, capturing the strategic city of Leningrad.

Interestingly, this initial draft revealed that any push toward Moscow was envisioned as a subsequent objective, to be contemplated only after achieving the first goals of the campaign. Hitler’s strategy highlighted an astonishing military undertaking: he stipulated that the German forces would not advance beyond a delineation he had in mind, spanning roughly from Arkhangelsk in the north to the Volga River in the south. This indicated a monumental task, covering a staggering 2,000 kilometers from the starting point of the German forces. To put this in perspective, the German front was already vast, measuring 1,400 kilometers wide, but by the end of the planned campaign, it was expected to expand to over 2,100 kilometers. War Directive Twenty-One proposed a campaign unparalleled in military history, setting the stage for what would be the most ambitious military operation ever executed. 

Ambitions aside, the planning for the invasion highlighted significant issues within the Wehrmacht from the very beginning. A critical source of tension was the stark contrast in strategic vision between Adolf Hitler and his generals at the Oberkommando des Heeres or “OKH”, the German Army High Command. It was subordinated to OKW or “Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht”. OKW was the German Military’s unified military high command. Hitler rarely followed the chain of command and regularly consulted with OKH staff without first talking to OKW and vice versa. Being someone who suffers the life of bureaucracy, working for what is essentially the federal government of Canada, won't get into details, I can assure that this was a bold strategy cotton. At the helm was Colonel General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff. Halder was a professional officer who had been selected to be the next chief of the Army General Staff after the resignation of his predecessor General Ludwig Beck over disagreements with Hitler concerning the latter’s plan for Czechoslovakia. Although a loyal supporter of the Nazi regime, Halder firmly believed that Hitler was mistaken and misled in his approach to conquering the USSR. Hitler’s strategy emphasized the destruction of the Red Army as the primary objective of any campaign, suggesting that this would pave the way for the subsequent seizure of vital industrial and agricultural centers in Ukraine. He prioritized swift and decisive action aimed at neutralizing Soviet military capability, viewing it as essential for a favorable outcome.

In contrast, Halder advocated for focusing efforts on capturing Moscow first, arguing that securing the Soviet capital would destabilize the Soviet government and lead to a quicker resolution of the conflict. He believed that after taking Moscow, the Wehrmacht could negotiate for the economic and industrial resources necessary for a prolonged war in the West. This fundamental difference in perspective reflected not only tactical considerations but also divergent visions for the overall campaign in the East. These conflicting strategies created a hazardous environment where, although Hitler ordered one campaign plan to be developed and prepared, Halder and his subordinates only committed half-heartedly to fulfilling Hitler's directives. Instead, they began laying the groundwork to implement their strategy, banking on the idea that initial victories in the campaign would provide an opportunity to persuade Hitler of the merits of their plan. They believed that demonstrating success on the battlefield could sway the Führer to adopt their approach, thereby enabling a more focused and effective strategy in the East.

Beyond strategic disagreements, the Wehrmacht faced several fundamental issues that severely impacted its campaign in the East. A critical challenge was the sorry state of equipment standardization, which affected everything from the readiness of fighting units to the intricacies of logistics planning. During the buildup for operations, Colonel General Halder’s staff discovered that the Heer, aka the German Army was equipped with no fewer than 150 different models of trucks, each produced by various German manufacturers. This hodgepodge of vehicles created significant logistical headaches. Many of the trucks used to transport supplies and maintain mobility for the Panzer and motorized forces were actually civilian models that had been requisitioned during previous campaigns in Poland and France. This diverse assortment of vehicles meant that it was impossible to establish a comprehensive inventory of spare parts, which had dire implications for maintenance and the longevity of the trucks. As the units faced the harsh conditions of the 1,200-kilometer march to Moscow, the reliability of their transportation would inevitably suffer.

Many of you might gloss over what essentially amounts to a logistical issue, however, logistics is honestly what defeated the Axis during WW2. No members of the Axis held significant oil, excluding Romania who was dishing it out to them all, but it was not nearly enough. On top of that, Germany had a beautiful way of making automotive vehicles, but it was also glaringly idiotic. To overly simplify, the Ford assembly line, created by Henry Ford had workers creating all the different parts that made up a car over assembly lines. This meant the worker teams each made separate parts that would be placed together at the end basically. For Germany it was mostly the opposite. The German workers would build up their vehicles or panzers from start to finish, providing excellent craftsmen for sure, but it was unbelievably inefficient compared to the US and other allied nations. The Germans would be dishing out panzers at pathetic rates compared to their enemies and worse yet, all the German manufacturing companies did not standardize their parts. This meant there was a ungodly amount of different parts for all their vehicles, requiring specializations for repairs teams and a ton of reserve parts that all need to be brought to the front lines. In comparison, the Allied repair teams all used standardized parts, even shared between the British and Americans. The Allies were out producing, out repairing the Axis like no tomorrow, it proved to be a decisive factor in the North African campaign, which me and my cohost Gaurav over at Echoes of War Podcast did a 10 episode series on, go check it out. On top of all of that, the German economy did not even became a full war time economy until 1944 when Albert Speer took over and honestly he freaked out at what he found out was going on. German manufacturers were literally stealing from each other, all scrambling for steel, sometimes sabotaging another and outright refusing to cooperate on designing and other factors. While many tank bro’s get wet in their pants thinking about the glory that was the Tiger 1, in the end 3 beat up Shermans could take them down, or T-34’s at a fraction of the cost. Das Auto indeed.

By May of 1940, the ten Panzer divisions each averaged 256 tanks. However, by June of 1941, the number of Panzer divisions had increased to twenty, but their average strength had diluted to just 190 tanks per division. More importantly, the strongest Panzer divisions in 1940 were the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Panzer, each boasting over 300 tanks. In marked contrast, by 1941, the most powerful divisions shifted to the 6th, 7th, and 20th Panzer, with only one of them exceeding 250 tanks. This dilution of the Wehrmacht’s critical armored capability was deemed necessary to provide broader coverage across the vast front envisioned for Operation Barbarossa. While this strategy allowed for greater territorial reach, it came at a significant cost: a marked reduction in the striking power of the Panzer divisions. The very core of the German military's offensive capability was weakened, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the entire campaign in the East.

Despite the challenges posed by the restructuring of the Wehrmacht, there was a silver lining. Many of the now decidedly obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II tanks were being phased out and replaced with more modern armored vehicles. Among these replacements were the Czech-built Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t), along with the more robust Panzer IV and Panzer III models. Notably, about 700 of the newly introduced Panzer III were the Ausführung F variant, equipped with a significantly improved 5-centimeter gun. This weapon boasted superior armor penetration capabilities, making it effective against the lighter Soviet tanks that the Heer would encounter in the East. To get in more gritty details, the 5 cm KwK 38 was the close cousin of the PaK. 37 wheeled anti-tank gun that was also being introduced into service around this time. Unfortunately, neither of these weapons proved to be a match for the best Soviet armor that would be encountered in the coming campaign. Eventually they would be replaced by the 5 cm KwK 39 with a longer barrel. Even this proved inadequate. At that point, the Panzer III would reach its maximum development capacity, and the Panzer IV would take over the anti-tank role, eventually being fitted with the 7.5 cm KwK 40. This upgrade was an essential enhancement compared to the older tank models, which were increasingly outmatched on the battlefield. However, this mix of tank models soon became a logistical headache that would plague the German war effort in the East. As the distances between frontline troops and the industrial heart of the Nazi war machine expanded, ensuring the availability of spare parts for this diverse array of armored vehicles posed significant challenges. The complexity of maintaining and supplying such an eclectic fleet of tanks would complicate operations, making the already daunting logistics of war even more arduous. As the campaign progressed, the Wehrmacht's ability to sustain its operations would be increasingly tested, revealing the stark limitations of an overly diversified vehicle inventory during the intense and prolonged engagements in the Soviet Union.

Logistics planning for Operation Barbarossa uncovered serious problems that had only been minor issues during the previous campaigns in the West. While the standardization issues with trucks we discussed earlier contributed to these logistical headaches, sheer numbers also became a critical concern. The Heer faced a significant shortfall in trucks as early as February of 1940, and this situation would worsen dramatically over time. German industry was only managing to replace about half of the losses sustained, leaving the army struggling to maintain its mobility. Adding to the complexity, requisitions from civilians and captured stocks further complicated the standardization issues. Although these measures provided a temporary reprieve, they were not a sustainable solution to the broader problem of equipment replacement. Compounding the challenges for logistics planners in 1941, was the fact that Soviet railroads operated on a wider gauge track than the standard used throughout the rest of Europe. Yes, what could seem such a minor detail as the gauge of the track would have a profound effect during WW2. As you can imagine, the most powerful land based logistical method, even to this very day, is by rail. The Germans depended heavily on rail and to be honest upon horse and mule. 

The Soviet rail gauge in 1941 was defined as 1524 mm between the rails. In 1970, the Soviet Gauge was standardized as 1520 mm. European rail gauge at this time was 1435 mm. This is now known as “standard gauge.” Most if not all of the continental track was set to this size before the turn of the century. The notable exception was the Iberian Peninsula which ran 1672 mm in Spain and 1664 mm in Portugal. This discrepancy became a formidable obstacle in transporting supplies and reinforcements to the front lines. There were essentially two possible solutions to this problem: the Germans could either capture substantial amounts of Soviet rolling stock and locomotives or re-lay the railroad tracks to conform to the narrower European standard. The first option hinged on operational luck, a variable steeped in uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly in the chaos of war. The second solution would demand vast amounts of manpower and time, resources that were already stretched thin due to the expansive nature of the campaign. As logistical planners looked toward the challenges ahead, they faced a daunting reality: without effective and responsive logistics, the Wehrmacht's operational success in the East could be severely compromised.

The actual plans and troop dispositions for the invasion of the Soviet Union went through three major phases of planning. The first phase was an operational study conducted by Major General Marcks. Marcks was the chief of staff of the 18th Army. He was selected for this first draft because he was a longtime friend of Halder and had a reputation for being a competent mind. Additionally, Halder had already asked him to start sketching out a draft. His planning received official sanction on July 29, 1940, well before Adolf Hitler issued War Directive Twenty-One. Marcks' initial plan called for the establishment of two army groups: one positioned north of the Pripyat Marshes and the other to the south. The Northern Army Group was designed to be the dominant force and the main effort of the campaign. In his assessment, Marcks estimated the strength of the Red Army on its western front at 96 infantry divisions, 23 cavalry divisions, and 28 motorized brigades. Interestingly, it seems that Marcks was not fully aware of the existence of the Soviet tank divisions or the mechanized corps, which would later prove significant in the conflict.

To counter the estimated strength of the Red Army, Marcks utilized figures that included the planned continued expansion of the Heer, ultimately assigning a total of 147 divisions for the operation. This formidable force consisted of 110 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 24 Panzer divisions, and 12 motorized infantry divisions. The breakdown of troop allocations was as follows: the Northern Army Group would receive 50 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 motorized divisions, and 15 Panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Southern Army Group would be allocated 5 Panzer divisions, 6 motorized divisions, and 24 infantry divisions. The remaining divisions were earmarked to form a substantial operational reserve, intended to plug any gaps that might arise as the army groups advanced into the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. This early planning phase was critical in setting the stage for what would become one of the largest military operations in history, reflecting both strategic ambition and the challenges ahead. The source material is unclear on exactly how the Wehrmacht thought the Soviet tank arm was fielded in the army. A fair guess might be that they understood the Red Army to be organized along the French model which had tanks in brigades and regiments attached to rifle divisions and corps. Ultimately, this is a significant sign of the poor state of Wehrmacht intelligence at this time. 

Major General Marcks divided his operational concept for the invasion into four distinct phases. Phase One focused on the army groups pushing the Red Army back approximately 400 kilometers, with the objective of encircling the bulk of Soviet forces. This initial push was essential to secure a quick victory, as failing to achieve this would lead to significant complications.Phase Two would involve a renewed attempt to break through any new defensive lines established by the Soviets, aiming to encircle the defenders over a distance of 100 to 200 kilometers. Marcks projected that these first two phases should be completed within a span of seven weeks. However, he recognized the risks: if the initial operations failed, the outcome could devolve into positional warfare, where secure lines of communication would be jeopardized. Units of the Red Army that could not be decisively surrounded and defeated would eventually drain the strength of the invasion force. Scattered Soviet troops could pose threats to supply lines, demanding the attention of larger Wehrmacht units to eliminate these threats. Phase Three of the operations called for a simultaneous advance through Eastern Ukraine, along with the strategic capture of both Moscow and Leningrad. This was an ambitious vision and Marcks emphasized that it was heavily contingent on the success of the first two phases, along with a robust logistics framework to support the campaign. Finally, Phase Four was even more audacious, envisioning a broad push towards Arkhangelsk in the north and Rostov in the south, with Gorki marking the easternmost limit of the advance. This expansive objective reflected not only the ambitious nature of the plan but also the extensive logistical challenges the Wehrmacht would face in executing such a sweeping campaign. At this stage, the strength of the Heer’s logistics would be measured by the number and condition of the trucks, as well as the progress made in conversion of the Soviet rail gauge. 

Major General Marcks also developed a geostrategic analysis of Germany's position following an invasion of the Soviet Union. He cautioned that an immediate alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would be unavoidable, which would likely lead to increased economic aid from the United States, a nation already heavily committed to supporting the UK. Marcks was astute enough to recognize that the Western Allies would seize any opportunity to land in Europe and begin efforts to liberate their fallen allies. He stressed that Germany would struggle to conduct a war on two fronts effectively. To mitigate this impending crisis, Marcks emphasized the necessity for the Wehrmacht to defeat the Soviet Union swiftly. While he acknowledged that such a rapid victory could not be guaranteed, he firmly believed that capturing Moscow was crucial to achieving this goal. In this regard, he echoed the sentiments of his friend Colonel General Halder, who was at that moment attempting to persuade Hitler to pursue this very course of action. The operational plan Marcks proposed represented an incredibly ambitious undertaking, all within a 17 week timeline. Yet, it was not the most audacious plan devised by the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the Soviet Union. That dubious honor belongs to the subsequent plan, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg.

On September 19, 1940, Colonel Walter Warlimont’s National Defense Division of the OKW presented its proposal for a new campaign, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg. This plan, now known as the "Lossberg Study," outlined four key objectives for the Eastern campaign:

To destroy enemy forces in Western Russia.

1. To prevent capable enemy units from retreating into the interior.
2. To isolate Western Russia from the sea.
3. To seize crucial Russian resource areas.

Lossberg’s plan called for three army groups: North, Center, and South. It aimed for a primary advance on Moscow via Smolensk while also allowing part of Army Group Center to divert northward to assist Army Group North. Additionally, the plan included a southern advance by German and Finnish forces through Karelia.

Among all German studies, Lossberg’s was unique in addressing the deficiencies of the Russian road and rail network. He asserted, “All German operations must be supported in their later stages by reliable Russian railways, as a transport system solely based on roads will be insufficient in the vast expanses.” There were two main ways to meet this requirement:

1. By seizing enough enemy rolling stock and locomotives to utilize existing tracks.
2. By converting Russian tracks to European Standard Gauge.

Both approaches presented challenges. One solution was to leverage naval power. If the Wehrmacht could swiftly capture and repair eastern Baltic ports and eliminate the Soviet Baltic Fleet, most logistical needs for AGN could be fulfilled by sea, allowing engines and rolling stock to support the other two army groups. In the campaign’s second phase, supplies transported by sea could sustain advances toward the Volga, Gorki, and Archangel. The incorporation of sea supply in the OKW plan was a significant development, marking the first time planners considered the impact of naval power on the campaign. Historically, the German High Command had displayed a marked ignorance of maritime strategy, a failing more evident now than ever. At this point, the Navy was unaware of the impending invasion, and the OKM staff had not participated in the planning process. The OKH studies conducted thus far appeared as if created by individuals who believed the world ended at the shoreline. The Lossberg Study changed this perspective.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg conducted his study concurrently with Major General Marcks’ planning efforts. Unlike Marcks, who operated under the aegis of Colonel General Halder, the chief of staff for the OKH, Lossberg worked under Colonel General Jodl, the chief of staff for the OKW. The OKW and OKH were engaged in a serious rivalry for influence within the Nazi state at this point, and OKH was losing ground. One area where their influence would hold strong was the operations in the east. Nevertheless, OKW still commissioned their own study of potential operations. While Lossberg's plan bore similarities to Marcks', it featured three notable differences. First, Lossberg divided the field army into three army groups rather than two, a change that would prove to be significant and enduring in the context of the invasion strategy. Unfortunately, an exact order of battle for his plan is elusive, and it remains unclear whether Lossberg even formalized one. Halder was still fundamentally in charge of crafting operational plans and leveraged the full extent of his historical responsibilities to authorize Marcks’ study, lending it considerable weight. In contrast, Jodl, despite being nominally superior within the OKW, lacked the gravitas associated with Halder’s position. His role was much less clearly defined, and while this sometimes allowed him to seize power in areas beyond the Army’s purview, it could also act as a hindrance. In this instance, it proved to be more of a disadvantage for him.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg faced significant limitations in developing a comprehensive operational plan due to the lack of resources and staff at his disposal, a direct result of his boss, Colonel General Jodl, not having those resources. Consequently, Lossberg’s plan was more truncated in detail compared to Marcks’ extensive study, despite having access to the completed version of that plan. His primary mission was not to devise the operational blueprint for the Heer, but rather to keep Jodl informed of potential strategies and scenarios that could emerge. Jodl needed ammunition in his power struggle with Halder, and Lossberg's insights were to provide that. The ultimate aim of this struggle was to influence the outcome of the planning process, and in that respect, Lossberg's contributions did have a notable impact. The three-army group disposition in his plan is a clear reflection of his influence.

The second key difference in Lossberg’s approach was his evaluation of the logistics situation. He recognized that without capturing significant amounts of Soviet gauge rolling stock, the strain on the existing truck resources would be insurmountable. He proposed that as much supply as possible be funneled through captured ports in the Baltic and Black Sea, a strategy that would eventually be integrated into the final invasion plan. The third major distinction between Lossberg’s study and that of Marcks was his identification of potential support among the local populace in the Soviet Union. He noted that the Baltic states were still in the process of being incorporated into the Union, and that Stalin faced considerable opposition, although mostly unarmed. Ukraine was also recognized as a possible source of support against the Soviets. However, while these ideas presented intriguing possibilities, they overlooked the racial ideology that underpinned the Nazi state. The regime was engaged in an aggressive war of conquest, not one of liberation. The encouragement of local independence was fundamentally at odds with the Nazis’ genocidal ambitions and their desire for cultural domination over all non-German peoples. We will delve deeper into these themes shortly, but first, let’s discuss the final iteration of the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The final plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was organized and supervised by Lieutenant General Paulus. Paulus would go on to become infamous for his command of the 6th Army in Stalingrad. At this point however, he was a well-respected staff officer who had worked for Guderian and Lutz. At this point, he had been made the Quartermaster General of the Army, the same position that Ludendorff had held when he was military dictator in all but name during the latter part of the First World War. The position did not carry the same power in Paulus’ time but was still one of real prestige and influence. Operating under a mandate from Halder, Paulus was tasked with refining the work done up to that point, and he approached this through comprehensive wargames. He initiated these exercises in December, benefiting from Hitler's clarified political directives and updated intelligence and force estimations provided by the OKH staff. Paulus’ studies centered around the concept of three army groups, mirroring the structure proposed in Lossberg’s plan. One of Paulus’ most significant contributions was his insightful assessment of the Red Army’s force regeneration capabilities, a factor that the previous planners had largely overlooked. While both Marcks and Lossberg had assumed that the destruction of the main enemy forces, coupled with the occupation of the most developed regions of the western Soviet Union, would render the Red Army incapable of rebuilding, Paulus was far less optimistic. He estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize 30 to 40 new divisions to reinforce the main defense within the first three months of the war. These divisions would come from newly conscripted soldiers and force transfers from other theaters of conflict. Furthermore, he projected that this number could rise to a total of 100 new divisions within just six months of the invasion’s commencement. This potential for rapid expansion was unprecedented and would have been difficult for the Nazi leadership to fully comprehend. In military history, there had never been an instance of such a quick mobilization of forces. The idea that the Soviet Union could muster 30 to 40 new divisions in such a short timeframe challenged many of the Nazi leaders' beliefs and assumptions, running counter to their entire ideological framework. Yet, as we will see, the reality was even more striking, the Red Army not only met these expectations but actually exceeded them. This resilience would prove to be a significant factor in the unfolding conflict.

In addition to this critical insight, Paulus’ wargaming also revealed another key lesson: neither of the flanking Army Groups, the North or South, was sufficiently strong to accomplish their respective objectives. This shortfall led to a significant bulge along the front, with Army Group Center advancing much farther than its northern and southern counterparts, leaving its flanks exposed. To address this vulnerability, the two weaker groups would need to request Panzer support. This support was essential, as Army Group Center would struggle to adequately cover its flanks, decisively crush its encircled enemies, and support its own front. The resulting weakening of the center ultimately led to a grinding halt of the advance on Moscow, providing the Soviets with the time and space they needed to organize a more effective resistance. Paulus concluded that the advance through the center had to be the primary effort, regardless of other objectives, and that Moscow should be the singular target for all three Army Groups. This conclusion may have seemed the only reasonable one, or perhaps Paulus recognized that Halder would be unwilling to accept any alternative strategy. At this time, Halder was deeply entrenched in his own struggle for influence over Hitler. He was desperate to persuade the Führer of the “Moscow above all else” framing of the campaign. It remains unclear whether Halder genuinely believed this was the best path to victory or if he was merely trying to demonstrate his strategic competency to Hitler.

The final topic we’ll cover this week is the profound impact of Nazi plans for genocide on the operational considerations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. These plans were fundamental to the entire Nazi conception of the war and its purpose. The regime believed that only through war could Germany achieve its goal of acquiring land, ominously termed “Living Space.” To secure this living space, it was essential to clear the region of those they deemed racially inferior, which meant nothing short of genocide and ethnic cleansing on a scale that dwarfed anything else in history. This was enshrined in the General Plan East, which had roots in Hitler’s earliest ideas about expansion. On an operational level, the Nazis committed significant resources to execute this horrifying plan. Einsatzgruppen formations were prioritized within the Heer’s logistics plans. The Einsatzgruppen or “Special Task Forces” were the death squads of the SS. They were tasked with roving the rear areas in the wake of the Wehrmacht. They especially targeted Jews as part of the final solution, but were not hesitant to murder anyone else. The  Einsatzgruppen would number around 3,000 men. They were allocated special privileges for transportation and supplies. Efforts were made throughout the campaign to accommodate the Einsatzgruppen in their murderous mission. These units would follow the front-line troops, systematically carrying out mass murders throughout the Soviet Union. They operated with the cooperation of many regular army personnel and, at times, received active assistance. No one was to escape this war unscathed, physically, morally, or otherwise. This brutal strategy not only shaped the course of the invasion but also left an indelible mark on the psyche of those involved, transforming the war into a harrowing chapter of human history.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In June 1941, Hitler planned to launch Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union, aiming to destroy its military before fully conquering Britain. Despite initial planning, the Wehrmacht faced critical logistical issues and ignored warnings about Soviet defenses. Strategic disagreements arose between Hitler and his generals regarding objectives, with General Halder advocating for capturing Moscow first. Would the whole rotten structure cave in when they kicked the door? Or was Hitler about to engage his greatest rival yet? 

 

Last time we spoke about the Blitzkrieg in Western Europe. In 1939, Europe teetered on the brink of war as tensions surged following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler, which divided Eastern Europe. With fierce ambition, Germany initiated its blitzkrieg strategy, invading Poland swiftly and decisively. In a mere thirty-five days, Polish defenses crumbled under overwhelming German might. Following Poland’s fall, Hitler’s forces turned to Denmark and Norway, capturing these territories with remarkable speed, establishing German dominance in Scandinavia. The focus then shifted westward, as Belgium and the Netherlands were quickly overrun, leading to the rapid collapse of French defenses. By June 14, 1940, the Germans stormed into Paris, signaling the end of France's defense. This sequence of events unfolded with shocking speed, causing global astonishment. The blitzkrieg campaign established Germany as a formidable force, setting the stage for a conflict that would engulf the world and dramatically alter its landscape.

This episode is Prelude #10 Planning Operation Barbarossa 

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are edging closer to the beginning of the Eastern Front. Following the disastrous Winter War with Finland, Stalin aimed to reorganize the Red Army. Fresh from the purges, he also opted for a reshuffling of leadership. While tensions ran high, very few, if any, leaders of the Red Army faced purges due to the outcomes of the Winter War. In February 1940, General of the Army Zhukov was summoned to Moscow to assume the role of Chief of the General Staff. Now Zhukov will be a towering figure in this series, so why not go through a short bio on him?

Zhukov was born into a struggling peasant family of Russian descent in Strelkovka, located in the Maloyaroslavsky District of the Kaluga Governorate in western Russia, about 62 miles east of Moscow. His father, Konstantin, who was orphaned at the age of two and later adopted by Anuska Zhukova, worked as a cobbler. His mother, Ustin'ya, was a peasant laborer. Zhukov was believed to have taken after his mother, claiming he inherited her physical strength; Ustin'ya was reportedly capable of handling tough tasks, such as transporting 200-pound sacks of grain over long distances. At a time when most individuals from the lower and working classes in Russia received only two years of education, Zhukov completed a three-year primary schooling at his local school. He later became an apprentice to his uncle Mikhail in Moscow, learning the furrier trade. While working with his uncle, Zhukov enhanced his education by reading various subjects, including the Russian and German languages, science, geography, and mathematics, alongside his cousin Alexander. He also enrolled in night school, completing courses as time allowed while working in his uncle's shop. By 1914, he finished his apprenticeship and started his own fur business, employing three young workers. 

In 1915, Zhukov was drafted into the Imperial Russian Army, serving in the 10th Dragoon Novgorod Regiment, where he was wounded during combat against the Germans at Kharkov. Throughout World War I, he was awarded the Cross of St. George twice for his bravery and was promoted to non-commissioned officer ranks due to his valor in battle. After the October Revolution of 1917, he joined the Bolsheviks, where his background of poverty served as an advantage in party circles. Following a severe bout of typhus, he participated in the Russian Civil War, serving in the Second Cavalry Brigade under Commander Semyon Timoshenko, which was later incorporated into the 1st Cavalry Army led by Semyon Budyonny. In 1920, he completed a cavalry officer training course and received his commission as an officer. In recognition of his role in suppressing the Tambov Rebellion in 1921, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Zhukov rapidly progressed through the ranks, becoming the commander of a cavalry troop and squadron, then the deputy commander of a cavalry regiment. By late May 1923, he was appointed as the commander of the 39th Cavalry Regiment. The following year, he entered the Higher School of Cavalry and graduated in 1924, after which he returned to command the same regiment. According to Friedrich von Mellenthin, "It is not generally realized that Zhukov received much of his early training in Germany. Together with other Russian officers, and by arrangement with the Reichswehr, he attended courses at German military schools in the 1920s. He spent some time attached to a cavalry regiment under Colonel Dingler, who vividly recalled Zhukov's boisterous behavior and the large amounts of liquor he and his comrades consumed after dinner. Nevertheless, it is evident that Zhukov made good use of his time in military training." Zhukov attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1929 until his graduation in 1930. In May 1930, he became commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division. By February 1931, he was appointed as the Assistant Inspector of Cavalry for the Red Army.

In May 1933, Zhukov became the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division. During the Great Purge, when thousands of officers were arrested and executed; Zhukov and those associated with the First Cavalry Army were spared, as they were involved in conflicts with the Japanese near Manchuria. By 1937, he commanded the 3rd Cavalry Corps and later the 6th Cavalry Corps. In 1938, he was appointed as the deputy cavalry commander of the Belorussian Military District. Later in 1938, Zhukov was assigned to lead the First Soviet Mongolian People's Army, engaging in combat against Japan’s Kwantung Army along the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Japanese-held state of Manchukuo. The Soviet-Japanese border clashes lasted from 1938 to 1939. What started as a border skirmish quickly escalated into a full-scale war, with the Japanese advancing with around 80,000 troops, 180 tanks, and 450 aircraft. This escalation led to the crucial battle of Khalkhin Gol. Zhukov called for significant reinforcements, and on August 20, 1939, his Soviet offensive commenced. 

Following a substantial artillery barrage, nearly 500 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks advanced, backed by over 500 fighters and bombers, marking the Soviet Air Force's first fighter-bomber operation. Initially, the offensive seemed like a standard frontal assault. However, Zhukov executed a pincer movement, a classic cavalry strategy holding back two tank brigades before ordering them to advance around both flanks, supported by motorized artillery, infantry, and other tanks. This bold maneuver successfully encircled the Japanese 6th Army and captured their vulnerable supply lines. By August 31, the Japanese forces were expelled from the contested border, resulting in a clear Soviet victory. This campaign held importance beyond its immediate tactical and local consequences. Zhukov tested and refined techniques that would later be employed against the Germans on the Eastern Front during WW2. His innovative tactics included using underwater bridges and enhancing the cohesion and effectiveness of inexperienced units by integrating a handful of seasoned veterans to improve morale and overall training.

The assessment of the issues faced by the BT tanks led to replacements of their flammable gasoline engines with diesel engines. This battle provided critical insights that contributed to the successful development of the T-34 medium tank utilized in WW2. Following this campaign, veterans were systematically reassigned to newer units to disseminate their combat experience. For his success, Zhukov was honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union. However, the campaign, and particularly Zhukov's groundbreaking tank strategies, remained relatively unknown outside the Soviet Union. Zhukov viewed Khalkhin Gol as crucial preparation for future operations in WW2. By May 1940, he attained the rank of army general, becoming one of only eight senior Red Army officers.

Upon taking command, a comprehensive reorganization of the country's defense forces was initiated. There is some debate regarding how much of this restructuring was Zhukov's idea, but he demonstrated the same level of competence in this new position as he had in the field. The army in the western region of the country was divided into five specialized military districts, which were designed to create defensive fronts to withstand any invasion while the primary forces were mobilized. These districts were based in Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, Kyiv, and Odesa, respectively becoming known as the Northern, North-Western, Western, South-Western, and Southern Fronts. Essentially, these were provisional staff organizations that would be supplemented with mobilized units as determined by the Stavka.

At the time, it was widely recognized that the upper echelons of the Army's command structure had been profoundly impacted by the purges. However, what remained unclear was the fate of the mid-level officers responsible for leading the divisions and regiments of the Red Army in 1941. These individuals were generally younger than their counterparts in the Wehrmacht, and in many instances, division commanders lacked any formal military training. To complicate matters, many of these officers had very little time to prepare their troops. Developing skilled tactical leaders requires time, and experience must be acquired through the operation of units. Effective maneuvers need to be planned and executed on training grounds to educate officers on the principles of division-level combat. Regrettably for the Red Army, this crucial experience would have to be gained in the theater of war. Post-war literature excoriates Red Army leaders for “Human Wave” tactics. This is only partially a legitimate criticism. Such wasteful tactics certainly happened, but they were primarily due to poor state of command and control. Division, Corps and even some Army commanders had no experience in maneuvering large units in battle. Even when they did, the desperate strategic situation was often such that there was no choice but to conduct large scale frontal assaults on prepared German positions. As the war progressed, officers of all ranks gained experience in tactical movement. Additionally, the strategic situation improved slowly. This allowed for assaults to be well supported with Artillery, Armor and Air. By 1945 “Human Waves” were a relic of the past. Combat was still bloody, but it was not desperate assaults of 1941. 

The country's defense against a threat from the west was structured into strategic layers. There were two layers of the regular army and a forward defense element at the border. This border defense comprised NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in "fortified regions." These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and manning the fortifications along the USSR's border. By June 1941, there were fifty-seven fortified regions, with forty-two located in the west, totaling one hundred ninety thousand personnel. The NKVD Border Guards had around one hundred sixty-five thousand members across their various units and detachments. The goal was for these forces to resist any invasion while the rest of the Army mobilized and positioned for counterattacks. If that failed, they would create a substantial obstacle to slow the enemy down. However, their location near the border required them to be ready before any invasion attempt to effectively delay or repel the enemy. Unfortunately, this objective was not achievable on the day of the attack, as Stalin's late order to prepare the troops did not allow sufficient time for them to take their positions. Lastly, the NKVD Railroad Security forces, consisting of approximately sixty-two thousand men, were deployed around the country’s railroad depots, bridges, and other key logistics areas.

The country's defense against a western threat was structured into strategic levels. It consisted of two strategic echelons of the regular army and a forward border defense unit. This border defense was formed by the NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in the "fortified regions." The NKVD Border Guard detachments were independent units who were armed and equipped as light infantry but fell under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or NKVD. This was in opposition to the Red Army’s Fortified Regions, which were division sized elements intended to be able to build and man bunkers along the border. Both types of units were emplaced along the border to a depth of approximately 20km. 

These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and staffing the fortifications along the USSR's border. On June 22, 1941, the Fortified Regions only had 47% of their men and 27% of their officers. Around 50% of the authorized fortifications had been built. This, when combined with the late authorization to go over to full alert from Moscow, spelled disaster for the defense of the border. 

The subsequent line of defense is often called the first strategic echelon, comprising the initial standalone units of the Red Army. This force consisted of fifteen field armies divided into the five Fronts mentioned earlier, totaling one hundred sixty-six divisions. On the Northern Front, the 7th, 14th, and 23rd Armies comprised twenty-two divisions, supported by reserves including three independent rifle divisions and a motorized corps. They were positioned along the Soviet-Finnish border, extending from Leningrad to the Barents Sea. The Northwestern Front, covering the areas of the former Baltic Republics, had three field armies available. The 27th Army was in reserve around the Ostrov area alongside the 5th Airborne Corps, while the 8th and 11th Armies were stationed along the front that faced German East Prussia down to Vilnius. Together, these forces totaled twenty-nine divisions. The Western Front consisted of four armies, three of which were positioned along the border with German-occupied Poland. The 3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies were deployed near the border, with the 13th Army held in reserve further behind the lines near Minsk. Overall, this front, including reserves, had forty-three divisions.The Southwestern Front was the largest of the Red Army’s formations. The 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies were deployed along the front, supported by substantial reserves situated behind them. With four rifle divisions, two motorized divisions, and an airborne corps, the Southwestern Front possessed considerable strength that could create secondary lines to safeguard the retreat of its forward forces, a luxury that none of its counterparts would enjoy during the initial days of the invasion.

The Southern front was the smallest, comprising just one field army. Its fourteen divisions were stationed along the Romanian border near the port of Odesa. In contrast, the 9th Army was considerably larger than its northern counterparts, partly because of the extensive area it needed to cover. This region was also not perceived as a probable zone of operations. While the source material is vague on this point, it’s possible that Stalin did not anticipate the Romanians would actively engage against the Soviet Union. It was clear that Germany had become the dominant political force in internal Romanian politics by this point. Stalin was under no illusions of this. It had been one of the flaring points in the rising tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. Bessarbia had been occupied in June 1940. The German campaigns in the Balkans and Greece were seen as counterweights to Soviet influence in the region. 

Behind these field armies, the Stavka Reserve was positioned in the second strategic echelon, consisting of fifty-seven divisions spread across six field armies. Three of these armies, the 19th, 21st, and 22nd, were stationed west of Moscow, each positioned behind one of the main fronts. The 20th Army was located near the capital, while the 16th and 24th Armies were stationed in Siberia, based in Chita. They were set to advance westward eventually, but for now, they served to maintain the Red Army’s presence along the lengthy stretch of the Soviet Union, linking the Far Eastern Front to the capital. In this deployment framework, plans were crafted for the country's defense. The armies in the first strategic echelon were expected to bear the primary impact of the enemy invasion. Aiming to strengthen the border guards and occupy the defensive positions along the border, they would require time to mobilize. Within this echelon, the initial operational reserve was designated to be the main component of the Red Army's counterattack capability. In this context, an Operational Reserve can be distinguished from a Strategic Reserve. The first type are units that may be fed into battle, usually piecemeal to short up weakened defenses or a to help carry forward a struggling attack. Units in a Strategic Reserve are typically used as a bloc in order to build a counter-offensive capability on a wide scale. Any breaches in the border defense would be managed by these forces, while the Red Army's strategy focused on creating substantial counterattacks to strike back at the invaders utilizing the Stavka Reserve.

After France's defeat, it became clear that a war with Germany and its allies was likely unavoidable. Following some discussions, the consensus emerged that the most probable approach would involve fighting on two fronts: Germany and its European partners would launch attacks in the West, while Japan would aggressively target the armies in the Far East. Although plans were frequently adjusted, the overarching strategy was to ensure that the border forces could effectively hold off the invaders while the majority of the Red Army was mobilized and positioned for a major counter-offensive in the West. This operation was primarily envisioned to come from the Southwestern front, advancing northwest towards Lublin, continuing to Lodz, and ultimately reaching Danzig. Such a daring maneuver aimed to isolate the enemy along the border. Throughout the latter half of 1940, discussions persisted regarding the focal point of the German offensive. In October, Stalin asserted his belief that the Germans would primarily target Ukraine and its rich natural resources. Ironically, during this same period Hitler was struggling with his General Staff about where the main effort should be focused. No explicit agreement was reached beyond the destruction of the Red Army being the first priority. This indecision would come to haunt the Wehrmacht’s war effort throughout 1941. Hitler eventually decided that Ukraine would be the first priority, but only after months of indecisive combat had drained the resources of the Wehrmacht. 

Despite the challenges, the Soviet Union began implementing several defensive measures. A significant portion of their efforts focused on expanding industrial capabilities to produce equipment and ammunition. They placed substantial orders for large quantities of the latest tank models, the T-34 and the KV-1. While it would take time for these tanks to reach frontline units in sufficient quantities, it was crucial to establish production capacity as soon as possible. This urgency stemmed partly from the Soviet Union's ongoing shortage of machinery necessary for mass weapon and ammunition production. While Stalin sought to gain favor with Hitler by increasing exports to Germany, Hitler was reducing deliveries to the Soviet Union. To address this gap, Stalin placed extensive orders for machinery at German factories, highlighting the long way the Soviet Union had to go to establish a robust industrial base for a protracted conflict. By the summer of 1941, it was well understood among the top leadership that the production capacity was inadequate. There was a significant shortfall of anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, and even modern field artillery, and ammunition for these weapons was also being produced in insufficient quantities.

In addition to the fundamental reorganization of the frontier into designated areas of responsibility, there was the requirement for a thorough overhaul of the Red Army's order of battle. The independent tank units had been suspended sometime after the invasion of Poland, and following the observation of the German campaigns in the West, the Stavka recognized the error of this decision. They began to reinstate these units, founding tank divisions and mechanized corps that were included in the Red Army’s organizational structure. However, these formations were fundamentally different from the German concept of Panzer groups, which were designed for strategic objectives like breakthroughs and subsequent encirclements. The classic example of this was the 1940 campaign in France and the low countries. Infantry units held down the bulk of the enemy army, and the panzers selected a strategic weak point, orchestrated a breakthrough and then conducted a sweeping envelopment, cutting off the enemy’s lines of retreat. 

In contrast, Soviet tank units were allocated to individual field armies for localized breakthrough operations and counterattacks. While the Red Army's doctrine would later evolve, it remained relatively rudimentary in 1941. These reformed units were essentially being built from the ground up, a process that required considerable time, resources, and personnel. Many of the tank divisions were significantly understrength on June 22, 1941. Although exact figures for each unit are difficult to ascertain, three divisions serve as a broadly representative example of the Red Army as a whole. The tank divisions were critically lacking in the modern equipment they were supposed to possess. For instance, the 1st Tank Division had less than ten percent of its authorized 62 KV-1 heavy tanks, while the medium tank battalions fared no better, with only 38 percent of their authorized strength of 206 T-34 tanks. The failure to adequately equip these divisions with modern tanks was further exacerbated by the presence of obsolete tanks, creating a misleading impression of strength that would later trouble commanders in the early months of the campaign. Overall, there were 40 tank divisions in the Western Theatre. To achieve full authorized strength, 8240 T-34s and 2480 KV-1s were needed. However, by June, 967 T-34s and 508 KV-1s had been delivered. Across the theatre, the Red Army managed to acquire just 11 percent of the required medium tanks and twenty percent of the necessary heavy tanks.

The tank arm was not the only aspect of the Red Army that faced significant issues in the final days of peace. In the early 1940s, the standard structure of rifle divisions was modified to a more streamlined format. This change was partly because tanks were removed from their role of infantry support, where they had previously been included in the infantry division. This is similar to the French model, where infantry divisions had organic medium and heavy tank elements that would support the infantry division’s breakthrough. This was another theory of armor employment that was borne out of the experience of the first world war. It proved to be the inferior model in many respects to the German theory of massed armored formations conducting breakthroughs on their own accord. The Red Army’s leadership was merely following the trends of theory development as they saw it. They were not alone. The US Army was also continuing development of their concept of armor employment in response to German successes in Western Europe. 

However, this reduction in division size on paper did not reflect the actual strength of the units in the field. Some rifle divisions deployed in the western theater were so undermanned that it bordered on absurdity. The peacetime personnel levels of the Red Army were set by Stavka, following decisions made by the NKO regarding readiness measures. NKO is the acronym for the Soviet Union’s equivalent to the Modern US Department of Defense. Stavka was the military high command, but they ultimately reported to the NKO head, called the People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union. In June 1941 this position was held by Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko. After the invasion began, he was also named the Chairman of Stavka, but eventually gave both of these positions to Stalin. These strengths were periodically reviewed, fluctuating up or down, but they never reached the full mobilization strength of approximately 14,500 soldiers. By June 1941, the authorized strength had risen to as high as 85%. While this represented progress, not all divisions achieved this level. Some divisions were recorded as having less than 42% of their authorized personnel. This figure was further diminished by absences due to leave, illness, or desertion.

The Red Air Force faced significant challenges in its efforts to rebuild and redeploy in the west based on the new strategic framework. Drawing lessons from the Winter War and the Spanish Civil War, the Red Air Force revised its mission objectives. Prior to these conflicts, the emphasis had been on long-range bombing aimed at destroying enemy airfields and industrial facilities. However, the updated strategies prioritized tactical air superiority and close air support over such missions. This shift was a logical decision, one that resonated with air forces globally. Nonetheless, difficulties emerged with the strategies implemented to achieve these new objectives. The air force was organized into regiments, with aircraft assigned to Front and Army commanders, allowing them to deploy the planes as they preferred. In practice, this led to the widespread dispersion of the Red Air Force to satisfy local commanders' needs. Consequently, smaller frontier airfields became overcrowded with aircraft due to command-and-control complications. This overcrowding resulted in many planes being stationed too close to the border, lacking the space and time necessary to respond effectively to German air formations. As a result, thousands of aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the early days of the invasion, caught off guard by surprise attacks. The pride of the Soviet military was on the brink of being systematically eliminated. In addition to these placement issues, the Red Air Force also struggled with modernization, as insufficient industrial capacity had been allocated for the production and delivery of the advanced aircraft required.

The mobilization plans were not fully realized when the Germans launched their invasion, and actual implementation was even less developed. The fundamental flaw in the Red Army’s mobilization strategy was its reliance on the assumption that they would receive advance warning before any attack. In retrospect, this assumption seems absurd and outdated. The slow-moving armies of World War I had adhered to lengthy mobilization timelines that often took weeks or even months. However, given the context of that time, it was not unreasonable to believe that the Red Army would have sufficient time for mobilization. The unmistakable signs of the German army's mobilization and deployment in 1939 were evident to all. The Poles were unprepared, largely due to internal indecision and external pressures from the UK and France that a mobilization of the Polish Army would give the Germans reason to invade. This proved to be a senseless hesitancy on their part that cost the Poles their country. Appeasing Hitler, even in the short term did not stay his hand. Stalin would have to learn this lesson for himself, even after watching it happen many times before. 

By 1940, the only uncertainty was about the main thrust of the Wehrmacht, not whether they had prepared and mobilized. Much of this uncertainty stemmed from the density of their deployments, allowing forces in one location to strike in various directions. The Red Army was justified in expecting a warning to facilitate mobilization; in fact, they received ample warnings. What was missing was the authorization to mobilize, which came from Stalin himself. It was unpredictable that Stalin would hesitate and issue orders against mobilizing when every indicator suggested otherwise. Front-line intelligence signaled to Stavka, and covert sources within the Soviet Union indicated an impending attack. Both the US and UK provided warnings concerning Germany's intentions. In early 1941, the US Government informed the Soviet Ambassador that Germany was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring. The British also communicated that they were aware of Germany's invasion plans. Stalin chose to ignore these alerts. Even in April, despite firm warnings from the British government that Hitler was preparing to invade, Stalin remained dismissive. The British Government was not fazed by Stalin’s refusal to see the truth and continued to regularly warn his government of the attack. As late as June 18th, they had told the Soviet Ambassador that the German attack was “inevitable” and would come not later than the middle of June. Only three more days would pass before they were proved right. 

Stalin routinely characterized these alerts as “English provocations” and “clumsy fabrications.” This decision-making failure, rather than a lack of warnings, spelled doom for the Red Army. While discussions of tactical and strategic surprise are common in analyses of the invasion's early days, they are often overstated. Many individual units were not in position because they were not permitted to deploy. They were not fully staffed because, in many instances, mobilization had not been authorized. Soldiers cannot simply appear when requested by Colonels or Generals; they must be summoned from their civilian lives, organized, and assigned to their units. These responsibilities fall to the highest levels of any bureaucracy. In the Soviet Union, as in many other countries, such decisions were made by top authorities. Stalin chose to restrain the army, and they ultimately paid the consequences of that choice.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Stalin watched in horror as the Germans conquered most of western Europe in a lighting fast sweep. All Stalin could do was speed up the training and military production of the USSR, hoping he could bide enough time to meet the enormous threat to his west. Despite numerous warnings, he was not prepared for the storm that was coming.

Last time we spoke about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In a turbulent prelude to World War II, tensions soared as Hitler's rise transformed Europe’s landscape. The Soviet Union, wary of Germany's ambitions, sought alliances with Britain and France, aiming to deter further aggression. However, when these alliances faltered, Stalin turned to Nazi Germany, leading to the historic Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. This shocking agreement allowed both powers to divide Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, into spheres of influence, ensuring mutual non-aggression. As Europe braced for conflict, this pact altered geopolitical dynamics, alarming nations like Japan, who feared a united Axis front. The pact bought Stalin time to fortify his western borders, while Hitler prepared for rapid expansion. Thus, the seeds of a devastating conflict were sown, illustrating how failed diplomacy and ideological clashes shaped the world’s fate, setting the stage for global warfare that would ensue. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remains a chilling reminder of alliances forged amid chaos.

This episode is Prelude #9 The Blitzkrieg of Western Europe

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are diving into the outbreak of WW2. Buckle up. During the summer of 1939, Germany was gearing up to invade Poland. This operation, known as Case White, aimed for the main force of the Wehrmacht to penetrate Polish defenses in a pincer movement culminating in Warsaw. For the invasion, the German Army, referred to as the Heer, was organized into two major Army Groups, with a smaller group stationed in the west to deter any French or British advances. In the West, Colonel General Ritter von Leeb commanded Army Group C, tasked with defending the Westwall, which extended from Duisburg in the north to Mainz in the center and the Swiss border in the south. Although he was technically in charge of three field armies, the 1st, 5th, and 7th, their strengths were largely superficial, meant to project the appearance of a much larger force to intimidate the French and British. No tanks were available in the west, and Leeb's troops relied solely on Luftwaffe reconnaissance and anti-aircraft units for support.

In the Polish theater of operations, the Army was organized into two groups for the invasion. The primary focus was assigned to Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt, who led Army Group South. His mission was to move his forces from Silesia in a northerly direction toward Warsaw via Lodz. Rundstedt commanded three field armies: the 8th, 10th, and 14th, along with most of the Panzer divisions. At this point, there were only six Panzer divisions in the entire army. Additionally, there were four Leichte, or “Light,” divisions, each consisting of one Panzer battalion combined with an infantry brigade and an artillery regiment. These combined divisions had just 39 tanks. There are different opinions regarding the role of the Leichte divisions. Some paint them as a stop gap solution to motorize the army pending production of more tanks. Others say they were an experimental attempt to modernize the cavalry as reconnaissance divisions. The truth, as always, is probably a mixture of both. While they were more mobile than traditional infantry divisions, they were approximately half the size of a motorized infantry division, which did not have tanks. Rundstedt was in charge of all four Light Divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th. He also oversaw four of the six Panzer divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th.

The other military formation in the Polish theater was Army Group North, led by Colonel General von Bock. He commanded two field armies: the 3rd Army, stationed in East Prussia, ready to advance southward to converge with Army Group South in Warsaw, and the 4th Army in Pomerania, aiming to secure the Polish Corridor. Bock was also assigned a motorized corps under the General of Panzer Troops Guderian, which included one panzer division. Additionally, he received Panzer-Division Kempf, a combined task force of Panzer and SS regiments that fell short of the typical division strength. Panzer Division Kempf is notable for more than its odd combination of SS and panzer troops. It was made up of one light panzer regiment, the Waffen-SS Regiment SS Deutschland, and an unnumbered SS Artillery regiment. The OKH held in reserve a total of one panzer division, thirteen infantry divisions, and two mountain infantry divisions. Eleven of the thirteen infantry divisions were kept in strategic reserve to address any significant operations in the west that might threaten Army Group C, while the remaining troops were designated as reserves for the campaign in Poland. Overall, the Germans were deploying a formidable force of one million five hundred thousand soldiers, supported by two thousand seven hundred fifty tanks and nine thousand artillery pieces of various sizes.

To confront the cluster of German troops in the west, the Poles assembled seven field armies along with an independent corps. One of the field armies was kept in reserve, with divisions stationed near Warsaw and Sandomierz. The Polish field armies were not numbered, but instead were given regional names. The six armies on the front were: 

1. The Carpathian Army, commanding: MG Fabryey. 2. The Krakow Army, commanding BG Szylling. 3. The Lodz Army, commanding: MG Rommel . 4. The Poznan Army, commanding MG Kutrzeba . 5. The Modlin Army. commanding: Bg Przedrzymirski-Krukowicz. 6. The Pomorze Army. commanding: LTG Bortnowski. The reserve army was the Prussia Army commanding: MG Dab-Biernacki. Independent Corps was known as the Narew Group. Commanding: BG Mlot-Fijalkowski. This constituted the majority of the Polish forces; however, many units were still in the process of mobilization when the Germans launched their attack.

The invasion of Poland would be preceded by a false flag operation, quite reminiscent of the Mukden Incident or Marco Polo Bridge Incident, used to guise the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China proper.

Operation Himmler, also known as Operation Konserve, was a covert false flag operation conducted by Nazi Germany in 1939, primarily aimed at creating a pretext for the German invasion of Poland. The operation was orchestrated under the supervision of Heinrich Himmler, with key figures including Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Müller involved in its planning. In the months leading up to the invasion, a propaganda campaign was launched by German authorities, especially by Adolf Hitler, accusing Polish officials of ethnic cleansing against Germans living in Poland. This narrative served to justify the impending military actions and to sway international opinion against Poland. Most of the deceptive incidents attributed to Polish aggression occurred on August 31, 1939. Initially scheduled to begin on August 26, the operation's actual launch was delayed due to shifting diplomatic circumstances. German operatives, including members of the SS, executed staged attacks wearing Polish uniforms. This saw them attack German border posts and broadcast messages in Polish from seized radio stations. They left behind the bodies of concentration camp prisoners dressed in Polish uniforms as evidence of Polish brutality. The most infamous of these incidents was the Gleiwitz incident, where operatives seized a radio station to deliver anti-German propaganda, further fueling the justification for war. On September 1, 1939, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, claiming that several border incidents twenty-one on the night before were acts of Polish aggression. He framed the invasion of Poland as a defensive measure to protect Germany from perceived threats, despite the fact that these "threats" were fabricated during the operation.

On September 1, 1939, at around 4:45 AM, Hitler’s military campaign was set in motion. Throughout the previous year, the UK and France had assured support for the Polish government, but now they hesitated. It wasn’t until September 3 that they were able to declare war. In the meantime, the Wehrmacht was rapidly advancing. Every hour was critical as Polish cities faced bombardment and German tanks began to encircle the strongest units of the Polish army. By September 8, the 4th Panzer Division was engaged on the outskirts of Warsaw, while the French had not yet completed their mobilization. By September 15, Warsaw was surrounded, and the fight for Poland was nearly concluded. In the days prior, Hitler had questioned the Soviets about their intentions regarding Poland. Stalin delayed until he recognized that Poland would soon fall. On September 17, he ordered the Red Army to cross the border. Two Army Fronts were formed for the invasion: the Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts. These were temporary formations, assigned a mix of units ranging from independent brigades to entire field armies. The main force consisted of three "mobile groups," which were essentially army-sized units of tanks, cavalry, and motorized infantry. Stalin aimed for Soviet troops to extend deep into Polish territory, hoping to reduce reliance on German withdrawals to meet the demarcation lines outlined in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, thereby avoiding any potential conflict. The Poles, already on the brink of defeat, fell back quickly in response to this new onslaught. On September 27, a German delegation met with Molotov to discuss altering the initial plans for dividing Eastern Europe. After several days of discussions, a modification was agreed upon. Originally, Lithuania had been designated to the German sphere of influence, but it was now transferred to the Soviet Union. In return, Germany received Lublin and all of Warsaw.

The campaign concluded on October 6th, with the final Polish resistance surrendering under General Kleeburg at Kock, situated between the Bug and Wieprz rivers. This came just thirty-five days after the German invasion began. Poland was devastated. While few believed the Polish Army could defeat the Germans, the rapidity of their victory was unexpected. French Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin had informed his government that he anticipated the resistance to continue at least until spring. Although the campaign ended swiftly, it was challenging and resulted in significant losses for the German Army. The Heer experienced approximately fifty thousand casualties, including dead and wounded. While these losses were relatively light for a campaign of such scale, each one was felt deeply in an army reliant on a small, experienced cadre of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. The Germans also lost around two hundred tanks, which was less detrimental to the army's overall strength compared to personnel losses, as many of the destroyed tanks were older models like the Panzer I and II. This situation revealed flaws in the organization and tactics of the Panzer divisions. It would take time to replace the lost resources and fully integrate the lessons learned from this campaign.

Even before the conflict escalated in Poland, Stalin began his actions in the Baltic states. His goal was to assert Soviet control over the territories assigned to him by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact just weeks prior. Facing the threat of invasion, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed agreements allowing Soviet troops to station themselves within their borders. This was merely a precursor, and by the summer of 1940, Stalin commanded the occupation of all three countries. By August, they had been integrated as republics of the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Finns managed to withstand Soviet advances, leading to the Winter War in late 1939. Although the Soviet Union annexed some Finnish land, it came at a significant cost. 

With Poland now conquered, the focus shifted to the West. Gamelin attempted to take advantage of the weeks that followed to further mobilize the Army and initiated a limited offensive in the Saar during the war's early days. This operation was quite restricted, involving troops from three field armies. Nonetheless, it was stopped after advancing only a few miles. The French forces remained in place until October 16th, when they retreated in response to a weak German counterattack. No additional fighting occurred in the West for the rest of 1939. This period marked Germany’s most vulnerable point since 1936, yet the French failed to capitalize on the opportunity. The reasons for this retreat, be it incompetence, lack of resolve, or inadequate intelligence, remain unclear. Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht commenced its transfer from the east and began preparing for actions in the west. As winter approached, Hitler turned his focus northward. Germany depended on Swedish iron ore for its industries, which during winter was transported through Norway before being loaded onto ships bound for Germany. Swedish iron ore was transported through the Baltic sea during the summer months, but in the winter, too much of the route was blocked by large ice floes. This shipping route was vulnerable to interference from the Royal Navy as the vessels sailed through the North Sea instead of the more secure Baltic Sea. Therefore, securing Denmark and Norway became essential. Plans for an operation were developed, aiming for a coordinated attack on both countries in early April of 1940. It was determined that the Scandinavian nations needed to be secured before any offensive against France and the Low Countries could proceed. 

Before the invasion, Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, which lasted less than a year. Initially, Germany aimed to persuade Denmark to allow access to its military bases. However, Adolf Hitler ultimately ordered the invasion, shifting to a more aggressive strategy to secure Norway's vital resources, particularly iron ore shipping routes from Narvik. The establishment of radar systems in Denmark was part of an effort to protect German territories from potential British air attacks later on. The German High Command devised a multi-faceted attack plan. Paratroopers were to secure strategic points such as airfields and bridges. Ships were tasked with landing troops at key coastal cities like Copenhagen and along the Jutland Peninsula. Ground forces were set to advance quickly across Danish territory.

On the morning of April 9, at 04:15, German troops began breaching the Danish border in multiple locations. The Danish military, which was unprepared and scattered, struggled to mount an effective defense. Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning feared heavy bombings similar to those witnessed in Poland and ordered an end to resistance within mere hours of the invasion, citing the untenable position of the Danish forces. The initial clashes included sporadic resistance from Danish troops, particularly at Lundtoftbjerg and Aabenraa. Danish units attempted to set up roadblocks and engage German forces but were quickly overwhelmed by superior numbers and equipment. For instance, at Lundtoftbjerg, a Danish anti-tank unit faced off against a German column, managing to disable some German vehicles before being forced back. Danish forces made determined efforts to defend specific towns like Haderslev and Tønder, inflicting some casualties on advancing German troops. However, prolonged resistance was impossible, and by around 08:34, Denmark formally capitulated after only six hours of fighting.

The rapid fall of Denmark led to a notably lenient occupation by German forces, as they allowed Danish authorities to retain some degree of autonomy in managing domestic affairs. The Royal Danish Army was largely disbanded, and a small unit called the Life Guards was retained. The swift occupation of Denmark was viewed with disdain by Allied forces, leading to perceptions of the Danes as passive in the face of aggression. The phrase Aldrig mere 9 April “Never again April 9” has since become a popular saying in Denmark, reflecting a collective wish to never again experience such a sudden and humiliating defeat. Yet Denmark was to only be part of a larger invasion.

Following the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, the UK shifted its plans to occupy northern Norway. However, after negotiations and military planning, conflicts of interest and the evolving geopolitical situation led to an escalation on Germany's part. In December 1939, Hitler ordered a preliminary assessment for a Norwegian invasion, solidifying Germany's intention to capture strategic ports and airfields. Under the codename "Operation Weserübung," the Germans planned to invade Denmark and Norway in rapid succession. General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was appointed commander for the operation, which included the deployment of infantry, mountain divisions, and paratroopers. The Luftwaffe was key to the operation, intending to secure air superiority with around 1,000 aircraft. On April 5, 1940, the British initiated the mining of Norwegian waters in a bid to provoke a German response. The Allies had planned their intervention in Norway as a two-fold mission. 1. To prevent Hitler from securing the Baltic and 2. To prepare to support Finland in its war against the Soviet Union. In France, public opinion was strongly in favor of intervention against the Soviets during this time.

The German invasion was launched on April 9, 1940, involved around 120,000 German troops and significant naval and air support, targeting key locations such as Oslo, Narvik, and Trondheim. At Oslo, German forces encountered resistance but secured the capital quickly after dealing with coastal defenses. The German cruiser Blücher was sunk by Norwegian forces at Oscarsborg Fortress, which delayed the invasion. The port of Narvik was one of the most critical of the Norwegian campaign. The port became crucial for German access to Swedish iron ore and witnessed fierce fighting. After several engagements, including the First and Second Battles of Narvik, the Allies initially retook the city before being forced into retreat due to the changing nature of the broader conflict in Europe.

The Allies had mobilized a force of about 38,000 troops, which included British, French, and Polish units. Despite some early successes, such as the landings at Narvik, the Allies struggled with coordination and support logistics due to the swift German advance. Following the German success in France, which we will get into later, the Allies were compelled to withdraw from Norway. The successful evacuation efforts from locations like Narvik were challenged by heavy German air superiority and the efficient use of U-boat patrols by the Germans.

The battle for Norway was a complex situation that unfolded over several weeks, but the outcome was rarely in question. The Germans deployed five divisions, backed by comprehensive naval and air support. The Norwegians were taken by surprise, poorly equipped, and faced internal turmoil due to a coup attempt. While this coup ultimately failed, it transformed Norway into little more than a puppet state for Berlin. In Moscow, Stalin felt a sense of relief; he had been concerned that the Allies might draw the Soviet Union into the broader conflict following the Winter War. With Germany's occupation of Norway, it became evident that any chance for the Allies to strike against the Soviets was lost. 

The fighting in Norway would continue until early June, but the region was secure enough for Hitler to proceed with plans for Western Europe. He clearly indicated to his Generals that Belgium and the Netherlands' neutrality would not be honored. Initial strategies for invading France aimed to replicate the Schlieffen Plan from 1914; however, this was abandoned in favor of a proposal from the relatively junior Lieutenant General Manstein. His plan involved a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest while creating a diversion in the Low Countries to lure the Allied forces out of France. The majority of the panzer divisions would then advance through the Ardennes to sever the Allied armies' connection to France, enabling the large encirclement that had been central to German military strategy since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

The Germans devised a meticulous strategy involving diversionary forces that would enter Belgium to lure British and French troops away from their established positions. A second contingent would traverse the Ardennes Forest, circumventing the Maginot Line, with the objective of disconnecting the northern Allied forces from those in the south. The French hoped to rely not only on the fortified concrete defenses of the Maginot Line but also on the natural barrier provided by the Ardennes Forest, which they believed was impassable. The German objective was clear: to conquer Holland and Luxembourg before taking Belgium and France, ultimately advancing towards the English Channel while dismantling any Allied resistance and capturing Paris. With this plan, a brief crossing of the English Channel would suffice for the German military to invade Britain. The success of the "Blitzkrieg" tactics, championed by General Guderian in Poland, expedited the invasion process and equipped German forces with invaluable experience.

In contrast to Norway, the Low Countries had been anticipating an invasion for several months. Both the Netherlands and Belgium were nearly fully mobilized and had established agreements for their collective defense. Together, they had roughly 900,000 troops, although a significant portion of their equipment was outdated and of questionable quality. Their combined air force numbered fewer than 900 planes, with even fewer being modern combat aircraft. A well-armed and trained British Expeditionary Force was located just south of the Belgian border with France. Along with the French armies positioned immediately south of the Belgian frontier from Sedan to the sea, there were about 750,000 potential reinforcements available to the Dutch and Belgian forces. Although there was a sizeable Allied air presence in reserve, it was insignificant compared to the strength of the Luftwaffe.

In May 1940, the German military's strength consisted of approximately 3.5 million troops, over 5,500 aircraft, and 10 panzer divisions. The Allies could deploy a similar number of tanks, but these were scattered among infantry units instead of being organized into concentrated armored divisions, and many tanks were without radios. The Dutch defense strategy relied significantly on flooding certain areas that an invading army might cross. The Belgian defenses were more formidable; their defensive line followed the Meuse River up to Liège, then extended along the Albert Canal, a waterway with steep banks that created a significant barrier. At the heart of the Belgian defense were a series of forts along the canal, with Eben Emael being the largest and seemingly impregnable fortress, overseeing the routes to the Dutch city of Maastricht and crucial bridges across the Albert Canal. However, as a joint Dutch-Belgian defensive line, this system had a critical flaw: it did not connect the Albert Canal and Belgian Meuse defenses with the Dutch lines, creating a gap that significantly contributed to the rapid isolation and defeat of the Netherlands.

The Allies anticipated that the German attack would align with the Schlieffen Plan used during WW1. Indeed, the German plancode named “Fall Gelb” or “Case Yellow” strategy proposed by Chief of the Army General Staff Franz Halder followed this model. Even before the plan fell into Belgian hands in January 1940, Hitler had dismissed it as too conservative and lacking ambition. He was thus open to Lieut. Gen. Erich von Manstein's bold alternative. The offensive was to be executed by three army groups: Army Group C, led by Gen. Wilhelm von Leeb, would feint against the Maginot Line, while Gen. Fedor von Bock's Army Group B would execute the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands. This would draw Allied forces into Belgium, consistent with their expectations of a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan. Meanwhile, Gen. Gerd von Rundstedt would command the third army group, Army Group A, consisting of 1.5 million men and over 1,500 tanks, executing an armored assault through the Ardennes, bypassing both the Maginot Line and the Allies' strongest divisions.

On May 10, when the Germans invaded the Netherlands, their ground attacks launched from multiple locations, all aimed at The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam. The most formidable of these assaults swept through Dutch Limburg towards Maastricht, quickly achieving success and cutting off a large part of the Netherlands from reinforcements coming from the south. The gap in the defense lay between the Belgian lines, which at Liège and just west of Maastricht turned west along the Albert Canal, and the Dutch water defense positions located about 40 to 50 miles to the north. The only feasible route to bring Allied or Belgian troops to the Rotterdam area, aside from via sea, was across the long bridge over the Meuse at Moerdijk. However, this bridge was captured on the first day of the attack by German paratroopers, who held it firmly until the main body of German ground forces could arrive.

In Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and The Hague, German airborne forces took control of crucial airfields and bridges, while Dutch commanders fretted over potential sabotage by fifth column agents. Within hours of the German attack's onset, British and French troops abandoned their positions in northern France and raced north through Belgium to confront the enemy. The French Ninth Army advanced from near Sedan, the endpoint of the Maginot Line. The French relied on the Ardennes, which they deemed impassable to armored forces, to protect their right flank. This incorrect assumption would become a key factor in Germany's triumph and France's defeat.

Resistance centers in the Netherlands faced intense aerial bombardment. By May 12, German tanks were nearing Rotterdam, and the next day, Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers escaped to England, where they formed a government in exile. On May 14, recognizing the dire situation, Dutch commander-in-chief Gen. Henri Gerard Winkelman surrendered the armies stationed north and east of the Schelde River, which included nearly the entire Netherlands. On the same day, as the commander of Dutch forces in Rotterdam was negotiating the city's surrender, numerous Heinkel He-111 bombers appeared overhead. The subsequent air raid devastated the city center and led to the immediate surrender of Rotterdam. While it took several additional days for the Germans to defeat the remaining Dutch forces in Zeeland, “Fortress Holland” was conquered in just a week. 

On the first day of the invasion, German forces near Maastricht crossed the Albert Canal into Belgium after successfully neutralizing the fortress of Eben Emael through a daring predawn airborne assault. Several hundred elite Fallschirmjäger paratroopers quietly landed in gliders on top of the fort and began to methodically destroy the turrets and casemates using shaped charges. Once daylight arrived, they were joined by an additional 300 infantrymen who parachuted in. By noon on May 11, the garrison of 1,000 had surrendered, clearing the route to Liège. The Germans kept the details of their operation so secret that Allied strategists suspected Eben Emael had fallen due to betrayal, and the true circumstances surrounding its capture would remain unknown until after the war.

On May 13, elements of Panzer Group Kleist, led by General Paul Ludwig von Kleist, crossed the Meuse River. By the next day, the Germans had effectively breached the Meuse-Albert Canal line and entered France just west of Sedan. Continuous assaults from Stuka dive-bombers severely impacted the morale of the French defenders in this area; French commanders had been so confident that an attack through the Ardennes was impossible that the troops stationed there were almost entirely devoid of antitank and antiaircraft weapons. In contrast, the Maginot Line remained unbroken; however, the German incursion occurred at a weak point along the Belgian frontier, where the defenses were undermanned with lower-quality troops. Nonetheless, the region that the Maginot Line aimed to protect had been invaded, necessitating the eventual evacuation of the line itself.

On May 15, Heinz Guderian’s 19th Panzer Corps breached the French defenses and advanced west into open territory. The speed of this advance was remarkable, and by the standards of previous warfare, it represented a looming disaster. The German armored thrust was narrow, with thinly held if any flanks, and its front was roughly 150 miles ahead of the main body of the German forces. To the north lay the entire Belgian army, most of the British Expeditionary Force “BEF”, and at least two French armies, totaling nearly one million troops, while the rest of the French forces were positioned behind and south of them. Guderian’s superiors attempted to slow his advance to consolidate their forces, but he recognized the critical need to maintain momentum. Describing his forward movement as “reconnaissance in force,” Guderian continued his push. On May 17, he crossed the Oise River, entering the Somme valley, and raced toward its mouth at Abbeville. By May 20, Guderian had reached the English Channel, effectively cutting off communication between the Allied forces to the north and south. He took a brief pause to allow German mechanized units to reinforce his flank along the Somme before shifting northward to threaten the Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk on May 22.

 

Other German units also achieved remarkable successes. General Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division crossed the Meuse near Dinant, Belgium, on May 13, quickly establishing a bridgehead on the west bank. On May 15, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s 76thPanzer Corps forced its way across the Meuse at Monthermé, breaking the French lines. Both Rommel and Reinhardt advanced west into open country. Alongside Guderian, they had created a 60-mile gap in the French defenses. Rommel’s division advanced so rapidly that it could maintain only sporadic communication with the Army High Command, leading to its nickname as a “ghost division,” as both Germans and French were uncertain of its precise location or next move. Meanwhile, Reinhardt’s corps approached the Channel ports south of the British rear at Arras.

On May 15, Gamelin informed French Premier Paul Reynaud that Paris could fall within two days. In response, Reynaud reinstated retired General Maxime Weygand, who was 73, to succeed Gamelin as commander in chief. However, Weygand did not arrive from Syria until May 19, leaving a significant gap in leadership just as German armored units advanced rapidly through Flanders. Upon taking command, Weygand immediately dismissed over a dozen generals and promoted fighting colonels, including Charles de Gaulle, to replace them. He aimed to target the German salient in the Somme Valley, but the French response was hindered by civilian refugees clogging the roads toward the front lines.

Bock’s Army Group B quickly dismantled the Dyle Line, a defensive structure from Antwerp to the French border. Antwerp and Brussels fell swiftly, and by May 19, BEF commander Gen. John Gort had begun considering evacuation by sea. On May 21, Gort launched an unexpected counterattack against Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division at Arras. Two BEF tank battalions, supported by two infantry battalions and elements from a French mechanized infantry division, struck south, briefly disrupting the 7th Panzer and parts of the Totenkopf Waffen-SS division. Despite lacking air support, sufficient artillery, or reliable intelligence on German troop movements, this British assault shocked the German army. However, due to severe disruptions in Allied communications, this localized success could not be leveraged, making Arras little more than a fleeting setback for the Germans.

While Army Group A threatened the precarious Allied position on the Channel coast from the south, Walther von Reichenau’s Sixth Army pushed the beleaguered Belgian defenders to their limits. On May 24, German forces were crossing the canal defense line near Dunkirk, the last port available for BEF evacuation, when an inexplicable order from Hitler halted their advance and commanded them to pull back to the canal. This order transformed the Allies’ retreat into a race to evacuate before the Germans encircled them. Evacuations began in earnest on May 27, becoming urgent the next day when Belgian King Leopold III surrendered his army amid a chaotic retreat and millions of civilian refugees trapped in the “Flanders pocket.”

 

Between May 26 and June 4, 1940, around 340,000 Allied troops were evacuated from Dunkirk to England. The Royal Air Force temporarily established air superiority over the Luftwaffe in the area, while the Royal Navy, with impressive coordination and the help of French naval vessels, remained close to shore to oversee the evacuation, rescuing thousands of men using overloaded destroyers and smaller craft. Additionally, approximately 700 civilian boats joined in the rescue operation. The remarkable success of the Dunkirk evacuation was partly due to the fighter cover provided by the Royal Air Force from the English coast and partly because of Hitler’s critical order on May 24 to halt the German advance. This order was based on several factors: primarily, Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, mistakenly assured Hitler that his air force could eliminate the trapped Allied troops; and Hitler appeared to believe Britain might be more inclined to accept peace terms if its pride wasn’t injured by witnessing its army surrender. After three days, Hitler rescinded his order, permitting the German armored forces to advance toward Dunkirk. However, they encountered stronger British resistance, who had fortified their defenses in the interim. Almost immediately, Hitler halted the advance again, redirecting his armored forces south to prepare for the complete conquest of France. By June 4, when the operation concluded, approximately 198,000 British and 140,000 French and Belgian troops had been saved.

By early June 1940, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands had fallen. The British forces had been pushed into the sea, and the Germans had captured over one million Allied soldiers within three weeks. The newly established French front along the Somme and the Aisne was called the Weygand Line. This line was longer than the original Franco-Belgian border, but the forces available to defend it were significantly reduced in both numbers and morale. The French had lost 30 divisions by this point, yet Weygand managed to assemble 49 divisions to cover the new front, leaving just 17 to defend the Maginot Line. The Germans had strengthened their 10 well-experienced armored divisions with fresh tank reinforcements, while their 130 infantry divisions remained largely intact. For the upcoming offensive, German forces were reorganized, with two new armies, the 2nd and 9th, positioned along the Aisne sector, between the Oise and the Meuse. Guderian was tasked with commanding a group of two armored corps that were prepared for action in that area. Meanwhile, Kleist retained two corps to attack from the bridgeheads over the Somme at Amiens and Péronne in a pincer movement aimed at converging on the lower Oise near Creil. The remaining armored corps was set to advance between Amiens and the coast.

At 4:00 AM on June 5, 1940, the German offensive commenced, targeting the western area between Laon and the Channel with a barrage of dive-bombers and a strong assault of mechanized and armored troops. It quickly became clear that the immediate German goal was not solely to capture Paris but to completely annihilate the remaining French armies on the battlefield. For the first two days, resistance along the Somme was fierce, but on June 7, the westernmost armored corps, led by Rommel, broke through toward Rouen. By June 8, German forces had crossed the Avre at Roye, and the capture of Noyon allowed them to advance over the Oise. The French were compelled to retreat generally from the coast to a position east of Soissons, along a front extending about 100 miles.

The defense then crumbled into disorder, and on June 9, the Germans encountered little serious opposition in crossing the Seine. However, Kleist’s pincer maneuver did not unfold as planned. The left pincer, advancing from Péronne, faced strong resistance north of Compiègne. The OKH decided to withdraw Kleist’s group and redirect it east to support a breakthrough in Champagne. This offensive did not begin until June 9 but progressed rapidly. Infantry secured crossings over the Aisne, while Guderian’s tanks surged through the breach toward Chalons-sur-Marne and then eastward. The advance quickly moved across the Langres Plateau to Besançon and the Swiss border, isolating all French forces within the Maginot Line.

On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, was completely unprepared to capitalize on Germany’s invasion of Poland. To benefit from the Pact of Steel, it seemed essential for Mussolini to take action before Germany independently pushed the Allies to seek peace. However, both the declaration and Italy’s involvement had little impact on the outcome of the Battle of France. Although Italy had around 30 divisions ready along its Alpine frontier, they postponed their attack on southeastern France until June 20, by which time the situation was nearly resolved. When they finally launched their offensive, it made minimal headway against the French defenses.

At the same time, German forces were advancing toward the French capital. Prime Minister Reynaud and his government had already retreated from Paris to Tours, as there appeared to be no strategic reason to defend the city. On June 12, Weygand informed Reynaud and other ministers that France's war was lost and that further fighting would be futile. This assessment was undeniably accurate, as entire French armies were collapsing under the German assault. On the same day, the 51st Highland Division, a British Expeditionary Force unit operating under French command, was facing defeat at Saint-Valéry-en-Caux. Unable to reach Dunkirk, Cherbourg, or any other evacuation ports and having run out of supplies and ammunition, Major General Victor Fortune and his 10,000 troops surrendered to the Germans. Fortune became the highest-ranking British prisoner of war captured by Germany. On June 14, the French army evacuated Paris, and the Germans entered the city later that day.

The official armistice between Germany and France was signed on June 21st, just six weeks after the campaign began. The world was taken aback, as France's army had been held in high regard globally. Even Hitler's generals hadn't anticipated such an outcome. The rapid victories in Poland, Scandinavia, and the West unfolded like a flash, leading the British and American press to popularize the term "Blitzkrieg." For the Wehrmacht, these campaigns represented the pinnacle of German military success. However, as they started to buy into their own propaganda, they began to lose their professionalism. Planning and the strict adherence to orders, which had defined German military tradition since Frederick the Great, were sidelined. This insubordination would later become a significant issue in subsequent campaigns.

The response in the Soviet Union was one of shock and denial. Stalin had centered his entire strategy in the previous year around a prolonged conflict in the West. With France now out of the war and the UK seemingly weakened, adjustments needed to be made. The Red Army was still grappling with its own shortcomings from the Winter War against Finland, which had prompted a reorganization following that setback. As a result, a sense of panic began to emerge. By late summer, the Red Army initiated significant troop redeployments to the Western Military Districts. On July 21st, Hitler instructed his generals to start formulating plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union. Tensions were escalating, and both sides were in a race against time to prepare.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In 1939, as Europe stood on the brink of war, Stalin allied with Hitler, signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to divide Eastern Europe. Germany swiftly invaded Poland, employing a brutal blitzkrieg strategy. Afterwards Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France fell as the world devolved into WW2. 

Last time we spoke about the Spanish Civil War. In the backdrop of 1930s Spain, a storm brews as political tensions peak following the abdication of King Alfonso 13th. The establishment of the Second Spanish Republic ignites hopes of reform among the progressive populace but alienates conservative factions. This polarization breeds violence, with the left, led by socialists and anarchists, clashing with monarchists and fascists. In July 1936, a military coup, spearheaded by General Francisco Franco, sparks the Spanish Civil War. As battles rage, international powers intervene, with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy backing Franco, while the Soviet Union supports the Republicans. Amidst brutal conflict, notable events unfold, like the devastating bombing of Guernica, which embodies the war's horrors and ignites global outrage. By 1939, after years of ferocious fighting, Franco emerges victorious, establishing a dictatorship that endures for decades, forever altering Spain's trajectory. The war, a precursor to WWII, becomes a haunting reminder of the cost of ideological battles.

This episode is Prelude #8 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello again, today we are diving into the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the events right before the outbreak of WW2! Since its establishment, the Soviet Union was apprehensive about the possibility of German revanchism. This concern intensified when Hitler rose to prominence and seized power in the early 1930s. Stalin emphasized that the Soviets would strive to overcome the country’s diplomatic isolation, particularly concerning France and the United Kingdom, which had been allies during World War I. He urged them to acknowledge the new European security landscape under Hitler's regime and sought to revive the Triple Entente, encouraging Britain and France to engage in negotiations on this issue. Basically it was a large case of the enemies of my enemy are my friends. 

By 1935, it was evident to everyone in the Soviet Union that multilateral treaties were essential for effectively deterring Hitler's expansionist ambitions. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, worked tirelessly to forge a mutual defense pact with France. This task proved challenging, particularly due to political opportunists in France who seized the negotiations as an opportunity to portray the Soviets as the real threat to peace in Europe. Ultimately, the treaty was signed on May 2, 1935, and established a mutual defense agreement between the Soviet Union and France. It was intended to provide support in case of an attack by Germany or any other aggressor. The treaty aimed to bolster France's security and form a united front against fascism in Europe. However, it lacked specific military commitments and was often seen as more symbolic than practical. The French, lacking enthusiasm, diluted the treaty by stipulating that commitments to the Soviet Union would only become obligatory after the League of Nations was formally involved and the other signatories of the Treaty of Locarno had been consulted. Essentially, it amounted to a hollow promise of support. The Soviets were undeterred by this setback. Following the Soviet-French treaty, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed their own mutual assistance treaty on May 16, 1935. This agreement committed the Soviet Union to support Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack, offering military assistance and cooperation. The treaty aimed to strengthen Czech defenses, particularly against German expansionism. However the treaty was ultimately weakened when France and the United Kingdom pressured Czechoslovakia into accepting Germany's terms during the Sudetenland crisis. 

As I mentioned in a previous episode, prior to the annexation, Czechoslovakia had built a robust system of fortifications along its borders, particularly in the Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak defensive strategy relied heavily on this region's fortifications, which were among the most advanced in Europe at that time. With a mountainous landscape, the Sudetenland provided an excellent defensive position, enabling Czechoslovak forces to monitor and potentially repel any German advances. However, the Sudetenland also hosted a significant German-speaking population that fostered a sense of discontent and irredentism. Adolf Hitler exploited these sentiments, claiming to protect ethnic Germans and leveraging them as a pretext for invasion. Hitler's aggressive diplomacy culminated in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, where Britain and France acquiesced to Germany's demands, effectively allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland without Czechoslovak involvement.

With the Sudetenland's annexation, Czechoslovakia lost its most fortified and defensible borders. The mountainous terrain, which had offered protection, was now directly exposed to German military advances. The surrender of the Sudetenland led to a massive decline in morale among the Czechoslovak military and the population. Many Czechoslovaks felt betrayed by the Western powers, leading to a lack of national unity that hindered cohesive resistance efforts. The annexation diminished Czechoslovakia's industrial capacity, as many of its weapon production facilities were located in the Sudetenland. This negatively impacted the country’s ability to maintain and supply its military. The Munich Agreement also indicated to Czechoslovakia that it could not rely on its allies, Britain and France, for support, leading to increased isolation. In turn this feeling of abandonment discouraged any serious mutual defense aligned with other Eastern and Central European nations. As a means of survival Czechoslovakia began aligning itself with Germany. In turn Germany desperately needed Czechoslovakia armament capabilities. 

Czechoslovakia maintained a modern army comprising 35 divisions and was a key producer of machine guns, tanks, and artillery, primarily manufactured at the Škoda factory in Plzeň. Many Czech factories continued to create their own designs before transitioning to German specifications. Czechoslovakia was home to several prominent manufacturing companies, and entire steel and chemical production facilities were relocated and reconstructed in Linz, a region that remains heavily industrialized in Austria. In a Reichstag speech, Hitler emphasized the strategic significance of the occupation, highlighting that Germany acquired 2,175 field cannons, 469 tanks, 500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43,000 machine guns, 1,090,000 military rifles, 114,000 pistols, approximately one billion rounds of ammunition, and three million anti-aircraft shells by occupying Czechoslovakia. This vast arsenal was enough to equip around half of the Wehrmacht at that time. Czechoslovak arms later played a crucial role in Germany's invasions of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940.

All of this left the Soviets without justification to intervene and save the nation, even if Stalin had genuinely wanted to act. Although the Soviet Union claimed they were ready to assist Czechoslovakia in its resistance, it was evident that there was no feasible way to do so. Geographic constraints meant that without Poland's consent, Soviet troops could not reach Czechoslovakia. The Polish government resisted the pressure to grant this permission due to valid concerns about Soviet intentions toward Polish territory. At this point, it remains unclear whether the Soviets had any hostile designs. However, their later ambition to annex parts of Poland and fully integrate the country into the Soviet sphere was evident in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which we will address later. Poland’s refusal to allow Soviet forces passage through its land ultimately sealed Czechoslovakia’s fate, representing a significant failure in negotiations to include the Soviet Union in a collective defense pact following the Czechoslovak crisis.

The Munich Conference, led some of the western powers to naively believe Hitler was content and that Czechslvakia represented his final territorial aspirations in Europe. He would violate this promise within mere months however. It was during this time that France and Britain recognized the true threat posed by Hitler. By March 1939, they concluded that the Soviet Union was crucial for effectively deterring further German expansion under Hitler. However, this did not mean that the Triple Entente of 1914 was restored; in fact, the opposite occurred. The British and French governments delayed diplomatic discussions until a military agreement could be reached. Under General Gamelin, the French military would be the primary beneficiaries of an alliance with the Soviets. The French army would once again bear the brunt of the conflict in Western Europe, just as it had in World War I. The Red Army was at least comparable to the French army in terms of numbers, and its involvement in the fight could mean the difference between a desperate last stand and a viable operational strategy capable of defeating the Wehrmacht. The French military and government recognized this clearly, and it was the foundation of their strategy of appeasement toward Hitler. Despite this understanding, General Gamelin did not advocate for the military discussions that his political superiors insisted should happen first. In April, the British and French governments issued unilateral declarations to ensure Polish sovereignty. They urged the Soviet Union to do the same, but Stalin and Foreign Minister Litvinov were wary of being drawn into a conflict against the Germans while the Allies remained passive.

Stalin was also wary of Britain and Frances intentions and extremely eager to secure the Soviet Union's borders. Within this conundrum, Stalin sought out non-aggression pacts as a means to avoid direct conflict with Germany. It was the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in 1939 for a collective security agreement against Nazi Germany that further pushed Stalin towards a rapprochement with Hitler. Negotiations for what would be known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact began in the summer of 1939. The main architects of the agreement were German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov. A little bit about these two figures. Ribbentrop was born into a wealthy family in Hamburg on April 30, 1893. His father was a prosperous merchant. He pursued studies in a variety of disciplines but ultimately joined the family liquor business. Despite a relatively comfortable upbringing, he harbored ambitions that would lead him into the political arena. Ribbentrop’s path shifted dramatically with the outbreak of World War I. He enlisted in the Imperial German Army and served as an officer. His wartime experiences and the social changes that followed the war deeply influenced his political ideology. After the war, he returned to Germany and attempted to rebuild his career in business, but his focus eventually turned towards politics. In the early 1920s, Ribbentrop became involved with the nationalist and conservative movements in Germany. He joined the German National People's Party (DNVP) and began to associate with influential political figures, gradually aligning himself with the National Socialist German Workers' Party. His connections in high society and business circles helped him gain a foothold within the Nazi Party.

By the late 1920s, Ribbentrop had established himself as a prominent member of the Nazi Party, known for his persuasive oratory and ambitious nature. In 1929, he was appointed the Nazi Party's foreign policy advisor, a critical role that allowed him to develop his diplomatic skills and contacts. Ribbentrop’s first significant diplomatic achievement was in 1934 when he negotiated a non-aggression pact with Poland. This agreement marked a turning point in Germany's foreign relations, leading to a temporary thaw in diplomatic ties. His success in this endeavor elevated his reputation within the party. In 1936, he was appointed as Germany’s ambassador to Great Britain, where he attempted to foster diplomatic relations and convince British leaders of Nazi Germany's intentions. In 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking over from Konstantin von Neurath. As Foreign Minister, he played a crucial role in shaping Nazi Germany’s foreign policy. He was a staunch advocate of aggressive expansionist policies and was instrumental in the signing of various pacts that would solidify Germany’s alliances, including the Munich Agreement, which allowed for the annexation of Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.

Molotov, born as Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Skryabin, came from a modest background and pursued education in law. He became politically active in the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in the early 20th century. After the October Revolution of 1917, he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party, gaining a reputation for his organizational skills and loyalty to the party line. In the 1920s, Molotov distinguished himself as an adept politician while serving in various government positions. He became a member of the Soviet government’s Council of People's Commissars and was appointed Chairman of the Council in 1930, effectively becoming the de facto head of the Soviet government. Molotov was instrumental in implementing the First Five-Year Plan, focusing on rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization, which laid the groundwork for the Soviet Union’s economic transformation. Molotov’s career in foreign affairs began to take shape in the 1930s. He was appointed as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1939, succeeding Maxim Litvinov. His appointment marked a significant shift in Soviet foreign policy, particularly as the regime sought to secure its borders and establish alliances. Molotov's early years in foreign affairs were characterized by a pragmatic approach to international relations driven by the Communist Party's ideological goals.

Ribbentrop sought to neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany by ensuring Soviet non-aggression, allowing Hitler to invade Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. The talks were conducted in secret and were characterized by mutual suspicion and a pragmatic approach to diplomacy. The Soviet leadership believed the pact would provide them with time to prepare for any future conflict with Germany, while Germany saw it as a means to secure its eastern flank. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The agreement contained several key provisions. Both parties pledged not to attack each other or support any attack against the other for the duration of the pact. The most significant aspect of the pact was a series of secret protocols that delineated spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. They agreed on the division of Poland and the Baltic States, with the Soviets expected to gain control over the eastern regions, while Germany would take the west. Both nations agreed to facilitate economic relations, exchanging raw materials for industrial goods, establishing a framework for cooperation beyond mere military non-aggression. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shocked the world. Many had expected the Soviet Union to align with Britain and France against Nazi aggression. You know who was the most shocked by this, the Empire of Japan.

Japan had been closely observing the rise of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union’s communism with a mix of admiration and apprehension. Both countries were seen as ideologically opposed; fascism and communism were expected to be at odds rather than collaborating. The signing of the pact indicated a surprising willingness from both powers to overlook their ideological differences for mutual benefit. For Japan, this was alarming, as it suggested that both nations might coordinate their actions, potentially threatening Japanese interests in Asia. Japan had been engaged in territorial conflicts with the Soviet Union, particularly during the late 1930s, such as the battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. The Pact effectively meant that the Soviet Union would not oppose German military actions, allowing for a more aggressive stance from Germany without fear of a two-front war. This left Japan vulnerable, as the Soviet Union could now focus its military efforts elsewhere, potentially leading to increased tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan had imperial ambitions in East Asia, particularly in China and the broader Pacific region. The Pact indicated that Germany and the Soviet Union were willing to agree upon spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, which could hint at future agreements in Asia as well. Japan had hoped for German support in its territorial expansions, particularly against the Soviet Union, which now seemed less likely. This realization prompted fears that Japan would face an increasingly isolated position as Germany cozied up to the Soviet Union.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact significantly shifted alliances and affected the dynamics of World War II. Japan was concerned that the weakening of Western powers relative to the strengthening of an Axis alliance, which included Germany and Italy, would lead to an intensifying race for dominance in Asia. Japan had been anticipating potential conflicts with Western powers, like the United States and Britain and worried that the Pact would embolden the Axis, making it harder to navigate its own imperial ambitions without facing coordinated opposition. In response to their shock and the evolving circumstances in Europe, Japan moved to solidify its own alliances. This led to the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, further entrenching itself in the Axis powers. However, Japan's initial reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was one of concern and recalibration of its foreign policy, as it reshaped their military and diplomatic strategies in the face of newly apparent threats. On May 22nd, Hitler and Mussolini made an irrevocable decision to unite their nations and their destinies. Their foreign ministers announced a formal military alliance, known as the “Pact of Steel.” But why did Germany and Italy join forces?

Both Germany and Italy were governed by fascist regimes led by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, respectively. Their shared ideology centered around nationalism, militarism, and anti-communism, promoting the idea of powerful, authoritarian states. This ideological alignment fostered a sense of camaraderie and mutual support, as both leaders viewed their fascist principles as a bulwark against the spread of communism, particularly the Soviet Union. Germany and Italy also had aggressive expansionist aspirations. Hitler aimed to establish German dominance in Europe, seeking Lebensraum for the German people, particularly in Eastern Europe. Mussolini, inspired by the Roman Empire, desired to build a new Italian Empire, particularly in Africa and the Mediterranean region. The Pact of Steel provided a framework for cooperation in achieving these expansionist goals. It signified a commitment to support each other militarily in their respective pursuits.

In the years leading up to the war, both Germany and Italy faced increasing diplomatic isolation from the major Western powers, primarily Britain and France. Their attempts to expand their influence were met with opposition, pushing them closer together. The Pact was a response to this isolation, signaling a united front against Western democracies. By establishing a formal alliance, they aimed to strengthen their position and deter any potential intervention from Britain and France. The Pact of Steel included provisions for military cooperation, emphasizing mutual assistance in times of war and coordination in military strategy. This military alignment was crucial for both countries, as they sought to bolster their armed forces and enhance their military capabilities. Joint military planning and support were expected to give them an edge in any forthcoming conflicts. The Spanish Civil War also highlighted the necessity of military collaboration between Italy and Germany. Both countries intervened in support of Francisco Franco's Nationalists, sharing resources and strategies. Their involvement in Spain solidified their military partnership and demonstrated the benefits of cooperation, further paving the way for the Pact of Steel. The aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles had left Germany humiliated, while Italy felt denied the territorial gains promised to it after the war. Their shared grievances and the desire to overturn the post-World War I order created a foundation for their alliance, as both sought revenge and restoration of their national pride. Although this alliance would later prove to be a detrimental partnership, causing significant suffering for both sides, it was initially viewed positively as Hitler demonstrated to the Allies and the Soviet Union that he was ready for a full-scale war. Throughout the summer, there were ongoing discussions between the Soviets and Germans regarding a possible agreement. At the same time, the Japanese intensified their pressure on the Soviet Union in the Far East. By June, the Battle of Khalkin Gol was escalating, significantly raising tensions as the Soviets were resolute in their stance. Although the situation in the east remained tense by late July, it quickly stabilized. General Zhukov then finalized the details of the meticulously planned battle he had been preparing throughout the summer.

At this time, trade negotiations with Germany were reinitiated, with the understanding that a successful agreement could significantly impact the situation in Poland. Time was of the essence for everyone involved. Hitler had instructed the Wehrmacht to be ready to commence operations by September 1st. Britain and France had already pledged to defend Poland against Germany, yet their governments were still grappling with how to implement this commitment effectively. During this period, General Gamelin suggested that the French Army would be prepared to advance across the Rhine into Germany around September 16th. The British Army remained too small to play a substantial role in ground operations, but plans for a naval blockade against Germany were being developed. These plans were essentially reruns of the plans of the first world war. The Royal Navy’s blockade in that war had been effective, and the surface fleet of the Kreigsmarine was not the threat that the Imperial High Seas Fleet had been. The urgency of the situation was clear to all parties. Ultimately, Britain and France sent a military mission to coordinate with the Red Army’s leaders and establish a unified plan of action. However, they were too slow, lacked understanding of the vast country’s security needs, and were not willing to make the concessions Stalin required.

Hitler did not embody any of these characteristics. Discussions between the ambassadors and foreign ministers of the two dictatorships were progressing, with neither party eager to be the first to reach a decisive moment. By August 19, the Soviets had presented the German Ambassador with the preliminary terms of a non-aggression pact. This agreement was finalized with minimal alterations by August 23. The Allied military mission reacted with disbelief upon hearing the news. They informed their governments and began their journey back home. The non-aggression pact would later be referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after the foreign ministers of the two nations. At the time, a secret additional protocol was not disclosed. On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares; its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Despite the intense diplomatic efforts during the summer of 1939, the Soviet Union was readying itself to confront the Nazi regime in a life-and-death struggle. Soviet rearmament initiatives outlined in the five-year plans were designed to prepare the nation for a potentially devastating war with Germany. These plans were not yet finalized, and as noted, the modernization of the Soviet military was still in progress in 1939. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was viewed not as a lasting peace but as a strategy to buy time and create space to fortify the Western borders of Stalin's empire. Similarly, Hitler was focused on his own western boundaries, where he faced France and the UK.

Although this motivation was present, Stalin's Great Purge complicated these efforts and was partially driven by them. The purge was based on an alleged conspiracy in which high-ranking state and military officials were thought to be collaborating with the Nazis. A significant aspect of this conspiracy involved Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was accused of conspiring with the Wehrmacht to overthrow Stalin and undermine the Soviet Union's defenses. This conspiracy theory was never substantiated, and Tukhachevsky was officially cleared of wrongdoing in 1957. This happened under the so-called “Khrushchev thaw” that happened after Khrushchev took power following Stalin’s death. This program was designed to ease internal tension after the years of terror under the former leader. Tukhachevsky was just one of millions of Stalin’s purge victims to be officially rehabilitated. 

Nevertheless, there was considerable internal tension in the Soviet Union throughout the late 1930s regarding German interference. For Hitler, meddling in Soviet internal affairs was appealing, but instead of investing time, money, and resources to support potential plotters, he chose to let Stalin's paranoia escalate. The Nazi leadership recognized the purge's impact on the Red Army and allowed it to proceed. In fact, Hitler's famous misjudgment of the Soviet Union's resilience partly stemmed from overemphasizing reports regarding the damage inflicted on the state and military by the purges. Alongside this was reports from the Winter War with Finland that indicated to Hitler that the Red Army was a paper tiger. His remarks on the eve of Operation Barbarossa summarize his thoughts perfectly: “We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.” The Nazi government never denied its involvement in the purported conspiracy, and this silence only fueled the speculation. The most tangible involvement from Hitler's regime came not from his direct orders but from one of his subordinates, Reinhard Heydrich. Heydrich was one of the most notorious SS men in the entire Nazi regime. He organized Kristallnacht, the Einsatzgruppen death squads, and is considered the architect of the Final Solution. He became head of the SD or SicherheittsDienste, which was the intelligence office of the SS and was responsible as the principal non-military intelligence agency in the Nazi regime. At the Nuremberg trials, they were declared to be a criminal organization alongside the Gestapo. Their leader at the end of the War, Ernst Kaltenbrunner was hanged as a war criminal in 1946. As head of the SD, Heydrich created documents that implicated Tukhachevsky and others and ensured they were seized by the NKVD. The NKVD or People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs was the security and secret police agency of the Soviet Union until its evolution into two different agencies in the late 1940s. The NKVD was responsible for many crimes, including the majority of the extra-judicial killings of Stalin’s purge. They are also responsible for the infamous Katyn Massacre and thousands of incidents of murder throughout the war. It remains unclear how much, if at all, Stalin relied on these documents in his decision-making regarding the purge.

Hitler was also in the midst of a purge, though it was less violent and extensive than the one occurring in the Soviet Union. Sixteen Wehrmacht generals were retired, and Hitler assumed control of the OKW, the unified general staff for the entire German military. This non-violent purge ousted then-War Minister General von Blomberg and the Army's commander-in-chief, General von Fritsch. General von Blomberg was retired in disgrace over allegations that his new wife was a former prostitute. He sat out the entire war. He eventually testified at the Nuremberg trials, but was not charged.

Both men opposed Hitler’s complete control over the military and had expressed disagreements with his policy of provoking the British and French, fearing that such confrontations could lead to a war Germany could not win. They were joined by several other senior Wehrmacht leaders. Many of these individuals continued to support Hitler after the diplomatic successes of 1938 and the military victories of 1939. This is not to overlook the Oster plot, which implicated dozens of senior officers but failed to go through with any action. As well, the 20 July Plot of 1944 also involved many senior officers but few if any of the conspirator’s escaped punishment or suicide in the aftermath of that coup attempt. This reshuffle did not reach the scale of Stalin’s purges, primarily because Hitler recognized the potential military consequences of such an initiative. The total Nazification of the Wehrmacht was a more gradual process aimed at systematically eliminating politically unreliable officers while trying to win over those who could be bribed. In fact, bribery of Army generals became a formal, though unofficial, policy in 1940.

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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shocked the entire world. In many ways it came about because of numerous failures between many nations trying to find a way to thwart Germany’s aggressive actions. Ironically in the end the pact would prove to be a tool that Germany would use to enact the war in the east.